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ABSTRACT
THE NATION AND NATIONALISM
FEBRUARY 1999
HENRY C. THERIAULT
B.A., PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackermann
The recent surge in academic theorizing of the nation and nationalism has made it
difficult to isolate the actual phenomena from their constructions as objects of theory.
This is all the more difficult because most contemporary theories are grounded in
unacknowledged political agendas that to a significant extent generate the theories
independently of the phenomena.
Chapter 1 focuses on "antinational-ist" theories of the nation — theories that deny
the reality of nations or fundamentally delegitimate them as retrogressive or inherently
oppressive political forms. Such a theory rejects the nation primarily because it is
inconsistent with the theorist's uncritically assumed political ideology.
In Chapter 2, 1 examine theories that do not reject the nation, but rather control its
form -- again in line with a particular political agenda or ideology. Such a theory allows
the reality and/or legitimacy of nations, but only (1) after theoretically misconstruing
them as consistent with (and possibly servants of) the theorist's specific ideology or
(2) by limiting approval to only those nations that are in line with this ideology. I stress
the important practical consequences of this: when backed by powerful institutions and
forces, such a theory of the nation supports the coerced transformation of minor or post-
colonial nations to fit it.
These critiques expose the complexities of nations and nationalisms that most
theories fail to register, due to their limiting assumptions. In Chapter 3, I develop an
account of the nation sufficiently comprehensive to capture this complexity. Perhaps
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most importantly, my account does not reduce the nation to just one type of social force,
political relation, identity characteristic, narrative structure, or "false consciousness" -
which virtually all other theories do. All "unity" associated with the nation is partial: any
presumed universal unity is always cut by gaps or discontinuities. A nation exists where
the discontinuities are bridged by some alternate connector, by another type of relation
I then consider the relationship of nation to race, gender, and sexuality, as well as
to state and ethnicity. Finally, I develop a novel concept of national "self-determination"
as conceptual self-definition, not territorial control.
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INTRODUCTION
The contemporary era of "serious" theorization of the nation and nationalism can
be said to have started in the early 1980s. In 1983, Benedict Anderson published
Imagined Communities and Ernest Gellner published Nations and Nationalism
,
both of
which not only became immensely studied, but also marked a point at which the idea of
theorizing the nation entered the mainstream academy as a worthy focal project. In that
same year, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger also published The Invention of
Tradition, the influential forerunner of Hobsbawm's later Nations and Nationalism Since
1780 [1992], Yes, there were "important" theories long before, such as Kedourie's,
Deutsche's, and especially Hroch's — as well as Seton-Watson's rejection of the
possibility of arriving at a final coherent theory of the nation — but these did not inspire
the formation of a "field" of study, with conferences, anthologies, journals, and important
personages, as well as a unified academic framework into which divergent theories and
the conceptual frames and political agendas grounding them could be fit and managed.
Though some even today bemoan the paucity of theoretical work on the nation
[see, for instance, Chatteijee, 1993a: xi] 1
,
John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith much
more accurately represent the situation in the preface to the anthology Nationalism [1994]
they edited. There they apologize for the "highly selective" nature of their text - which
includes excepts from roughly 40 different authors -- the academic "field [of] nations and
nationalism" is "so vast" and "expanding at an exponential rate" that anything more than
a highly selective representation is not possible. The vastness is not merely a matter of
volume, but of diversity as well. Theories have been advanced from a wide range of
fields, from history, to political science, to economics, to literary studies, to cultural
'Page references will be given in brackets throughout the dissertation. The first time a work is referenced
in a series of references to the same work, the name(s) of the author(s) will appear, followed by the year of
publication for the edition cited and the referenced page number(s). If some ot this information is given in
the narrative, then only what is not given will appear in brackets. In cases in which references appear to
more than one work by an author or authors, the year will distinguish which publication is referenced, he
subsequent references to this work within the series will contain just the referenced page number(s) in
brackets. When a work is re-introduced after another work or other works have been referenced, the initial
reference of the series will again be in the full form.
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studies, to anthropology, to philosophy, to sociology, and so forth, and from a wide range
of perspectives : Marxist, liberal, postmodern, republican, cosmopolitan, industrial,
feminist, and so forth. [Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: v]
But, things might not be as they appear. For, even as Hutchinson and Smith
indicate the vastness of the field, they find its object -- nationalist phenomena — much
more vast, such that we have only just begun to organize and approach it. Relatively
speaking, little has been written on the nation. And, perhaps a more complicated
meaning sits behind the words of the ever-incisive Chatterjee. Perhaps his measure of the
level to which the nation is "untheorized" is not the volume of pages devoted to
theorization but the number of distinct and penetrating ideas regarding the nation that
inhabit the pages.
The issue, then, is not why so little has been written, but why the immense
amount that has been written has told us so little.
Chatterjee offers significant help almost immediately, by emphasizing the
presence in the dominant theories of nationalism of the workings of new-colonial forces,
conceptual frames, and agendas [Chatterjee, 1993b: 1 - 35]. This recognition of the
political (and economic, military, etc.) context and role of theories of the nation and
nationalism is crucial.
Anderson recognizes that the ideologies of liberalism and Marxism had produced
inadequate theories of the nation/nationalism [Anderson, 1992: 4]. He rejects the
"Ptolemaic effort[s]" to produce liberal or Marxist theories of the nation that resolve -
through extravagant twists, turns, allowances, exceptions, etc. — the limiting conceptual
frame accompanying either ideology with the readily observable phenomena that seemed
quite often and in significant ways at odds with the conceptual frames themselves. He
calls instead for a "reorientation of perspective in ... a Copernican spirit" that would shift
starting point from ideology to phenomena. He attempts in his own work to produce such
a theory, though the entanglements of ideology (particularly post-colonial colonialist)
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proved much more difficult to break out of than he has anticipated. Still, his recognition
of the problem and his attempt put him in a separate class from the pure ideologues who
yet dominate the field.
His failure, perhaps, results from his failure to appreciate the fundamentally
political nature of academic theorization itself, though he wrote after Said - let us not
forget that Anderson is an Orientalist himself - and Foucault. It is not just a matter of
dismissing "incorrect" theories that are the result of inadequate thought and adherence to
prejudice. Contrary to the claims of Socrates and Plato, this type of error does not
produce bad (oppressive) politics, but rather is the latter's symptom. And these forms of
oppressive politics are not merely represented in academia: their presence and
functioning in academia is fundamentally linked with their presence and functioning in
politics, economics, militaries, etc.
What is more, these forms themselves are interwoven in complex ways with the
form and development of actual nations, nationalisms, and states. Inaccurate theories are
not merely so, but the inaccuracy has concrete effects and causes. Understanding the
nation is not simply a matter of getting beyond such theories, for they are tied up with,
even part of, the object of study, in both their direct and indirect effects. Not only are the
theories taken as bases, legitimation, and justifications by national and anti-national
forces, but they are also resisted and reacted against in their concrete forms.
Far from floating above their objects of study, on a wholly distinct plane of
existence, as Anderson assumes, theorists of the nation are mired in their objects. It is not
just a matter of adjusting theories to reflect a new perspective on "independent data."
This requires political as well as intellectual transformation. We might even say that the
latter depends on the former.
The naive but dominant concept of academic theorizing is that expert, objective
scholars study social or natural phenomena and develop theories, speculations, and
models by disinterested analyses of them. The scholar pursues truth, only limited by
3
his/her ability and by any features of the phenomenon under study that make analysis
inherently difficult. As more and more studies are produced -- becoming bases for further
research — and as the methods and technologies of study improve (in social sciences and
liberal arts, better information systems; in physical sciences, better instruments of data
gathering and processing), the phenomena are understood better and better. Of course,
this may mean that they become more complex, the questions asked more difficult and
subtle, as new aspects appear (gender-based social analysis, subatomic particles, etc.).
But, improvements are made.
A sophisticated scholar — one with a deep sensitivity to and understanding of
social and political issues2 - recognizes the naivete of this concept. Scholars do not exist
outside a world of social, political, and economic forces, but are subject to and agents of
them as much as anyone else.
Yet, the pretension still predominates. Some scholars recognize the compromised
nature of the work of others, as a means of asserting their own purity. Julien Benda, in
The Treason ofthe Intellectuals [1928], commits the error of believing that the academy
was pure and unsullied by worldly agendas until the rise of nationalism, communism, and
fascism. He seems oblivious to the fact that the Western Academy was for much of its
history an ideological mouthpiece for and indeed subsection of one of the most powerful
social formations yet known — the Catholic Church. Even Plato worked for a king for
many years, and Aristotle tutored a conqueror. The academy has always been
fundamentally compromised by complicity with the forces that be. That Benda claims
otherwise is a master-stroke of mystification in the service of ideology.
The necessity of interest on the part of the academy is not a disease, an intrusion
to be opposed and minimized as far as possible. On the contrary, it is the very thing in
which the possibility of deep meaning in the academy inheres. For, with the danger of
2This goes for the physical scientists, too -- especially those involved in military technology,
pharmaceuticals, oil geology, etc., but development of this point is beyond the scope of this work and my
expertise.
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academic complicity in oppression comes the potential of academic opposition to it. And
this potential has been, at certain times and in certain places, courageously pursued.
Indeed, most likely at every university everywhere, at some point some scholar has been
or is resisting.
The great danger is that interested scholarship is systematically presented as and
consumed as if it were disinterested
,
as if the claims made, the facts presented were
simply true, or the simple attempt to achieve the truth, however elusive. The greater the
pretensions to "objectivity," the greater should be one's wariness.
Yet, these are honest pretensions. That is, the scholar truly believes that he/she is
pursuing truth. There are three types of "honest" intellectual errors: mistakes due to
lapses of thought or lack of thoroughness, errors determined by limits on the available
information and processing, and errors based on the limits ofthe theorist's conceptual
frame or ideology. This last error is all the more insidious for being honest.
It is the last type of error that will be the focus of the first two chapters of this
dissertation. I will treat it in both its political and intellectual aspects - that is, I will
examine its ideological grounding and political consequences, while also analyzing the
ways that ideology limits conceptual possibilities and produces inaccurate analyses and
models.
At the same time that theories of the nation have proliferated out of control — that
too much has been written on the nation, rather than not enough — theorists have
capitalized on the monopoly rights of academia on determining what constitutes
legitimate theorizing. Eric Hobsbawm need not waste his time with "nationalist"
historians, who self-evidently cannot and should not be taken seriously, because they
cannot be agents in the process of understanding the nation, but at best part of the object
itself [Hobsbawm, 1992: 1 1-12]. This exclusion, adopted widely throughout "the
literature," completes the general consolidation of academic control over what is said and
believed about the nation and nationalism — a control that itself depends on a continuing
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significant (but not total, which would be resisted by both the power-hungry self-
interested and by the truly principled) reflection within academia of the political and
economic forces and parties in power in the wider world.
The result is profound: the "actual phenomena" of the nation and nationalism
have been displaced by an over-abundance of theories about them which leaves no room
for them even as these theories obscure them and an academic "hot-house" formation is
substituted. This is not a once-and-for-all shift, but a continuing process that endlessly
displaces the actual phenomena. The nation and nationalism themselves, in academic
theorizing of them, as well as to some extent in their actualforms, have become
academically generated. Theorists from Liah Greenfeld to John Breuilly to Hobsbawm to
Anderson are fond of stressing intellectuals as the well-springs of nationalisms; the irony
is that they -- disinterested scholars — are implicated just as much if not more in what the
nation and nationalism "are" for us. As I will discuss — particularly with regard to
Greenfeld — this is far from a tautology.
Fortunately, academia is not a monolith, not a "big individual" without deep-
running internal currents and tensions. This is the seat of my hope and the condition of
my writing. Within it, there is always the possibility of genuine approaches to the nation.
After a tradition of challenges to the colonialist roots and tendencies of academia
culminating in Said's Orientalism [1979], the Western academy performed the tactical
retreat of allowing some voices from the colonized and post-colonized world into it. And
occasionally other voices come up, usually from outside the dominant groups in the
United States and Western Europe. Resistance does break through, as the successes of
feminism(s) in academia over the past three decades attest.
Thus, that Anderson's naively presumed direct return to the phenomena is not
possible does not mean that no worthwhile approach is available. To understand the
nation it is possible — and necessary, both politically and philosophically - to begin by
engaging the theories that predominate. As should be clear by now, this is not just a
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matter of prudent scholarly method, that is, of learning what has been said of the
"objectified" subject matter before venturing one's own opinion. Nor is it a matter of
paying academic tolls on the way to legitimacy. Rather, the theories themselves, even as
their theorists almost uniformly presume a perspective above and beyond their objects,
are part of the object itself, part creator and part prison guard. I enter with the intent of
liberating as much as understanding.
Though one has the possibility of learning from these theories, and building on
them, this is not a voluntary choice. The only "freedom" one has is the attitude with
which one approaches them. As I have already stated, I adopt a critical attitude. This is
necessary in order to engage the theories/theorists themselves at a level as deep as the one
on which they claim to engage the nation. Given the nature of these theories, in most
cases it will become ideological critique, that is, exposure and analysis of the conceptual
frames and political/intellectual agendas that have a powerful influence on -- even
generative role in — the theories produced.
In some sense, this means beginning with the nation and nationalism not as
empirical facts (or widespread delusions), but as an "object" of theory, that is, simply as a
term that has been/is being conceptualized, analyzed, theorized, defined. This is not to
suggest that the nation is unreal apart from its construction in theory, but rather in order
(1) to emphasize that the "construction" of the "nation" (or "nationalism") is not an
activity limited to ideologues of this or that national movement or nation (or state), but
extends quite fully to theorists who theorize the nation from positions external to a
nation/nationalism (ostensibly "objective" positions), (2) to emphasize also that academic
theorization of the nation has become so extensive, comprehensive, and institutionalized
in the form of an academic "field" that it is no longer possible for even "nationalists" to
perceive or conceptualize nations without mediation through at least some part of the
broad array of theories, 3 and (3) to avoid misleading initial references to the nation form
3This is not to say that these theories are not dependent to a surprising and unacknowledged degree on the
theoretical work of "nationalists" themselves. Nor is it to suggest that this engagement is necessarily
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that would belie the theoretical complexity that will emerge: because "the literature"
does not provide a conceptual framework adequate to theorizing the nation and attendant
concepts in their actual complexity and richness, I must work through the process of
critique to develop such a framework myself. This is a difficult process, because the
concepts/frames developed in the literature have been elevated to the status of
assumptions (if conflicting). Fortunately, this type of challenge is not without precedent,
even in the field of nation-theorization. 4 Again, this process is not simply about
dispensing with compromised conceptual frames, in favor of direct apprehension of pure
data.
Exploring the objectification of the nation is not, of course, an assertion of the
passive nature of the object. This "object" is not passive: it is always already talking
back. In these pages, it will use my voice, though I have no pretense to being a
spokesperson for nationalism generally, or even a specific nation. But, as "theory" has
become object, so does "the object" become the agent of theory.
At the Risk of Marginalizing Mvself
This said, it is important that I attempt to be clear about my own reasons for
writing on the nation, in other words, my agenda. In November 1992, 1 attended the
National Association for Armenian Studies and Research's annual membership meeting.
A retired Harvard Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations professor, Richard Nelson
Frye, delivered the keynote address. He stressed the importance of Armenian Studies,
that is, of studying Armenian culture and history. His own specialty was medieval Near
Eastern languages.
He ended his talk by condemning the "foolish ethnic conflict" (to paraphrase)
between Armenians and Azeris and Turks that was then reaching a crescendo in
passive
,
or has been so historically. That "nationalists" must engage the academic field of what we might
call nationalism studies does not mean that they cannot take a critical attitude toward it.
4
Especially the work of Chatterjee and Hroch.
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Karabakh. He dismissed it all as irrational and needlessly destructive, and expressed the
hope that more reasonable people in each group would prevail and end the bloodshed.
It did not occur to him -- a scholar - that the nationalism he was dismissing might
be more than simple irrationality. It did not occur to him - a historian - to try to
understand the causes of the "foolish bloodshed." From his chair at Harvard, he felt
qualified to judge it and dismiss it.
I was angered by his self-righteous rejection of Armenian struggle, and
recognized it as typical of the reactions of Western academics to national movements.
What made it much worse was the unexpected reaction of his predominantly Armenian
audience. There was loud applause and full agreement. The audience seemed oblivious
to the fact that this man had delegitimized an Armenian national struggle against groups
that had a long, genocidal history of oppressing Armenians. That Frye, from his
comfortable chair at Harvard, where no one ever challenged his right to exist, home,
values, or belief system, saw fit to judge negatively such a struggle was at the least
predictable; that his Ajmenian audience embraced his judgment was deeply disturbing.
I thought a great deal after that about why this had happened. I concluded that the
sentiment against national movements - particularly of small and oppressed nations -
predominant in Western political, academic, and press circles had penetrated even into
the American Armenian community. There are complex social causes behind this
penetration, which I will explore in general terms below, in my consideration of the
concept of "identity." But the basic features are clear: at least some Armenians had
given up their own agency in self-conception, and were instead perceiving themselves
through this externally produced sentiment.
This was in part a function of "Armenian Studies" itself. Through the
development of Armenian Studies, Armenia and Armenians had become an object of
study. Through its practice, scholars had become used to applying other ideas and
methods to Armenia, and Armenians adopted as their goal the study ofthings Armenian.
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In the process, they seem to have forgotten that being an object of study is at best
worthless and at worst oppressive, if it is not coupled with active agency in the process of
study. Through it, things Armenian become just one more item on the multi-cultural
academic menu, to be consumed at the pleasure of those who have agency. Armenians
lose influence even over what they are as objects.
Through this process, "agency" has been more and more reduced to the
importation of concepts developed without reference to Armenians, for application to
things Armenian
.
5 The issue is not that the concepts are "external" to some presumed
Armenian "essence"; it is, rather, that their use imposes the passivity of Armenian
objects. Even in cases where the concepts are interesting and their application
productive, the use is still damaging if they are imported without an understanding of the
context from which they are coming and into which they are being thrust, and the power
relations between these. With negative concepts of nationalism such as Frye's, the effects
are that much more devastating.
My reaction to Frye's remarks and their reception by his audience has become this
dissertation. It is motivated by the need to restore to Armenians and other oppressed
groups engaging in national struggle a frame of reference through which to understand
their nation that is not tainted by simplistic antinational-ism developed without the least
sensitivity to the history and political realities of the oppressed — while at the same time
engaging nationalism in all its complexity.
My perspective is "Armenian," but my intention is not to bracket off Armenian
history and politics from the general academy, reserving them for analysis by properly
"Armenian" theorists, justified by some sort of cultural relativism. It is about creating an
Armenian presence within the general theoretical complex that is applied to Armenian as
well as other nationalisms.
5For instance, Ronald Suny uncritically adopts in full measure Benedict Anderson's problematic concept of
the nation as the basis of his description of contemporary diasporan Armenia [Suny, 1993],
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This does not mean simply "getting into the club," that is, being included as
legitimate. It is about calling others to account for the effects of their theories - which
are their actions — on Armenians (and others). It is about analyzing them, about making
these effects clear and challenging them. It is about affecting those in the "club."
Such a challenge cannot help but transcend Armenian issues. There is no way to
bracket off the effects of the dominant complex of theories of the nation and nationalism
on Armenia from their effects on other marginalized and oppressed groups. First and
foremost, my own work has been greatly influenced by the work of others, engaged in
other struggles. Further, the issues of different groups correspond and interlock, and the
theories themselves reverberate throughout the world. To take up the issue of
antinational-ism as it affects Armenians is to take up the issue as it affects all subjected to
it and all who benefit from it. It is to theorize the nation and nationalism in general.
This is a proper Armenian agency - to escape ghetto-ization, and to engage the
nation and nationalism throughout the world. It means participating in the world,
contributing to it. It means giving something to the world - besides rugs and ethnic
dishes -- that has a use globally. My hope is that this study will resonate with the
struggles of others on the margins, and prove as useful to them as their ideas and
experiences have to me. My ultimate goal is to create a theory of the nation that is
universally relevant and at the same time Armenian, without pretension to a universal
perspective. This is neither meant to universalize Armenian experience as a model, nor to
ghettoize it as a derivative type: rather, it is meant to bring it into play as an active
participant in an unfolding philosophical, political, and historical (narrative).
This "globalization" of Armenian struggle carries with it the obvious
responsibility of not replicating the imperial attitude of those at the core of the Western
academy. It means challenging what should be challenged, and objectifying that which
objectifies, but not reinforcing the objectification of the subjugated. Such an agency must
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appreciate the specific forms of their marginality even where it does not coincide with
Armenia s. It must attain agency without oppressing
.
6
For those who would, with Hobsbawm, use my honesty about my own political
positioning and agenda as justification for marginalizing my work as that of a
"nationalist" with a limited perspective and range of concerns, I stress that my
"Armenian" perspective is no more inherently narrow than the Marxism of Hobsbawm
himself, the liberalism of Kedourie, Breuilly, and too many others; or the "Americanism"
of Greenfeld. Indeed, I would hope that the self-reflective way I will approach the nation
will actually prove my work superior to such theorists, at least on this count. Having a
minoritarian perspective is not a limit, but the possibility of seeing beyond the default
limits of the majority.
Structural Synopsis
The dissertation is divided into three chapters. In the first, I critique theories of
the nation that might be called "anti-national." These theories attempt to delegitimize the
nation politically and even metaphysically, generally through imposition of a reductive
concept and in the service with a competing political agenda. In the second chapter, I
engage theories that attempt to regulate and exploit the actual phenomena of nations and
nationalism through imposition of a constrictive and ideologically tainted concept, again
in line with some type of social/political agenda. As part of these critiques, I develop a
conceptual framework that grounds a fuller, more comprehensive grasp of the complexity
of the nation and attendant terms, both as concepts and as determinate social formations.
In the process of critique, specific parts of a final theory emerge, which I develop in full
in the third chapter. This chapter transcends the critique form: it is structured around the
various conceptual issues that a comprehensive, adequate theory of the nation must work
through.
b
In contrast to the "Franco-Universalism" that rose during the French Revolution and became a justification
for Napoleon's conquests.
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CHAPTER 1
ANTINATIONAL-ISM
In the past decade in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, "communism" has
fallen and nationalism has risen as a central political force replacing it — both as a force
legitimating existing newly formed states and their boundaries, and one opposing them.
With this fall and rise, discussion of the "nation" and "nationalism" has pervaded public
discourse, including the popular press, academia, and government policy discussions.
Two prevailing tendencies have emerged in this discourse. First, "progressive"
political theorists in academia have extended the tradition of antinational-ism 1 that has
been so significant in Marxist and other progressive political analysis and theory of the
past 1 50 years. The thrust of this form of antinational-ism has been to consider national
movement a retrogressive form of politics, one that detracts from genuine social and
political development and is given to violence and oppression.
The second tendency has been to valorize the interstate order, as institutionalized
in recognized nation-state boundaries, in the face of what is considered the disruptive
force of re- and newly emergent nationalism. The "resurgence" of (separatist and
irredentism) nationalism threatens to undermine the post-Cold War order that has
emerged, which is seen as the proper culmination of liberal-capitalist historical
development.
These tendencies differ significantly. "Progressive" theories are the intellectual
base of left-oriented advocates and agents for social change. "Progressive" attitudes
toward the nation, which show up in the so-called "liberal" press, the rhetoric of left-
leaning political organizations, and so forth, seem to originate in the academy, and
expand out into the more general (well educated) left circles in the United States and
Western Europe. On the other hand, liberal-statist attitudes toward the nation do not
Opposition to anything "national," as differentiated from "anti-nationalism," that is, opposition to
"nationalism,” taken in its negative sense.
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seem to originate within the academy, but more within the realm of "realpolitik" public
policy - in diplomatic and military circles, for instance. These attitudes, of course, are
reflected in the academy, but their real bases are found in the popular xenophobic
movements that appear a constant companion of advanced industrial development.
Another difference is that "progressive" theorists agitate against the status quo
state order, and often against the state system in principle, while liberal-statist policy
makers seek to consolidate the current status quo state order. These policy makers are
drawn from the broad range of those involved in "First World" governmental and quasi-
govemmental activities, as well as the elites of many "Second" and "Third World" states.
If one considers these two tendencies generally, then, they appear as two political
camps in opposition to each other. Indeed, within the rhetoric of the "left" side,
"nationalism" is another face of all the other "isms" through which the essence of the
liberal-statist "right" manifests itself; while, within the rhetoric of liberal-statism,
"nationalism" is the latest "foreign threat" that has "us" in danger, replacing
"communism," the heretofore ultimate threat from the "left." "Nationalism," like
communism, feminism, (/non-Christian) "religious fundamentalism," and so forth, is yet
another irrational disrupter of the ultimate rational organization of society that has been
achieved or shortly will be.
Yet, these two tendencies have much in common. Both see current national
separatist struggles as retrogressive, undermining positive social development. One
portrays the current proliferation of national struggles and nationalisms as the re-
emergence of social forces that should have been superseded in the dialectical
development of history, and the other as the resurgence of irrational -- even "evil" —
forces that have risen to undermine the rational development of history toward the best
possible human (liberal 2 ) society.
2 Liberal in the original sense of the term, that is, within the atomic-individualist, rights-based tradition of
Locke and Mill.
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Indeed, more than sharing a similar perception of separatist nationalisms, these
two "opponents" actually complement each other, functioning together as a unified front
against truly progressive national struggle
.
3 A separatist movement opposing a state
government is generally not embraced by progressive forces in opposition to that
government, but is, on the contrary, often actively excluded from the ranks of
"legitimate" oppositional groups.
What is more, each side has great efficacy in its anti-national activities. For
instance, so powerful is the first side that Armenians in Karabakh are frequently
portrayed in the left-leaning "alternative press" as misguided or even xenophobic
"aggressors" who seek dominance over land that should be shared as the hallowed ground
of a multinational state. So powerful is the second side that Armenians fighting a war
of national and individual survival in the face of nationalist oppression by the Azeri
Turks - fully within the Turkish tradition of antiArmenian-ism and genocide1 - appear to
the "world community" as nationalist insurgents against a benign state power, as the
willful disrupters of a peaceful order.
Whatever the merits of the principles explicitly invoked in the rhetoric, each
discourse actuallyfunctions to allow oppressor to appear as liberator, and progressive
political movement to appear as regressive and oppressive. What is more, these two
discourses become all the more potent because they are in sync — they have caught
Armenians, Kurds, Palestinians, and many others in a crossfire that appears to be a
serious debate between rival political agendas, but is in fact the mere show of opposition.
Within the debate as framed, between progressive and liberal-statist political forces, the
non-state nation is locked out. Indeed, the exclusion of national struggle under all
circumstances appears the precondition of the contemporary political "dichotomy"
3As well as, certainly, against nationalisms in the negative sense.
“Beginning in 1915, and under cover of World War 1, the Ottoman Turkish government planned and then
executed the genocide of its Armenian subjects. Over 1 million of the 2 million Armenians were killed,
and most of the rest scattered about the world. To this day, the Turkish government denies that this
genocide occurred.
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present in industrially advanced countries. For those in separatist struggles, neither a
progressive nor a liberal-statist" agenda is a valid option.
Though these discourses do not share a complete monopoly position in academia,
they are prevalent and immensely influential. They even tend to influence interpretations
of theories that are not in themselves "antinational-ist": for instance, quite often Benedict
Anderson's "imagined communities," which are genuine social formations constructed
through materially influenced ideal processes, become nationalist delusions without basis
in fact.
Marxist Antinational-ism
Eric Hobsbawm's Nations and Nationalism Since 1 789: Programme, Myth,
Reality [1992] is an explicitly "anti-national" work. Hobsbawm initiates his analysis of
the nation and nationalism by claiming that "nationalists" are inherently deluded [10]. He
then develops a case showing (1) that the nation is not a genuine social formation, but
rather a constructed or forced delusion or imposition and (2) throughout its 200 year
history, nationalism has mutated from an originally revolutionary, socially progressive
political ideology, to a more and more oppressive and destructive one. He concludes his
book by celebrating the indications that nationalism is in decline, and will wane in
influence in the coming years. This sentiment appears based on the historical facts he
presents and his analysis of them. Is it justified? That is, does Hobsbawm's analysis
support it?
According to Hobsbawm, the nation is not an organic social formation, but is,
rather, in the first instance an ideal object of a "nationalism," that is, a political movement
with the establishment of a state corresponding to a given nation as its goal [9 - 10]. This
goal is used to guide the political aspirations of inhabitants of a geographical region or
existing state around the interests of the purveyors of the national idea, "governments and
ruling classes" [89], Thus, nations were/are "constructed essentially from above" [10].
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Even where a political state is achieved, however, it will not correspond to the
proposed nation. The nation is a fiction that imposes a reductively unifying concept on a
diverse social reality of differentiated, distinct classes and other diversities [see, for
instance, 91 - 92]. This concept has often been made to fit by eliminating socially
distinct groups through deportation or genocide [156]. The nation appears real only in
the symbols and traditions created or manipulated by governments and ruling elites,
which make an ideal, "imagined" — not real — community appear concretely present [71 -
72], These symbols become the icons of a "patriotism" that is a "civic religion" [85; see
also 172 - 173]. To understand social reality, Hobsbawm routinely turns to class, as in
his analysis of the apparent "nationalism" of working-class soldiers during World War I
[126 - 130],
Certainly Hobsbawm's contention that nations are constructions misrepresenting
actual social relations is not unfounded, and through it, he makes an important
contribution to the study of nations and issues a warning especially important for those
engaged in national struggle. Some "nations," as conceived by a nationalism and even as
constructed in the actual social world, are essentially misconstruals or deformations of
social reality precisely in the manner Hobsbawm describes. But, that this is true in some
cases does not mean that it is true in all. Not all, nor even most, social formations labeled
"nations" can be reduced to such top-down manipulative constructions.
Reynaldo Clemena Ileto's stunning analysis of popular movements in the
Philippines, Pasyon and Revolution [1979], is a powerful counterexample to Hobsbawm's
model. Ileto shows that the driving force in Philippine anti-colonial national movements
from 1840 to 1910 was the peasantry. The elite segments of Philippine society resisted
the anti-colonial nationalist movements, which eventually destabilized the Spanish
government which withdrew in 1898. In later, post-American occupation Philippines, the
elites have rewritten their role in history, to present themselves as the original liberators
of the Philippines.
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Things are not, then, as they would appear to Hobsbawm. In the case of the
Philippines, rather than imposing a nation on the peasants, the elites ultimately
appropriated the nation that the peasants had created. The elites certainly misconstrued
history, but they did so in order to capture a nation produced through the efforts of others,
not to create one. Frantz Fanon, in The Wretched ofthe Earth [1963], analyses this
tendency to theft among colonized elites. In the chapter "The Pitfalls of National
Consciousness, he alerts readers to the phenomenon of the "national bourgeoisie." A
national bourgeoisie consists of elements of the colonized elite that served and supported
the colonizing power and who would seize control of the liberated colony and bring it
back into a subservient, neo-colonial relationship with a new or the former ruler -- for the
gain of the elites. This is precisely what happened in the Philippines, as the controlling
elite sold the country out to the United States, which re-colonized it in 1900, and then
collaborated actively at least until 1986. Fanon's "national bourgeoisie" is anything but
nationalist, but rather sacrifices the nation for its own petty interests. Hobsbawm
misinterprets or misrepresents national bourgeoisies as the universally necessary cores of
nationalist movements, rather than anti- or a-national usurpers. In such cases as Ileto and
Fanon highlight, Hobsbawm himself is often duped by the elites, into believing that they
produced nations, rather than stealing them.
Hobsbawm's failure to recognize in any of the multitude of "national movements"
he reflects on anything like the dynamics presented by Ileto is not a simple failure to see
what is there. It is the result of a limited and limiting conceptual framework that makes it
impossible for him to see what is there in any comprehensive or penetrating way. There
are two main aspects of this limited framework.
(1) Implicit in Hobsbawm's misreading is the assumption that peasants and
workers are mere passive receptors of bourgeois ideology, without intellectual or political
agency. Or, more precisely, when peasants and workers take up a socialist agenda, they
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are agents, but when they take up a nationalist one, they are passive dupes. The reality of
agency is much more complex, and obscured by Hobsbawm's relatively gross analysis.
The means Philippine peasants employed in their struggle is instructive on this
point. The peasants transformed Catholic organizational structures, songs and prayers,
and festivals, earlier imposed on them by the colonizing Spanish, into revolutionary
organizations, songs, and theater. Through these, they operated against the Spanish and
presented their liberatory message to other peasants in terms accessible to them. The
underclasses of Philippine society were anything but passive, and the object of their
oppositional agency was not merely Spanish, but also elite. In many cases, it was the
same Philippine elite that later sold out the peasants that buttressed the imposition of
Spanish customs on them. Challenging this assumption of passivity on the part of
"Orientals," the colonized, or the underclasses is essential for the dignity of their political
movements, not to mention to an accurate understanding of their complexities and
innovations.
Though Hobsbawm at length emphasizes the importance of analyzing and taking
seriously the "assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people,"
against the "official ideologies of states and movements" [10 - 1 1], he seems to do so
only when such are in line with his political agenda. This is a crafty way of allowing the
show of popular agency in the form of the activities and thoughts of "ordinary people,"
but in actuality denying this agency and retaining it through exercise of the scholarly
mechanism of data selection and exclusion. Denying afully representative presence of
the "assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people" in scholarly
work is manipulation that exploits some and represses others. Indeed, one might call this
activity "totalitarian scholarship," that is, the suppression of any views not in line with the
scholar-dictator. What is perhaps most interesting is that Hobsbawm claims to be
representing the real views of the masses, while using his deformation of their views for
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his own agenda - exactly as he claims "nationalist" leaders claim falsely to speak in the
name of the people to advance their own agendas.
(2) Of course, the existence ot peasant-driven, popular nationalisms does not call
into question Hobsbawm's deeper assumption, that class-tension is the one true dynamic
of social progress. The implication is that only class oppression is true oppression and
the abolition of class true liberation. Hobsbawm's response to Ileto might be that the
peasant movement, despite its outward appearance as anti-colonial nationalism, was
ultimately a class movement. Though Ileto disproves a major tenet of Hobsbawm's
theory, he appears to confirm the foundation of that theory. Indeed, it appears that any
challenge to Hobsbawm regarding his focal claim that nationalisms are elite-driven will
confirm this foundation, that class is the key to understanding nation, that class is the
fundamental social formation, nation secondary to it. Why?
The answer is simple, though not obvious. Rather than being observable on the
same level with nation, class is the very conceptual framework through which Hobsbawm
approaches the nation. In Hobsbawm's work, class is not a social formation that can and
should be analyzed as the nation is. Rather, it is the grounding assumption of analysis of
social formations. Case analysis after case analysis of nations are in terms of elites and
masses, ruling classes (interchanged with "governments"), peasants, and/or workers, with
"aristocracy," the "big bourgeoisie," and the "petty bourgeoisie" often thrown into the
mix [for a comprehensive example, see 116-117]. It is not that such terms have no role
in analysis of nations and nationalisms — they have a very important, useful, and
necessary one. The problem is that they are granted an actuality and legitimacy (and
fundamentally) that is unsubstantiated by analysis and argument — while other key social
formations, such as "language group," "ethnicity," and "religion," are challenged to
demonstrate their actuality and legitimacy, and probed and analyzed endlessly.
These latter are generally revealed as inadequate terms for explaining nationalism.
For instance, even where language and ethnic groups are not purely the conceptual
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constructs of nationalism (and that is not often for Hobsbawm), shared language or
ethnicity alone does not indicate necessarily any type of shared political consciousness or
necessary social positioning [62, 64 - 65], On the contrary, "class consciousness" - as an
active social force - is employed without definition or defense - and juxtaposed to the
terms "ethnic" and "national" consciousness that are examined extensively throughout the
book [88 - 89],
Ultimately, the unreality that Hobsbawm finds at the heart of nations is the
conclusion of a tautology. If all genuine social groupings are to be explained in terms of
classes and their dynamics, then such groupings as the nation, the concept of which is not
class-based, are revealed to be false formations. This tautology emerges as Hobsbawm
traces through his version of the history of the "nation," examining the various self-
concepts used at various times and places to define the nation. These range from the
"popular-revolutionary" concept of membership in a "body politic" [18ff.], which implied
either a collective cohesion or a shared relationship (loyalty) to a territorial state, to later
concepts of identity based on perception of sharing a common language, ethnicity,
history, religion, etc. [5 Iff] Hobsbawm tests these concepts against his perception of
social reality, which is at base a function of class dynamics — particularly those between
ruling elites and the masses. As the various concepts of the nation fail to correspond with
his perception of the social realities involved, Hobsbawm determines the concepts to be
false. At the least, such things as linguistic identity are not sufficient to produce concrete
unity or subjective commitment, and other forces are required. At the most, a concept of
national identity or unity is directly against the interests of some members, and must be
artificially imposed by elite manipulation and force.
But, exposing the tautology is not disproving its premise/conclusion. The
tautology is assisted at at least some points by problematic data that supports the primacy
of class. For example, Hobsbawm tries to show that, as the masses entered politics in the
late 1800s, class became as important an element of national movements as nationalism.
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The implication is that even misguided nationalisms tended toward true liberation in the
form of class revolution. He cites a number of national movements in which socialist
organizations were the main vehicles. The limits of my historical expertise restricts me to
commenting on only one such movement. Hobsbawm points out that the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation was affiliated to the Socialist International [125], This is true,
and in fact it is possible to argue that the ARF was as much a vehicle for the general
liberation of all Ottoman and Russian subjects (including Turks and Russians) as it was
of Armenians. At the same time, Hobsbawm is incorrect to present this as a
counterbalance to nationalism: the ARF was then and has been since "nationalist” at its
core, fighting against subjugation and genocide of Armenians. It has been by and large
socialist, though for the past 50 years this has been a very contentious issue, and it is not
possible to claim that all ARF members are committed socialists. Indeed, though one
could argue that the founders of the party were socialists before they were nationalists,
and so socialism as a vehicle toward a general liberation that would include Armenians, it
seems more accurate to say that the socialism itself was mediated through nationalism.
Armenian revolutionaries tended to see economic oppression of Armenians as one aspect
of a more general oppression that included political factors as well, while at the same
time economic oppression of Armenians motivated commitment to ending economic
oppression beyond the Armenian nation. What is perhaps more damaging to
Hobsbawm's claims that the socialist aspect of such parties as the ARF manifested the
"peaking" of class consciousness through the mystifying haze of nationalism. On the
contrary, it is incontrovertibly clear that nationalism was as indispensable to the ARF as
socialism (if not more so): the Hunchak Party, an Armenian Nationalist/Marxist party
formed in the 1880s, emphasized Marxism over nationalism; it was effectively defunct
before 1900.
He also claims that communism superseded nationalism -- especially minority
nationalisms in communist states such as the Soviet Union -- and kept in check the
22
destructive forces nationalism [180], In point of fact, the very existence of the Soviet
Union depended in part on the manipulation and exacerbation of ethnic tensions by Stalin
in the 1920s. During this period, Stalin undermined minority resistance to consolidation
of the Soviet revolutionary state forced on them by placing portions of national minorities
under the jurisdiction of hostile local majorities, thereby making the former dependent on
central Soviet authority. This in turn restricted the resistance of other portions of hostage
national minorities, who could not act without undermining the safety of some of their
own. Hobsbawm even goes so far as to minimize the significance of Official Soviet anti-
Semitism, which deeply undermines his claim [180-181],
I could go on for some time challenging Hobsbawm's historical data, assumption,
and analysis in this piecemeal fashion. 5 One could follow other historians in presenting
other "facts" selected to support one's point, to the exclusion of other facts, in the manner
criticized by John Breuilly [1994], Problematizing some of his historical analysis is not,
however, a general refutation of Hobsbawm's methodology, conceptual frame, and
theory. The findings of Miroslav Hroch, in the Social Preconditions ofNational Revival
in Europe [1985], suggest such a general challenge. Hroch analyzes the composition of
5As one instance that further exemplifies the problematic nature of much of Hobsbawm's historical
analysis, one could evaluate Hobsbawm's 1990 claim the commitment of most Armenians support transfer
of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia in principle, but the support would crumble as soon as
the issue demanded concrete specifics [177] against subsequent historical events that contradict it. At the
risk of compromising my "objectivity" as a scholar with an example that appears to express national pride,
I point out the following. 200,000 Karabakh Armenians with 15,000 troops chose to fight against
overwhelming odds — the Azeri population of 7 million supporting an army much larger and better
equipped than the Armenian one — and continued to fight despite heavy losses. A majority of Armenians
in the Republic endured intensive deprivation of basic human needs (food, water, heat) for more than six
years willingly (my direct interviews indicate) rather than give up Karabakh, while their popular
commitment forced the Armenian government to maintain support against the narrow interests of its
leaders and their oft-stated preferences. Finally, Armenians around the world gave large amounts of
money and other humanitarian aid, as well as direct labor, to alleviate the suffering in Armenia and
Karabakh. Some even fought in the Karabakh army. In every meaning of "concrete," from risk of life, to
material deprivation, to unsolicited material sacrifice, a majority of Armenians followed through on the
commitment Hobsbawm labeled merely "general."
As another, one could challenge the selective analysis behind such conclusions as that, in the
absence of contemporary xenophobic nationalism by majority language speakers or the perception of it by
extremist nationalist minority groups [see 170 - 173], linguistic oppression in the pre-contemporary world
was not an issue [1 1 Off.]. He offers such evidence as the fact "that a standard work on socialism in
Belgium in 1903 did not even refer to the Flemish [language] question," the implication being that
"language caused so little trouble," that is, was so unimportant to people [117]. Obviously, there could
have been and probably were other reasons for a socialist text privileging class (as Hobsbawm) to ignore
language issues.
Even within the limits of my historical knowledge, such examples go on and on.
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19th Century national movements in various North and East European regions in terms of
their social composition. First, for each of the nine national movements researched, "no
class or social group had a stable place in the structure of patriotic communities,
sufficient to signify that such a group had a fixed and necessary share in the national
movement," and thus it is impossible to "establish a definite rank order for the importance
of the groups" [Hroch, 1985: 129], In other words, the proportions of different classes
and groups within movements decreased, increased, or fluctuated as the movements
developed. More than this, no groups across movements displayed the same trends, so
there is no evidence that national movements tended to attract or repel members from this
or that class or group, which One would have expected if the movements were in line
with the interests of some politically conscious members and not others. The possibility
that some members could have been duped or manipulated is not supported by the fact
that these movements were vanguards containing politically conscious individuals.
At the same time, and in fairness, it is necessary to point out that "it is clear that
the strongest component in every national group . . . was the group we refer to under the
summary description of 'intelligentsia,'" that is, "all those who lived from their
intellectual labor" (teachers, etc.), as well as all those with high school educations [129],
But this does not indicate elite origins, or even specific class origins: the "intelligensia"
could include members from a range, from elite landowners, to clergy, to teachers, to
peasants. What is more, in some cases the segment of the intelligentsia that became
active in a national movement was representative of the social composition of the
intelligentsia as a whole, while in others "the social origin of the patriots was
diametrically opposed to the social origin of the intelligentsia as a whole" [157 - 158].
This suggests that in some cases being from the intelligentsia was a key factor in joining
a national movement, while in others it was coincidental, as much higher percentages of
some segments of the intelligentsia joined a movement than the percentages from other
segments.
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Finally, some movements consisted of activists from predominantly peasant
origin (Lithuania, Estonia, Belorussia), some were led by the intelligentsia and middle
class (Norway, Finland), and others were led by members from urban middle classes
(Bohemia, Flemish movement) or craftsmen and traders (Slovakia) [157], Indeed,
Lithuania’s national movement was 90 percent peasant [156], Overall, the composition
and leadership of movements varied, contrary to what One would expect from
Hobsbawm's analysis.
Thus, according to Flroch, national movements are not consistently elite-based,
middle-class based, or peasant-based, not just because it varies by movement, but the
composition of individual movements is generally mixed as well, that is, not easily
identifiable with any one class. This is consistent with the possibility that "class interest"
- explicit or veiled - is not the determining factor in nation-formation. Though class
consciousness, class interest, and the objective realities of class (economic pressures,
social structuring around class, etc.) may have important roles in nation-formation, an
understanding of the nation cannot be through class alone.
Hobsbawm might counter-argue that the fact that class does not appear to be
foundational is due to its being mystified by nationalism. Even at their cross-class
origins, national movements consisted of elites manipulating lower-class members — or,
as Ileto shows, peasant-based anti-colonial movements for which "national liberation"
was always about class. An irresolvable debate threatens.
What if, instead of claiming that Hobsbawm makes class too fundamental, one
instead questions just how fundamental his own concept is. If one probes the constituent
"elites," "masses," et al that comprise the substratum of his concept of social reality,
something interesting happens. The underclasses of Eastern Europe tend to have been
formed as the result of conquest by other ethnic or language groups. The black slave
underclass of the United States and elsewhere was formed by domination of one racial
group by another. Indeed, social and class distinctions among the dominated race were to
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a great extent leveled within Africa, and completely leveled among those people removed
from Africa. Other examples of conquest determining a class structure abound: the
Ottomans in West Asia, Europeans throughout Asia and Africa, and so forth. While
some structures produced by conquest have faded as the result of subsequent historical
events and forces, in many cases the structures have persisted strongly. Indeed, in the
case of South and Central America, class corresponds quite closely to degrees of skin
color, with lighter skin meaning higher class. This, of course, is directly traced to the
Spanish and Portuguese conquests, the domination of the indigenous populations, and the
importations of African slaves. The societies have internalized the colonialism into their
own class structures, which have proven quite rigid and tenacious.
Even in societies such as India, in which pre-colonial castes were rigid and central
to society, and for whose cultural products (at least the ancient ones) Europeans had a
perversely self-interested but acknowledged respect, even the most elite of Indians lost
significant status and objective power through colonization, while even the most lowly
white in Britain or - even more so - coming to India had a legal and social status above
all Indians. Through the process of colonization, this tended more and more to push
Indians down and white British up. Indian elites simply had further to fall, and lower
class white British higher to climb. The relative changes in Britain made possible the
eventual rise of the lower classes. In India as other colonized societies, internal class
divisions were maintained, but the entire structure was either compressed by the
downward pressure, or shifted downward intact, relative to pre-colonial economic, social,
and political power/status. In Britain and other colonizing societies, the reverse was true.
This is not to discount the percentage of those in each whose status/power/wealth
increased or decreased more dramatically, due to manipulating the colonial system or
being impacted fortuitously or adversely by it.
Even in Western Europe, the origins of social classes, at least in the feudal period
(nobility vs. commons, with the priesthood and the crafts guilds as buffers [to absorb
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overflow ol conquerors, or malcontents of commoners?]), tended to be based on
conquests by different cultural or linguistic groups from different territories. Witness the
Norman conquest of England, producing the core of the English nobility. In the United
States, class formation was originally through conquest (of Africa and North America,
though the natives proved impossible to exploit directly [Ackermann, 1995] and the
colonizers turned to land and resource theft coupled with deportation and genocide), and
then through importation of waves of "non-white" immigrant labor pools, though the
complexities of capitalism and liberal-statism has tended to allow some immigrant groups
to acquire higher status, and has also allowed some percentage of individuals from even
the most low-status groups to rise as a pressure release and co-optation strategy for
maintaining the general status quo.
Even the economic rise of Jews in Europe can be traced to Christian restrictions
on certain financial activities, and the rise of the (obviously white) Scottish after
annexation by England was due to the complex developments and exigencies of the
expanding British empire, as Tom Naim shows in The Break-up ofBritain [1981],
Outside of Europe, the rise of certain conquered peoples - or at least segments of their
populations — were due to similar factors. For instance, the rise of some Greeks, Jews,
and especially Armenians under Ottoman rule was due to their focus on finance, trade,
and artisan production, which were devalued under the Ottoman code, which emphasized
military and political activity. The rise became dramatic as capitalism made finance,
trade, and production the central guarantors of military and political power, not the other
way around as previously.
Thus, racial, territorial, linguistic, cultural (especially through "orientalism" and
the like), religious, and other differences were/are in many, many cases the basis of class-
formation, rather than the other way around. Increasingly, as single mothers tend to head
households in industrial as well as agrarian societies, gender has come to determine class
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more directly
.
6
"Class" is just as constructed a social formation as "nation," though its
history is much longer and more pervasive, and its construction has tended to be in
material terms rather than "legalistic" or "conceptual" terms. (But even this materiality
might be more a result than a cause.)
Of course, a Marxist such as Hobsbawm might counter that classes in a
society/era are products of the dominant mode of production, without reference to nations
and other such categories. One might then point out that the "net class" of Jews around
the world in the late medieval and modem era and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire
consisted of a direct tension between economic levels and legal/social status.
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice is a nice illustration, where the wealthy Shylock is
discriminated against in court. But, even if one grants this point, the mode of production
does not determine which people in a society will be fit into which classes. Now, in
feudal or caste societies, class-status is almost entirely hereditary, and one is compelled to
look toward the origins of a particular social system, as described above. In slave or
plantation societies, the classes have their root in racial differentiations and are produced
initially through conquest and colonization, though they may reproduce self-sufficiently
(as the US slave society was forced to when slave shipments were banned) or through
perpetual conquest. In later industrial societies, both displacement of rural agricultural
workers and population migrations (immigration) have produced underclasses.
Thus, the mode of production itself is not able to determine exactly who fits in
which class. In the modem era and before, such things as language, ethnicity, and race
have been used for this process of differention, and now, with the dissolution of
traditional and modem heterosexual family structures, more and more gender is also
being used — though it is quite possible to argue that prostitution has been a means of
gendered class differentiation and that in exploitative domestic relations wives and
6The fact that Hobsbawm does not at any point consider the issue of gender in his "deconstruction" of
national unities makes his "class-centrism" all the more significant. However, in the interest of giving
gender the central focus it requires in an account of the nation, I reserve fuller discussion of the issue until
development of my own theory.
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mothers have already constituted an exploited class below husbands/fathers/sons in
status. Only abstractly does mode of production determine class structure; to determine
classes concretely, who is in which class, requires appeal to other factors. What is more,
even the nature of exploitation, class-tensions, and struggle is often influenced or even
determined these other factors, such as national tensions. This is true of colonialism,
where the choice to exploit is tied up with the choice of whom to exploit. This suggests
the possibility that the very colonial mode of production (which deserves recognition as
its own mode) might itself be contemporary with the development of imperial racism.
This result could have been anticipated, given the almost labored point that Marx
really took no account of anything but economic relations when formulating his concept
of class-tension as historical driving force. This is not to say that Marx' analysis of
industrial economic relations, ideology, and so forth, were clearly brilliant, complex,
ground-breaking, and crucial to an understanding of oppression in the modem world. But
even many Marxists admit now that it does not take proper account of such things as
gender and nationality. The classical Marxist theory of class was formulated by analysis
of an abstraction of the actual world, in which non-economic factors were de-emphasized
or ignored entirely. For instance, Marx does not engage the nation at all — in his
abstracted world, it was not even worthy of notice, let alone enmity.
The historical urgency of such things as nationalism has made acknowledgment of
them even by Marxists inescapable, and Marxists have for a century struggled to account
for them through the Ptolemaic contortions highlighted by Anderson. Marx may well
have been justified in focusing on the most salient features 19th Century industrial Britain
or Germany, but even then, as Bakunin reminded us above, the analysis had its limits.
Indeed, this very concept of class, far from being an ahistorical description of the various
historized iterations of class structures, is itself historical bounded. As I have shown,
when pushed, even the abstraction leads beyond the economic.
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The foregoing is not intended to suggest that class is any less foundational than
nation, gender, etc. Rather, - against the Cartesian Marxism of Hobsbawm - all these
factors are complexly interrelated and mutually presupposing, and that none of them can
be established as the foundation of all others. There is no "historian's stone." I will
explore the implications of this later, in Chapter 3.
This is also not meant to suggest that the role of class in nation-formation is not
important: it is, if often in ways different from those presented by Hobsbawm. For
instance, it seems plausible to argue that the experience of colonization was in part
constitutive of the nations produced through anti-colonial national movements. What is
more, though one cannot reduce colonization to a purely economic system and colonial
relations purely to class, certainly economic exploitation is a central aspect. This is not to
delegitimate these resistant national movements and the nations they are based on and
produced, to suggest that they are ultimately reactive. For they cannot be explained
simply in terms of colonization, and did not happen in a vacuum without at least proto-
national elements present. Yet, resistance to colonization was a key factor in the specific
forms they took and the intensity of their structural relations. The failure of such
theorists as Anderson and Gellner to consider class in their analyses results in deep
problems.
This is true even in such cases as that of the Armenians, whose distinct language
and culture can be traced back two millennia, and sense of self-identity probably back to
the Armenian state's conversion to Christianity in 301, which sharply differentiated it
from neighboring regions and peoples, and led to war with Persia. A genuine "Armenian
nation" that went beyond simply shared characteristics such as language and territory, to
relational bonds and subjective recognition, was not present until the process of
revolutionary activity against the brutal oppression faced by Armenians that reached a
crisis point in the second half of the 19th Century, due in large part to the intense
economic subjugation/exploitation of the vast majority of Armenians, who were peasants.
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Indeed, without colonialism as a general experience, it is very possible that the
contemporary general concept of the "nation" itself might be significantly less political
and contested, and much more ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural. And, of course,
colonialism was/is just as important if not more so in the nation-formation of colonizing
groups.
To argue against Hobsbawm-type class-essentialism is not to argue for a national-
centric viewpoint. Not at all. Nor is it to argue against the importance of class in a
consideration of the nation. This is not simply to acknowledge the inescapable. It seems
inconceivable that a genuine sense of national community could not be socialist, at least
within the national community itself. For, what is the point of considering "the nation" a
worthy object of care and sacrifice, if one does not see the people who comprise as so
worthy? To exalt one's "nation" is a hypocritical empty abstract gesture when it does not
mean at base a commitment to the well-being of others of the nation. Who cares about
ancient battles and dynasties, piles of rock and expanses of grassy ground, when actual
people today are suffering? Indeed, even outrage at past oppressions are illegitimate
without as strong a commitment against the suffering of people today — which can be
prevented. Indeed, without this commitment, the value of the nation devolves into what it
does for the member with such a lack, rather than what that member does of it — in its
concrete form of people.
More than this, it is not a matter of determining that nations are "real" rather than
"unreal." Hobsbawm's distinction itself is suspect: one can find elements of
"construction" in all nations, but that does not mean that they are mere fictions or
impositions. After all, the same can be said of the Marxian concept of the proletariat,
which does not mean that it is not a real formation. Workers from a wide range of
circumstances and with greatly varying immediate needs and concerns were unified in the
First International. As Bakunin pointed out, the members from highly industrial societies
such as Germany imposed their own agendas on the organization as a whole, to the
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detriment of members from less developed or agrarian societies, such as Russia. Yet, the
fact of tensions and unequal power relations within the International and within the
"working class" more generally does not mean that there was no legitimate concept of the
working class. Lack of homogeneity, internal structural complexity, or even power
differentials does not necessarily imply unreality. Accepting Hobsbawm's grounding
frame forces the would-be nationalist to choose between nation and class (and to exclude
gender, sexuality, race, and so forth). This is perhaps its most insidious implication. Of
course, merely national socialism7 carries its own risks, as well.
To return to the issue raised at the beginning of this section: does Hobsbawm's
analysis of the nation and nationalism justify his anti-national attitude? What my
analysis suggests is that, rather than being supported by Hobsbawm's analysis, his
antinational-ism generates the analysis. Though there are valuable elements of
Hobsbawm's critique of the nation, these elements are ideologically tainted and must be
refined through the type of counter-critique that has been offered.
Enlightened Antinational-ism and the Colonial Service
Elie Kedourie develops his theory of nationalism in Nationalism [1966]. Though
originally published three decades before Hobsbawm's, in 1960, the work remains
important for two reasons. First, this work is a comprehensive liberal-statist theory of the
nation, which raises issues and develops arguments that have remained central to
contemporary liberal approaches to the nation. In fact, Kedourie occupies an explicit and
central place in Omar Dahbour's [1996] introduction to the Winter 1996 - 97
Philosophical Forum, as I will discuss in Chapter 2. Second, Kedourie's work overlaps
to a surprising degree with non-liberal theorists who adopt an antinational-ist position.
7
This is not to suggest that the Nazi system was "socialist" in any commonly accepted meaning of the term,
even within German borders. It was, rather, a capitalist system in which the central government exerted
extensive control over business interests, or, perhaps more accurately, business interests chose with some
degree of autonomy and in economic as well as political self-interest to coordinate activities with the
central government, and to mediate activities through the Nazi ideology.
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such as Martin Thom and Hobsbawm. Writing in 1995, Thom for instance replicates
Kedourie's linking of nationalism generally with a strain of German nationalism resulting
in Nazism, and follows Kedourie to a significant if unacknowledged degree in tracing the
intellectual roots of nationalism, which he also follows Kedourie in privileging.
Hobsbawm follows Kedourie in raising the difficulty of ethnic and linguistic intermixture
for territorial nationalism.
For Kedourie, nationalism is summarized in a simple, two-part doctrine: (1)
humanity is naturally divided into nations," each determined by a unique set of
characteristics common to all members and (2) "the only legitimate type of government is
national self-government" [Kedourie, 1966: 9],
Nationalism as we have it was developed primarily by post-Kantian German
philosophers, who reworked aspects of Kant's philosophy in the aftermath of the French
Revolution. Though other theorists, such as the Italian Mazzini, elaborated the doctrine
further and fit it to their own political circumstances, it has remained the same in all
essentials as it has been spread to every comer of the world.
Prior to the French Revolution, the state existed to maximize the well-being of
those gathered within it. The enlightened government was seen as the caretaker of the
individual, and was justified solely by the extent to which it fulfilled this role. [10]
Obedience was expected in exchange for the benefits of security and well-being. The
Revolution asserted that this was not enough, that even a good caretaker is not legitimate
unless the people taken care of choose it. 8 [12] This could mean that the population of a
state could change the government in fundamental ways, as in France, or a minority of
people discontent in a state could separate from it, as had the 13 British Colonies that
became the United States [15]. The origin of political power had become relevant. By
8
I set aside for the moment that the revolutionaries in France had directly linked the fact that the
government was not popular with its failure to adequately take care of the basic human needs of much of
the population. As they appear to have seen it, if a government was not ofthe people, then it would almost
never be for them - even if it had the resources to be. In the rare event that it did fulfill its role as
caretaker, this was by its whim, which could be changed whimsically.
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the revolutionary logic, only states formed or supported by the will of the people - only
states deriving "their sovereignty from the nation" - were legitimate [16].
The nation at this point was a body of people to whom a government was
responsible through their legislature" [15], It did not require that the people have any
other bonds or commonalities than that; it was defined purely in terms of citizenship in a
state.
To explain the transformation of this simple political doctrine into full-fledged
nationalism, Kedourie traces a strain of philosophy that had its origins in the work of
Kant.
In the second half of the 1 8th Century, Kant produced a theory of morality that
did not rely on external forces, nor the whimsy of individual choice. People -- those who
counted as people, anyway - had in them a "categorical imperative" toward good actions
and thoughts. They need only recognize its authority and act in accord with it for a moral
life. The "universal moral law" was within each individual, and he/she could act in
accord with it despite inevitable external constraints or circumstances. In that sense, the
individual was free, had "autonomy," and this was the sense that mattered, [see 22 - 23]
Not even the external "will of God" was "the ground of the categorical imperative" [24].
To be good requires choosing the good without any external constraint, as the individual
"will itself legislates for itself [24].
Kedourie explains that Fichte, in an effort to remove the issue of "things-in-
themselves" that he saw as a debilitating weakness of Kant's formulation of his
philosophical insight, developed his own version of Kantianism. Instead of choosing as
the producer of reality either the unknowable "things-in-themselves" of which we have
only sensations, not knowledge, or the atomic individual subject, he chose a compromise.
The seat of reality is the intellect, but not an individual intellect; it is a universal intellect.
Thus, he avoided at once the skepticism inherent in a view of reality based on ultimately
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unknowable noumena, as well as the subjectivism inherent in individual constitution of
reality.
For Fichte, as for Schelling and other post-Kantians, the individual became but
part of an organic, universal whole, and pure illusion outside consideration of the whole
[37]. Rights were no longer individual, but of the whole, with the individual merely
partaking. Freedom meant partaking in freedom of the whole, not being free from the
whole; indeed, "complete freedom [meant] total absorption in the whole" [38], "From
this metaphysics the post-Kantians deduced a theory of the state" [38], The proper state
is not the product of a contract among autonomous individuals; it is logically prior to the
individual.
It might seem reasonable to conclude that such a state should contain all of
humanity [51]. Indeed, Fichte's concept of universal reason suggests that this "state"
should be a universal one. But Kant had already argued, in Perpetual Peace, for a world
of many states in balanced, continually easing tension as the optimal arrangement [53].
Fichte saw the level of tension as constant, arguing that the struggle for dominance was
crucial to the positive development of humanity. For him, a state achieving dominance in
the struggle was thereby revealed as the carrier of the highest "culture" at its time, that is,
to represent the greatest development of humanity to that point, and for as long as
dominance was maintained [54].
Of course, such an on-going struggle for dominance could result in erasure of
subject cultures. Herder complicated the picture by emphasizing diversity. For Herder,
the proper telos of world history was the achievement of "a harmony of possible varieties
of creatures which Nature or God can bring forth" [57], apparently in both time and place.
Yes, there was the struggle Fichte claimed, but what was eliminated should not be
belittled as inferior — it was part of an ever-emerging whole. This suggested a positive
duty in the human social world: to contribute to realization of the telos, each particular
person or group had a positive duty to develop its unique self as fully as possible. By
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implication, to mix or merge with another individuality was immoral. "A nation, on this
. . theory, becomes a natural division of the human race, endowed by God with its own
[unique] character, which its citizens must, as a duty, preserve pure and inviolable" [58],
The nation (culture) was seen to best develop itself in its own state, and the best political
arrangement was seen as one in which each nation has its own state. States containing
more than one nation were "unnatural, oppressive, and finally doomed to decay" [58 -
59].
According to Kedourie, the last step in consolidating the concept of nationalism
was emphasis on language. For Herder and Schleiermacher, language was the key to the
individual. Language was bom "as man tried to express his feelings towards the things
and events he came across
;
language was originally the combination of things and events
with the emotions which they arouse in man" [62]. Words and linguistic structures were
the pure, direct result of the encounter of human consciousness with the world. Even as
abstract terms were later developed, they still had a basis in the originating "substratum of
sensual impressions and reactions" [63]. They were simply farther removed from the
originating encounters.
Naturally, different groups went through different experiences and lived under
different circumstances. This left its strong imprint on their languages, initially resulting
in different languages, and then increasing the differentiation as languages became more
complex and abstracted. Thus, language became the expression not simply of a universal
encounter with the external world, but of the encounter by a particular group in particular
circumstances and through a specific sequence of experiences (that is, with a specific
history). Language expressed group identity. [63]
For each individual, there is one and only one language that expresses his/her
identity [63]. As the marker of group membership, it became the key criterion for
determining nationality, and so it became the true criterion of the legitimacy of a political
state [63 - 64 and 68].
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Comparison of languages - based on which are more pure, without admixture,
and closer to the sensual and emotive substratum that is the essence of group identity -
became a way of establishing the superiority/inferiority of different nations, in line with
the struggle described above. The German-speaking Fichte found that German, of course,
was an original language, unlike French or English, which were composite, derived
languages [66]. Indeed, only groups speaking original languages were considered "true"
nations [67],
For Kedourie, the implications of the wide-spread dissemination of such a theory
in 19th Century Europe are clear: a complete redrawing of the map of Europe, through
bloody conflict. Linguistic minorities fought for independence, while existing states
attempted to annex areas outside their borders where their languages were spoken - even
if only by a minority of residents.
Once the linguistic criterion was established, racial ("ethnic," in current
terminology), cultural, and even religious criteria could be linked with ease [73]. For the
Nazis, the German language was the "outward sign" of German racial identity because its
formation expressed the essence of the race [71], This prevented any claims that Jews
could be considered "German" simply by knowing and using the language - they could
never understand it truly, because it did not resonate with their racial essence [72].
Ultimately, "in nationalist doctrine, language, race, culture, and sometimes even
religion," came to "constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity, the nation"
[73]. "Nation" became the logical ground of these other terms.
Kedourie rejects nationalism thus formulated on a variety of grounds. (1)
According to him, prior to the rise of nationalism, the interstate order in Europe was the
result of "accidents, wars, or dynastic arrangements, and [was] regulated by the play of
conflicts and alliances, of friendships and antagonisms which somehow managed to
produce a balance of power." Thus, though there was no ideology guiding political
activity, as after nationalism, the good sense of rational agents pursuing their own best
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interests tended toward the balancing of power and the avoidance of mutually destructive
war, and a general stability that was not fundamentally disturbed even by surface
disruptions. [15] This practical ordering was mirrored within the more advanced states,
where political arrangements were meant to maximize the well-being of the subjects and
minimize conflict and suffering [10 - 11]. Nationalism undercut the practical logic of
these arrangements, introducing into politics rigid principles and ideologies that paid little
heed to social realities or consequences, but drove forward on uncompromising, almost
monomaniacal, paths. Violence was the inevitable product of this [70 and 126]. Indeed,
nationalism is fundamentally violent, in its rejection of compromise and the balancing of
conflicting agendas and claims.
(2) Nationalism produced a politics of fantasy and idealism, not politics that deals
with the realities of actual history and societies, and offers realistic solutions in the face
of recognized actualities. Activities are carried out in order to realize the perfect state,
not to deal with the actual state of affairs. [47 - 50]
(3) Politics became philosophical, depending thenceforth on metaphysics for its
norms and principles. The result was that intellectuals become the well-spring of
political principles and movements. Yet, ultimately, the "kings" learned to "tame
philosophy to their use," to hide their interests and real-politicking beneath the patina of
"high philosophical words." Mass propaganda and "an ideological style of politics" was
bom. [50] Real-political maneuvering and narrow interests came to be hypocritically
hidden by appeal to high-sounding principles, which allowed them to be advanced under
false pretexts. The idealized synchrony of individual and general will came to mystify
the violence necessary to impose it [47]. All sorts of academic schemes were hatched to
justify the supremacy of this or that nation, to legitimate it as the heir to some earlier
political entity (which was misconstmed as a national precursor), or even to create it
[1 1 8 ff. ]
.
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(4) The one-nation, one-state principle was/is impossible to implement in areas
inhabited by more than one nationality - that is, without great conflict, deportations, and
even exterminations [70 and 1 18ff.].
(5) Finally, nationalism was/is founded on the ultimately dubious reasoning that
shared language, culture, ethnicity, etc., even where they exist, are necessary or even
good criteria on which to base political arrangements.
These criticisms flow reasonably from Kedourie's analysis of nationalism. Their
truth or falsity, then, depends entirely on the truth or falsity of the analysis of nationalism
that grounds them. And this analysis is deeply problematic.
First, Kedourie's selection of the authors of the "doctrine" of nationalism is
suspect. He focuses on only two theorists, Fichte and Herder, while including many
supporting references to just two others, Schelling and Schleiermacher, and dropping
one-time references of little importance to a few more. This is an extremely narrow
sampling of the thousands of theorists who have written on the nation, from inside and
outside national movements, from within and without the academy. More than this, all of
these theorists shared a very specific (or restricted) temporal and spatial location, early
19th Century Germany.
Even if one grants — which I do not — that early nationalism was the narrow
doctrine produced by Fichte et al, it is difficult to believe that; while the basic
conceptions and concrete forms of the state, the subject, communication, space, mobility,
economics, etc., changed dramatically during the 19th and 20th Centuries; the "doctrine"
of nationalism remained fixed and finished: if the passage of time itself did not result in
changes, the significant mutations in related concepts and social forms surely would have.
And, what of the thousands to theorize the nation, such as Ernest Renan,
Woodrow Wilson, and Frantz Fanon? In the 1880s, Renan conceived the nation as the
result of a "daily plebiscite," by which a group first established a nation (presumably by
becoming self-aware of its coalescence or relevance), and individuals thereafter
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confirmed or established their individual membership in the nation on an on-going basis.
On this model, the nation ceases to exist at the point that it is not willed by its members.
Though in itself a highly subjective and incomplete concept, as a reaction to a
primordialist view of the natural, even God-given status of nations, this was a powerful
corrective that greatly deepened the gradually developing concept of the nation and the
attendant concept of nationalism. Indeed, it reintroduced and developed ideas from the
French Revolution that had been de-emphasized by the Germans.
Wilson also had a concept of the nation that, while limited to the legacy of the
American Revolution and not particularly interesting in its own light, did have practical
influence and a role in the on-going conceptual development of the nation. And Fanon,
along with many other theorists in colonized regions, transformed the legacy of national
struggle into one of the central features of anti-colonial liberation of 80 percent of the
globe - while simultaneously subjecting the "nation" and "nationalism" as given to
critical reconstruction and problematization far more penetrating and productive than had
been accomplished or even attempted in colonizing societies.
Rather than explore the theoretical richness and complexity that these references
but hint at, Kedourie is content with his narrow focus. For it is this focus that allows him
to present as "nationalism-in-general" a specific strain of nationalism — even a mere
aspect of a more general concept of the nation. This strain, of course, culminates in
Nazism, an imperial nationalism of domination and genocide. Obscuring the rather
tenuous grounds of associating Nazism with all nationalisms allows Kedourie to
manipulate a reader's justified revulsion at Nazism into the service of a general
antinational-ism — an antinational-ism with, as I shall argue, its own strong colonialist
basis and function.
This reduction in the complexity of nationalism's development is matched by
blindness to the internal complexity and tension present in any particular nationalism and
in "nationalism" in general. Nationalisms in the real world are generally complexes of
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different and competing "doctrines," national self-conceptions, and intra-national forces,
and not simply reducible to a unitary set of claims - except when forced by an extremist
fraction (as Nazism) or external circumstances. This is even more true when considering
the general phenomenon of nationalism, where the various concrete manifestations, in
all their individual specificity, become aspects and potentials within a general model that
is not so much a unity as a complex of tensions and divergences.
Second, Kedourie assumes that nationalism is merely a doctrine, that is, a set of
beliefs or claims. (1) This ignores the inevitable effects on a "doctrine" when it is put
into practice, and reshaped and deepened as the concrete circumstances and events of its
implementation react to and act on it. Significant differences in these circumstances are
reflected back into the doctrine itself. Even assuming that it is a single doctrine that is
applied to many different circumstances, the ultimate result is a fragmentation of the
doctrine into distinct forms.
(2) Of course, the assumption of an original unified doctrine itself is suspect. The
groups in significantly divergent circumstances and situations do not merely produce a
modifying reaction to an externally developed theory: they often generate distinct
theories themselves. Of course, originality is never an absolute, but rather relative. Thus,
an early anti-colonial national movement might have taken the term "nation" and the
desire for a state from the externally held concept of the nation, but produced much else
of its concept of the nation and national concept itself, as Chatterjee stresses at length
[refer to either/both books]. Even the outward appearance of derivation from a dominant
model might mask a profound divergence, as analyzed by Ileto [see previous section].
Further, apparently basic essentials of the narrow doctrine Kedourie proposes can drop
out. For instance, within the complex of conceptions that characterizes diasporan nations,
such as the Jewish and Armenian, the desire for statehood is held only by some members,
while it is opposed by others. What results is a concept of the nation remarkably
divergent from Kedourie's account. Indeed, the "unities" in language, religion, and
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territory that Kedourie might claim compensate for such an exclusion are not there in
either of these cases. For instance, relatively significant linguistic, territorial, and
religious divergences cut through both Armenian and Jewish communities surprisingly
deeply. One might even say that these nations are characterized not by some overriding
unity, but by fundamental internal diversity in a way directly at odds with Herder's ideas.
(3) More than this, Kedourie's analysis of nationalism depends on the assumption
that the idea of nationalism can be isolated from concrete material circumstances and
forces, which it logically and historically precedes, as a self-contained intellectual
(academic) product. Certainly, a more complex concept of "nationalism" as a political
form is required, one that is more consistent with the complexities of the relationship
between ideas, circumstances, and actions, that is, between the mental and material.
Without it, there is no way to explain how Filipino peasants could have been presented
with the same Catholicism as their Spanish overlords, but transform it by their practice,
without a doctrinal guide or explicit intention, into something quite different. The
peasants understood the passion of Christ as a metaphor for their own situation, and
communicated their revolutionary aspirations through passion plays; these were not
explained to them — by Spaniards or Filipinos — as such. 9 The explicit understanding
and theory of their activities derived from the actually activities. In simpler terms, the
idea that a doctrine alone, without at the least significant resonances with and adaptations
to the concrete realities in which it is "implemented" and at the most origins within those
realties, can result in committed political movements is a stretch.
Kedourie's assumptions regarding social bonds are also problematic. For him, in
the pre-national era, the ideal was a society as derivative of the individual, formed by a
contract among essentially autonomous individuals in order to maximize the well-being
9
I stress that this is not meant to suggest an intellectual inferiority on the part of these peasants. Their
minds were certainly as a acute and active as Fichte's as he reworked Kant's theories. The issue is, rather,
of how their ideas, which were undoubtedly different from those of their colonizers, were developed. Ileto
shows that they developed not independently of their concrete situation, but as a response to it and by
intellectual activity within it.
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of individuals [12]. Nationalism, through Fichte's and Spelling's promotion, introduced
the ideal of the logical precedence of society, with the individual as derivative: the
society was seen as an organic whole, with the individual person as a mere part without
meaning outside the whole. [37ff.] Kedourie makes much of this, stressing that, unless
all individual wills were in sync with the general national will, this ideal required the
coercion and even elimination of individuals of divergent wills. This is the basis for
ascribing to nationalism an inherent violence toward even members of its own nation, and
part of the basis for insisting that nationalism increased violence in the world.
Fichte's organic society, of course, had its roots in Hellenic thought, Plato and
Aristotle especially. In another context, Kedourie states this ancient Hellenic thought was
not nationalist in itself, nor tied to modem Greek nationalism [77]. The organic concept
is fully present in Hegel, whose theory of the state Kedourie stresses emphatically was
also not nationalist [36]. The first question, then, is how can this be a negative purely in
relation to nationalism? Were not there non-national societies regulated by this political
ideal, such as the ancient Greek city-states, that imposed the same conformity on their
members, through violence if need be, but not in the name of nationalism? Is it not the
organic concept of society, and not nationalism, that Kedourie should be criticizing as the
ground of such violence and oppression?
More importantly, is "organicism" an accurate presentation of nationalism
generally? The previously discussed narrowness of the intellectual basis of Kedourie's
concept of nationalism suggests that the organicism that Fichte and Schelling held as part
of their particular nationalist doctrine might have been no more than a strain in the
overall general concept, which Kedourie elevated to a generally present element of all
nationalisms.
Why? Kedourie's selectivity here is grounded in his garden-variety liberalism,
which appears incapable of conceiving of any alternative to the liberal concept of society
other than the ancient organic one. That he fails to point out that the organic concept of
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society is a re-introduction of an ancient concept, and so intellectually regressive, is
telling. He seems only able to conceive of a non-liberal social form that is the strict
negation of liberalism — and indeed what liberalism reacted against originally. Thus, he
fixates on theorists who promoted it, notably Fichte and Schelling. He accepts Fichte and
Schelling s philosophy as a final statement, rather than as a reaction to a century and more
of liberal atomic individualism. He does not even entertain the idea that nationalism as it
really has existed/exists could contain or even have produced some other concept of the
social beyond society as a big individual. Had he explored the ideas of Renan, Fanon, or
others, he might have discovered some - including the possibility that nationalism could
have arisen as a reaction to and attempt to move beyond the limits of liberal atomic
individualism, including its simple negative, social organicism.
Kedourie's reduction of nationalism also reserves self-interest for liberal
individualism. Because such social/political forms as nationalism de-emphasize the
individual, individual self-interest becomes an aspect of liberal individualism. It is not
that the form of self-interest -- which one might characterize as "petty" — characteristic of
liberal individualism is attractive in itself; rather, by reserving self-interest for liberalism,
Kedourie limits the potential of self-interest to the narrow liberal form. Thus, he excludes
other forms of "self-interest" from consideration, forms that depend on strong social
bonds and/or a more complex concept of the individual, as well as alternative possibilities
for individual agency, such as "desire" and "engagement" over mere liberaP" interest."
The ultimate cleverness of this is to suggest that, wherever something that appears to be
"self-interest" of some sort exists, then political forms such as nationalism are excluded.
This can even mean misconstruing national social structures as liberal. I will explore
these issues in more depth in Chapter 3.
Other failings of this type abound, again dependent on highly selective inclusion
of historical facts as well as ungrounded historical speculations. First is Kedourie's claim
that the very theory of nationalism lent it to fantasy and idealization, because it ignored
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social realities in favor of speculation about what could or should be [85], The pre-
national order, on the other hand, was based on consideration of the concrete realities and
necessities of the relevant situations. It tended toward rational political arrangements that
maximized the benefits for all, and was the result of actual individuals engaging other
actual individuals, all in pursuit of their actual interests.
But, what if liberal individualism and its social contract obscured social reality?
It was just as speculative as a theory emphasizing social relations as in some way
fundamental; it appeared more realistic only because it claimed to deal with the nitty-
gritty of specific social relations among specific concrete individuals, rather than more
apparently abstract social forces and relations. What if this emphasis on the individual
kept those involved from recognizing the impact of more general social forces and
relations. The emphasis could — intentionally or not — have prevented people from
recognizing their true interests, which are distinct from the childish urges of self-
gratification and -aggrandizement at the core of this system. Were these concepts then
any more grounded in social reality than nationalism? Were they not also political
fantasy, of a most manipulative and dangerous kind? What is more, is Kedourie's own
valorization of liberal individualism and the social contract as more real than what he
calls nationalism any less fantasy - especially when his concept of nationalism itself is a
(negative) idealization? Kedourie presents no argument to defend his privileging of the
limited social philosophy he promotes. I have already attempted to reveal the
shortcomings of his understanding of the concept of society he sets in opposition.
The direct evidence Kedourie presents of the romantic fantasies and idealizations
of nationalism is no more compelling. He analyzes selected anecdotes about the
romanticism of young nationalists in 19th Century Europe.
Kedourie presents at length what he sees as the fundamentally romantic, fantastic world
of vanguard nationalists of 19th Century Europe, whose nationalism he claims to be
merely an escape from the drab realities of everyday life, into a realm of exciting intrigue
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and conspiracy [see especially 103]. Indeed, he reduces it to a rebellion of the young of
various societies, who craved excitement and action, against tradition and stability. [96 -
106] Nationalists acted "in the intoxication of a poetic dream" [103], Nationalism was
the "schoolboyish avocation[]" of "schoolboys" - which turned series and bloody [104],
Certainly, the kinds of intrigues and romantic actions were present in many
political movements of the 19th Century, including national ones, but were they dominant
or even widespread? Kedourie does not address or even acknowledge the undeniable
existence of very serious nationalists fighting against very carefully analyzed and
understood oppression, in pursuit of very rational - if difficult to attain - goals.
He instead stresses the rationality of the pre-national interstate system of real-
political arrangements and balances. According to Kedourie, the best compromise was
generally reached, with the minimum of violence and loss. But, exactly whose interests
were represented in this game of conflict and balance? It is delusional naivete to pretend
that the political leaders and negotiators in pre-19th Century Europe really represented
the best interests of the general populations of their states. They would perhaps have
been the first to laugh at such an idea. Their arrangements were meant to benefit
themselves, that is, first as distinct individuals and second as an elite group of nobles and
rulers over against the non-elites. It was the underclasses who absorbed the consequences
of failed balances, resource losses, etc. The associated exploitation and oppression of this
system was the whole reason for being of the revolutions of the late 1 8th and 19th
Centuries. The idea that societies were organized in order to represent the interests of
subjects is exposed as fantasy when one realizes that, prior to the 19th Century, most of a
population was excluded from the "polity" covered by the social contract, and could
not, except through the twists and turns of mystifying propaganda, be considered parties
to any such contract and representation in the international realm justified by appeal to it.
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This also excludes mention of the fact that only powerful states had any real
agency in such negotiations. Indeed, most regions of the world were not only excluded
from the negotiations and conflicts, but were the exploited objects of them.
Such politics would then, presumably, appear rational only to the elites of
powerful states. For all others - that is, the vast majority of human beings - it would be
irrational, evaluated against their rational self-interests - that is, by the liberal criterion.
Is it any wonder that a political form that at least had the potential of greater inclusion in
the political process, for the weak of powerful states and all in weak states, should be
embraced so seriously by so many? Were such people deluded about the realities of
balance of power state politics, or is Kedourie?
Neither does Kedourie follow this "romanticism" into struggle. Does he really
believe that the tremendous sacrifices made by many fighting for national independence -
- not only deprivation, imprisonment, and death, but also ridicule and castigation -- were
motivated by schoolboyish romanticism? Were there really all that many European-type
"schoolboys" available to most national movements, particularly of subject and colonized
groups? Hroch's above-discussed study suggests not, and Kedourie offers no
comprehensive evidence of its own to the contrary. In its absence, Kedourie's own broad
generalizations based on analysis of a very restricted sample are themselvesfantastic and
unrealistic, and ring of manipulation.
Even Kedourie's own selected evidence is often less than compelling. He presents
Heinrich von Kleist, a German playwright in the early 19th Century, as a psychologically
disturbed young man suffering from having read too many novels and losing touch with
reality, who eventually committed suicide in a romantic manner. He presents Kleist'
s
play, Hermann's Battle
,
as a romantic nationalist work "strangely prophetic of the
insatiable appetite the Nazis were later to show for purposeless and monstrous atrocities"
[86]. From the details Kedourie considers, however, it seems anything but a
simplistically proto-fascist work of romantic nationalism. First, the play includes a scene
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in which Germans disguised as Romans are to burn and loot German villages to stir up
anti-Roman sentiments. Kedourie assumes Kleist to include this approvingly, but it
seems odd to celebrate nationalism by showing it to be deceptive, and the oppression that
justifies it fabricated. Second, the German hero Hermann learns of a Roman soldier who
saved a German child from a fire, and is upset because it undermines his anti-Roman
feelings and causes him to "'betray for a moment the august cause of Germany"' [86].
Were his nationalism simplistic and romantic, Kleist would have been unlikely to pose
such a dilemma for his hero. Third, Hermann's wife Thusnelda, who is upset with a
Roman Legate whom she thought to be in love with her but is not, tricks him into a
garden, where she releases a bear on him. She watches with delirious pleasure as the bear
savagely kills him. Presenting the hero Hermann's wife as a would-be adulteress — and
one with desire for a foreigner and enemy — who cruelly kills a man out of spite that he
does not want her may be sexist, but it is hardly a positive characterization of German
nationalism. These three (of four) details that Kedourie assumes to be damning evidence
of Kleist' s romantic nationalism and to manifest the relationship between romantic
nationalism and Nazism, can just as easily be read as evidence of a thoughtful and critical
analysis of nationalism, which shows an understanding of its difficult realities and
tendencies.
Kedourie's focus on a few anecdotes about romantic idealism and conspiratorial
intrigue allows him to sidestep the real issue. As much as being cause to dismiss
nationalism, Kedourie's insistence on the romantic and even delusional basis of
nationalism allows him to avoid the difficult question of why so many people would
participate in national movements if they were simply romantic and irrational. Kedourie
claims that average people in pre-national states and empires were often not that bad off
before nationalism [see, for instance, 97, and Kedourie, 1970: 287 and 297] — and almost
as a rule were not better off after national revolutions [Kedourie, 1966: 107 - 108 and
138 - 139]. This claim becomes more tenable for a reader who has absorbed Kedourie's
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manipulative argument regarding the inherent romantic idealism of nationalism. In this
context, the lack of evidence supporting the claim is less noticed, and the one-sided
evidence presented by Kedourie appears much more solid than otherwise, simply based
on its consistence with what has already be argued.
When one challenges the assumptions, however, the weakness of the historical
claims also become more apparent. One must then ask. Were people so well off before?
Kedourie appears to devalue participation in the political process as a good, and focuses
only on material quality of life and security. But, even in Europe, there is no evidence
that people were materially reasonably well off prior to the advent of nationalism. More
importantly, the social and economic changes concurrent with the rise of nationalism,
such as industrialization, increased the oppression of great segments of society
independently ofnationalism. Kedourie does not even mention the other issues and
forces in play, in order to identify the specific changes that should be associated with
nationalism. Instead, in an exercise in scape-goating, he blames such suffering on
nationalism — rather than on the liberal system that created these problems, the system he
vaunts.
This becomes especially telling when one considers colonization. He claims
repeatedly in Nationalism and elsewhere that life in the colonized 80 percent of the world
was no worse before nationalism than subsequently [see, for instance, 109ff., 117, and
138 ff
.
] . This is highly contestable, when one considers the draining of resources, the
exploitation of labor and slavery, and genocide that characterized colonization by
Europeans. Given the significant residual effects of colonization and the extreme efforts
at neo-colonization by former colonizers and other great powers afterformal de-
colonization, it is difficult even to see the "after" state of post-colonization yet. It is, in
fact, quite plausible, as Fanon recognized, that the years and even centuries of
colonization so "de-developed" and impoverished the colonies, and so negatively affected
their social fabric, that an immediate or even relatively short-term recovery is extremely
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unlikely. It is made impossible by the continuing economic, military, and political
domination by former colonizers and contemporary great powers. The relevant
comparison might be between pre-colonial and colonial standards of living and indeed
ability to survive; the evidence in the Americas, Africa, and much of Asia is
unambiguously against Kedourie.
One element of Kedourie s before-and-after argument is even more extreme and
ungrounded in historical realities. He argues unambiguously that the rise of nationalism
resulted in a dramatic rise of violence and conflict in the world. He states that, even
though wars and conflicts had some role in the pre-national order, the order by its nature
was self-limiting and tended toward balancing power and conflicting claims and interests
[15]. On the other hand, violence and terrorism increased with nationalism because
adherence to ideals and principles allows little flexibility of the form Kedourie considers
essential to rational compromise. Indeed, the rigidity of nationalists adhering to
principles results in what Kedourie sees as characteristic of nationalism, the fighting out
of rigid dialectics of increasing ferocity. "By its very nature, this new style [of politics]
ran to extremes" [18]. Self-righteousness justified ever greater crimes and terrorism, and
even the interests that before had been balanced became ever more adept at clothing
themselves in the appearance of sacred principle.
Strangely, Kedourie, offers no systematic historical comparison showing that the
19th Century was bloodier or more violent than previous centuries. Had he taken an
objective look, he might have seen it to be no more or less than at least the previous three
centuries — but only if he looked at the egregious excesses of what Europeans did to those
outside Europe, the civilizations they destroyed, the people they genocided and enslaved.
The blood of such non-Europeans, however, appears not to figure in his calculations. Of
course, even in his own world, his idealizations of the "balance of power" obscure a
brutal reality. The Thirty Year War was not the result of nationalism, but was devastating
nonetheless. Such ”limit[ed] and controlled] . . . breakdown^]" in the balance of power
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and European interstate order seem to have been as devastating as any that followed.
More than this, the daily brutality of exploitation under the early modern and feudal
social structures prior cannot be minimized, except by those who are taken to kindly
idealizations andfantasies about the days of noblesse oblige and the grandeur of the
court — by those, undoubtedly, who identify themselves with kings and queens, ladies
and knights, and Oxford clerics - rather than those who tilled the soil to produce food
that often was not used to stop their children from going hungry, those who were raped
by the knights coming through their villages, etc. Only for the aristocrat can life be said
to have been better then than later; for the rest, whether lowly peasants, black slaves,
colonized labor, or dead Amerindians, things have, at the least, not gotten worse, and
nationalism certainly should not bear sole responsibility for any failure of improvement.
Where genocidal nationalisms did make things worse for some groups, their own
nationalism was quite often the key to resistance and eventual survival and even triumph,
as in the cases of the Jews and Armenians.
What is more, the everyday violence necessary to keep the colonized in line, the
slaves in the fields, the subjects obedient, seems to have vanished in Kedourie's work —
while he reiterates that nationalist state governments relied on violence to mold the wills
of their subjects to the national will. Kedourie ignores the violence used by non-
nationalist, or anti-national, states to maintain dominance over subject minorities and,
later, national movements, but registers quite fully the violence of the latter.
Kedourie even presents non-nationalist uses of nationalism as purely nationalist.
For instance, he makes much of the fact that Napoleon attempted to exacerbate and
exploit, for instance, anti-Habsburg feelings within minority groups to weaken the
Empire [93 - 95]. This, of course, precurses Stalin's use of ethnic tensions in
consolidating Soviet power. Though Kedourie suggests that these activities by Napoleon
actually created the tensions that would later erupt in nationalist conflict in Europe, he
neglects to recognize in Napoleon's activities the dark side of the real-political practices
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Kedourie himself vaunts. If it is true that European nationalism was at least in part
created through Napoleon’s actions, then it must be recognized as an outgrowth of the
practical politics that Kedourie claims tend to produce balance and reduce violence. Not
only would this mean a violent tendency for this form of politics, but it would make it the
direct cause of nationalism. Kedourie's entire opposition would collapse.
At this point in my analysis, something interesting emerges. The often inaccurate
generalizations Kedourie passes off as historical analysis and the limited and one-sided
selection of supporting details does not appear to generate his understanding of
nationalism, but are in fact generated by it. This means that the "irrationality"
(romanticism, idealism, fantasy, immaturity, etc.) that Kedourie finds at the heart of
nationalism he actually puts there himself. Following standard liberal "rationalist"
practice, Kedourie has projected "irrationality" on that to which he is opposed. His own
social and political preferences and prejudices he presumes to be "rational," and so what
conflicts with them must be "irrational." The specific points of the characterization of
nationalism as "irrational" follow.
An example from The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies
[1984], originally published in 1970, shows just how deeply skewed Kedourie's
perspective is, and the disturbing consequences it generates. In discussing minorities in
the Middle East, he focuses on Armenians first and foremost, offering his analysis of
Armenian political history in the Ottoman Empire from the 1 870s through World War I.
For him, the minority nationalisms that developed in the Ottoman Empire were "the
purest, perhaps the most classical," and "the most pitiful among" the groups to take up
nationalism — that is, the one that most harmed by its nationalism - is "the Armenian
community" [Kedourie, 1970: 287].
Kedourie's familiar themes are present. Armenian nationalism is strictly
derivative of European, as nationalism spread "from western Europe through the Balkans,
the Ottoman empire, India, the far east and Africa" [286]. A minority of Western
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educated, elite "Enlightened" Armenians were infected with nationalist aspirations in the
1850s, 60s, and 70s. Their ideas were fantasies: before them was no recognizable
"Armenian nation." Armenians "had no cohesion, no sense of political unity and they
were geographically scattered Nowhere were they in a decisive majority More
important still, the Armenian community was intimately intertwined with other elements
of Ottoman society" [290]. The "Enlightened" ones had to create such a nation, and this
they did, through forcing nationalism on a "defenseless" population [286]: nationalists
imposed the will of the nation — which they defined -- on the population that was to
constitute it. This imposition allowed no compromise in its extremity: any opponents of
this national movement were purged from the population [291 and 296].
Predictably, Kedourie claims that Armenians did not have it that bad under the
Ottomans, before nationalism. Armenians had "a certain measure of internal self-
government" under the millet system and "took their place in the delicate balance of
Ottoman society" [287], Kedourie quotes with approval the words the mutassarifof
Amasia in 1893:
You [Armenians] pay little tax; you are free from military service; you keep your
religion, your language and your customs. Would [a European] Power coming in
our place give you the same liberties? Look at Russia, where the government has
shut up all your schools and is now considering the question of shutting up your
principal church at Etchmiadzin. [297]
Indeed, he argues, the "repression" that Armenians appeared to face under the Ottomans
was in fact manufactured by Armenian nationalists in order "to convince the generality of
the Armenian people" to join the move for independence [296],
Finally, Armenian nationalism was purely irrational. Internally, an Armenian
nation-state was not viable: the Armenian community was geographically scattered and
lacked social cohesion and the range of classes necessary to a full social structure.
Externally, the Ottoman state was much more powerful than the Armenian community. It
had lost much territory in preceding years to national separatism in the Balkans and
elsewhere. It could crush a separatist Armenian movement if it wanted to, and it was
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certain to want to. What is more, if Russia provided the necessary support to Armenian
separatists, this would only serve to strengthen Ottoman resolve. And it was very
unlikely that Russia would do so.
Armenian nationalists were willing to trade a decent situation for a fight against
all odds. Given their comfortable situation, the low probability of success, and the harsh
consequences of failure, nationalism was not in the Armenians’ rational interest. Reason
should have shown that nationalism was an irrational, even insane, "fantasy" [292], but
the nationalists were immune to "sweet reasonableness" [291], Indeed, Armenian
nationalists were irrationally obsessed with liberation [291],
Kedourie moralizes about the negative consequences of embracing nationalism.
As Armenian nationalism gained ground through the coercive efforts of extremists,
Sultan Abdiilhamid II reacted strongly if understandably. Abdulhamid's logic was
simple: "The Armenians were rebelling against their lord: punishment should be meted
out to them [297]. For Kedourie, especially in light of the role European powers such as
Britain and France had begun to play in the "Armenian Question," as well as their use of
it to undermine Ottoman sovereignty and power, this approach was rational, if
unfortunate: "of course" Armenians were "bloodily suppressed" [295]. More than this,
the bloody suppression was ultimately the responsibility of - caused by - Armenian
nationalism [289].
After the massacres of 1 894 - 1 896, Armenian nationalists increased their
demands for independence, for Kedourie final evidence of complete irrationality. This
led to more massacres in the next two decades, but the nationalists pushed on. Finally,
the Ottomans put a stop to the agitation for the foreseeable future, through genocide of
the Armenian population of the Empire. But even the Armenian Genocide Kedourie
rationalizes as a direct reaction to Armenian aggression, both a popular revolt in Van and
an attack by Russian Armenian troops in the Russian army on the Turks [298].
54
It an Armenian were to look only at this treatment of the "Armenian Question,"
he/she would recognize within it the standard fabrications and arguments used by those
Turks and others who have subsequently attempted to cover up the Genocide. Kedourie's
main arguments, in fact, were the ones used by the Turks as they committed the
Genocide. This seriously compromises Kedourie's treatment of the Armenian Question.
What is more, his treatment of the Armenian case (1) flows directly out of the general
theory, as its consistencies with the general theory indicate, and (2) is explicitly intended
as a model for understanding of all separatist nationalism among subjugated and
colonized peoples [286 - 287]. This suggests profound problems with the theory. First,
in order to avoid admitting a counter-example to the general theory, particularly as it
relates to subjugated and colonized peoples, Kedourie chooses to justify genocide.
Kedourie's theoretical work itself emerges as an extreme form of politics, as bad as the
worst forms of nationalism. Second, Kedourie explicitly generalizes this critique to all
such national movements.
Kedourie justifies oppression and genocide by flipping the relationship between
oppressor and oppressed. For him, the subjugated are the agents who generate the
negative results, not the dominator. In the Armenian case, he misconstrues the
oppression that led to nationalist resistance in the first place as a response to what he
represents as unjustified nationalist agitation and instigation. Kedourie blames the victim
for the crime. By doing so, he transforms such actual historical incidents as the self-
defense of the Armenians of Van against the Turkish troops who came to massacre them
well into the execution of the Genocide, into a "revolt" against legitimate Ottoman
authority. He cites others purely manufactured by the Turks as justifications for
oppression — directly the reverse of Kedourie's claims about Armenian "manufacture."
More than this, he focuses his analysis almost exclusively on Armenian activity,
which suggests that the agents driving the deadly dialectic to the Armenian Genocide
were Armenians. Indeed, where he discusses Ottoman actions, such as massacres, or the
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negative Ottoman attitude toward their Armenian subjects, he presents these uniformly as
reactions to aggressive Armenian actions [see especially 296 - 297],
But the driving force behind the desire for Armenian autonomy was Ottoman
oppression itself. Even as early as the 17th Century, Armenians had appealed to
European powers to intervene against the Ottomans' brutal treatment of them. As study
after study of the causes of the Genocide show, this oppression increased during the 19th
Century
,
due to internal and external social, economic, and political factors quite
independent of Armenian activity. AntiArmenian-ism itself became a fundamental
component of the emerging pan-Turkist, fascist nationalism that resulted directly in the
"purification" of Turkey through elimination of the Armenians. The Turkish persecution
of Armenians intensified, quite independently of the however convenient Armenian
resistance, and culminated in the Armenian Genocide.
Indeed, that Kedourie does not analyze or critique - or even mention - pan-
Turkism calls into question his whole critique of "nationalism." In this instance,
nationalism is an evil plague because the Turkish Armenians - or some extremists among
them - embraced it, and this was the cause of their destruction. "Sweet reasonableness"
suggests a much more obvious critique of nationalism, as the force or ideology that led or
supported the Turkish state in a premeditated murder of more than one million subjects.
Of what use is a critique of nationalism which fails to call to account one of its most
egregious manifestations?
In this case, the consequence of Kedourie's antinational-ism is denial — hence,
support — of genocide, and of an extremist nationalism. How could Kedourie, so
concerned about increasing violence and suffering in the 19th and 20th Centuries, take
such a position?
The answer is relatively simple. As discussed above, Kedourie recognizes that
pre-national political arrangements were arbitrary, and were not based on any guiding
principles, but rather were the product of balancing external interests among states and
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competing internal interests within each of them. As was also discussed, the upshot of
this is a system that functions in the interest only of powerful states and the powerful
withtn states. Thus, Kedourie sides with power - with who has power within any given
status quo.
The status quo is Kedourie's deity. Even older people who produced the current
status quo are superior to younger ones who seek change. Disruption of status quo
power-arrangements, no matter that they are brutal and exploitative, as in the case of
colonialism, is never justified. Anyone with thoughts about how the political
arrangements could be changed in the future — with alternative conceptions of what the
arrangements should look like — is an idealist romantic, and a dangerous one at that.
Even where there are competing nationalisms, as in the case of the emergent
Turkish nationalism of the early 20th Century that led to the Genocide versus resistant
Armenian nationalism, Kedourie sides with the more powerful, that is, the one in power
with state control already. One would, of course, at the very least expect Kedourie to
condemn both nationalisms, but he condemns only the weaker victim. Indeed, he
celebrates the more powerful and brutal nationalism, going on at length about the virtues
of the republican movement in Turkey after World War I [299 - 300], Tie neglects to
mention that this was first and foremost a nationalist movement, a movement in fact that
was an extension in theory and practice of the nationalism that produced the Genocide.
The principles of the "republican" nationalist movement were generated by the
perpetrators of the Genocide, and its leaders were heavily involved in the Genocide.
Indeed, the new "republican" government sent its troops to invade the newly formed
Republic of Armenia as soon as it became clear that the Allies had no intention of
protecting it after the end of World War I. Turkish forces conquered half of the Republic,
which remains part of Turkey today.
The power Kedourie sides with is generally imperial. He sides with pre-colonial
empires, such as the Ottoman, in which subjugated peoples took on the status of
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minorities within formal political and informal cultural/linguistic relations that were
discriminatory against them. Of course, he recognizes the waning power of such empires
- they were based on obsolete political models, cumbersome bureaucracies, and so forth.
He sides even more forcefully with colonial empires, particularly the British, which on
his presentation is the best possible political arrangement for all concerned, even if the
colonized do not understand what is best for them.
The only empires Kedourie explicitly does not side with are Napoleon's
[Kedourie, 1966: 92ff.] and Hitler's. This is most likely because they brought
colonization and conquest home to Europe, and directly threatened his sacred Britain.
Objectively, of course, there is little difference between these empires and the British,
either in terms of political form or violence and destructiveness of methods.
From his imperial perspective, Kedourie is correct to view nationalism as a
dangerous disrupter, as an agent of change. With Marxism, nationalism was the key form
of political challenge to the European empires from the 19th Century to decolonization.
Of course, this perspective is extremely limited. It finds violence by the oppressed even
where it does not exist, while it hides the much greater violence of the colonizers. For
instance, Kedourie makes much of a reported massacre of Assyrians in Mosul by the
army of the newly independent Iraq [138], but never mentions the centuries of violence
and massacre perpetrated by colonizing Britain, Iraq's former lord. It vaunts compromise
and balance, without recognizing that "balance" between unequal powers -- particularly
between a conquering/colonizing power and its victims — is a nonsensical term. Even
where "agreements" to end conflict are reached, they are generally (1) forced on the
weaker side, (2) completely unfavorable to the weaker power, and/or (3) ignored by the
greater power subsequently (as the history of the US treaties with indigenous North
Americans demonstrates in 100s of cases).
Indeed, this perspective displaces all the blame that should be taken by European
colonialism, onto nationalism. For Kedourie, the bad effect of colonialism is not
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genocide, exploitation, or de-humanization - it is the dissemination of nationalism to the
colonized peoples [Kedourie, 1970: 299], It is not the small pox deliberately given to
natives by Jeffrey Amherst and other colonial land-clearers, or the venereal disease that
wiped out large sections of the Hawaiian and American indigenous populations, that
Kedourie calls attention to, but nationalism
,
which is to him a "rash, a malady, an
infection
. . . eating up the fabric of settled society to leave it weakened and defenseless
before ignorant and unscrupulous adventurers, for further horror and atrocity" [286].
Kedourie excuses the horrors colonialism, and then blames the colonizers for one
of the few things from Europe that had productive uses. He delegitimates the use of
nationalism by the colonized both by presenting it as a disease (and through his general
critique), and also by suggesting that anti-colonial national movements were strictly
derivative of European nationalism. Nationalism is not liberation, but further
enslavement to European ideas. This is the height of colonial arrogance, that the
"orientals" are so incapable of creation or thought, and so socially and politically
retrograde, that even something bad like nationalism must have come from Europe.
Thus, he denies the colonized and subjugated positive agency: they cannot create new
political forms that lead to productive change. At the same time, he projects on to them a
negative agency: they can initiate violent political movements that disrupt the very basis
of the global social order. "Sweet reasonableness" would expect more consistency here:
the power to disrupt and reshape the interstate order would suggest a strong enough
independence to affect the intellectual realm as well.
What one has instead is Kedourie's insistence on the White Man's Burden. He
blames colonizers not for the evils of colonization, but for failing to fulfill the full
colonial mission. At least in the Ottoman Empire, and by implication throughout Asia
and Africa, "if there had to be European reforms, if 'nations' were going to be built up,
there was only one way by which these operations could prove beneficial and not
catastrophic. It was for Europe itself to administer them and carry them through." But,
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Europe failed to shoulder this burden; the colonizers failed to exercise "power and
influence with the [attendant] responsibility" of helping the colonized societies to develop
along the proper European model. [3 1 6]
What is more, Kedourie blames the rise of nationalism and the principle of state
sovereignty it grounded for interfering with the colonizers attempts to complete their
mission [Kedourie, 1966: 134ff], Colonizers were forced by anti-colonial national
struggles to recognize such interference as "imperialistic and immoral" [Kedourie, 1970:
316]. Indeed, organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations pushed
colonizers to relinquish their possessions, and so to turn loose immature societies on the
world. Even though it generally allowed a vestige of colonialism to remain for some
time, through the form of "mandates" in which the colonizers oversaw their colonies
transition to independence, it did not allow the colonizers enough leeway to do even this
adequately. This Kedourie attributes to the unreasonable distrust of the colonizers to
pursue the best interests of their colonies. [Kedourie, 1966: 134ff] This was especially
insulting to Britain, "where there was consciousness of [colonial] responsibility [and]
scrupulousness and concern inculcated into generations of administrators," which became
finally "a firm tradition in the colonial service" [135]. Kedourie's fantastic idealization of
Britain and its colonial administrators here is on a level of with the most extreme
nationalist fantasies he reports. To sane people, not trusting genocidal exploiters to assist
their own victims after centuries of domination would be a reasonable minimum. The
irrationality that Kedourie finds is similar to that which keeps the shepherd from using
wolves to guard the sheep.
In this way, colonialism emerges as central to Kedourie's theory of nationalism.
Whether the desire to counter-attack against the forces of anti-colonialism — still quite
present at the writing of this book — was the motive for the general theory, or merely an
important benefit, is not important. What is is the function of the theory as first and
foremost a delegitimating of the struggles of subjugated and colonized peoples, by
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reducing them simply to nationalism, and by presenting nationalism as a negative
phenomenon.
Liberal Progress and the Cosmopolitan Ideal
Though representative ot liberalism in its philosophical underpinnings, Kedourie's
position does not exhaust the possible political agendas that liberalism grounds.
Kedourie is a conservative liberal: his theory is based on the desire to return to what one
might call pure liberalism, the roots and foundations of liberal society, in the form of
pre-national centralized states - whether popular or ruled by "enlightened" despots -
based on social contract theory and the autonomy of the individual.
Peter Alter, in Nationalism [1989], offers a different take. His journalistic
account of nationalism is less a theory, and more an evaluation of different types of
nationalism against the teleology of progressive liberalism. While Kedourie sees
nationalism as the disrupter of a good pre-national social and political order, Alter sees it
as a step or detour on the way to the impending post-national order.
Alter’s teleology is an updated version of 19th Century liberal progressivism. The
Enlightenment had freed the individual from external metaphysical constraints, and
individual reason had become universal law. National self-determination was a step
toward actualizing this metaphysical freedom in the political realm. The American and
French Revolutions began the shift of political legitimacy from an issue of power over
subjects to an issue of self-determination by citizens. From the late 18th Century on,
political legitimacy rested more and more on free choice by the people governed — or at
least the pretense of it. The liberation of "nations" from empires or absolutist rule was a
part of the general movement toward greater liberty. 10
10This general framework is present in Hobsbawm, as well. However, in his work, it is driven by a Marxist
perspective driven toward a different telos. Still, and consistent with some Marxist positions, Hobsbawm
allows early, liberatory nationalism a certain legitimacy in 19th Century Europe. As with Alter, this
legitimacy soon fades.
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For Alter, the next level would be "multinational" states that did not -
presumably in contradistinction to empires of conquest and colonization - oppress
nations living within them [Alter, 1989: 86], Beyond this lay greater unions, such as the
potential European Union, which has only been partially realized [122 and 128 - 129]
and "Pan-" movements, such as Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, etc., which are much
farther from meaningful realization, yet have produced supra-national joint efforts and
organizations — such as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Andean Pact, and the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States — that portend a future political order that transcends the nation-
state principle [151 - 152],
The general model of progress begins with the destruction of old empires of
conquest and domination by national self-determination movements, which are then
integrated into larger and larger social and political structures that better and better
preserve individual and group liberty and well-being.
The role of nationalism in advancing liberty in Europe and the Americas was
fulfilled in the 19th Century, and its role in Africa and Asia in the decades after World
War IT Nationalism beyond this role is obsolete and, if continued as intensively,
becomes retrogressive [49]. In practice, it takes the form of "integral" nationalism, in
which the "nation" takes on the supreme value for individuals, who are enticed to
promote the interests of their nation above all others, internal and external [37ff.]. The
"nation" becomes an end in itself, rather than a means to the end of liberty.
Nationalism no longer has the task of securing the freedom of its members from
external oppression or of reforming the state structure of the nation into one that
expresses and preserves the self-determination and liberty of its members, so it has no
place to go but against states outside its borders and minority groups within [49 - 50], It
takes the form of irredentism, which seeks to extend the state territory to include all
nationals (defined in linguistic, cultural, or historical terms) outside its present borders —
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regardless of their conditions or the extent to which this will require conquest of non-
nationals on the same lands as well. And/or it takes the form of "Russification," in which
a dominant nation within a state attempts to force national minorities to assimilate [see
3
1 ]. As for Hobsbawm, Alter holds that the struggles against internal and external
enemies serves as a diversion from the real social problems and tasks confronting a
society, allowing those in power to maintain it without social change.
Alter stresses that the shift from "emancipatory and 'legitimate' nationalism" to a
"conservative, indeed reactionary ideology" is not logically necessary. Yet, it has been an
undeniably widespread historical occurrence, and is a potential of every nationalism, no
matter how liberatory. [50] It culminated in Europe in the two World Wars; the extreme
forms it took in the second occasioned its general discrediting on the Continent [27 - 28
and 125]. Since that time, Europeans have moved beyond nationalism in the political
sense: it is at most now simply a "’a sense of national pride’" or a "'robust national
feeling’" [126] without the power to motivate violence and conflict. Such a residual
nationalism is consistent with its supersession as a political force.
Nationalism continues, however, as an important force in former colonies,
particularly in Africa and Asia, but there too it has fulfilled its emancipatory mission and
has begun to shift to integral forms [147], "Social and political emancipation for the
individual" have become rather marginal in these nationalisms [144], Nationalism, that
is, "nation-statism," has, in fact, become a buttress against self-determination of minority
groups within the newly formed states [148ff.].
But, even if this were not so, it simply is not up to the tasks that face it as a central
political ideology in the post-colonial era [149], Modem conditions have left the nation-
state behind more generally. What is required is a shift to "supranational institutions"
that might take over more and more of the functions currently performed by them. [124]
There are two main problems with Alter's approach. First, his belief that
"supranational institutions" will guarantee political liberties is naive. In old empires of
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conquest and colonial empires, there was never a question of equality: within the
imperial structure, the conqueror/colonizer dominated. Though Alter focuses on such
organizations as the European Union, the old style model is not far from what he has in
mind: he takes Lord Acton's touting of multi-nationalism as prophetic [86], but what
"multinational" state was Acton speaking of? The British Empire, which he was
defending against national and anti-colonial separation.
Perhaps this is a bit unfair: what Alter has in mind is different from what Acton
was defending. Even if one grants a clear distinction between imperial and supranational,
however, the tendency of internal domination would still be an issue. The tendency is
present in all such supranational political structures. Certainly, what has happened to
Yugoslavia in the past decade suggests this. But even in less extreme examples, such as
the European Union, certain states have greater power than others, and use it - this is
perhaps the issue most discussed regarding the EU.
Most likely, the more power such supranational structures have, the more
repressive they will become. One can even see a hint of this with the increase in
importance of the United Nations. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the UN became a
more unified body — that is, the dichotomy of its dominant powers gave way to a unity.
This unity allowed more decisive and sweeping actions than previously, making the
organization stronger. But, in becoming stronger, it has also come to serve a more
limited set of political agendas, those of its leading members. Recent actions have
included giving legal clearance for a devastating war against a country that had acted
against the interests of the dominant powers.
The Gulf War is revealing. Through it, one can see a likely future of larger and
larger, ultimately global, supranational bodies. The UN did not change the basic facts of
geopolitics: the Gulf War was simply the result of a conflict of interests between a global
dominator and a regional one. What did change was the justification for the War. It was
a legal war against a country that had transgressed an international legal structure that
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was globally enforced. In other words, what was actually the same old power struggle as
has always been present in the world, was presented and perceived as a legal action
against part of the "international community." The "external enemy" had been moved
inside, and politics of power had been shellacked over with a patina of legal and moral
legitimacy. As with state politics two centuries before, legitimacy in interstate politics
has come to depend on principle, not power. In a world with such sizable power
differentials among states, this is, of course, abused. It is not a matter of eliminating
interstate enmity; rather, powerful states have developed mechanisms that — however
sincere their intentions at some level - simply bring their enemies closer, for better
control. Supranational structures such as the UN, rather than increasing liberty, actually
undermine the self-determination of disparate groups, bringing them under one political
structure and under the legitimate power of the most powerful groups within it.
The second problem is that Alter divides up the world into discrete parts, such as
Europe as opposed to the once colonized parts of Asia and Africa. He then fails to see the
continuing relationship between these parts, when analyzing the problems facing the
latter or the progress made by the former. It has been frequently and well argued that
"decolonization" in formal political terms is only the first step toward a genuine end to
domination of colonized peoples and territories - "post-colonial" domination continues
in new forms but along old lines and with familiar results. What is less frequently
commented upon is that Europe's supersession of "nationalism" and conflict within -
which Alter celebrates as an indication of European maturity and world leadership - has
depended on this just as much. For Europe as a whole depends fully on cheap non-
European labor imported "temporarily" - Turks, Kurds, and Vietnamese in Germany;
Algerian in France; Pakistani and Indian in Britain; and so forth. The nationalism that
was once in part based on competition among Europeans for colonial conquest [see 40],
has now been focused entirely on producing a division of labor that reserves the benefits
of economic activity primarily for the Europeans. It is cooperation, but cooperative
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domination. Any decrease in intra-European national conflict has been more than
matched by an increase in neo-fascist, neo-colonial racism, which has been raised from
residual colonialist mass sentiment to law and public policy. For instance, the centuries-
old conflict between France and Germany has been replaced for each by conflict with the
groups supplying immigrant labor.
Alter does not recognize this because he does not recognize the connections that
exist contemporaneously. This depends on a temporal differention that is the hallmark of
progressive liberalism. Africa, Asia, and Latin America are behind Europe and North
America in terms of an absolute scale of social and technological development. Thus,
one finds that in 1950, former colonies "still" had the relationship to nationalism that
European states had previously [26] — this "still" indicating the implicit developmental
schema.
This temporal differentiation is at the same time a forced homogenization of the
different areas of the world. Though Alter is careful to "bear in mind" the differences in
circumstances between Europe and the "Third World" [144], he finds nationalism in the
latter tending toward what it became in the former, as discussed above. As with
Kedourie, this cuts off all possibility that the radically different societies and
circumstances in colonized regions has led and will lead to entirely new possibilities not
produced in or envisioned by Europe.
At a more fundamental level, it also assumes that the left-right, progressive-
conservative teleological dichotomy at the core of Alter's work is relevant beyond 19th
Century Europe — or, more accurately, when Europe is removed from its self-imposed
conceptual isolation. Historical facts suggest otherwise. First, this split within European
politics, which looms so large in the minds of Europeans, has had little meaning for those
in colonized or formerly colonized societies. At most, liberal theory merely provided/s a
different method of domination. For instance, liberal theory in the 19th Century was not
opposed to colonialism. Rather, it justified colonialism not simply in the interest of the
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colonizer - the more honest conservative justification - but also in the interest of the
colonized. As John Stuart Mill put it in On Liberty
, those in colonized societies
(particularly China and India) could not be granted any right of self-determination, as
Europeans could, because their societies were still immature [Mill, 1977 : 9 . io]-
colonial rule by an advanced society was necessary to bring these societies to maturity.
Indeed, Mill, the paragon of liberal-progressive, emancipatory thinking in 19th Century
Britain, served many years as a colonial administrator for the East India Company,
apparently extracting a nice profit for himself and the Company in exchange for "helping"
the natives.
In the 20th Century
,
a similar role of liberal-progressives in colonial and post-
colonial domination has continued. One strain of this has been well documented in Thy
Will Be Done [1995], in which Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett trace the use of
liberal, almost radical development techniques by missionary Charles Cameron
Townsend to bring indigenous groups in various Latin American countries into line with
the agendas of their governments and international business concerns, most notably the
corporate empire of Nelson Rockefeller. These progressive methods allowed Townsend's
organization to gain the trust of and influence over various indigenous groups. They
were then led easily into line. In some cases, with the idea that they were "helping"
indigenous groups, the missionaries even actively assisted in their genocide by
governmental and corporate interests.
Yoko Harumi [1997] has shown that the progressive techniques pioneered by
Townsend and the liberal attitudes justifying their use were at the core of the US Peace
Corps and other Cold War-era US development approaches. The Peace Corps was, of
course, implicated in CIA activities, and various liberal governmental and non-
governmental programs functioned as adjuncts to the US war effort in Vietnam. What is
more, these techniques and attitudes have resurfaced at the heart of contemporary
"participatory" development methods and ideologies that are currently billed as correcting
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the past failures and compromised nature of US-based international development
programs.
Even more innocuous externally driven development efforts have had oppressive
effects. Often, projects intended to "help" native societies have deeply destabilized or
destroyed indigenous economic and social structures, with horribly negative effects:
emotional and economic support networks have been destroyed, young women forced en
masse into prostitution, children go hungry, families broken apart, and adults and
children forced to move to urban industrial centers to join growing ranks of exploited
laborers working under hazardous and inhumane conditions.
Beyond this, the very terminology of "left" and "right" was to a large extent
imposed on the "Third World" by the major players in the Cold War. The United States
continues even now its practice of evaluating the political orientation of movements
relative to its own interests. "Communists" are against those interests, and "democrats"
are for them — without regard to actual ideologies or effects on the native societies
[Harumi, 1997]. This imposition of Euro-American political agendas on the "Third
World" has ripped apart term from referent, foreclosing any meaningful use of this
imposed political terminology.
Even if one brackets off this neo-colonial domination of political terminology and
the material facts of neo-colonial dominance relations, and looks at the "Third World"
alone in order to isolate the native agency of various groups, the categories of
"progressive" and "conservative" do not have the consistent meaning that Alter assumes,
especially in reference to national movements. In many cases, anti-colonial national
movements were grounded in a conservative appeal to the pre-colonial past. In others,
liberal reforms have destabilized indigenous economic and social structures, and created
conditions of greater poverty and dependence on government assistance, while at the
same time eroding potential sources of political opposition. More than this, to the extent
that the European political terminology and forms have been put to use by agents in the
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"Third World," they have been removed from their context and mixed, matched, and
rearranged into constellations of ideas and political forms that do not look like those
visible in Europe. For instance, the very name of Mexico's long-ruling PRI appears
contradictory in European terms: institutionalized revolution, that is, conservative
progressivism.
What this means tor colonized and oppressed peoples in the "Third World" is
simple: the necessary link Alter assumes between the terms and forms of
emancipation/hberation and liberal progressivism does not hold regarding colonized and
formerly colonized areas. "Liberalism" has led and can lead to oppression just as directly
as conservatism." One might say that nationalism itself circumscribes "left-right,"
progressive-conservative," rather than the other way around, as Alter assumes. To say
nationalism went from a leftist, liberal political form to a rightist, conservative one in the
latter part of the 19th Century in Europe says nothing about its potential liberatory (or
oppressive) possibilities elsewhere and at other times - this depends on the theoretical
and concrete forms its takes in these circumstances, which (as argued above) may be
radically different from what was produced in 19th Century Europe.
More generally, the foregoing refutes any claim that liberal-progressivism is
emancipatory in some universal sense. Liberal-progressivism does not advance the
general liberation of humankind. As a result, a determination of nationalism's
emancipatory potential cannot be made by evaluation against the claimed teleology of
liberal-progressivism.
It is, ultimately, his liberal-progressive developmental scheme that drives Alter's
work. Indeed, it is this that allows him at times to take a relatively temperate view of
nationalism: he is not claiming that nationalism has become irrelevant [Alter, 1989: 126]
nor that it should be [124], He has only to demonstrate the trend of nationalism's
decreasing social/political appropriateness and progressiveness, and to project this trend
into the future. Against this demonstrated trend, nationalism is not simply present today,
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It is still present [122, 123, etc.]. It is hanging on, despite forces that are pressuring it out
of history - forces that will, presumably, eventually succeed.
History is relegating nationalism to a passive or marginal role, and so its residual
presence is not a problem: it is fine to grant a residual place for nationalism in the world
order that is emerging, so long as it is a "'normal’, legitimate" or "moderate" form [126],
that is, not a central political motivator. In other words, nationalism is fine, so long as it
does not interfere with the developmental scheme that grounds Alter's work. It can be a
feature of personal identity, with formative influence in terms of culture and language, so
long as it is not a basis for active political solidarity and movement.
With the self-satisfaction of a liberal European convinced that Europe has learned
from its mistakes and has forged ahead toward a liberated, well-balanced future, Alter has
nothing to fear from nationalism. This historical inevitability allows Alter a much more
balanced and measured representation of the nation and nationalism than either
Hobsbawm or Kedourie, who defensively condemn a political form that has actually
taken their trains of destiny on different tracks, carrying them further and further from the
correct route. For Alter, it is at worst the addition of a few extra stops on the way. He
can even safely analyze different attitudes that have prevailed at different times regarding
nationalism, without begging questions about his own attitude: he is not judging
nationalism, but rather evaluating it against a given (liberal progressive) standard
embedded in the very foundation of his guiding ideology.
Jonathan Ree, in "Cosmopolitanism and Nationality" [1996], rejects any
internationalist" transcendence of nationality. For him, the former depends on and
assumes the latter: after all, the term "international" can have no meaning without
reference to the "nation": internationalism preserves the basis of nationalism [167 - 170].
He counters the obvious objection that "international" should properly be
understood as " interstate" (which is very different, given the difference between "nation"
and "state," as concepts and realities) by suggesting that the confusion between these
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terms is essential to them in what they mean in practice, and so part of their nature [Ree,
1996: 170], The theorist should dismiss abstract "terminological squeamishness," and
focus on analyzing the practical confusion instead [170],
This "confusion," of course, recalls the analyses of Kedourie and Hobsbawm. Ree
follows them by asserting that inter/nationalism is the product of illusion. He categorizes
the core illusions as empirical and conceptual, as well as "dialectical," or illusions in
reasoning [170 - 171]. The empirical illusions echo Hobsbawm and Kedourie: they are
the illusions that "nations" have some basis in history (they claim to reach back to pre-
historical origins), biology (the nation is the product of a "continuous chain of racial
inheritance going back to a biologically pure past"), geography (nationalism refers to a
territory that was once the exclusive possession of the nation), and language/culture
(linguistic/cultural differences are essential markers of social groups) [171]. These
illusions can be exposed by direct appeal to facts in the relevant fields.
The first conceptual illusion is that nationalism derives from a natural, concrete
attachment to what is local, what one experiences in one's everyday life. Ree counters
that the borders of one's "local" attachments have no necessary relationship to the range
of the nation. Individuals generally have, first of all, more than one such set of
attachments, which do not correspond with each other. What is more, specific sets
generally either fail to extend to the borders of the nation, or cross over them. [172 - 173]
The second illusion is that this or that nation is self-generating, that is, defined through
self-reference. However, as stressed above, nations exist only through differentiation
from other nations: they are negatively defined, against other nations. [173]
Finally, the "dialectical" illusion is that "our life is nothing apart from our nation"
[173]. That is, following Kedourie, the nationalist mentality holds the individual to be a
dependent, derivative part of the national whole. This is the result of a conflation of the
"natural," "political," and "subjective" realms: the personal is perceived as also national,
the given circumstances of one's birth are confused with the essence of one's subjectivity,
71
and so forth [173 - 175], At the same time, the nation itself becomes
"subjective," as the
conflation runs in reverse: "national identity" means not only the enduring features of the
nation apart from historical accidents, but also its "collective self-image" [175 - 176],
This takes Ree beyond Kedourie: the individual is not a purely derivative part of the
whole, but affects the whole as well.
As with Hobsbawm, Kedourie, and Alter, Ree attributes to inter/nationalism a
bloody history of violence and genocide. What is worse, this is a history without guilt:
the destruction has come as much through self-sacrifice and altruism as destructive
malice. Self-righteousness has, indeed, allowed for increased destruction. [167 - 168]
To the illusion of inter/nationality, Ree counterpoises a future cosmopolitanism,
in which individuals could live without essential reference to nationality [178]. The ideal
of such a form is the individual who can move freely from one area to another, associated
with no place more than any other, with no language more than any other (except for the
trivial fact of not knowing some) [177 - 178], It is a world in which the individual
subjectivity is freed from the political, to exist in itself, a world "which could put the
illusions of intemationality behind it, for good" [178],
Ree s case against inter/nationalism and proposal of cosmopolitanism are
themselves compromised by empirical, conceptual, and dialectical errors. It shares much
with Kedourie's, right down to the classic liberal attribution of delusion and irrationality
to what he/she does not like. Against it, the critique of Kedourie stands, with the
following additions.
(1) Where Kedourie painstakingly traces his concept back into German
intellectual history, Ree appears to pull it out of the air — with some very limited
obligatory allusions to Kant, a reference to Jeremy Bentham, analysis of a speech by
Bertrand Russell (an antinational-ist with a crude understanding of the phenomenon, who
is particularly irrelevant to a serious discussion of this or most other social or political
issues), a short discussion of Erik Erikson, and little else. He does not survey current
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theories about nationalism, nor does he discuss any actual national movements - though
he does claim to base his understanding on observation of "nationalist practice." Out of
these inadequate sources, he outlines a set of positions and beliefs supposedly held by
nationalists generally, at the core and essence of nationalism. This description of
nationalism is, quite simply, a straw man. Far from capturing the complexity of the
concept(s) of the nation available in different contexts, it merely restates a set of trite
points.
(2) Ree does attempt to obviate any counterclaims regarding the conceptual
complexity and richness of concepts of the nation and nationalisms, by claiming that such
complexity is the function of confusion and the co-existence of contradictory elements.
By this conjuring trick, he avoids having to treat the actual phenomena, instead
representing the complexity that contradicts his presumed concepts as intellectual error
and delusion - "contradictions, fictions, and confusions" [170], In a typically "analytic"
move, he flattens a potentially interesting complex of ideas and practices into a
conceptually simple unit. His own illusion is to suppose that the world can be understood
through simple, unified concepts, and anything more complex must be error: he fails to
entertain the possibility that a "confused," internally tense concept of the nation or
nationalism might correspond to social and metaphysical reality better than a simplistic
analytic liberalism — at least a reality in which social engineering has not accomplished
the simplistic analytic ideal. For instance, to the extent that what he labels "empirical
illusions" are present in specific national movements and nationalism, they are often
highly contested, and must be understood in this context of conflicting ideas.
More than this, Ree restricts nationalism to the merely conceptual level. He
reserves the material realm for evaluative use against national self-concepts and
nationalism. He claims that he has extracted the elements of his concept of nationalism
out of "nationalist practice," but does not entertain the possibility that concepts of
nationalism themselves - even such limited ones as his, to the extend they exist in
73
practice - might be generated out of material forces, and not simply be ideas imposed on
material reality. This was also an issue with Kedourie. Ree, by insisting on nationalism
as mere concept, prejudices his account against actuality. Of course a purely conceptual
account of nationalism appears illusory when compared with observable facts; the
interrelation of the concept with the material realm that is necessary andfundamental to
the concept itselfhas been obscured, and so the concept is "not itself," that is, is
represented as less than it really is, which causes it to appear to be a false account of the
observable reality of nationalism.
(3) Claiming that the concepts of nation and international are confused concepts
allows Ree to reject a distinction between nation and state [170]. He seems unable or
unwilling to try to sort out these and related concepts, let alone probe them in the depth
their complexity deserves (see point 2, preceding). It might be that his conceptual
framework is simply too crude and limited to capture the concepts and their instantiations
adequately. He then justifies this lack of comprehension by projecting it onto the objects
of study themselves. This one might call an epistemic tautology: the limits of his
conceptual frame he experiences as the limits of the object of conceptualization. It might
not, after all, be nationalists who are "simple-minded" [see 171 - 172].
(4) The first conceptual illusion follows Hobsbawm, while the second is the
standard claim that nationalism defines the self in terms of the other, as an exclusion of or
defense against the other. As above, the first contention cannot be refuted without appeal
to the internal complexity of national concepts and nations themselves. Across different
concepts of the same nation, the boundaries of the nation - even one associated with a
state with fixed borders — rarely coincide. Some members have a very localized concept
that is projected onto the whole, while others exclude members whom yet others include
or who include themselves. Some are considered members by others but do not consider
themselves so. And so forth and so on. 11 There is never a consistent concept held by all
U
I will return to this point in Chapter 3.
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Who are in the nation, and rarely are concepts even shared by large subgroups. Different
individuals often even understand different things when embracing the same concept.
Indeed, single individuals might operate with more than one concept of the nation,
depending on the context, while the significance of the nation varies from individual to
individual and subgroup to subgroup, even beyond the differences in the content of the
concepts. The human boundaries of an actual nation are then always fuzzy - though the
different positions in debates about it might be clear. By their nature, they cannot
correspond to the fixed, unique boundary of the state - which, to the extent that it is
imposed on those with different concepts, exacerbates tensions within the nation. At
best, to the extent to which nations determine their own fixed borders in proposal or fact,
the borders are the product of compromise or the agenda of a potentially opportunistic
dominant strain of nationalism (which is quite often selected through external forces and
manipulations).
These facts do not mean that the "nation" is a conceptual illusion, but rather that it
is a much more complex phenomenon than can be conceived within Ree's philosophy.
The conceptual error of nationalists is simply to perceive or conceive only one concept of
the nation, where there are many; of course, Ree, from whom one has a right to expect
more, actually delivers less - the same reductive concept, but without the compromise
and interaction with other concepts that is often present in serious national movements.
Indeed, I will argue in Chapter 3 that this internal tension is actually in part constitutive
of the nation, and an essential part of formation and on-going self-transformation of a
nation.
Regarding the second conceptual illusion, Ree's pretension to Kantianism [168]
would be well served by a re-reading of the Antinomies. His counter to the presumed
universal nationalist claim to self-generation is to state merely the other side of an
antinomy, rather than to rise above it. Claiming that the nation is defined simply through
negation of other nations requires a solid reference point somewhere, which Ree denies.
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He does suggest that this reference point is itself the illusion of "an imagined
international order" [173], that is, the illusion that other nations exist. But this begs the
question of how such an illusion (or conceptualization) can itself can be spontaneously
generated. As Ree himself stresses, the international cannot be conceived without
reference to the national. Thus, even at the merely conceptual level, the international that
he claims is the ground of the national is itself grounded by the national. While he claims
as the very basis of his essay that the national and international are two sides of the same
coin, "inseparable partners," and their antinomy should be superseded in favor of
cosmpolitanism [170 and 177], here he transgresses this basis, by privileging the
international over the national.
To avoid the messy fact that "local attachments" provide an internal source of
nation-generation, he simply rejects them as "national." 12 They must be converted into
nationality through the operation of a nationalist self-conception. [171] But, could such a
self-conception occur in the absence of these "local attachments"? If not, then does that
not suggest a dialectical relationship between local attachments and the negation of what
might be called foreign attachments, or external, distinct systems of local attachments?
My objection is not a defense of the claim to pure self-generation of nations.
Rather, to the extent that the nation can be understood through purely mental operations
of definition (see point 2, above), the definition should be understood as both positive and
negative, with these elements dialectically related and in mutual presupposition.
This dialectic between positive and negative definition has been the general trend
historically. For instance, in anti-colonial national movements, the impetus toward
nationalism was generally acknowledged by participants to be reaction against
oppression. The struggle, as described in Fanon’s Wretched ofthe Earth [1963] and as
has been readily observable, was to create a positive definition of the community of
resistance to oppression, to balance the negative one. What is important to recognize is
12
In direct contrast to his equally arbitrary conflation of nation and state.
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that in such national movements, both a negative and positive self-definition has been
essential, which has, further, been recognized by various participants - though not
always by the same ones. This is one of the reasons why these issues have been so hotly
debated within the movements - further evidence that it is inaccurate to privilege in
either direction.
Indeed, in the case of anti-colonial movements, the issue of positive versus
negative self-definition is necessarily tied up with the very issue of liberation. A negative
definition against the colonizer was, in fact, definition by the colonizer: the colonizer
defined the colonized by oppressing them. The colonized then, understandably,
considered positive self-definition part of liberation. It was, like the other aspects of
liberation, not a given, but struggled for. This possibility of self-definition, in fact, might
have been one of the things that made nationalist form of liberation movement attractive
to so many groups. Ree seems to fixate on this emphasis on positive self-definition,
without considering its context. Indeed, Ree fails to consider such power issues among
groups at all. The issue enters Ree's analysis only as something to be superseded by
cosmopolitanism - it is itself based on the "illusion" of imagined totality or world system
of nations arranged in a hierarchy [173], Of course, one might want to distinguish simple
illusions from illusions with guns. I will revisit this issue below.
Even in earlier anti-imperial national movements, where pre-existing nations were
institutionalized or imagined prior to active nationalism, the experience of oppression has
been recognized as formative. For instance, though many Armenians would argue
strongly against privileging Turkish oppression of Armenians including most of all the
Genocide in any national self-definition, others view it as essential to understanding the
nature of the Armenian nation as it exists today. There is no one dominant position,
which itself suggests the dialectical relationship between the two possibilities.
In the broader history of nationalism, the data simply do not line up on one side of
the "antinomy" or the other: even though it might in individual cases, these are offset by
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cases manifesting the opposite tendency, both of which are offset by cases in which both
are fully present.
(5) As Kedourie, Ree sets a bland anti-liberal organicism against his version of
liberal individualism, again imposing his own conceptual limits onto his object. Ree
pushes the issue more deeply than Kedourie does, however. Ree attributes the
organicism to an illusory identification of politics and subjectivity. It seems strange that
this position is based on observation of nationalist practice: such observation would
indicate to most observers that any identity between political (unit) and subjectivity was
highly unstable and variegated. Different individuals with different concepts of the
political (unit) and subjectivity might share some type of abstract conflation of them, but
these are likely different and in tension with one another. In practice, different
conceptions of the political (unit) collide with one another, and distinct individuals are in
relation to a concept of the political (unit) that is at best a stable net result and at worst a
shifting, unstable area of continual contestation. Such a concept is, of course, distinct
from an individual's own concept (assuming this to be a relatively unitary concept),
which makes identifying with it a very complex issue. The only way to ensure a stable
identity between the political (unit) and subjectivity such as Ree describes is to reduce the
political unit (nation) to one member. 13
Ree does not get caught in a typical progressive liberal teleology. According to
him, the dialectical illusion transforms political relations into the "master-phenomenon of
human existence" [176]. A proper understanding of the subject reduces politics to a
specific form of social relation that predominates only within specific historical contexts
[176]. The presumption that politics is essential to subjectivity, which is at the core of
nationalism, is a historically conditioned illusion that can and should be shed, toward a
peaceful post-inter/national cosmopolitan future grounded in fact not illusion. The ideal
13This is, in fact, what "nations" often become in "multicultural" (as distinct from multinational) states.
There, the social structure of the nation is suppressed, and the individual enters the greater society as an
individual. Thus, the nation is fragmented into the national concepts of each of these individuals. I will
take up the implications of this below.
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emancipation, his liberal telos, is not political liberation (as for Alter), it is liberation
from politics. Progress is not measured in political terms at all: liberation is not
dependent on developing non-oppressive political structures. Even the social contract,
which preserves the logical priority of the autonomous individual, links the subject too
closely to politics.
But, what can an escape from the political mean, in concrete terms? Ree offers a
model, in the form of Ben Jiju, a 12th Century Jewish merchant. Ben Jiju lived in various
places, including Aden, India, and Egypt, had a daughter with an Indian woman, was
business partners with an Indian man who eventually moved to Aden. What is more, his
Indian daughter went off to Palermo to marry. Neither he nor his family were "national"
(or the 12th Century equivalent, 14 tied to a locale or culture) or "international," that is,
focally conscious of moving among different cultures or states [178].
No, they were not national or international — they were a combination of elites
and slaves. Ben Jiju s mate he originally purchased as his slave, and his business partner
was also his slave. His "multicultural" social and economic relations were relations of
dominance; he moved among cultures to buy slaves. Even his moves to various locations
one might assume to have been out of simply business interest: his cosmopolitanism was
a culture of economic power he carried with him wherever he went.
One can see this type of "cosmopolitanism" today, in men who purchase mail-
order brides, the brides themselves, corporate "salary men" who travel the world on
business (never leaving the corporate world, never really "being in" the places they visit),
wealthy globetrotters, etc. The "cosmopolitans" of our age are also migrant and "guest"
workers, mail-order brides and women on entertainment visas, refugees, etc. — as well as
the employees of transnational corporations, development workers, missionaries, men on
"sex tours," trekkers in the Himalayas (often themselves on unofficial sex tours), those
14Neither Ree nor I hold that nations and nationalism existed before the modern era.
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with the educational resources and time to learn new languages
,
15
and so forth - the
dominated and the dominators. They are those with the wealth and power to transcend
political arrangements and law, or their victims. One cannot shed one's links to one part
of the world simply by buying things (people, clothes and crafts, new languages, or
native experiences) from other parts of the world ~ despite the incessant attempts by
would-be cosmopolitans from powerful societies to do so. Nor, obviously, is one "free
from politics" by being purchased as a slave and taken away from one's homeland, or its
contemporary equivalents
.
16
Nationalism is particularly anathema to elite cosmopolitans, because it
counterbalances their power and domination. It restricts their movements and their
ability to benefit from their elite power outside of their home area. It also restricts the
movements of slaves and exploited labor, and often explicitly challenges the dominance
relations underlying them. That is not to say that nationalism in itself is a solution to the
issues of power and domination, nor that it succeeds consistently in its challenge to them
- nor even that it does not sometimes become a tool of power and domination. Certainly,
the existence of state borders and economic boundaries contributes to the exploitation of
immigrant or migrant laborers, entertainers, etc. But, the state structure is not a direct
expression of nationalism, and national movements do have a potential against the
structure and the power of cosmopolitanism. My point here is to stress that
"cosmopolitanism" is not a solution to these problems, but simply another form of
domination, which itselfmight be aided by the state system.
Perhaps Ree could have chosen a better example, but this would have served
merely to obscure the reality of domination and subordination beneath it. Perhaps Ree
could counter-argue that this reality is a function of our politicized times, and will
disappear with the transcendence of politics. But, this was also reality in Ben Jiju's
15R£e has obviously never tried to enroll in an English as a Second Language course in an urban US area,
nor has he had to figure out a way to pay for ESL courses or find time when working full-time, raising a
family, etc., to attend class and do assignments.
16 By Ree's definition, African slaves brought to the Western Hemisphere were "cosmopolitan."
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world. What is more, it will be reality even in a stateless, politics-less world, of the sort
that Ree envisions. This makes simple transcendence of politics irrelevant to liberation.
It is not just the erasure of state borders and "national prejudice" that make cosmopolitan
movement possible, but also wealth. If one defines politics broadly, to include issues of
power generally, then the cosmopolitan future cannot ensure emancipation except
through direct address of power issues - economic, social, gender, and military, as well
as political.
Liberation cannot mean a simple escape; it requires struggle and social change.
Ree’s approach seems to be that, if one just pretends that power relations are illusions,
they will go away. This childish approach can work for some people, whose position of
dominance (as citizens of a powerful state, as wealthy, or so on) guarantee their ability to
move freely around a world inhabited by people tied to locales or moved about it, through
subjugation and exploitation. Indeed, their appearance of cosmopolitanism depends
precisely on dominance relations and a structure guaranteeing them, as well as the ability
to hide these from themselves and others. Only those who have power can "transcend
politics," that is, the constraints of power. But, then, they are the deluded ones, who have
succumbed to an illusion.
If Ree's conception of the autonomous individual in its proper, undeluded and
unconstrained state, is the cosmopolitan subjectivity, then essential (even central) to that
subjectivity is power, that is, politics broadly defined . 17 "Freedom from politics" does
not mean that an individual really has no political relations with others, but rather that the
individual does not acknowledge those relations. In the case of the cosmopolitan elite, it
means simply freedom from responsibility for one's domination over others.
17This could also have been argued by appeal to the extensive literature on the social construction of
subjectivity. This literature, however, might be rejected by Rie and others who maintain belief in the myth
of the autonomous atomic individual subject.
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The Last of the Romans'?
Martin Thom takes a less typical approach to the nation than Hobsbawm,
Kedoune, Alter, or Ree do. His highly sophisticated Republics
,
Nations, and Tribes
[1995] penetrates to the core of French political theory during and after the Revolution, as
well as subsequent German scholarship, demonstrating a deep knowledge of a
comprehensive range of primary sources from and secondary sources on the period.
Thom argues that the French Revolution - or, more precisely, reaction to the
ensuing "Terror" - marked the beginning of a shift from a European tradition of
republican free cities with its origin in ancient Greece and Rome, to an era of "tribalism"
[Thom, 1995: 131]. According to him, the tradition of free cities was still a strong
political force in 18th Century Europe [5 - 6 and 168ff., especially 183]. More than this,
he reads the oeuvre of Rousseau as at its core a contemporary (mid- 18th Century) theory
of the free republican city, taking Republican Rome as its model. This theory was posed
by Rousseau as an alternative to the ascendant centralized state and liberal capitalism.
[58ff.]
The key feature of a free city is that it is governed by the "citizens assembled,"
that is, citizens as direct participants in the governing assembly [see, for instance, 46, 47,
and 57]. Indeed, in a free city, "the government" itself can only be understood as the
"citizens assembled." Thom finds supporting evidence of this identity in such facts as
that the pre-imperial Roman "state" had virtually no bureaucracy. The citizens of a free
city are, thus, "active." Indeed, this activity is the essence of their freedom, which
evaporates in its absence (with the ascendance of oligarchy or dictatorship).
This marks the distinction between the "liberty of the ancients" and the "liberty of
the modems." For the ancients, liberty was directly proportional to direct participation in
public assembly, that is, in government. For the modems, liberty became inversely
proportional to government control over the individual: political liberty was freedom
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from external coercion by public authority.'* Individual liberty was seen as grounded in a
set of rights that guarantee "the independence of citizens from the power of the
government" [93], In an interesting challenge to the general Enlightenment approach,
Thom sides with ancient over modem liberty: his hope for the future is the re-emergence
of such liberty, through the ascendance of the free city model [7],
It is important to stress that this is not merely a communitarian approach. At the
heart of Thom's concept of the republic is that it is not dependent on a shared culture,
language, lineage, set of core values, or even conception of community: it requires
merely the shared commitment to participate in an assembly. 19 In fact, without that
commitment, an individual simply ceases to be a member, without necessary effects on
the remainder of the republic.
Thom defends the liberty of the ancients against the standard liberal criticism that
it required suppression of the individual for the good of the group, and allowed liberty of
the individual" only as a share in the liberty of the entire group; that is, only the society,
not the individual, was a "unit of liberty." Thom counters that an equivalent of modem
individual freedom was not only codified in Roman civil law, but guaranteed by the
government. The essential difference from modem individual liberty consisted in the fact
that this guarantee depended on the participation of the individual in public assembly.
The individual did not passively receive the liberty, but gained it through his [not her]
activity within the legitimate assembly structure.
Thus, the "private," as a sphere away from public life, was intimately tied to the
latter, and guaranteed through it. The shift to modem liberty came when people came to
be "represented" in assembly, and the "private" became disjoint from the "public," such
that different people focused on each realm. 20 Rights were determined by nature or by an
“Private coercion seems acceptable for the modern liberal.
“Though, as I will argue, Thom sneaks in a "given," in the form of the law or constitution given to the
assembly by the law-giver.
20This is reminiscent of Ree, but for Thom the development of the distinction leads directly to the
production of the "nation," while for Ree, this distinction was the feature of a /^re-liberal era, the erosion of
which leads to nationalism.
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imaginary "social contract” that, since it was always already entered by all citizens,
guaranteed the rights in perpetuity. Indeed, the focus of concern under the social contract
model became not how to perpetuate it (to guarantee rights), but whether an individual
could ultimately break his [not her] commitment to it.
It is this change that provided an opening for the development of the concept of
the "nation": "once the liberty of the individual was no longer guaranteed by his or her
[sic] being an active part of a sovereign assembly
... the danger arose that it might be
thought to inhere in a more general, purportedly ever-present attribute, a race or a
language or both" [92]. One's liberty slipped from being guaranteed even by an
imaginary act of entering the social contract: it became a given, guaranteed through a
language, land, culture, etc. Liberty was no longer "guaranteed" through representation
,
it became a matter of something beyond the government, as the government itself became
further and further removed from the individual. 21 On Thom’s account - contrary to
Kedourie, but with Hobsbawm and Alter — the nation was in part a consequence of
modem liberalism.
Yet, this shift was not the only necessary ingredient. The emergence of the nation
depended also on the discovery of "tribes" in North America. Popularized and
"analyzed" by a succession of ethnologists writing in the tradition22 of the "noble
savage," the "tribe" became a conceptual alternative to the citizens assembled or the
latter's devolution, representative liberalism. German romantic thinkers back-read such
tribal structures into their own presumed history, by appeal to such texts as Tacitus'
Annals and Germania [214], This back-reading was combined with new "discoveries" in
linguistic history that placed German as a pure descendant from the Indo-European proto-
language and that gave language a new significance as encoding the "essential character"
of a "tribe" [22 Iff.]. 23 This also freed Germans from the Roman tradition that penetrated
2
'Though, if one recalls Foucault or even accept Hobsbawm's argument, government gained yet more
power over the individual, reaching more deeply into his/her life.
22 Rousseauian.
23See the above treatment of Kedourie.
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France and other areas of Europe: the Germanic peoples did not develop due to the
influence of Roman civilization, but despite it, struggling in ancient times to remain a
pure tribe uncorrupted by Rome [212 and 215 - 216], It represented a politically charged
transfer of value from the ancient city to the barbarian tribe, from Rome to the Germanic
peoples" [1]. The model for politics was no longer the free city of the Roman tradition; it
had become the primal Indo-European tribe.
The shift was driven by the failure of Revolutionary France to realize the political
structure of the free city model. The Revolutionary political structures were based
explicitly on the model of Republican Rome. Unfortunately, the "citizens assembled"
unleashed the Terror: the rule of assembled citizens became totalitarian and homicidal.
Many within and without France saw this as the failure of extreme or direct democracy.
In France, more power was ceded to traditional-style rulers, with Napoleon the ultimate
beneficiary, while in Germany, an alternative was sought to the form of mass politics that
unleashed the Terror within France - and without it in the form of Napoleon's armies.
Some French intellectuals, such as Madame de Stael, participated in the German reaction.
The German alternative motivated mass political participation without widespread
political agency.
Thom's goal is to expose the weak foundation of the shift to the nation as
dominant political form, and of the concept of the nation itself. His political agenda is
explicit: he
write[s] from the conviction that before the age of nations there was an age of
cities, and that after the age of nations there could be, if there is not a
pandemonium of 'ethnic cleansing' instead, a new age of cities, in which regional
assemblies, freed of the terminal claims of providence, could answer in all clarity
to the rightful demands of cosmopolis. [7]
Thom's analysis marks a genuine step beyond the limits of the theorists I have
considered thus far. He actually develops a novel political theory in relation to the
nation, rather than merely counterpoising the nation to a threadbare political alternative.
He digs into history to excavate an interesting and contemporarily relevant trend in
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political form. What is even more impressive is the fact that his theory is a genuine
attempt to theorize the social group that does not reduce it to either the
"supra-individual"
or a "logically contingent contract among autonomous individuals" that it becomes when
conceived from a liberal perspective.
The limit of his theory is that he, like each of the other theorists I have discussed,
counterpoises the nation to a social/political form valorized within his own agenda, as a
means of rejecting the nation and establishing the superiority of the valorized form. This
opposition turns on the distinct forms of group represented by republic and nation
according to Thom. After rescuing the non-liberal group from the standard liberal
reduction to a big individual and posing in its stead the concept of the "people
assembled," Thom re-focuses the "supra-individual" critique fully onto the nation [see,
for instance, 267]. The distinction is historically concrete: it was created in the shift
from the civic to the "social," that is, the shift from city to nation as dominant political
form [8], Thus, Thom at once rejects liberalism, with its negative individualism, and
nationalism, with its perceived "supra-individualism." As a challenge to the liberal
reduction of all non-liberal groups to "supra-individuals," it is exciting; as a treatment of
the nation, it is wanting and trite.
The result is a strict dichotomy between the concepts of nation and city. The
nation becomes "tribal," while the purely "republican" becomes the city. Participation in
the nation is merely ascriptive and so passive, while in the city it is active. The city is
ephemeral, existing only so long as those who participate in it do so [see, for instance,
29], When participation lessens or ends, the oligarchs and tyrants move in, and the
republic is dead. The nation, on the other hand, is perceived as eternal, with roots
reaching into prehistory, connected to the present - andfuture - by an unbroken
continuity [see, for instance, 263].
Interestingly, liberalism drops out of its possibility as a third pole in a potential
"trichotomy." For Rousseau, liberal capitalism was the coming scourge of the 18th
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Century. The intellectual, technical, and commercial "advances" of the Enlightenment
were bringing ruin to humanity. He embraced the republican city as an alternative. [58]
It is understandable that Thom, in following Rousseau, would reject a liberal analysis of
and solution to the rise of nationalism. Both poles of city and nation are non-liberal:
both privilege the public or group in a way not acceptable within a liberal conceptual
framework - though Thom does maintain a liberal critique of the nation.
In the republican city, the citizens have not entered a social contract in which they
trade liberty for security; they have not delegated their sovereignty to an external
authority. Rather, their society is determined continually by their active participation in
the sovereign, that is, in decision-making. This requires a different concept of individual
and group from what is available in liberalism.
In the nation, political participation depends on historical and cultural factors that
pre-empt any contract. There is no "volition" or action on the part of nationals, even
the action of giving up sovereignty. Rather, history, blood, language, etc., determine the
bounds of sovereignty. Indeed, the concept of the nation challenged the Lockean notion
that, in the beginning, all the world was the state of nature [2], by claiming that even
"then" were the Germanic (and other) tribes, which have come down to the present.
Political activity always already occurs in a world of tribe-nations, and its possibilities are
bounded by this fact. The proper foundation of the state is the tribe-nation, for the latter
is the reality of social structuring and so guarantees social cohesion for a state based on it.
Of course, this social cohesion is mediated through the concept of the tribe-nation,
in its specific aspects of language, blood ties, land, etc. As Thom describes it, "love of
accustomed land and language
. . . replaced love of fellow citizens" [6] predominant
under the republican city model.
Unfortunately, even where it transcends the standard liberal one, Thom's concept
of the nation remains reductive and idealized. As Kedourie, he reduces nationalism in
general to German nationalism as it developed beginning in the early 19th Century. The
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Germans created the concept and it spread around the world, coming down to us today.
More than this, in a number of places, he specifically links this development to Nazism
[see, for instance, 2 1 6, 219 - 220, and 226], Again as for Kedourie, Thom sees German
nationalism to have been Romantic, manifesting in part the shift from Enlightenment to
Romanticism [see 10], The essence of this Romanticism is the idealization of ancient
German tribes, particularly as described by Tacitus, resulting in a "cult of primitive
German virtue" [213 - 214],
He does go beyond Kedourie's work in locating the basis of this "cult" in the rise
of ethnological studies of Native North Americans [119]. This ethnological approach
began in the "noble savage" tradition, which I might characterize as a "positive
orientalism," and stressed the natural virtue and spirit of freedom (manifested as
resistance to European domination).
Thom also modifies his concept of "tribe-nation" slightly, to produce the concept
of "word-nation." The "word-nation" is not grounded in blood, language, or territory, but
rather in a shared history, customs, and/or destiny. This allows acknowledgment of an
internal diversity that resists any easy assumption of tribal unity, while at the same time
allowing the customs and destiny to be a potential of all humankind. 24 Thom takes
France as the model "word-nation," produced through the work of such thinkers as
Michelet. [8 - 9] Thom traces the development of such a French self-concept in contra-
distinction to the German "tribe-nation" [230 - 240]. Just as the French concept of nation
allows a celebration of diversity that is ultimately reductive [9], so is his distinction
between "word-nation" and "tribe-nation" merely the surface show of one: he emphasizes
that beneath the "word-nation" there lurks the "tribe-nation" [9],
It is possible to challenge Thom's reductive concept of the nation in much the way
that I approached Kedourie's and Rae's. For instance, it is possible to argue that Thom
2 ‘1Thom is very ambiguous regarding this concept, and his words could be interpreted to suggest that
humankind be unified in one grand nation — a pretension that justified Napoleon's conquests — or that the
nation form could be legitimately adopted by any group that embraced its principles.
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attacks nationalism in general as a particularly virulent aspect or form of Romanticism
,
25
rather than properly focusing his attack onto "Romantic nationalism" as a specific sub-
type ot nationalism, and reserving criticism based on a rejection of Romanticism from
other types of nationalism.
I will not reiterate the set of previously discussed items here. I will add only the
following. Rather than viewing Romantic conceptions of the nation as pure constructions
that contradict observable social and political reality, one might view Romantic concepts
of the nation -- if not Romanticism more generally — as preliminary European attempts to
comprehend and conceptualize emerging European social and political forms. That
Romantics conceived of their own activity as transcending the earthly realm does not
mean that one has to accept this self-delusion. One can take more of a materialist
approach, and see their "transcendence" as the product of material forces and interests,
however obscured. Thom is strictly an idealist on these matters: the "tribe-nation" and
nationalism were first intellectual constructions that were adopted as the bases for action;
they were not representations of social reality, but rather impositions on it. My
speculative argument transforms what Thom views as a delusional construction into a
preliminary engagement with a complex social and political reality.
More than this, in the context of the devolution of the French Revolution into the
imperialism of Napoleon, and of the devolution of British liberal capitalism into much the
same. Romantic concepts of the nation might be part of a reaction to these failed forms.
This reaction might have swung to a counter-balancing extreme, and so become as
limited and problematic as what they reacted to — as the rise of Nazism in Germany
suggests. However, in the broader development of the nation form, these might have
been invaluable advances in a complex dialectic. I have already commented on the
complexity that Renan introduces for any reduction of nationalism to Romanticism.
25He does differentiate at one point between liberal and romantic nations [ ]; however, the distinction
between these forms is wholly relative to their role for states: the former grounds a liberal state (or is one),
while the latter grounds a nationalist state. Nationalism is always romantic.
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Renan's " What Is a Nation?"
[ 1 990] poses an extreme problem for Thom: his concept of
the nation as a "daily plebiscite 1 ' in which the nation exists only through being willed by a
set of people, and cannot outlast this active willing, actuallyfits the nation into the
republican city tradition. To avoid this problem, Thom focuses on La Reforme
Intellectuelle et Morale
,
in which he argues that Renan adopted "aristocratic, militarist,
and Germanist positions" [Thom, 1995: 253], Though this may be true, Renan also
developed a very "French" and republican interpretation of the nation in "What Is a
Nation?": at the least, Renan's own writings betray a complexity or ambivalence on the
issue that Thom denies.
More than this, even Fichte, who was central to the German reaction to French
nationalism" and whom one might expect to occupy a simple opposite pole relative to it,
developed a political theory deeply imbued with the principles of the French Revolution,
while at the same time echoing Romantic notions of "German history, language and
culture" [see 261], That even in Fichte such counter-currents existed suggests the
complexity inherent in any genuine attempt to conceptualize the nation. Yet, Thom
eliminates this complexity, and reduces the nation to a simple pole in a simple
dichotomy. One wonders why Thom, who throughout his text expends much effort on
detailing the minutest complexities, subtlest distinctions, etc., of republican and
Enlightenment thought, approaches the nation so lazily, often presenting gross
generalizations of complex positions. 26
Thom's republican city model is just as idealized, but in a favorable direction.
Consider, for instance, his assumption of the active nature of the citizenry assembled,
versus the passive nature of the members of a nation. Thom admits historical limits on
participation in the assembly: in Republican Rome, those in the lowest social classes
were excluded from substantive participation [83 - 84]. Yet, for Thom, this exclusion
meant that the Republican Roman model had to be modified for use by "nineteenth-
26 For instance, on 266, he writes "The crucial step taken by Niebuhr, as by all advocates of the tribe-nation,
. . .
." He simply does not make such gross generalizations about republicans or Enlightenment liberals.
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century democrat[s]" [85], Republican Rome remained a viable model, with slight
modifications.
But these modifications do not address the deeper shortcomings of Thom's
concept of assembly. It is not a question of mere participation in the assembly, but of the
conditions under which one participates. By calling for a flattening of the hierarchical
formal structure of power that was the rule of the Roman assembly, Thom does not
obviate questions of relative power among the "people assembled." Formal equality
among participants from different classes does not mean a more substantive equality. Not
only do participants from higher classes have advantages in education and other resources
that allow them to "perform better" as orators and writers (in the modem assembly
mediated through books and mass media [cf. 44]), but the concrete power differentials
that obtain outside of the assembly generally have determining power over what happens
within it. Such things as economic class, gender, and social status27 guarantee some
participants will be listened to, and others will not be. More than this, as any one who
has attended a New England town meeting or participated on a few different committees
can attest, the concrete dynamics, cliques, tensions, and so forth that exist among a
formally equal set of individuals have great influence as well -- again, there are those
who, no matter what they say, simply will not be heeded, while there are others who, no
matter how irrelevant or misguided their statements, will have influence.
It might be possible to characterize these issues as variations on the "tyranny of
the majority." However, the liberal solution of certain guarantees of individual freedom
from social constraints are not an option for the non-liberal approach of Thom. Instead,
Thom focuses on the structure of decision-making itself. This is limited or structured by
a set of laws given by an external "law-giver." His [not her] externally guarantees his
objectivity, that is, that he will produce laws as the basis for the assembly that ensure a
27
In a non-national, multi-racial society, this would include race as well.
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balanced structure Thom suggests the necessity for law itself in preventing what might
be called "mob rule": without it, "popular sovereignty" could devolve into brigandry and
mob violence, as the Terror had shown [17-21],
The very notion of someone actually functioning as an objective, disinterested
law-giver is itself highly speculative. Thom is clear that this is not a symbolic figure; for
instance, he counterpoises it directly to Adam Smith's internalized "impartial spectator"
[57], It is, rather, a real figure, however extraordinary and paradigmatic. Thom attributes
difficulty conceiving or accepting the possibility of such a figure to the fact that we are
prisoners of the narrow limits of "our nationalist sensibilities." [70]
I would speculate that, rather, hesitation is a function of realistic knowledge of
human nature, and bitter experiences in the modem age with so-called "altruists" and
disinterested political personages, quite independently of whether or not one's
conceptual framework is truly determined by the nation-state concept. Indeed, even
Thom’s belief that the law-givers of ancient republican cities were such paragons of
disinterest and objectivity is questionable. Thom's belief is based on Rousseau's, which
itself was based the historical testimonies produced by ancients. Thom's own work on
this issue, scholastically comprehensive though it is, appears to idealize Rousseau's work.
Rousseau's conception of ancient republicanism, mired as it is in abstract philosophical
concepts such as "nature," "wilderness," the "general will," etc., seems itself to idealize
its object; this becomes more likely when one recalls Rousseau's penchant to idealization
of Native Americans in the concept of the "noble savage." But, even if one assumes the
accuracy of both representations, there is still the fact that Rousseau — and Thom where
he does not rely on Rousseau — bases his concept on the testimony of ancient chroniclers
and others who wrote of the history of their own societies or others. The idea that these
reporters were disinterested and objective is too much to accept. Thus, Thom's account is
28
Interestingly, this reverses the executive-legislative structure typical in liberal states or even
constitutional monarchies, in which the assembly creates laws and the executive (sovereign) acts within the
bounds of these laws.
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at least an idealization; it might in fact be an idealization of an idealization of an
idealization.
Even if one were to grant the idealized notion of the law-giver, however, it is not
clear that a structure he [not she] were to introduce would forestall power-differentials
among the assembled, or abuses of power by a majority block. Yet, even if this were
possible, the presence of the law-giver still causes problems for Thom. Most importantly,
it contradicts the activity-passivity dichotomy between republican city and tribal nation.
For, in relation to an external law-giver, the people assembled are passive. They might
even be defined by the law-giver, in his regulation of inclusions and exclusions in the
assembly. This erodes the distinction that Thom stresses against the passive ascription of
political participation to members of a tribe-nation.
At one point, Thom allows himself to admit explicitly that Rousseau's concept of
Republican Rome and the general republican city tradition is idealized [85], To save his
argument, he of course must differentiate this idealization from the nationalist form he
critiques as the quintessence of bad faith (but which are emerging as dependent as much
on his own negative idealization of nationalism). Indeed, he not only defends but lauds
Rousseau’s idealization as at once admitting "the fragility of willed human constructions,"
but only within the context of a guiding, even determinant republican commitment to
justice, that is, "rounded always by the sleep of the just" [85]. Yet, an idealization that
includes corruption (properly resisted) is still an idealization, even if it looks more
realistic than one without. 29
At the same time, Thom's dichotomy between city and nation erodes from the
other pole, as well. Thom's claim that the nation is a purely passive, ascriptive social
grouping is false. As I have mentioned, Renan challenges this at the conceptual level —
29A reference to US popular culture might help make this point for those familiar with it. In the past 1
5
years, old-style police television shows following the noble actions of card-board cops have been
somewhat replaced with down-and-dirty crime dramas in which the cops are not clearly the good guys, and
their actions do not really stop crime, and so forth. This shows focus on the nitty-gritty, the dirty and
ambiguous. Yet, they are every bit as idealized in their presentations of this as their predecessors were of
their own ideal. They are not less ideal, it is just that they have a different ideal, one that it is easier to pass
off as true.
93
the nation requires an active assertion of its existence by a set of people, through their
assertion of membership in it. On this reading, the nation is not ascribed to a passive
group, but rather actively ascribed by individuals in that group to themselves.
Concretely, the history of nations has included a significant strain of active assertion of
national "identity" 30 through external struggle and internal dynamic tension. However
much the content of these claims of identity confirms the passivity of the nation, inform
they are active (assertions). Indeed, the very strain of "nationalism" that maintains the
given, primordial nature of national identity itself is often contested within the active
forging of a nation - as suggested by Renan's above-mentioned ambivalence.
The general features of such an internally complex concept of the nation I have
described at length above, in the sections on Kedourie and Ree. What remains to be said
here is that many nationalist claims of the givenness of national identity must be
understood in the context of denial of that identity. The extremity of the counter-
assertion balances that of the assertion against the existence of the nation at all. The age
of nations has also been an age of genocide, in which smaller or weaker groups (including
nations) continually face the frailty of their own existences. This tendency exists even at
the intellectual level: the work so far examined in this dissertation itselfcreates a context
requiring active assertion by nations.
Interestingly, Thom undermines his argument by inadvertently providing a clear
example of a context in which group identity cannot have been considered "given" in the
manner he claims, but contested at both the material and the conceptual levels.
According to Thom, the production of a tribal concept that could be imported into Europe
was accomplished through such "proto-ethnological" approaches as Chateaubriand's.
Chateaubriand arrived in North America with preconceived, abstract notions of what he
would find. Indeed, he appears to have composed the first draft of his epic on the
Natchez Indians in Louisiana prior to his journey to America [133]. He was more
30 For want, at this point, of a better term.
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concerned with his "own secession" from France than with the "plight of the aboriginal
peoples" [134], and ultimately produced a series of works that (perhaps unconsciously)
deformed "Native America" into illustrating his own world view and into a conceptual
support of his own agenda. This account was not necessarily pejorative, but rather
created an image of pure and brave people oppressed by the invading Europeans. He
celebrated their resistance to oppression and (natural) love for liberty, but on his own
terms, which included the Christianization of these features [141]. Where necessary, he
even perceived democracy where there was extreme despotism [138],
The effects of work such as Chateaubriand's were only temporary, however.
Soon, more scientific ethnology came on the scene, to dispel the "noble savage" myths.
In this regard, Thom presents the work of Volney, who countered the romantic approach
of Chateaubriand. But this science consisted as much of "rigorous control of [native]
testimonies" [145] as of dispelling obvious myths by appeal to observable facts. One of
Volney's goals was to eliminate "ventriloquism" from ethnological studies, in which the
scientist projected his [not her] own voice into the mouth of the native [146]. Of course,
as Thom points out, this meant excluding the agency of the object of study with respect to
the one studying: the native no longer could "gaze back" at the European ethnologist
[145]. The only way to ensure this was to focus on the externally observable facts of a
society, such as '"customs, mores, rites, religion and, above all, languages,"' rather than
depending on the self-perceptions of those being studied [146]. Through this approach,
language, culture, etc., came to be viewed as objective givens independent of the agency
of those associated with them.
Yet, in relation to their objects of study, these approaches converged. Whether
putting his or her own words into the mouths of natives or shutting these mouths, the
ethnologist exercises power over the native. The ethnologist determines what the group
under study is and does. This is true also of the "genuinely scientific ethnology" that
Thom holds as having been realized since Chateaubriand and Volney [see 146], as has
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been exhaustively argued by Said (in Orientalism) and others. I, is no, necessary for the
present discussion to rehearse these arguments again: that Thom sees Rousseau, with
whom the concept of the "noble savage" is most associated, as the arguable founder of
such a truly scientif.c ethnology [146] is sufficient.- When Thom's dismissal of the
apparent racism compromising the ideologues '"cold
. . . ethnographic gaze,” which
blurred the distinction between animals and "native peoples" as a function of this
genuinely scientific viewpoint [148], is added, Thom's position becomes untenable, and
even repugnant.
Thom s treatment of ethnology has two important implications regarding the
purported passivity of "ethnic identity." 32 First, in the case of oppressed groups, this
passivity is externally imposed. It is not the result of some grand intellectual shift in the
academic circles of late 18th and early 19th Century France and Germany; it is, rather, the
result of on-going conquest, domination, subjugation, colonization, and exploitation. The
ethnological silencing corresponds to a material pacification as well - natives were/are
enslaved, genocided, and deported. The "law-giver" for oppressed groups was/is the
oppressor, and it was/is precisely his or her "laws" that eliminate/d liberty. 33
Second, even if Europeans viewed Native Americans and other conquered or
colonized peoples as preliminary "givens" on their own territory, even as the Europeans
sought to eliminate them from that territory — or, in a few exceptional cases, bemoaned
this elimination 34 - the native views of themselves and the Europeans is likely to have
“Thom's naivete is evident in his discussion of Eduard Norden's study of ethnology in classical Antiquity.
He cites with approval Norden's argument that similarities among ancient ethnographic studies by different
authors in different places suggests that there existed in Antiquity a consistent, even scientific, tradition of
ethnography, rather than a set of random texts that should not be called a discipline. These similarities
included "a particular style" and the treatment of "a given set of themes"; for instance, '"migratory motifs"
were applied by Greek and Roman authors "to a range of different people," and even the same phrases —
such as a nation peculiar, pure and unique of its kind'" had been applied to a similar range of distinct
groups. Though this might represent an interesting intellectual development at the time, I would argue that
it is evidence of an reduction of distinct societies to fit certain universal pre-conceptions of the "Other,"
anticipating modem "Orientalism."
32 For want, at this point, of a better term.
“This, of course, directly contradicts the position of liberal progressives such as J. S. Mill, who held this
colonial law-giving as the condition of the future liberty of the colonized. [Mill, 1978: 9 - 10]
“Thom calls attention to the concern of the ideologues over the fact that "not a day passed without [a
native] society disappearing forever." Their concern, however, was not for societies destroyed or even
their individual members as human beings simpliciter, it was that there had as yet been no study of many of
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been more complex. I am not an expert on pre-Columbian Native American self-
conceptions or cosmologies, but I would venture that native groups in general had more
complex understandings of themselves and their histories than the reductive,
ideologically-driven European reading of them as "natural givens." At the least, it
appears reasonable to assert that they did not share the Christian-liberal teleological view
of history that makes claims about "primordial" lineages relevant or desirable in the first
place.
Regardless of the pre-Columbian self-conceptions of various native societies,
what happened after Columbus is clear. Native groups did inhabit their lands before
Europeans invaded, and as soon as the Europeans came, the native groups' very ability to
continue existing on that land came into question. From that point on, their survival as
physical beings and "identity" as social groups became a matter of every day
contestation: bare existence required action. Thus, where imperialist Germans could feel
passively secure through their primordial continuity - could take the action of "choosing"
to be passive - such an option did not exist for subject and colonized peoples around the
world. The perceived absence of such activity was purely a function of the imperial gaze,
which just by perceiving could deny agency to the subjugated or colonized.
This imperialism was certainly not simply a function of European nationalism,
either. It had causes in the imperial status quo valorized by Kedourie, as well as in
Thom's own republican city tradition. Rousseau himself contributed, especially through
his glorification of the "noble savage." Though Thom views him as the arguable founder
of "genuinely scientific ethnology," Rousseau's own ethnological ventriloquism is clear.
For instance, Thom makes much of Rousseau's tendency toward prosopopoeia, through
which Rousseau was able to borrow the voice of a historical figure to make comments
relevant to the situation of his own age and society [60ff.J. In one instance, Thom quote's
these "tribal peoples," and valuable information would be lost if they died out. [149] In other words, as
Thom presents them, the ideologues were more concerned about the completeness of ethnographic
documentation than people. Whatever it might say about the ideologues
,
this implicates Thom, who either
approves of this callousness or projects it onto the ideologues.
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Rousseau borrowing of "the voice of the Amerindian, figure of universal humanity"
[235], It is bad enough that Rousseau puts the words he is not courageous enough to
write into the mouth of an unnamed idealization of an actual human group. But what he
has the Amerindian say makes things that much worse:
You are announcing to me a God who was bom and who died two thousand years
ago, at the other end of the world, in some small town
. . . Why did your God
cause the events which he wished to instruct me by to happen so far from me? Is
it a crime to be ignorant of what takes place at the antipodes? Am I supposed to
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^°ther hemisPhere there wa* a Hebrew people and a town of
Here, the Amerindian is attempting to defend him-/herself from criticism that his/her
people are pagans, by pleading ignorance of Christianity. One can see readily an allusion
to Dante s concern over the fact that Aristotle and other virtuous and wise pagans were
relegated to limbo simply because they lived in an age before Christ; one has a much
more difficult time connecting this to Native America. Perhaps these are words that a
Native American might have spoken, as Thom considers a necessary criterion for genuine
prosopopoeia [60], but are they a legitimate representation of a general Native American
stance toward Christianity or toward accusation and condescension by Europeans? The
imaginary speaker does not question the general framework of European evaluation of
Native Americans; he/she merely asks for a measure of good faith within that framework.
Any challenge to European evaluations is at a very surface level, and wholly within the
framework of colonial proselytizing.
Far more likely a statement would have been the actual words of an actual Native
American, William Apess, a Pequot:
Have you the folly to think that the white man, being one in fifteen or sixteen, are
the only beloved images of God? Assemble all nations together in your
imagination, and then let the whites be seated among them. . . . Now, suppose
these skins were put together, and each skin had its national crimes written upon it
— which skin do you think would have the greatest? I will ask one question more.
Can you charge the Indians with robbing a nation almost of their whole continent,
and murdering their women and children, and then depriving the remainder of
their lawful rights that nature and God require them to have? And to cap the
climax, rob another nation to till their grounds, and welter out their days under the
lash with hunger and fatigue ... I should look at all the skins, and I know that
when I cast my eye upon that white skin, and if I saw those crimes written upon it,
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IshouW enter my protest against it immediately and cleave unto that which ismore honorable, [as reproduced in Ackermann, 1995: vii]
Here is agency, of the sort that Rousseau does not allow - and of the sort that Thom
cannot accept. For the republican city depends on a "wilderness" or area outside of and
between cities, a spatial or temporal "zone of unconditioned liberty between cities, a
wilderness across which a rapt lawgiver would pass, or to which a despot would be
expelled" [60], In the age of nations, no longer was the "land" a margin, a beyond: it had
been incorporated into the political structure of the territorial state [60], As
historiography became an ethnology of the past, a continuous line of descent became
visible, there were no longer empty or "wild" periods, across which the law-giver moved
from ephemeral city to ephemeral city [61].
For a time, America represented that wilderness, at once a Rousseauian retreat and
the imagined heart of a new city" [135]. This role was essential to a republic in the 18th
and 19th Centuries: for the republican city model to function in a modem context
requires that the wilderness that existed two millennia ago almost everywhere, and
against which cities were exceptions, had to be replaced with the lands of colonized
peoples, who themselves had to be either cleared off physically or representationally, or
turned into a part of the wilderness (that is, into "savages"). In the 18th and 19th
Centuries, the republican city model might have been able to ensure liberty for some, but
clearly at the cost of loss of liberty for others. What is more, it seems that Thom's
republican city depends as much on (imperial) ethnology as he claims the tribe-nation
does, in order to create the "wilderness" essential to it. If Thom's account of the nature of
the republican city tradition and its modern role in history is accurate, then there seems no
way of avoiding recognition of its connection to colonization and genocide.
The age of nations overtook this necessary wilderness, and with it the political
possibility for the republican city in the 19th Century. As Thom states, the
obliteration of imagined lines of flight, whether to the Mons Sacer in ancient
Rome, to a frontier, or to another world, was followed not merely by the creation
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additi0n> by the c°nsolidation of
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The perceived failures of the French Revolution had estranged modernity from the
republican city tradition. At the same time, America went from being the external
wilderness necessary to the ideals of the republican city, to being a seemingly perpetual
source of land for incorporation into an expanding territorial state: colonizers no longer
went into the land to escape from the republic, but rather to bring the land into the
republic. As it lost its historical realm of idealization (Republican Rome) and its
wilderness (America), the republican city model gave way to the nation-state. Through
this process, the very meaning of "republic" shifted.
Given the implication of the republican city model in colonialism, it is not at all
clear that this was a bad development from the perspective of the colonized - especially
as it provided a new and highly effective form for anti-colonial struggle
.
35 Even in the
Americas, where indigenous anti-colonial movements have not enjoyed widespread
success, this might be due as much to the failure of the nation form to be instantiated by
movements — due to the particularly effective form of high-volume, settler-based, land-
clearing colonialism pioneered by the United States - as to their adoption of it. In any
event, to some - namely, those inhabitants of "the wilderness" - the transition to a
politics of nation was at worst no worse, and for many, it held the seeds of at least an
attempt or stage in overcoming subjugation/colonization. In a world of cities, no such
hope could persist; there would always be need of "the wilderness," and thus, it would be
produced or enforced by intellectual and practical means.
Interestingly, Thom's historiographic methods themselves echo and reinforce the
ethnological production of wilderness. His analysis assumes the "great man" theory of
historical change. The agents of Thom's history are great men (and at least one woman)
and their writings. Rousseau, Madame de Stael, Chateaubriand, Volney, Fichte, and
^Indeed, in Chapter 3, I will discuss to what extent anti-colonial struggle created or advanced the nation
form.
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others, even Tacitus, drive history. The "masses" have either to obey a good book or the
law of the law-giver, or to go against i, [see, for instance, ,7-18], Within the law, they
are the "people assembled," outside of it, they are part of the wilderness. 16 Whatever is
not an agent of this idealist concept of history becomes part of the wilderness.
In this sense, all the "unnamed" 1 ’ of history - the masses, the groups, the forces -
are excluded from what constitutes history for Thom. They exist only as absences from
the city. Michelet is simply a nationalist [9], a historian operating within the conceptual
framework of the age of nations [see 61], who thus mistakenly sees groups and the land
as the agents of history. Braudel is not even mentioned.
In contrast, Apess' words, above, suggest the existence of political and historical
agency outside the city, in the "wilderness" - a "tribal" agency that takes a position
relative to the city. These words manifest the agency of national assertion discussed
above.
The above discussion of Rousseau's use of prosopopoeia has an additional
implication, as well. I have already considered the passivity inherent in the hierarchical
function of republican assemblies, but in Rousseau's use of prosopopoeia one can glimpse
an even deeper level. Thom makes much of this "rhetorical device," suggesting a
correlation between it and the age of cities [60]. Yet, is not use of this device the height
of passivity? Through it, a proponent of some political position relies on the authority
and achievements of a historical figure to back his/her claims - and in fact relies on that
figure to make and defend the claims - rather than asserting them directly and letting
them stand or fall on their own merit or that of their proponent. Instead of actively
carving out new positions in the contemporary political scene, the proponent imports an
agent as well as a political position from the past.
36
This, of course, suggests Thom's very concept of the "people assembled" renders them passive. To be
counted within the republic, an individual must defer to the rule of the law-giver. This, it would seem, is a
limit on the activity of the people assembled, and in fact makes it an extension of the law-giver's activity.
37To borrow a concept from Jacques Ranciere's The Names ofHistory [1994],
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That the contemporary proponent actively constructs the words of the historical
figure is not a defense; indeed, this reveals the appearance of passivity as manipulative,
akin what is called "passive aggression" in popular psychology. It is similar to the tactic
of masking one's own intentionality and responsibility behind a statement such as "the
committee says," or the "group believes."
Thus, to the extent that it is an active creation by a contemporary agent (and thus
immune from criticism as simple passivity by adoption of a political position produced
elsewhere), prosopopoeia is a disingenuous, even manipulative use of history. It creates a
basis for a contemporary political formation by projecting a contemporary political
position into the past; it presents the contemporary agenda as a re-iteration of a past one.
The fact that there is not a linear continuity within the republican city tradition becomes
irrelevant: the appeal to the past for a foundation of the present accomplishes the linkage.
This functions at the level of Thom's writing, as well. Thom's theory of the
republican city requires him to project his contemporary agenda for the future into the
past, first to the French Revolution, back through the Machiavellian era and on to
Republican Rome. To the extent that his historical analysis is "factual," his method is
passive, to the extent that it requires picking out and emphasizing strains (strong reading)
and creative interpretation, it produces an "imagined tradition."
Is this construction of imaginary history grounds for rejecting Thom's model and
the individual production of republics on the republican city model? Not at all. In fact, it
is what makes Thom's work interesting, despite his own oft expressed explicit opposition
to creative history. For, he has produced something new
,
with potential application in the
contemporary world. More than this, the imagined history is an artifact of the present,
revealing the agenda that created it. This imagined history reveals contemporary desires
,
the intentionality of contemporary agents . 38
iS
This point, of course, follows Nietzsche's On the Use and Disadvantages ofHistoryfor Life.
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Does this mean that historical construction in general is a good thing? Not
necessarily. In fact, I have not even set the foundation for such an evaluation. The point
is only that creative history reveals the desires of contemporary agents constructing it.
Whether these are desires toward liberty or repression is another issue altogether, though
a basis for such an analysis might lie in an immanent analysis of the constructed history
or comparison of it with the actual facts of referent period (or alternative versions of the
period, if no definitive version is available). There is no easy formula for determining
what is a positive or negative construction, just as there is no easy formula for
determining what the historical "facts" are. That these tasks are difficult, however, does
not mean that they cannot be accomplished.
There are at least two types of bad construction. First, suppression of facts for the
gain of the constructors. A simple example is denial of genocide, which clearly serves to
consolidate the gains (in land, money, etc.) made through the genocide and to free the
perpetrators from responsibility. This is certainly a form of constructed history, and most
would agree it is a bad form . 39 One might call it "falsification,” as opposed to
"construction" or "creation."
Second, there is construction that relies on ignorance of relevant historical facts.
The "relevant" here is crucial: ignorance of historical facts that constrain contemporary
possibilities is not necessarily a bad thing 4 °; but when these facts are relevant to the
contemporary situation, then ignorance is not productive or even excusable. Consider
again the issue of denial of genocide. The fact that one's group committed a genocide and
gained, say, the land one lives on through it is a relevant fact. Being ignorant of it is not
a defense; and denial of the genocide due to ignorance is not a legitimate position, no
matter how unintentional. Of course, generally a person ignorant of the past (or present)
crimes of his/her society is confronted in some way with an inkling of the truth. There
39The denial itself might not be very simple, however. For instance, it might operate through rather subtle
manipulations of who acted when, as in Kedourie's, above.
40Again, with Nietzsche.
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are at the very least assertions by the victim group, or even contemporary tensions. It is
not simple ignorance that allows the denial, but the decision to remain ignorant, and no.
listen to the truth or at least test the accusations. The accusations are, quite simply, never
entertained as possibilities." Slavoj Zizek describes such "willed ignorance" as
unforgivable because it "conveys a hidden dimension of enjoyment" [Zizek. 1991: 2]
This enjoyment appears to be the reward for leaving gaps in one's "symbolic universe."
Both of these forms of falsification actually affirm the facts they appear to deny.
In the case of simple cover-up, these facts exist explicitly within the consciousness of the
falsifier. In the case of ignorant denial, the facts exist as gaps or lacks within the denier's
unconscious. In either case, there is no question of the existence of one set of historical
facts mutually accepted by claimants and falsifiers. Indeed, often an extreme, zealous
denial suggests the true facts themselves, by simply negating them. A strong denial
affirms the danger to the denier of what is being denied, its truth and relevance.
But, again, there is no easy path to the truth. The positive side of historical
construction is fully shadowed by its negative side, with its potentially devastating
consequences. Even an initially positive construction can turn negative. For instance, the
early 19th Century German tribalist counter to the Franco-Universalism represented by
the "ideals" of the Revolution and by the army of Napoleon itself ultimately led to Hitler.
It is this double-edge that indicates the seriousness of historical construction, its political
potency. As Plato suggests in The Republic, a person capable of doing great good is also
capable of doing great harm. The same goes for intellectual tools.
These reflections apply to nationalist historical constructions as well. Granting
this is the only way to save Thom from his own critique. He must give up differentiating
between the presumed historical honesty of republicanism and falsification of
nationalism. Either they are both to be condemned for historical construction, or both are
to be recognized as in a complex relation with historical construction. I do mean
41 That does not mean that the truth will not eventually be admitted — but only after it has become
irrelevant, through the passage of time or manipulation by those for whom it originally posed a danger.
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complex: i, is not jus. a matter of affirming historical construction, because that is not an
accurate portrayal of how either form operates. Rather, just as the city's aspect of
historical construction has been revealed, so has the nation's aspect of factual!,y. Th.s
aspect is at the minimum a potential, and its absence is possible and problematic. But, its
presence should not be asserted against the aspect of historical construction, as a way of
compensating for it; they exist together, as complements or partners. Facts can, after all,
corroborate a bad construction, and a construction can “spin-doctor” bad facts. One the
other hand, an interpretation or creative use of historical facts can produce productive,
liberatory movements. For instance, the study of oppressed groups and their subgroups
under colonization - "subaltern studies" and the like - has produced a body of work that
grounds positive political change. It proceeds by a creative interpretation of history that
pushes beyond the limits of direct documentation (which, of course, represents an elite
perspective), toward a deep if speculative analysis of non-elite groups and their historical
role and agency. Indeed, it is this constructive history that challenges oppressive
exclusions from recorded facts.
The general point is somewhat Kantian. Historical "facts" - however real and
even forceful — might be incomplete without a framework of interpretation. The
production of history - always a contemporary act -- has two components, the raw
material of facts and the form given them by the creative subject. In practice, however,
the distinction between these metaphysical categories ("fact" and "frame") becomes
blurred. Yet, the point stands: this dual-aspected nature of history is deeper than either
the republican city or tribal/national form.
It is one thing to argue that the relationship of the city to history is the same as the
nation to history, and another to question why this relationship is privileged in for either.
Thom claims that it is not for the republican city, that such a city must be understood as
an ephemeral phenomenon that exists only so long as an active general will exists among
its people -- if the will becomes a tyranny of the majority, or if the people neglect their
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agency, that the republican city ends. So long as it exists, it is present, immediate - it
does not appeal to history to guarantee it; only the activity of the people assembled can
do this. On the other hand, the nation's present is precisely guaranteed by its past. What
exists now is what has come down to the present from the past, indeed, from pre-history.
The nation is a lineage, a continuity that links present with past. The nation now is
derivative of the nation peal. This is why writing the history of this or that nation is so
important; without history, it does not exist.
I have already suggested that the primordialism of German nationalism was a
reaction to French claims of a Roman heritage. The form of heritage was different: the
French were less concerned with direct descent from Republican Rome than with the
inheritance of its political legacy in the form of resonance with its political structures.
Their link to the Romans was not historical, it was analogical. It was bom of the desire to
identify" with Republican Rome. The Germans countered with an entirely different
form of link to the past, one that emphasized continuity. But, as I have also argued, this
intentional French resonance with an element of the past is undeniably a reliance on the
authority of that past to buttress actions of the present. The contemporary republican city
relies on history just as much as the nation, if in a different manner.
This should be clear from Thom's text. Fie reaches into the history surrounding
the French Revolution and of Republican Rome for a model for the present. He
painstakingly identifies a historical tradition of republican cities that persisted into the
18th Century. Indeed, he focuses much attention on those "disciples of Rousseau" who
resisted the totalitarian developments in Revolutionary France and who were
subsequently labeled "the last of the Romans" [29], describing in detail their intentional
resonances with certain Republican Romans [25 - 29]. Individual republics may be
ephemeral in terms of their material existence, but as part of a tradition they persist from
ancient times to modem. More than this, in a modem republic's reach back into the past
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for a model and authority is an implicit claim to participation in this tradition, and thus of
"primordialism."
But, why does the nation stress continuity, while Thom claims that the republican
city is unconcerned about it? The above discussion of what it means for a nation to assert
its "givenness" has already suggested an answer. The issue here is not about roots, it is
about continued existence. Claims of identity through time may take the form of
continuity from primordial roots, as in the German case, or of a contemporary persistence
of group structure that does not rely on a proven historical persistence, as in the case of
Malinowski [Thom, 1995: 227 - 228]. In the first case, the nation is claimed to exist
throughout all history; in the second, it is claimed to exist outside of history, beyond the
flux of history, such that its historical origins (perhaps recent) are irrelevant. In both
cases, the assertion is about the continued existence of the nation in the future, which
concerns its present "legitimacy," that is, essential reality beyond the vicissitudes of
history. For this, it needs to have conquered history (be primordial) or exist
outside/above it.
I have already discussed why a nation might make such claims: the existence of a
nation is just as tenuous as that of a city. This cuts quite deeply: within the realities of
social and political history, Hume's deep problematization of belief in identity through
time seems to apply. A social formation appears to persist in time — to be "identical"
through time — only through the mental activity of a perceiver, and counter-perceptions
are possible. Thus, at the most fundamental level, a nation can be perceived not to have
continuity through time. Claims to a continuity beyond the immediate historical
circumstances or iteration of the nation are manifestations of a more general challenge to
transience -- transience itself being a widespread feature of social and political formations
generally. While specific republican cities come in and out of existence, and their
adherents find solace only in the persistence of the general republican tradition (the
resurgence of which is Thom's guiding hope), specific nations are more tenacious.
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Thom s rejection of this tenacity as negative is not justified universally, though of course
it is in cases in which the price of continuity is oppression within or without the nation
(as Kedourie claims is always the case). It can also be a liberatory challenge to
oppression, even at the level of attempted genocide.
This tenacity has a constructive as well as a defensive side. The republican city is
fully realized in the citizens assembled; before or after this exists, the republic does not.
The republic cannot then be a means of liberation. Thom agrees: the republic is not a
telos. Its "end" is what is immediately present, not what is envisioned as the product of a
long process. Indeed, the history of the republican city tradition is conceived as cyclical
[see, for instance, 29]: each new republic within the tradition is merely a re-assertion of
the general from, not a development built on previous instantiations.
On the other hand, the nation itself was/is a potential vehicle for political change.
It does not require immediate actualization, but rather its continuity through time allows
it to persist through long periods of struggle, sometimes measured by the century. In
such a case, the teleological basis of the nation that Thom asserts as a general feature
allows the nation itself to develop toward liberation, in original circumstances that do not
allow immediate liberation and which call for a strong and substantive political structure
as a vehicle for change, rather than a momentary confluence of political agents.
At this point, my focus is an ideal form of the challenge to transience, an assertion
of continuity through time. In Chapter 3, 1 will examine the workings of actual continuity
through time, as the product of both intentional actions and contingent forces, on both the
ideal and material levels. In this examination, the current focus will emerge as but one
component or tool.
This resilience of nations might have been a key factor in their ascendance, over
such things as the republican city model. The existence of the republic is always tenuous,
and devolves into oppressive political forms easily. The ideal of the republic must be
evaluated accompanied by this tendency, just as the nation form must be by the potential
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of its internal and external oppressiveness. The very function of the "ideal" in each is
relevant here: the ideal of the nation contributes to its resilience, while the rigid ideality
of the republican city model makes the continuity of a concrete instantiation as a genuine
republic difficult. That is not to say that the ideal of the republican city as Thom presents
it is not laudable as a political form, perhaps even more than the nation, in the realm of
abstract political principles. But it is to say that realizing this ideal requires much more
good fortune, and that a realized republican city tends to be rigid in the face of dynamic
history. The nation, for its faults, has a great degree of flexibility, which becomes crucial
in the struggle against domination (and is generally minimized in oppressive nations).
This flexibility, in fact, allows the nation form to absorb positive features of the
republican form itself under the proper circumstances.
For a political formation manifesting the republican city model to achieve such
flexibility or resilience, a fixed point is necessary. The fixed point grounds an identity
through time that allows flexibility. For the republican city model, it must be the
constitution, which is the only constant, a set of laws or principles that underlies or
frames the free activity of participants in the political process. Fixation on this is as bad
for the republic as fixation on its origins and past is for the nation. It reduces the republic
to a shade of itself, and introduces passivity in the form of appeal to a structural
adherence in the place of concrete political activity . 42 In such cases, the passive identity
of the city coincides with that of Thom's concept of the tribe-nation.
This analysis extends to the issue of the "self-generation" Thom claims that
nations claim. One form is primordialism: a nation has always existed, so it is not a
product of historical forces prior or external to the nation. The other main form is the
social closure at the core of Malinowski's concept: the nation is a self-perpetuating social
42This can become imperial, when members of the republic hold this model up for those outside the
republic. This justified Napoleon's expansionism, as well as the Franco-Universalism that has had a strong
presence in French academic and political circles since 1789. It is also a prevalent feature of 20th Century
"Americanism," the secular mission of bringing "American values" and the "American way of life" to
people around the world — through military intervention, economic coercion, or the Peace Corps.
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structure; though it may have origins in history, these are irrelevant in the present. The
city, on the other hand, relies on an external law-giver to create it, and thus has a definite
origin. But, this law-giver comes across a gap or "wilderness" in time and place, a
conceptual nullity for those in the city. Is this not a divine figure, an intervention from
the beyond? Rousseau accepts this point [71]. Indeed, is not a figure such as Fabricius
[59ff ] not a voice from beyond the grave? What is more, this law-giver must be
considered to be a truly great legislator, for there is no check on him/her: there is no way
to judge whether the laws or principles he/she sets down are good, because these laws or
principles are the condition and given structure of any such discussion. However much
the legitimacy of a republic depends on the evaluable activity of the citizens, it appears to
depend as well on faith that the law-giver has given good laws. 43
Thom offers as an alternative to Rousseau’s acceptance of the divine status of the
law-giver Vico's view, that the laws and political structures given by the great legislator
are the results of a "slow crystallization of institutions and laws" that began with the
earliest republics [71]. This, of course, requires abandoning the view that the republican
tradition is cyclical, rather than progressive, which is a key point of differentiation of city
from nation and so a central tenet of Thom. Whether Thom sides with Rousseau or Vico,
his argument runs into deep difficulties. What is more, whether divine or historical in
origin, such laws and institutions are external to a given city.
Interestingly Thom valorizes this externality as a counter to nationalist
pretensions to autochthony. Yet, it is this same externality that I showed above to
undermine the active nature of the people assembled. Again, in either direction, Thom
runs into difficulties. The only solution is to resist an exclusive move in one direction,
and to recognize that the existence of the republic thus depends on internal and external
causes in a logical tension: the agency of the people assembled requires an external
foundation at the same time that it is supposed to embody pure autonomy.
43This applies as well for such formations as the United States, whose laws and guiding principles were
imported from Republican Rome, British liberalism, etc.
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In the above discussion of Ree, I have already analyzed the issue of self- versus
external causation as it concerns the nation. What resulted was appreciation of the
complicated dialectical relationship between internal and external forces in the formation
and development of the nation.
Here, one can go further in understanding complexity of this issue. As Thom and
Rousseau both acknowledge, the Roman Republic had different levels of participation in
the assembly, to the extreme of exclusion [85], Thus, the issue of "citizenship" was
settled through a graduated class system, which determined who was "in" and who was
"out" of the Republic, and howfar "in" different types of "in"s were. This did not follow
the "natural" break of the city borders, of course: for instance, many from the "urban
tribes" were excluded [84]. The fact of this complex regulation signals the difficulties of
"parsing" the Republic. The parsing difficulties Thom points out for the nation [224ff.]
seem, thus, to be a specific form of a more general problem, one that affects republics as
well. The nation merely represents a different approach to the issues raised, focusing on
such things as history and culture, rather than class. 44 While republics in the tradition
Thom cites have tended to rely on a stratified parsing, national parsing has tended toward
a simplified form that focuses on differentiating members from non-members. The
republican city tradition had historically apparently not been confronted with regulation
of bare membership to the extent that it had been confronted with the issue of power
relations among those within it — perhaps as a function of its "open" form of assembly,
which allows for the operation of external hierarchies within it. Both imperial nations
and proto-national colonies, on the other hand, have been confronted with the "Other" as
a fundamental issue of "Self."
One might even see the modem state, rather than being the "cause" of social
parsing and the problems created by it, as a response to the general parsing crisis
produced by modern conditions. In both its republican and national forms — or their
44Gender differentiation, of course, has a complex and important role in both forms of parsing. I will
examine this issue in detail as it regards nations in Chapter 3.
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overlap - the state might be viewed as a mechanism to institutionalize a specific parsing
and regulate the pressures that militate against it. The industrial revolution and
colonization and the suffering and conflict that attended them drove population
migrations and movements - from country to city, from one area to another - to
unprecedented levels, challenging traditional social structures and concepts of unity. The
modem centralized state might have developed in part as a means of parsing the new
demographic distributions in a way that allowed regulation of migrations and social
structures in line with the needs of new political, economic, and military agendas. A
flexible potential set of criteria for citizenship (including property, ethnicity, gender, mere
adulthood, etc.) could be tailored to meet these agendas, and could be modified to
respond to changes in the agendas or the circumstances in which they operated (by
expanding the voting franchise, etc.).
The implications of the foregoing general analysis should now be clear: the
dichotomy Thom claims to exist between city and nation actually exists within each. The
political form of the nation as well as of the republican city contains the paired potentials
of activity and passivity, of transience and continuity, and of primordiality and
contemporaneousness. Though Thom is right to try to tie these forms down to specific
instantiations to avoid endless meandering through the vagaries of abstract models, this
exercise can only reveal how these potentials have been determined within a specific
context, such as late 18th and early 19th Century Europe: though the conclusions reached
may inspire questions for further investigation over a more general sample of nations
(and republics), the conclusions cannot be assumed to apply universally. Again, the
detailed implications of this set of complex internal dualities will be examined in Chapter
3; suffice it now, in reference to Thom, to assert that this complexity exists.
There remains a residual issue. As my treatment of Thom has progressed, I have
abandoned his concept of "tribal nation," and discussed the "nation" generally. Yet, is the
concept of the tribe a limit on the nation that must be shed? That is, has the foregoing
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critique of Thom's concept of the tribe-nation required a universal rejection of the tribe in
connection with the nation?
According to Thom, the tribalization of European politics was based on
ethnological studies of tribal structures in North America. Thom exposes these by and
large as inaccurate, which begs the question of what the actual tribal structures were. An
answer has no bearing on Thom's analysis of the German use of concepts of "tribe," but it
does bear on a discussion of what the term "tribe-nation" could actually mean. It is no
doubt true that Europeans reduced tribal life to the concept Thom links to the
development of the nation. But, does not rejection of the "tribe-nation" on these grounds
actually reinforce the European reduction? Is the concept of "tribe-nation" potentially
much fuller than Thom allows?
Pierre Clastres, in Society Against the State [1977], argues that pre- and post-
Columbian tribal structures in the Americas offered a range of political possibilities that
were opaque to analysis by Europeans hampered by a limited concept of political power.
According to Clastres, European concepts of politics depend on the conception of power
manifested in the "command-obedience" relationship, that is, coercion. The observed
absence of such relations among the Native American tribes — at least those appearing
more "primitive" — has suggested to Europeans an absence of the political altogether. [4]
However, Clastres argues that in such tribes complex political relations existed, which
were actually alternatives to coercive politics. Even if one argues that there is a tendency
in Clastres own work toward idealization of the non-coercive tendencies of Native
American politics (for instance, he does not adequately explore the issue of men's
exercise of power over women), his detailed analysis still supports the conclusion that
this non-coercive form of political power was significantly present.
This in turn suggests a complexity in the political form of the tribe that is not
present in the European representation of it engaged by Thom. To the extent that the
European concept of the nation was disseminated around the world and assimilated into
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societies with tribal and communal heritages independent of Europe's, the presence in
these societies of richer concepts of tribal and communal politics might have provided a
context for development of the concept of the nation beyond its European form. As the
constrained concept of the tribe associated with the European nation resonated with non-
European concepts of the tribe, new alternative national forms could have been produced.
Indeed, given the specific character of non-European tribal forms, at least in the
Americas, these alternative national forms might contain tendencies immune to Thom's
specific criticisms of the European tribe-nation. For instance, Clastres argues that tribal
decision-making was decentralized, and the role of the chief was more of mediator
without power than keeper of order or law enforcer. Members were thus not "passive" in
the face of governmental authority, but rather quite active, to the point where the chief
had to assume a certain level of passivity in order for them to allow him - or, in some
instances, her — the space to exercise his political functions at all. [see Clastres, 1977: 19
-37] In addition, tribes in the Amazon rain forest were not isolated from each other in
closed social systems, but had mechanisms of interchange even at the level of tribal
members. This, of course, runs counter to the assertion of autochthony Thom considers
central to the European tribe-nation, and in fact functioned to reduce tensions and
violence among tribes, quite the contrary of European nationalism, [see 38 - 62]
I would also argue that the European notion of tribes was not derivative only of
exploits in the Americas. It was rooted in colonial engagements in Africa, Middle East,
and Asia as well. Regarding the latter, there is the ever yet innovative and interesting
Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun [1967], This work is significant for a number of reasons.
Though composed in the second half of the 14th Century, it is the foundation of modem
sociology. The analysis of the nature of tribes, and their relationships to cities, offers an
alternative to Thom that is surprisingly relevant. Ibn Khaldun in fact reverses Thom's
valuing of city over tribe. Though he prefigures the later German valuing of the tribal
form as pure and socially legitimate, and devalues the city as the seat of decadence and
114
devolution, his tribal concept is also the driving force of the history of cities. Cities are
the result of tribal evolution and activity. This, of course, might be a function of the eras
in which he wrote and focused, but even so it raises questions about Thom's concept of
tribe. More importantly, Ibn Khaldun’s work is a key non-European example of
traditions of powerful intellectual analyses and conceptualizations of “tribal” forms that
themselves have had a (usually unacknowledged) influence on European theorists as well
as a significant role in the development of non-European concepts of social formations.
The existence especially of more complex tribes and concepts ofthem outside of
Europe suggests one thing further. It is a commonplace view that nationalism originated
in Europe, and later spread to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thom's general argument
is consistent with the position that the concept of the nation that was "returned" to the
Americas and disseminated in Africa and Asia was not merely an advance on non-
European tribal forms, but different in kind altogether. If one recognizes that the
European concept of the tribe actually reduced it from its non-European origins, however,
then the "European creation" of the nation is at least in part a regression from a non-
European social form. More than this, non-European forms of the "tribe-nation" that
drew on their own, richer forms of social organization (tribe) are not simply derivative of
European national forms. The non-European social forms at the root of the nation
appears to have a generative role in later non-European nation-forms. That this evolution
was mediated through European political developments makes Europe at best an equal
partner in this process, not its sole origin. That Thom does not take up this possibility in
his work is a serious shortcoming that has its base in the same reductive approach to the
non-European world as that which produced such a poor notion of the tribe — which in
this instance results in the assumption that one has fully understood the concept of
"nation" (or "tribe-nation") once one has considered its European form. Fortunately,
Thom's own argument suggests the possibility that non-European social and political
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tribal and national forms are both the origin and transcendence of the European tribe-
nation.
Concluding Caveats
My focus on the antinational-ist aspects of certain major critical analyses of the
nation and nationalism should not be taken to suggest that critical reflection on nations
and nationalisms is not an important and fruitful endeavor, nor that no facet of national
movement in general or particular national movements is problematic and deserving of
criticism. Indeed, a requisite for truly progressive national movement is committed self-
analysis and
-criticism. Indeed, it was the general failure of successful national
movements in the past to engage in such reflection and progressive development that led
to abandonment of "national liberation" by the left.
In the context of widespread critical appraisal and even dismissal of national
movement, however, it is important to expose the anti-national bias prevalent in accounts
of and policies toward contemporary national movements — indeed, to apply to these
positions the same level of critique widely applied to nations and nationalisms. The
literature is surfeit with critical appraisals of nations and nationalisms, while there is an
un-commented-upon absence of critical reflection on these critical appraisals themselves
and the ideologies grounding them. My focus should be understood in this context of
extreme unbalance: its goal is not to remove the burden of self-reflection from those
supporting national struggle, but to shift a reasonable amount to those negatively
disposed toward it.
What should also be evident to the reader is that — contrary to Hobsbawm — "non-
nationalists" do not have a monopoly on legitimate, "objective" scholarship on the nation.
It is not that "nationalists" are objective, too. Rather, there is nothing inherent in
nationalist or non-nationalist positions that makes them objective or biased. Within each
perspective, a range of levels of "objectivity" are possible. The extreme, fully biased end
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of the non-nationalist spectrum is antinational-ism, which is as compromised and
unobjective as the most extreme nationalism. The contempt with which the specific
antinational-isms examined have castigated and dismissed "nations" and "nationalism" is
pure dramatic irony. The higher the horse, the easier the indictment.
I have certainly not exhausted the range or depth of anti-nationalist theories nor of
their effects. The preceding has been a sampling of some of the more influential and/or
typical instances of antinational-ist theorizing. Within each type suggested -- Marxist,
Liberal, Progressive, Cosmopolitan, and Republican — there are variations. I have
focused on very specific texts in very precise ways in order to show fully how the
phenomenon under my study works.
Hobsbawm, Kedourie, and Thom are leading representatives of their type, and
critiques of them tend to catch the basic issues in any other instance of a type. At the
same time, regarding Kedourie’ s work, for instance, different components need not be
present in all instances of anti-national liberal theorizing of the nation. For instance,
some instances do not exhibit such a blatant orientalist and colonialist mentality, but
rather level all states without regard to former colonial status. This has its own
problems. Others do not invoke the intellectual history that Kedourie claims for the
nation. Yet, in terms of its basic liberal approach, key elements of the critique of
Kedourie’s work will apply.
Alter and Ree certainly are not key figures in the literature, but their respective
progressive and cosmopolitan accounts are fairly representative of this type of approach.
Indeed, the relative lack of profundity of their representations of their positions links
them all that more closely with the popularly-held versions of the positions. Again, the
same caveat regarding variation applies to these critiques as well.
There are also other types of antinational-ist approaches, such as psychoanalytic,
post-structural or post-modern, and capitalist or econocentric. Psychoanalytic approaches
portray nationalism as a contingent individual psychological abnormality or generality,
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based on all sorts of desires, need, insecurities, etc. These generally ignore political and
social issues, and in effect eliminate the reality of the nation by simply focusing on the
individual psyche in isolation. Capitalist or econocentric approaches function quite
similarly to Hobsbawm’s, except for substituting a focus on the goals of capitalist
economics in the place of class-struggle. I reserve one of the best examples of post-
structural antinational-ism, Etienne Balibar’s, for treatment in Chapter 3. As I explain
there, a study of it is quite a valuable aid in developing a more balanced theory,
outweighing is use in further developing my critique of antinational-ism. The outline of
such a critique is clear in Chapter 3, and can be considered a supplement to the present
discussion.
It is therefore unnecessary to continue with this treatment of antinational-ism. My
general approach and methods should by now be clear, and major examples suitably
treated. The reader is thus prepared to engage variations of critiqued types, additional
types, and even newly-emergent types in a similar manner, exposing hidden assumptions
and ideological agendas as well as perceiving the significant consequences of the
theories.
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CHAPTER 2
ON THE PROPER CONTROL AND USE OF NATIONS AND NATIONALISMS
Introduction
There are many theories and evaluations of the nation and nationalism that are not
explicitly negative or anti-national. These would seem an important balance to the types
of theories discussed in Chapter 1. Unfortunately, when many of these positive
approaches to the nation are examined, it becomes apparent that they are not simply that.
They approve of the nation only in certain forms and for certain functions. Their
approval itself is balanced against a threatened condemnation as vehement as any
antinational-ist. Indeed, their engagement with nations and nationalisms is a powerful,
disciplining one, that manipulates nations and nationalisms even as it claims to analyze
their nature.
Industrial Nationality
Ernest Gellner’s influential account of the nation and nationalism [1983] holds
them to originate in the Industrial Revolution, with its own origin in Great Britain. Prior
to the industrial age, agrarian societies had a rigidly set division of labor. Different
vertical strata (classes or castes) and horizontal divisions (different occupations and
regions) were rigidly fixed and distinct from each other [9 - 13]. The lower, horizontally-
divided peasant and artisan classes applied physical labor to land and to produce the
simple tools necessary to farming it. Their activities were specialized and their training
informal but all-consuming. Only primitive communication within each division was
necessary for its economic and social functioning [33]. Communication with the higher
strata was limited as well, and from the peasant and artisan end equally primitive. The
higher strata (clergy, clerics, artists, nobility, financial, etc.) might have been open or
closed, depending on the specific stratum, but in any case each was highly specialized
and buffered from interchange with other strata [9 - 10]. “High culture” was primarily in
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the hands of clerics [1 1-12]. Communication within each stratum was highly
specialized, and communication among them more limited [9 - 13]. The society was
stable, and each division and stratum self-reproducing (in the educational sense, even if,
as in the case of clerics, not in the biological sense) [30-31],
By “culture,” Gellner means first and foremost a milieu of language and specific
knowledge general to those in the culture [see 12, 32 -38], Thus, communication depends
on culture, that is, a shared medium of linguistic exchange within a shared context of
meaning.
As Britain industrialized, the social structure changed dramatically as a function
of the new mode of production. Peasants were uprooted, as the labor needs of farming
changed, and sought work in urban industrial centers. Thus, stable, self-reproducing
communities were shattered. Industry required a new type of work force. It was no
longer tied to a particular place or specific job function, but had to be flexible enough to
meet the flexible and progressing (ever-changing) needs of emerging and technologically
evolving industries. [24ff.] What is more, efficiency, not tradition and status, became the
dominant social value. [20ff] Thus, the best people for a given job — whether labor or
management - had to be found. The social structure had to allow for vertical as well as
horizontal mobility.
Rational organization was the crucial companion of efficiency. The new division
of labor was complicated. Industrial activity required a labor pool that was not organized
according to received traditions, based on inherited statuses and functions, but rather on
the rationally perceived demands of labor processes. Indeed, society itself had to be
organized rationally, according to the needs of industry, not the dictates of a merely
historical, non-rational, obsolete tradition. Individuals could no longer be conceived as
naturally peasants or nobles, as coopers or blacksmiths by lineage. Social structure itself
was recognized as naturally indeterminate, such that, if the inefficient and non-rational
agrarian order were eliminated, the demands of industrialization would produce the social
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structure best fitted to it. Individuals had to be freed from such predetermined roles, that
is, mobile and interchangeable. [20ff., 29ff.]
Interchangeability required that any worker or manager could be, at least in
theory, trained for any function within the division of labor, within a single industry as
well as in any industry [32, 35 - 36], What is more, work in industrial societies was less
and less an individual “manipulation of things”
;
people in different divisions, in different
roles, had to be able to communicate with each other clearly and efficiently, to coordinate
manufacturing and financial activities [32 - 33], Thus, industrialization required a
uniform, “context-free” medium of communication, or culture (language and knowledge
general to all using it) [33 - 35]. A “context-free” means of communication or culture
means that a given statement or message is understandable by any member of the culture
-- recognizing that some messages will require some additional specialized training, but
most will not.
There was already the basis of such a culture, in the “high culture” of the clerics
and educated strata. It was a precise language fit to communicate most information and
ideas, and able to evolve to communicate new forms of information and ideas. Through
universal basic education, it became the general culture of the industrial society [31 - 32,
35 - 38], This education included a set of knowledges considered (through rational
reflection) to be the basis of learning to function in most roles in the society. Though in
most cases some additional instruction was necessary, this was merely the conveying of
information through the cultural media already established [see 27], What is more,
though not always easy, with shifts in industrial processes, retraining was more possible,
consisting only of the last-added element ofjob training, not training in the basic form of
communication and a general knowledge base of knowledge.
Such an educational system did evolve out of industrialization, but not directly.
Education - the culture and methods as well as the actual universal dissemination of the
former — was a need that could only be organized and guaranteed by the most powerful
and comprehensive institution immediately possible, the modern centralized state [38],
The state emerged with a monopoly on legitimate education. 1 It regulated what people
learned, and what credentials they received for their learning. The state was the objective
guarantor ot a disinterested, universally comparable set of credentials, which aided
mobility, [see 28 - 29] Thus, as culture became essential to the industrial society, the
state became crucial to culture.
Even before Britain had advanced this far, other societies joined in the Industrial
Revolution. In a similar fashion they, too, developed an industrial division of labor
whose mobility and efficiency required a universal culture for “context-free”
communication. Though Gellner never names Britain or the other early nations, one can
speculate that he has in mind such early industrial states as France, the Netherlands
(though their industry seemed more financial than mechanical), and possibly even the
United States. Gellner is not explicit about the exact evolution of these nations. It is
clear that in all but the last case, the industrial societies that developed did so within an
already existing state dominated by a high culture that became the universal culture. In
this context, nationalism’ — the desire to make one’s cultural unit congruent with one’s
political unit [1] — probably did not drive state formation, but rather the nationalization of
the state, that is, the spread within it of the formerly high, now desiredly universal
culture.
2
Gellner ultimately offers a number of different scenarios of industrialization
within given state structures (thought not nation- or even modern states). One type is a
multinational empire in which the dominant high culture is that of those in power — as in
the Habsburg Empire. This group’s control of the state supports its culture, but other
groups finds themselves at a disadvantage in competing for jobs in an industrial (and
'As Gellner stresses, the industrial age replaced the state monopoly over violence with one over education.
Contrary to his rosy perception, however, the monopoly over education was added to, rather than
displacing the monopoly over violence.
20n this account, Scottish and even Welsh nationalism would not yet exist, but would be later constructions
potentially fracturing the British nation itself, on the model of the national fracturing of empires, below.
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financial) medium in which a certain language is used that is not their home language.
They have a choice: assimilate or separate. Some individuals and some groups choose
the former, some the latter. Those that choose the latter begin the process of transforming
a folk (not high) culture and at the same time pursue their own state as the necessary
means for establishing their culture, which itself will foster a distinct industrial society,
built from scratch or from the remnants of the original industrial society on the separated,
nationalized territory. In such cases, a group’s culture becomes noticed by it because it
bars members from full (upward) mobility within the dominant milieu. [97 - 98]
Because members of the group can assimilate, cultural difference becomes a
choice. What is more, cultural difference might not be the only bar to upward or lateral
mobility, but because it is such a salient feature, it might become the scapegoat for the
inevitable inequities of the earlier stages of industrial development. Their mitigation
might have occurred without separation of new nation-states, but this mitigation might be
attributed to separation. [61 - 62]
There are variations on this scenario. For instance, a minority might have
available to it a literate high culture. In such a case, the culture is recognized as a viable
alternative to the dominant high culture, and assimilation is presumably less of an option.
Separation allows this high culture to become the milieu supporting industrialization,
with a state to guarantee it. Of course, this might not be the perception of nationalists,
who in a culture-conscious world might focus on the fate of their culture more than the
industrial implications, [see 61 - 62] It might also be the case that the dominant political
power is not dominant economically, that is, its culture is not the medium of industry. In
such a case, the dominant power might construct and assert its own high culture against
the prevalent one(s). One can also speculate that the minority might choose to split away
before such a situation arises. It will be in the previous situation otherwise, with the
relevant options. This last situation in which nationalism arises is that of a diaspora, or at
least a minority diffused over a state’s territory [lOlff.]. As a diasporan or non-territorial
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minority, it will be free to take up crucial industrial functions within a society. Its
nationalism comes usually as a response to the emergence of nationalism(s) of the
politically but not industrially powerful majority(ies) in the state(s) in which the diaspora
or diffused minority operates (these catalysts following the preceding model).
African and other colonies fall into a different situation altogether. It is not that
adoption of the colonizing culture is not possible or even accomplished by segments
(usually elite) of the colonized population. However, race is used as an additional
separator that invalidates this assimilation: the colonized are barred from the colonizing
society by color. As a result of their frustration, they galvanize popular discontent based
on the more general exclusion, to unify a given administrative unit in a desire for its own
state.
3
Interestingly, the culture that this state is to support is often constructed out of the
colonizer’s. The administrative unit is generally not mono-cultural. Jealousies and other
factors prevent selection of a native folk or high culture as the new state’s. [81 - 83]
This is, of course, a rough schematic of Gellner’s overall presentation, which
itself is an admitted simplification that factors out many other forces that play a role in
industrialization, state formation, and so forth [see 88 - 89]. Gellner makes clear that it
also is not a universally applicable model: nations need not develop within every context
of industrialization, and every potential nation — situation within which a nationalism
might develop — need not become one, and perhaps one in ten or less do [44 - 48].
Further, which specific nations develop, and which particular pre-existing material they
are formed out of (which cultural elements, etc.), is historically contingent [48 - 49],
Beyond these basic provisions, Gellner actually qualifies and clarifies extensively, trying
to shore up his general theory, in its great abstraction, against comparison with a much
more varied and complex socio-political reality. It would be possible to challenge many
of his specific points and the qualifications he employs to anticipate criticisms, but my
3Gellner’s account of anti-colonial nationalism is strikingly similar to Anderson’s in Imagined
Communities, originally published in the same year as Gellner’s Nations and Nationalisms.
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object here is not to nit-pick on the details of his theory. I am concerned with more
fundamental issues.
The Homogenous Culture
Hobsbawm rejects the nation as illusory on the grounds that no such suitably
homogeneous, large-scale social formation exists — homogeneity is the fantasy of
nationalists, that covers over the real divisions in a given population. I myself reject
Hobsbawm’s critique of the nation and nationalism not on the grounds that such
formations do exist, but rather on the grounds that the nation should not be thought of as
a homogeneous social formation. Hobsbawm’s historical critique is accurate, in so far as
it presents the internal complexities of a host of actual and ideal nations, against any easy
belief in their homogeneity. My disagreement is with the criterion against which he tests
this or that asserted nation to see it it really is one: he begins with a reductive
homogeneous “ straw man,” which he easily knocks down.
Hobsbawm is satisfied with this result, as it serves his purpose of presenting class
as the key social tension and structure. Much of my Chapter 3 is devoted to offering an
account of the nation that picks up where Hobsbawm leaves off, that is, that conceives the
nation without depending on homogeneity. Suffice it here to say that at the least
Hobsbawm convincingly argues against any concept of the nation based on homogeneity.
The points he makes are accurate, but the framework within which he interprets these
results and the conclusions he builds on them are constrained by his own conceptual
limitations.
Other theorists paying a great deal more attention to the diversity of data make
similar arguments. In Chapter 3 I examine in detail the theories of two, Homi K. Bhabha
and Etienne Balibar. Balibar’s conclusion is similar to Hobsbawm’s, though from a post-
structuralist (as well as semi-Marxist) position, while Bhabha takes the internal
complexity of the nation as the starting point for a theory of it.
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Given the critiques by Hobsbavvm, Bhabha, and Balibar, Gellner’s theory simply
cannot stand. It is clear that nations are not the end product of industrial homogenization:
if industrialization does indeed tend toward homogeneity, the inherent internal diversity
ot the nation makes it an obstacle to industrialization, and at the least not its product. If
industrialization does not tend toward this homogeneity, then Gellner’s link is broken.
Even if one argues that industrialization cannot itself produce the homogeneity that is
necessary to it, but must rely on nationalisms that homogenize the social fabric, the
futility of the latter endeavor would greatly inhibit the possibility of industrialization
itself, in a way that contradicts the history of at least some of the world. And, Gellner is
very explicit in not taking the last line of argument. At length and in no uncertain terms
he rejects the idea — cited as Elie Kedourie’s — that nationalism itself produces or tries to
the homogeneity of nations. Homogeneity is the product of industrialization, period.
Nationalism is the surface form of this tendency to homogeneity. [39]
It would seem, then, that the link between industrialization and the nation is not
what it seems to Gellner, and presumably not the constitutional link he suggests.
Gellner does address critiques such as Hobsbawm’s summarily, arguing that of
course there are counter-examples to his theory, but that (1) these can be accounted for by
taking stock of other forces interfering in the process of nation-formation and the general
complexity inherent in any social situation and (2) there will always be counter-examples,
but this does not mean that the general theory is wrong - the exceptions prove the rule, so
to speak [139]. The problem is not so simple: it is not that there are some counter-
examples to his theory, or some amount of data that just cannot be made to lit. On the
contrary, every nation and nationalism is a counter-example to his theory. It does not
hold in any instance. His commitment to homogeneity forces a commitment to one side
of a pitched battle over the nature of nationalism and the nation in which both sides are
losers, as I argue in Chapter 3. Here it is enough to suggest that it is possible to develop a
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theory ot the nation that does not depend on absolute homogeneity, which thus accounts
much better tor the range ot data associated with nations and nationalisms.
Gellner does slightly qualify his commitment to homogeneity, by suggesting that
industrialization tends toward it strongly
,
but of course in practice may not reach it. He
does not assume it as the pre-condition of industrialization, but rather states that where
industrialization occurs, it will tend to produce homogeneity. [108 - 109 (note)] As I
have already implied, the nation should not be taken even as a general trend toward
homogeneity. In Chapter 3, 1 argue that (1) such a nation is only one type among many,
and so not the basis of general model and (2) that even such a trend might be one
nationalist strain among different ones associated with a given ideal or actual nation.
Here it is enough to state that, even if a nationalism is such a general trend, it is doomed
to fail in any attempt to bring its presumed nation into correspondence with an industrial
order. It might be expression of the homogenizing tendency of industrialization, but it is
an expression that attempts to deform the nation away from its characteristic internal
complexity.
The Condition of Industrial Society
Let us grant that early nations did arise out of industrialization — perhaps out of its
need for cultural divisions of labor (see below), say, not homogeneity. Does that mean
that nations and nationalisms will always take this form? Gellner appears to admit that,
once the concept of the nation was available, it could be adopted without strictly deriving
from an industrializing context. Such a nation/alism would be then an indirect rather than
direct product of industrialization. But, this is the same as saying that the nation has
exceeded its cause, becoming independent. 4 New forms of nation and nationalism might
emerge, out of more complex material and conceptual forces and tendencies. I explore
this issue at length in Chapter 3. The point here is that, even if the Industrial Revolution
4One sees here the perils of confusing accounts of the conditions or causes of nations with what they
actually are, as stressed by Lowell Barrington [1997],
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was the condition of the initial development of nations and nationalisms, that does not
mean that every subsequent form and instance is a product of the force of
industrialization. In new and ditterent contexts, different forms and manifestations might
arise. Gellner’s industrial origins account works universally only if industrialization is
taken as the exclusive cmd dominant force in every aspect of society and life in every
location. It not to him, then to me and many others, this is an excessive speculation.
Much more reasonable is the notion that, once available, the concept and reality of
nations and nationalisms had to some extent ‘lives of their own’ - if lives quite
intermingled with economic and industrial issues.
One might also question whether even industrialization itself is not intermingled
in complex causal relations with other aspects of modernity, including cultural and
political ones.
Gellner’s assumption of omnipresent and -potent industrialization itself depends
on a de-emphasis of all other aspects of human society and life. It relegates modern
culture, politics, and social relations purely to derivatives of the dominant mode of
production (in his mind, not capitalism, but industrialism). Is this not the fundament of
the Marxism Gellner so blatantly and vehemently detests? 5
Beyond even this, Gellner’s representation of the workings of industrial society is
idealized. It reads at points as the kind of pure propaganda that embarrasses even those
devoted to industrialization in the contemporary age. It is pure abstract idealism; it is
pure 19th Century. An industrial society tends toward a flat, egalitarian, homogeneous
pool of mobile individuals. It functions as rationally as possible, producing more to
benefit the producers - better and more plentiful food, shelter, clothing, luxury. It is all
rationally organized, around material needs. The ultimate society is beautifully flowing,
^Nearly every mention - and there are roughly 20 - of Marx or Marxism in Nations and Nationalism
occasions an attack. Marxism is the object of even more intense derision in Encounters With the Nation
[1994],
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elegant in its direct efficiency and rationality. The better industrialized, the more and
more everything and everyone serves and functions efficiently and rationally.
This is obviously idealization. According to Gellner, the bureaucratic realm
within the industrial order the rational, efficient, social organizing force of the state that
supports universal basic education, and the rational and effective management of
industrial endeavors. Having worked for close to two years as a US federal bureaucrat
and another two as a social worker regularly engaging bureaucracies — as well as having
made my way through various federal, state, and local bureaucracies in other capacities —
I find Gellner’s appraisal hopelessly naive. First of all, the structure and order of
bureaucracies is usually an evolving formation based on feudalistic precedents, without
direct “ rational” reorganizing. Its Byzantine procedures and processes are anything but
efficient, even when they are “rationally organized.” Indeed, when a bureaucracy is
“rationally” reorganized for efficiency, it usually functions worse. Bureaucrats are, of
course, people, and their functioning is greatly influenced by all sorts of personal and
psychological forces .
6
I have many a time received different answers to the same
question asked of two different individuals in the same office who are supposed to be
referring to the same procedure.' People who are supposed to be doing the exact same
job, as stipulated in clear regulations and job descriptions, perform them quite differently.
As anyone knows, when working through a bureaucracy, the individual personality of the
person or people with whom one is dealing is the crucial factor for one’s success of
failure .
8
One can speculate that the naivete of Gellner’s understanding of how
bureaucracies really work and his overestimation (indeed, devotional valorization) of
their efficiency and rational organization extends to other realms of industrial society.
6As confirmed by Ackermann [1995],
7So much so that I now, as a matter of course, always ask questions about important procedures of two
different workers at two different times. If their answers are the same, I can be very sure that what they tell
me is true, because most of the time they do not give the same answers.
8
I do not mean to insult bureaucrats, least of all the ones I used to work with. Many are excellent and
devoted -- but even that is a function not of the role into which they are put, but other factors.
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Consider Japan, which is a highly industrialized state with an apparently homogeneous
and unified culture. Yet, mobility is restricted by the specific form of industrialism,
which itself is constrained by cultural imperatives. Laborers are hired by a corporation
for life, at whatever level they enter it. What is more, their career trajectory (upward
mobility) is generally determined by the level and status of their ultimate educational
institution. Even if these do support Japan’s industrial success, the resulting structure is
quite certainly not of the form that Gellner claims.
More than this, there is the bulk of 20th Century psychoanalytic theory and
practice, as well as many currents in political and social thought. Since the time of Freud,
it has been more and more clear that human beings and their societies are complex
formations that cannot be reduced to single dominant aspects or explicit motivations and
behaviors.
9 Much more is going on in the mind of “industrial man” and in industrial
society than Gellner’ s simplistic model allows. Indeed, industry itselfimplicitly
acknowledges and depends on this, by its use of manipulative marketing campaigns that
trade on people’s “irrational” insecurities, desires, and so forth. Gellner appears a
Victorian, maintaining the surface veneer of propriety, order, rationality, and efficiency,
even as a pool of human complexity, ambiguity, and tension bubbles below the surface.
Just as Freud shattered the Victorian illusion, so has much of 20th Century psychological,
political, and sociological thought shattered 19th Century simplistic illusions about the
march of industrial society. Indeed, were Gellner truly committed to the progress he
extols, he would undoubtedly have to abandon his 19th Century sociology, economics,
politics, and anthropology in favor of the fruits of the subsequent century’s intellectual
production.
Gellner’s mechanist industrial determinism reduces the rich complexity of human
experience to one stilling and voracious realm of life. I would argue that, were industrial
’Though even Freud might be accused of reductive theorizing, at the least the bounty of theories of human
psychology and sociality of the current century suggests the genuine complexity and irreducibility of the
psychological and social realms to any easy, single principles.
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society - or, more accurately, modern society - truly to fit Gellner’s description,
industrial production would suffer profoundly.
To the extent that it has imposed its ideal of “ industrial man” on the subjects of
industrial societies, it has at the least had a deeply negative effect on human subjectivity
and sociality. Just because the industrial order does not admit the full range of human
subjectivity and sociality, does not mean that it simply ignores it. It is imposed on human
complexity, molding human beings to fit an industrial structure and machinery. It
imposition excludes and suppresses this complexity, producing, to use Marx’s
terminology and incisive analysis, a profound alienation from it.
Though Gellner views industrialization as the highest expression of and most
perfect fit to “ human nature,” since the beginning of industrialization, there have been
plentiful protests about its dehumanizing, de-socializing, and other harmful effects.
These protests and criticisms have come from every angle, progressive and conservative,
radical and reformative. The very fact of these protests suggests a complexity to human
subjectivity and sociality that belies any easy claims that “industrialized man” [sic] is the
fruition of the comprehensive nature of humanity.
Gellner asserts that the transformation from agrarian to industrial society strips
away antiquated, tradition-based, non-rational forms of social organization and replaces
them with an open and malleable social pool that supports an ever-changing industrially-
determined social structure. But, is this industrial order, with its “industrial man,” not a
very specific concept of social relations and subjectivity? Gellner believes that atomic
individuals are the basic constituent elements of all social structures. Industrial society
merely creates a context in which individuals are freed of their contingent and
constraining relations. Individuals can then be reformed into new, but now rational and
efficient, social structures. As I have been suggesting, this assumes a great deal about
what human beings are “naturally,” and, in fact, naturalizes what appears to be a
constructed form of subjectivity. Gellner ridicules nationalist naturalizations ol
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nations as natural human social forms [48 - 49], but then merely substitutes his own
equally dubious form of human subjectivity and sociality (atomic individualism) in its
place. He is right to contest the possibility of “natural” social and subjective forms, but
entirely deluded in believing that “atomic individualism” is the absence of the
presumption of any natural social form. The lack of social relations might itself be
possible only as the product of forces applied to “naturally socialized” human subjects,
and be quite artificial.
Indeed, atomic individualism has always been a philosophical abstraction that
mythologizes the logical (and sometimes historical) origins of human subjectivity and
social structures. Liberal atomic individualist partisans such as Gellner condemn the
myths of nationalist origins in long past ages, in nature itself [48 - 49], but then turn
around and engage in the same type of mythologizing. Though this is generally
understood as a logical isolation of human nature, it usually takes a historical narrative
form, which is suggestive of its mythologizing form akin to the most deluded
nationalisms of origins.
No one can do an experiment that isolates individuals in the way that this theory
or concept of human nature suggests is the natural form. Indeed, any experiments that
would isolate individuals away from social relations would undoubtedly leave 95 percent
insane in short order. Of course, more sophisticated notions of this type of theory do not
deny social relations as an individual need, and Gellner would probably not argue that
industrialization actually isolates individuals. But, this supports my point, that atomic
individualism is not human nature. Again, Gellner might claim that he is not arguing for
no social relations, but rather the absolute mobility of individuals within a set of social
relations and the absolute mutability of the relational structures themselves.
There is no absolute critique of this, but there is neither an absolute confirmation
of it. This suggests that there is no absolute social form, and that thus atomic
individualism is a particular form, historical contingent, not the raw material tor all
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possible social forms. This in turn suggests that there are alternative social forms. The
ready and usual examples are organic structures (as discussed elsewhere in this
dissertation), as well as more difficult to summarize social structures.
In Chapter 3,
10
1 develop my account of what I think a specifically national social
structure is. Suffice it here to state that Gellner’s presumption of a certain natural or
elemental form of human subjectivity is not defended by him nor absolutely defensible at
all, which suggests a much greater openness to human social relations and subjectivity
than Gellner allows. It is interesting that he believes that splitting societies into atomic
individuals opens up the greatest range of possible social structures. Given that it is in
fact a specific form of social structure, assertion of it as allowing the fullest possible
range of social structures in fact closes off a host of other types of structures in a stifling
manner. The nation might be one of those forms, or, as I argue in Chapter 3, might
actually have many different types. If this range of types includes a cultural container of
interchangeable atomic individuals, it includes other types as well. Thus, at most,
Gellner’s theory holds for only one type of nation. But, then, it must be mistaken about
the industrial nature of nations.
The Interior of Industrial Society
Acknowledgment of human subjective and social complexity does not, of course,
mean that the industrial order is not homogeneous. At the same time, Gellner’s
representation of industrial society and subjectivity is idealized in a manner relevant to
homogeneity, as well. His theory echoes typical propaganda about the industrial order (at
least in its liberal-capitalist form) that masks a reality of inequality, immobility, and
exploitation.
10
I apologize for any annoyance these references to Chapter 3 cause, but it has been difficult to keep
separate my critiques of existing theories of the nation on ideological grounds, and explorations of issues
necessary to development of my own theory of the nation.
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GeHner dismisses criticisms that the apparent or stated egalitarianism and
mobility ot industrial societies (liberal ones anyway) masks underlying structures of
domination that are every bit as rigid and powerful as feudal ones. This is of course the
Marxist line, and it is a compelling one that I hold to be very accurate, especially when
expanded to include a range of social issues and oppressions. For Gellner, any inequality
is the inevitable result ot the excesses and uncertainties of early industrialization. They
are its growing pains — unfortunate to be sure, but not grounds for a general indictment.
A general argument against Gellner’
s position on the nature of industrial
development would carry me far beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is also beyond
my base of knowledge, given the extensive history and intellectual breadth of debates
about the true effects of industrial capitalism and whether or not it is oppressive. But, it
is possible to focus on two issues relevant to this debate - race and colonialism - in a
way that has significant implications for Gellner’
s general claim that the industrial order
is fundamentally liberatory, not oppressive, for all of humanity.
Gellner does acknowledge that the internal structure of an industrial society, with
its universal culture, does not produce perfect mobility. “Entropy-resistant” markers
remain in effect, particularly race. This markers are different from the borders of cultures
that tend toward assimilation or separatist nationalism. They are anti-progressive, that is,
inhibit or militate against the increasing mobility that marks industrial development.
They are by default ‘throwbacks,’ that is, residual markers that industrialization has
ceased to erase. [64 - 70]
Though Gellner suggests that they are originally random groupings of people with
certain phenotypes in lower level positions in the industrial order [67], he accepts that,
over time, the people with those phenotypes become associated with low positions and
the characteristics that are in turn associated with them in an egalitarian labor pool -
laziness, etc. [68],
134
GeHner considers race and other “entropy-resistant” characteristics - which vary
by society - to be aspects of the pre-industrial order that industrialization has failed to
affect. He does not consider arguments that have been advanced from various quarters
arguing that, in fact, racialization is an essentialfeature ofindustrial capitalism. It is
requires to accomplish the division of labor, by creating a low-status group to fill very
low social roles that, if they were a danger to all members of the industrial society, might
trigger leactions against the industrial order. By stigmatizing one group and gaining the
help of the majority of society in enforcing that stigmatization, three problems are solved:
how to fill the low-level jobs, how to keep the majority of exploited workers happy, and
how to keep the oppressed minority in check.
Of course, this does not mean that there is not some slippage and mobility, but
just that a racist system prevents full mobility. Where Gellner sees this as the drive of
industrial homogenization, the argument I am summarizing views the slippage a
minimum concession to the oppressed that allows some to escape the lower levels of the
industrial order in order to maintain a myth of mobility such that critique of the system is
more difficult. Still, the solution is not perfect, and of course there is a great deal of labor
unrest, which Gellner dismisses as just the growing pains of development.
I would argue, following Omi and Wynant [1985], that non-racial cultural
difference (ethnicity, but not necessarily nationality) is a different form of difference, but
one just as necessary to at least some industrial societies." For instance, the United
States’ economy was organized around immigrant labor that was compelled — by
circumstances and desires — to enter the labor pool at the lowest levels, levels at which
full members of the society were unwilling to work. Though assimilation for some
groups was allowed, this was a gradual process and (1) traced their climb through the
levels of industrial society and (2) depended on a pool of racialized workers or recent
"This is a suggestive phrase: obviously, not every industrial or industrializing society is the same, even in
some fundamental way. Gellner’s crude model does not allow for any real variation, but reduces every
instance of industrial society to one central model.
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immigrants (or both) to do the lowest jobs. With this third group, a complex “division of
laborers existed, in which the conflict between the three main groups (as well as
component groups) prevented widespread organization against the system itself.
What emerges here is that industrial society itself might depend on ethnic and
racial divisions for its division of labor. In other words, these internal divisions are far
from anti-industrial, but rather crucial components of industrial society. Thus, industrial
society does not tend toward a general homogeneity or internal mobility, but rather
toward the production of divisions that allow for full mobility within and little mobility
between. This is different from the more specialized groupings of feudal European
societies, but contains within it a rigidity that is not merely a residual of feudal forms, but
perhaps the novel feudal aspect of industrialization.
From this point, it might be possible to argue that at least some nationalist
movements have their origins in the movement to fracture industrial societies on behalf of
those at the lower levels of the division of labor. This is the Leninist concept of one type
of “good” or anti-oppressive nationalism. At the same time, it still retains the industrial
or economic focus that is limiting for a concept of the nation and nationalism.
Colonialism and Development
One can push Gellner’s account of industrial society one step further. He does not
appear to view colonized groups as part of the same industrial (in the cases of Britain,
France, the United States, etc.) structure (division of labor) as their colonizers. Thus, not
only is an industrial society coextensive with a state internally fragmented, but the
industrial-age colonizing state itself is part of a broader industrial structure including
colonized groups and territories - which are, on racial and cultural grounds, usually
barred from genuine inclusion within the colonizing state. Colonialism was a division ot
labor, as well as the crucial guarantor of industrial raw material. It was fundamental to
the Euro-American Industrial Revolution. Even to very advanced industrial states,
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colonial relations (sometimes informal) have been crucial. The pursuit of oil has been a
diiving toice tor colonization ot and post-colonial neo-imperial domination of Middle-
Eastern, Southeast Asian, and South American societies, as described in Daniel Yergin’s
The Prize [1991]. Colby and Dennett meticulously detail the complex concrete political,
corporate, economic, religious, service, and military neo-imperial relations binding much
ot Cential and South America to the United States economy, as planned and engineered
by Nelson Rockefeller in the years before, during, and after World War II [1995],
Rockefeller explicitly conceived of the Americas as a single industrial unit, with the
production of raw materials for the United States’ industrial engine imposed on various
states, and including some industrial development of some regions.
The examples go on. The bottom line is that Gellner has an idealized and
inaccurate perspective of how industrialization has proceeded, and how industrial
production occurs. If he were to have taken it into the field, he would have met with
profound failure. Indeed, no corporation or government body involved in colonial or
neo-imperial production would ever take such an analysis seriously.
It is not that in the current age globalization has tended to create a world-wide,
unified division of labor. Globalization is nothing new, though its form might have
shifted due to political pressures and technological innovations.
Just how fundamental it was is clear from just how seriously colonizers took the
control of their colonies. Gellner’ s representation of industrial-age colonialism is a not
too veiled apology for it. For him, “the point made about the English, that they acquired
their Empire in a state of absence of mind, can to some extent be generalized . . . The
English also, most laudably
,
lost the Empire with a similar lack of attention” [my
emphasis; 42 - 43], Colonial empires just kind of happened as a correlate of industrial
superiority of one group by another, as it were by the invisible hand of trade and
industrial relations. They were, indeed, “ pluralistic” [43], It was not through military
conquest or direct intention of domination. The colonizer is not an intentional conqueror,
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and therefore has no real culpability. The industrial European form of conquest and
domination, its seems, was/is superior to and more humane than the more barbaric and
savage militaristic style ot other eras and regions (that is, of the colonized cultures). [42 -
43]
His representation ot the reasons tor the end of industrial colonization are just as
problematic. The two reasons he cites are that the colonizers became guilty, so they gave
up their colonies, and the United States and Soviet Union required their conflict to be
fought out by nominally independent proxies. I would say that the attitude referenced in
the second reason suggests the main motivations of the colonizers - to stop being
oppressed and exploited. Of course, Gellner utterly ignores the agency of the colonized.
They did not fight - and die in the millions - to free themselves from the yoke of
colonization. It was just the ultimate goodness of the colonizers that freed them! They
did not develop brilliant theories of colonialism, carefully analyzing the material and
psychological forces to be overcome. This is not to suggest that some within colonizing
societies did not eventually oppose colonialism. But, their “guilt” was generally a
reaction to confrontation by the colonized in inescapable terms. Indeed, their desire to
end colonization were often intentionally produced by the colonized as a means of
fracturing and weakening the colonizing society [Truong, 1985].
Tell this all to the Indians, tell it to the Mau Mau (if any are left), the Egyptians,
the Chinese .... Tell it to the Vietnamese, the Filipino/as, the Algerians .... Tell it to
the Zulu .... Gellner’ s representation is astonishingly inaccurate, especially for
something published in 1983.
As Edward Said argues [1979], an entire ideology was developed through a
myriad of linked political, academic, military, and social institutions. As he also argues
[1993], the identity of colonizers was fundamentally linked to colonization. But, this can
be seen by a read of any popular literature, newspapers, and so forth from the relevant
era. Take, just for instance, a novel by Agatha Christie from the 1930s, such as Cards on
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the Table [1966], It is filled with orientalist comments about the mysteriousness,
deviousness, etc., of Chinese and other Asians. What is more, two main characters are
colonial functionaries, whose current, past, and future exotic exploits in the colonies are a
crucial component ot the narrative, as well as the world/culture invoked by it. Christie’s
immense popularity suggests that her descriptions rang true, and her colonizing characters
interesting. Neither are at all original, but instead seem to reflect a general colonialist
attitude that was “absent-minded” only because it was so assumed ox taken for granted.
Another novel by Christie, Hickory Dickory Death [1956], written 20 years later,
after the loss of India and as the Empire crumbled, is positively obsessed with the end of
Empire. Many characters are colonials and post-colonials who are cardboard characters
stereo-typed in all the typical ways. They are mere comic relief for the most part, with
their superstitious relics, pornography, and subversive literature. Indeed, the challenges
to racism and colonialism that they are allowed to make, are presented as absurdly
inappropriate and inaccurate. Why include any of this? Whether of her own desires or to
please her millions of readers, Christie’s inclusion is an example ofjust how central the
loss of Empire was to the British, and just how intentionally they were “absent-minded”
about it.
Such manifestations of colonial consciousness are all but countless. The
awareness and intentionality not only foil Gellner’s weak apology, but also add to the
case against his representation of industrial development. It must be kept in mind that
Britain was already long a colonizer before its Industrial Revolution, as was the case for
all other initially industrializing states. If this does not guarantee that colonization was a
or the condition of industrialization, it does suggest that the colonial division of labor was
not a mechanical and inevitable result of industrialization, but rather developed out of
colonial structures and ideologies predating industrialization.
12
l2Gellner’s own dismissive remarks about colonialism occupy quite a bit of space in this work and become
focal in a number of sections of Encounters With Nationalism [1994], including a sustained attack on
Said’s critique of orientalism in Chapter 12.
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What is more, it calls into question the whole liberal-progressive developmental
schema. Differential levels of industrial development no longer appear to be between
discrete societies, but are actually part of unified industrial orders. By temporalizing
positions in single industrial divisions of labor and structures, the colonizing beneficiaries
naturalized an arbitrary division of labor and hierarchical industrial process. More
primitive areas were thus justifiably relegated to supplying raw materials
(involuntarily and at a huge financial loss) and later labor for the lowest, most dangerous
and difficult levels of the division of labor. This is not to suggest that technological
differences did not exist among dilferent societies, but that, once a single industrial
structure was formed through colonialism, the differences were rigidified, exaggerated,
naturalized, and often increased.' 3 Indeed, recent scholarship has implicated
developmental ideologies and practices in genocides. 14 Superior “development” quickly
came to depend on power, not the other way around - and power within a single
industrial system.
Colonialism was not the product of the differential levels of development due to
the uneven spread of industrialization. It was, rather, a factor in producing and
maintaining this unevenness within unified industrial structures, crucial to the internal
structure of production. Thus, differential development could not mark off different
nations — which is a rejection of Tom Nairn’s account of nationalism [1981], one quite
sympathetic to anti-colonialism. Rather, proto-national distinctions were in part
constitutive of developmental differences, and themselves have to accounted for by other
factors as well, including political and cultural ones. 1 '
l3 Such as with the San people of southern Africa, as discussed in Edwin Wilmsen’s Land Filled With Flies
[1989], Wilmsen shows that the San people, long hailed as one of the last truly primitive “hunter-
gatherer” societies on earth, actually (re-)turned to this method of economic activity only in the 20th
Century, after years of herding and animal husbandry, for themselves and others. They were forced to
hunting and gathering by the poverty resulting from their low racial and tribal status within South Africa.
In other words, they were barred from participation in more “advanced” forms of production due to racial
and tribal oppression, and thus “ primitivized.”
l4See Hilmer Kaiser’s Imperialism, Racism, and Development Theories [1997] and Colby and Dennett
[
1 995].
5Gellner’s revisionist history should be recognized as part of colonialism. Just as denial is not after
genocide, but its final stage, in which the very presence of those killed is removed from history, so this
type of revision is the final stage of colonialism. One might call it the “discursive stage,” in which the
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Gellner s theory itself is not simply a bad analysis of the nation form, but in the
service of a particular progressive industrialist agenda that itselfjustifies and mystifies
colonialism and neo-imperialism. Perhaps more importantly, his theory denies anti-
oppressive (especially anti-colonial) nationalism any genuine grounds. As nationalism
becomes the mechanical product of shifting tides of industrialization, it looses its
effectiveness as a potential challenge to oppression - oppression would have lessened
and ended anyway, and nationalism just marks this transition. Anti-colonial nationalism
becomes a derivative of industrial development and differentiation, rather than the
profound challenge to oppressive industrial orders that it often considers itself - and
might well be. This is another part of Gellner’s control and exploitation of the nation and
nationalism. Nationalism is pushed to serve the progressive industrialist model, rather
than some forms serving as direct challenges to the practice based on and ideology of this
model.
Indeed, anti-colonial nationalism as such ceases to exist, becoming instead a mere form
of industrial nationalism. In deforming nations and nationalisms to fit his progressive
industrial model, he does not merely exclude alternative forms, but rather covers up
precisely those forms that pose a genuine challenge to his ideological agenda.
Deluded Nationalists and Revised History
Like Hobsbawm as well as Kedourie, Gellner views the world through a very
restrictive conceptual frame. But, different from each, he does not merely “ irrationalize”
or dismiss what does not fit fully within the frame. His frame is rather superior, in that it
allows the nation and nationalism to show up as legitimate/real socio-political formations,
but at the same time it “corrects” them to be consistent with the frame.
colonizers are relieved of responsibility, and colonialism de-emphasized. It might even be taken as a
reassertion of colonialism, through discursive control of the history of colonization, in the place of a now
untenable direct military and political control.
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His theory does not show the industrial origins and basis of the nation and
nationalism. On the contrary, it deforms and fits the range of phenomena associated with
the nation and nationalism into forms that are entirely consistent with the industrial
conceptual frame, that is, derivative of industrialization. In perhaps cowardice, perhaps a
powerful, absorptive subtlety, Gellner chooses to tame nationalism, rather than confront
it. True to his industrious thinking, he decides to put it to work, rather than fight it.
I write figuratively, of course. Gellner does this by normalizing the history and
sociology of nations and nationalisms within the bounds of a dominant narrative of
industrialization. The nation is perhaps not really domesticated by industry in this way,
but at the same time, one must not underestimate the effects of normalized histories and
sociologies. Gellner is big on claiming that intellectuals have had no real effect on the
development of nations - that they are not driven by ideas, but rather by material
(industrial) forces [see especially 123ff.]. That he believes this as much as he believes his
theory itself does not prevent us from wondering about its force as a self-fulfilling
prophesy — especially when taken seriously by those in power. I will return to this issue
below, in connection with Leah Greenfeld, a more ready instance of the potential power
of the pen.
To do this, of course, Gellner must argue for the complete dismissal of concepts
of nations and nationalisms that perceive some forms as these types of challenges.
Disregarding contemporary development techniques themselves, he silences the agents of
national movements and nationalisms, and the members of nations. He repeatedly
dismisses their concepts of what they are and are doing as pure delusion [see especially
48 - 49], Here one can see Gellner’s orientalism run amuck. The essence of orientalism
is the imposition of reductive concepts of another culture or its members, without regard
to the complexities that really exist or to the protests of the victims. It is a supreme
arrogance to presume to describe nations and nationalisms without any regard whatsoever
for the ideas and understandings of those participating in them, as if they have no
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capacity for any form of self-understanding or
-reflection. Given Gellner’ s own complete
immersion in ideology, it is also pure dramatic irony.
It is, in addition, a necessary step. Nations and nationalisms are internally
complex and externally varied. For this complexity and variety involving explicit and
unconscious motives, a range ot possible functions and interpretations of nations and
nationalisms, etc., Gellner substitutes one very normalized, very ideologically determined
closed interpretation of all these. This requires ignoring the self-conception of nations
and nationalisms. It is one thing to argue that these must be interpreted and are by no
means accurate; it is another to reject them out of hand as irrelevant to the nature of
nations and nationalisms. Indeed, their very variety suggests a corresponding variety
among the factors determining nations and nationalisms. What is more, at least when
national movements are reacting directly against the foundations of Gellner’ s account of
them — progressive industrialism, atomic individualism, etc. — one can be rather well
assured that they are not products of these foundations.
By ignoring self-concepts of nations and nationalisms, Gellner clears the field for
his own theory. Indeed, he is free to transform the range of nations and nationalisms into
the seeming buttresses of progressive industrialism. Their history of struggle, their
successes, become associated with and evidence of progressive industrialism. That quite
often they have arisen as direct challenges to the ideology and practice of progressive
industrialism is erased from view and memory. That they quite often have represented
alternative social and ideological forms to progressive industrialism and the associated
liberal atomic individualism is erased from view and memory. These alternatives are
erased from view and memory, as the ideologues of progressive industrialism and liberal
atomic individualism convince themselves and their subjects that the "nature ol things”
is progressive industrialism and liberal atomic individualism - forestalling perhaps
further challenges to the order, on national or other grounds, even as the self-conceptions
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of nationals and nationalists are warped into conformity. Perhaps Gellner’s theory is a
mere wish, but it is a dangerous wish.
Nationalism and the State?
John Breuilly develops a theory of nationalism that relates it directly to the state,
in Nationalism and the Slate [1982], He defines nationalism to be the pursuit of a state
based on reference to a “nation,” that is, on behalf of a “nation” [1 - 2]. He excludes all
other definitions of nationalism. More than this, he views the nation as the product of a
successful nationalist movement, that is, the capture or creation of a state.
According to Breuilly, the characteristic ideology of a nationalism holds that a
given cultural group (defined by prior statehood, language, or some other feature or set of
features) should control a given state or territory. A “society (= nation)” [69] is a unique
community with a “ national spirit.” If it is ruled by those who do not share in this spirit
(those from another nation), then violence will be done to the spirit. Therefore, it must
control its own state. For Breuilly, this is reasoning is faulty, because it is built on a
conflation of culture and politics. It is a claim that the tension between society and state -
- what their proper relationship should be — is resolved in the nation, which is at once
both political and cultural. However, there appears nothing in the “political nation” that
is inherently linked to the cultural, and vice-versa. On the one hand, the nation is
conceived of as a ‘cultural spirit’ inhabiting a group, and on the other as a “body of
citizens” who have a right to self-determination. Nationalism does not make a rational
link between these two conceptions of a population, but rather links them by using the
term “nation” in two different senses that are presented as identical. [62 - 64, 69]
At the same time, the ideological content of a nationalism is irrelevant. When
treating nationalism, it is not sufficient to stop at its ideological content; like Gellner,
Breuilly believes that the nature of nationalism is something quite distinct from the
content of its ideology. The proper focus should be on how the ideology becomes
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widespread among a group and how that group is able to take or create a state, not on
what it says. Or, more accurately, the analyst must trace the manner in which different
component groups within proto-national grouping are brought into a unified political
movement. [54ff.]
This is accomplished through linking the specific interests of different component
gioups — professionals, intellectuals, businesspeople, workers, peasants, etc. — to
achievement ol national statehood. Through its false ideological reading of the situation
of members of a proto-national group, a nationalism links the members 5 interests to
attainment of a state abstractly. The spread of a nationalism depends on making that
abstract link concrete; that is, of appealing to and convincing members of different
segments of the population that their specific, concrete interests - problems, insecurities,
etc. - can be met through attainment of the state. In other words, it is getting individuals
to accept the nationalist reading of their situation, in such a way that the individuals’
actions on their own behalf are seen to necessarily involve attainment of statehood. This
is made easier when the individuals’ experience genuine problems that are related to
social differences that can be related to nationality, such as language - such as when
people’s native language is not the medium of business, governmental, etc.,
communication in their society.
It must be stressed that this focus is primarily on the political. Though nationalist
ideology might make claims about culture, nationalism is a primarily political
phenomenon. It must be analyzed in purely political terms. [1]
After presenting his definition of nationalism and detailed but generalized
comments on (1) the typical forms of and possibilities for participation by each
component group of a typical society (aristocracy, business class, peasantry, proletariat,
professional class, intellectuals, etc.) and (2) the nature and role of ideology in
nationalism, Breuilly offers a series of detailed case studies of different types ot
nationalisms. The specific typology is not relevant to the following discussion. What is
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important is that he presents histories ot nationalist movements based on the initial
definition and general analysis. These analyses are detailed explanations of the success
or failure of nationalist assertions for statehood, in terms of the link between statehood
and the specific interests ol members of different constituent groups of the proto-national
society, as well as certain relevant additional factors.
The Politics of Interest Groups
Close examination of Breuilly s concept of the “political” is necessary to a full
understanding of the implications of his general and specific accounts of nationalism(s). I
tend to use the term “political” broadly, recognizing that the political itself is linked to
the other aspects of existence, including psychology, economics, gender relations, family
structures, culture, etc. That is not to say that the political can be reduced to other aspects
of existence, or that any of these others can be reduced to the political. They are involved
in each other, but not identical another or reducible one to another.
Obviously Breuilly’s analysis of nationalist ideology disallows such a broad
concept of the political. Indeed, he would recognize in it the same non-rationally based
conflation of politics with other aspects of existence that is central to nationalism itself.
For him, the political is strictly that which is concerned with the governmental
and institutional aspects of the state. Politics is about deciding how a population should
be governed. He claims that he is avoiding the fault of theories that reduce politics to
other forces, such as economic or cultural. But, in doing so, he moves to the other
extreme, denying any substantive link between politics and other aspects of existence,
particularly culture. His opposition to such theories — as well as to the supposed
nationalist equation of the cultural and political -- excludes a huge middle.
In this middle is the possibility that there are different forms of political activity
and ideology. Reminiscent of Gellner, he assumes that his basic framework isolates the
true nature of the political. But, there might be a complexity and variety to the political
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that he denies. What is more, this variety might in part turn specifically on the level of
intersection between the abstractly pure “political"' and such things as culture,
economics, etc. Though he is right to reject any simplistic identity between culture and
politics — and any nationalist ideology based on this — he is not to reject considering that
they are linked.
Indeed, he fails to consider the possibility that even such obviously false
nationalisms as the one he portrays as the general type at the very least are the register of
genuine changes in the nature ot politics. The rise of nations or nationalisms was closely
linked to the emergence of mass politics in the modern era. In the 17th Century, politics
was recognized to concern every member of a society, and not just the elite whose reserve
it had up to that point been. From a state perspective, the next two centuries were the
gradual inclusion of greater portions of societies’ populations in political life. Individuals
from different social groups entered the political process. This is, in fact, Breuilly’s
model for the mobilization of a population by nationalism. Mass politics is simply the
organization of a set of individuals around an idea. The structure is a direct relationship
between each individual and the idea. [51]
But, people do not just enter the realm as isolated individuals. Recall my
criticism of Gellner on a similar point: their entrance is also the entrance of traditional
and emerging forms of social relation. From a non-state perspective, the entrance of the
general populations of societies into politics -- even politics narrowly construed - means
the entrance of their social relations, contexts, etc. These, in fact, now become political.
Language, culture, gender relations, and so forth become political - even formerly so.
This is not due to a “nationalist” error of conflation, but from real social and political
changes.
What is more, the political itself changes. The change is not smooth, for there is a
tension between what might be considered the traditional or formal concept of politics
(Breuilly’s) and the new or expanded concept. I am not arguing that this concept is
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embodied specifically or exclusively by the nation, but rather that the emergence of the
nation is part ot the transition. There remains a formal “ state perspective,” the one that
Breuilly himself adopts. But other perspectives become available. His construal of the
nationalist perspective in stark terms delegitimizes it as an alternative to the equally
stark formal-statist perspective he adopts. And from what might better be called a
national perspective, new issues and forces are seen to be relevant to this changing sense
P®htics. At the risk ot using a Gellnerian turn of thought, the national perspective
and the emergence of the nation as a social structure at the intersection of politics with
culture - is a necessary product of the popularization of politics.
It is not just about the introduction of the masses into politics, as Breuilly might
have it, but of their culture, social relations, etc., with them. It is precisely with the
popularization of politics that politics as decision-making by a field of interested atomic
individuals becomes an ideology, the ideology of the state. The state - as formal
democracy, or even as absolute subjugation of a population, which as Breuilly helpfully
notes is for the first time a direct relationship between every subject and the governing
power — is a formal or legal framework for the making and enforcement of decisions
relevant to the society as a whole. As such, it must - at the risk of another dubious
appropriation of Gellner — claim the power to determine the relations among the field of
citizens or subjects. It cannot recognize alternative sources of social relations, and so,
from the state perspective, national relations are invisible.
It is for this reason that Breuilly’ s extensive set of detailed case studies offers
little insight into the formation of nations. It is not just that he reduces nationalism to the
pursuit of a state (see Gellner section and below): he reduces nation-formation to the
history of formal political relations from the state perspective. In other words, when he
analyzes the development of a national movement, he does not register or discuss the
manner in which different constituent groups and individual agents were related to each
other and internally structured, nor how this changed through the process of nation-
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formation. Rather, he only explains that at this point, this group or set of individuals
adopted nationalism, because of this or that interest they had in doing so, and at that point
another gioup, and so toith. Hidden is the social texture and complexity
I am not claiming, however, that Breuilly’s history is a “history” from above, in
these form critiqued quite often in the past few decades. He discusses all constituent
gioups in a national movement or the formation ot a nation, and does so even-handedly
The problem is that his account is reductive of each group. For example, peasants
become meicly a set of people with a certain position in society, who thereby have certain
concerns and interests. They are “nationalized” when their interest is successfully appeal
to by nationalist ideology, [see 45]
It is also not to say that Breuilly’s account is anti-national. It is not. Though he
rejects the content of what he considers characteristically nationalist ideology, he does
not reject nations and nationalisms out of hand. They exist as important forces in the
formation and transformation of states. What he does is to reduce nations and
nationalisms to a state form, by factoring out as false nationalist ideology all that does not
fit within the realm of formal state politics, with its isolated individuals. That does not
mean that he treats all nationalisms as if they were derivative of an extant state — that
would be obviously problematic. The national movement becomes an exercise in
interest-group politics and parliamentary-style coalition-building.
Obviously crucial to Breuilly’s reduction of the nation and nationalism to “statist
forms” is his reduction of nationalism to pursuit of the state. In Chapter 3, 1 discuss the
limits of such a view. Here I merely stress that, if this is to be the definition of
nationalism, then any consideration of the nation must take into account much more than
nationalism, and extend to terms such as “national consciousness,” “national
movement,” “diasporan nation/alism,” etc. Indeed, a more accurate terminology might
expose Breuilly’s concept of nationalism as “statism” or “statist nationalism,” to make
clear its limited focus. Breuilly has committed his own conflation by means of a slipping
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term. He connects nation and state closely by assuming a close correspondence between
nation and nationalism — which of course depends on a broad meaning of nationalism —
and simultaneously using the term nationalism in a very restricted sense to link it closely
to the state. His full conception of the state means that it is the concept of the nation that
will be reduced through this linkage.
In addition to producing a reductive concept of the nation, this restriction on
nationalism excludes social and/or political movements in which nationalism or national
consciousness is an element, but not the sole dominant one.
It is not just that I do not agree with Breuilly’s focus on or assumption of a nation
formed through the exercise of rational self-interest by a grouping of atomic individuals.
The demographics of national movements themselves problematize this focus. Within
any group, there will be some who join a nationalism movement and others who do not.
The fracture might even cut across families. Breuilly fails to consider this issue. Rather,
he focuses on arguing why nationalism cannot be understood as the politics ofjust one or
another social group [see especially 4 8 ff. ] - that different social groups are led to
nationalism by their interests. Given the fact that Breuilly himself assumes that a given
segment of society — social group — is united precisely by its shared position and interest,
the observable division within any group in a proto-national society between nationalists,
anti-nationalists, and non-nationalists is a serious problem for any theory of nation and
nationalism based on rational self-interest. Certainly, other factors must be at work, and a
different kind of analysis necessary.
That is not to say that an individual’s interest does not impact on whether or not
she/he joins a nationalist movement, considers her-/himself a member of a given nation,
and so forth. But, other factors are essential as well, including social relations that link
individuals in deep ways across “ interest groups.” These are precisely the relations that
Breuilly ignores.
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The reliance on interest also makes it difficult to understand why many people
choose a national movement when it is explicitly against their interests, and they suffer
gieatly foi their participation. Appeal to the effects of propaganda and manipulation go
only so far, but more importantly.
An Exceptional Exception
In the much discussed and touted Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity [1992],
Liah Greenfeld presents the social histories of the formations of the English, French.
Russian, German, and (North) American presumed nations. Guiding these histories as
well as revealed in them is a general account of nationalisms and nations, which, in
supplementary articles, is applied to a range of other presumed nations.
At the beginning and end of her treatment of the “ American nation,” Greenfeld
states that all nations are “exceptional” [Greenfeld, 1992: 402] or “unique[]” [484],
Yet, “the uniqueness itself of American nationalism [is] peculiar” [402], America is an
exceptional exception.
Greenfeld reiterates this special, exceptional uniqueness ad nauseam, echoing a
standard tenet of “Americanism,” that is, the ideology that the United States is a special
“nation” that manifests most the special potential of human individual and social
achievement. America is/was the most “national” nation: “The national element in [the
American nation] is challenged by the fewest counter influences [of any nation]; it is a
purer example of a national community than any other” [403]. America was the most
sincerely committed to freedom and equality: “Americans pledged themselves, far more
explicitly and unambivalently than did the English before them [or any other group], to
universal liberty” [423]; further, “. . . the American society was . . . committed to
equality to an extent that was unimaginable elsewhere” [452], America was the most
truly liberated: it was an “oasis of liberty in the enslaved world” [442], America was the
most concretely egalitarian society: from the first, American society was “characterized
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by a unique equality of conditions” [429], Indeed, “that equality in American society
had advanced beyond anything imaginable elsewhere at the time [1830] cannot be
disputed
. . . and the reality in America in this regard was incomparably better than in
any other society ...” [452], America was the most tolerant and unantagonistic:
“ Unlike the case in so many other nations, American national identity was not sustained
by the hatred of the other: it knew no [resentment]” [422]; “ . . . immigration helped to
put certain uniquely American qualities into sharper relief. It reinforced and gave a new
meaning to the claim that America had a universal mission, and that the American nation
itself was a universal nation, the nation of mankind. Its uniqueness was a result of a
unique fusion of peoples
. .
.” [my emphasis - 437]. “ But while in other countries ethnic
chauvinism of this kind easily crowded out alternative attitudes and became a central
element in the respective national identities, in America it always remained a marginal
alternative to the national identity which was profoundly universalistic” [438], Further,
America was the most “ self-made” nation: “ it, more than any other, was a creation of
the people who believed themselves Americans, and a product of their national identity
and loyalty” [480], America was “singularly receptive to culture” [461], Indeed, even
at pointing out its own “shortcomings” as a nation, America was ‘Number One,’
possessing an “unparalleled penchant for self-criticism” [461]. The list goes on and on.
So America is special, very special. It is “the best” nation. Greenfeld’s love and
admiration for America spills over beyond these superlative statements above, to
restatements of the standard American points of pride (or self-delusion, depending on
one’s perspective). For instance, Americans possessed an “uncompromising
commitment ... to the purified principles of civic nationalism” [423], Through the
conquest of the West, Americans came to be identified with “ a pioneering spirit, with the
unpolished, but honest, independent, and self-confident individual who . . . knew the
difference between right and wrong and was steadfast in his solid common sense” [434],
Immigrants’ commitments to the United States “derived from the uplifting, dignifying
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ef fects of liberty and equality, the exhilarating lure of opportunity, and the enjoyment or
even the expectation of a greater prosperity.
. . . They embraced American identity
eagerly, because only as Americans were they elevated to the status of men” [435 j.
Again, the list goes on and on, but I will save some of the more choice examples for
references in support of subsequent points.
Such blatant statements of bias and aggrandizement are enough to betray
Greenfeld s dubious agenda. They are not, however, necessarily sufficient to accomplish
this agenda. To be credible, they must be supported by a historical narrative structure
that makes them appear well-reasoned, not biased. Examination of how this structure
functions in the service of that agenda is central to any discussion of the ideologically-
driven “use” of nations and scholarship on them.
Greenfeld’ s method is to “normalize” the history of the United States around her
image of it. This includes focusing on details that reinforce that image, explaining away
embarrassing details that call it into question, and utterly ignoring those details that
cannot be explained away. There are many points around which this normalization
occurs.
The first, ironically, is the very claim of a special, universally significant,
exceptional exceptionality. Such claims are anything but exceptional. Indeed, even
claims of “national exceptionalism” specifically based on a superior adherence to liberal
ideals are not unique to the United States. There are, first, the legitimate claims of anti-
colonial nationalism to have been the true bearers of universal liberation against the
hypocritical structure of liberal colonialism. But, these movements are often portrayed by
liberal theorists in the United States and Western Europe as in fact an extension of the
US, British, French, etc., liberalizing project. What is more interesting is that at least one
theory of the nation — and of the French nation in particular — claims for itself a
competing historical and intellectual primacy in the production of universal liberty. Julie
Kristeva’s Nations Without Nationalism [1993], originally published in French two years
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before Greenfeld s work, asserts for the French nation a primacy based on very similar
tenets as Greenfeld's aggrandizement of the United States.
Kristeva views modern contractarian liberal ideals to have come from the French
Enlightenment, into the French Revolution, rather than from English liberal contract
theory, into the Ameiican Revolution, as Greenfeld lays out [Greenfeld, 1 992 399 -
411], Yet, the similarity of the perceived results is striking. According to Kristeva, the
French nation is uniquely and fundamentally universalizing, and based on voluntaristic
social contract principles. It emphasizes individuality, liberty, and equality. What is
more, its universal principles suit it singularly well for the integration of immigrants, and
is counterpoised to illegitimate collectivist perversions of French national identity. These
points are, of course, central to Greenfeld’s representation of the American “civic
nation.”
There are, of course, differences. First, Greenfeld limits the extent of the
universalizing mission of the United States to its eventual territorial expanse. The
conquest of half a continent and assimilation of millions of immigrants (most of its
population deriving from immigration) appear a sufficient universalization of America.
On the other hand, Napoleon’s failures and the lesser numbers and presence of
immigrants in French history require Kristeva to supplement the actual universalizing
reach of France in the ideal realm. Kristeva thus projects the universalization of the
French nation through the dissemination of French universalistic, egalitarian, liberal
ideals throughout the world, which will ultimately transform the world into a unified
global liberal society.
The shift to the ideal realm does not, however, negate the Napoleonic project at
the core of Kristeva’s account of the (French) nation. Kristeva repeats the rhetoric of
universalization that justified Napoleonic expansion, represented as the spread of the
Revolutionary ideals. This suggests a sublimation of the imperialist/expansionist core of
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Fiench nationality into the ideal or intellectual realm
.
16
This is not to suggest that every
universalistic account ot a nation necessarily is Napoleonic, but Kristeva’s failure to
acknowledge and engage this very significant aspect of Franco-Universalism itself
implies her acceptance or reflection of it. Franco-Universalism cannot be taken simply at
face value, as Kristeva does, but rather must be acknowledged in its full reality, with
negative history and possibilities intact.
Second, in place ot Greenfeld’s rather pedestrian assumptions about social agency
around rational self-interest, Kristeva employs a more subtle if not more plausible
psychoanalytic account of the “need” for nationality. “Pride” in one’s nation is part of a
healthy narcissistic self-image. Of course, this psychological account, if more complex,
is just as hackneyed and dubious as Greenfeld’s “rational self-interest” assumption. I
take this up again below.
The crucial difference for us, however, is that between the methods of Greenfeld
and Kristeva. Kristeva’s account of the French nation is essentially just the espousal of
the tenets of Franco-Universalism, in a linkage with psychoanalytic theory. Greenfeld is
more subtle, backreading her ideology into a historical narrative of the United States. It
therefore requires a more detailed examination.
The American Nation
From the first, Greenfeld assumes that the ultimate American nation will consist
of some form of homogeneous group. While she rejects the idea that the nation is a
“collective subject,” she writes in fact as if it were/had been. Greenfeld presents
Americans as if a unitary group sharing key characteristics. For example, she writes ol
l6This is a somewhat Nietzschean point, following his analysis of Christianity in the Genealogy ofMorals.
It also has similarities to Greenfeld’s argument that Marxism was just sublimated German nationalism,
another Nietzschean analysis. However, there is a much more explicit connection between the ideology ol
Napoleonic expansion and Kristeva’s French nationalism than between Marx and German nationalism.
Indeed, in the former case, the rhetoric is identical, while the latter is highly speculative. It requires
assuming (1) that Marx was a German nationalist in the first place, which Greenfeld justifies solely on his
youthful embrace of Romanticism (though not German nationalism and (2) that, even if Marx was at some
point a German nationalist, he never moved beyond this ideology. I take up this issue in more detail
below.
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the Amer it an people leeling uniform urges [442], “ the American respect for the
individual” [460], and “ the American attitude toward reason” [460] [my emphasis
throughout]. In her conclusion, she states that “to be an American means to persevere in
one’s loyalty to the ideals
.
. [484] - there is only one way to “be an American”
(which is her way). Indeed, she presumes a unitary “American national purpose” [429]
at the core of the history of the nation.
Such statements undermine her explicit recognition of the more complex reality.
Greenfeld does acknowledge that, after independence, the new states “were not one
entity.” She also recognizes that each original state might have been considered its own
“ American nation.” Indeed, she admits that, for a long time after the American
Revolution, there was no clear consensus on “what was, or whether there was, the
American nation.” [423] What she does not doubt is that there should have been or
would be. Though she recognizes this initial complexity, it is formulated as a problem
hindering the proper formation of the United States nation, rather than an open moment in
history in which a range of equally legitimate and possible futures existed [see 423],
Greenfeld begins at the end, with an ideal goal of perfect unity and uniformity. Her
narrative assumes that the 13 colonies are an Aristotelian acorn whose natural, correct
growth should always have been into a unified “ nation.” Though she presents the history
chronologically, she had developed it in the reverse order. The exclusion of past
alternative strains of US nationality corresponds to an implicit exclusion of the
contemporary complexity of the United States as nation, which any assumption of
ultimate unity must make.
While some in early America might have questioned whether there needed to or
should be one “American nation,” for Greenfeld there was never a doubt. This
assumption in itself is powerful: through it, the multiplicity that existed in the early
United States becomes illegitimate. It must be subjugated to a unifying, univocal totality.
By assuming the unitary nature of the “ American nation, Greenfeld authorizes
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statements about what is consistent with that nature and what is not. Once she defines
this nature (see below), she makes all details of the history of the nation that are not
consistent with it suddenly inessential to the history. This frees her to explain such things
away as accidental or “un-American” - tautologically.
For instance, even though anti-immigrant nativist movements (excepting of
Anglos, of course) have occurred in every era of American history, and have been
championed by a range of influential leaders including Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Jefferson, the Federalists, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (who believed the
United States a sacrosanct nation as much as any other), Greenfeld dismisses it as
spurious to American core values: “on the whole, nativist sentiments were not
widespread and efforts to enforce uniformity on the part of the leadership were half-
hearted” [483]. Though California’s Proposition 187 was passed before publication of
the main work of Greenfeld’ s I treat, the groundswells against immigration —
championed by many political and media figures, not the least of whom was Pat
Buchanan — had been rising for years. The popular support for such initiatives is clear
from voting records; frequent instances of anti-immigrant violence; and perpetual,
innumerable racist popular representations of immigrants. It can hardly be considered a
marginal force, not even taken seriously by it proponents.
Further, the racism associated with slavery and slavery itself become, rather than a
central element of American ideology, actually wn-American. Even more broadly, and
without reference to slavery, the differences between New England and the South
becomes, respectively, a tension between true American nationality (with its “ unique
equality of conditions” and “ indomitable leveling spirit” [429]) and a spurious,
obviously un-American society, of ” docile commoners who “knew their betters knew
better and trusted in them” [430]. Why is there no room tor both of these as aspects or
strains in a more complex “American nationality” or nation?
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The Ideal American Nation
For more incisive theorists, any claim of the homogeneity of nations is suspect.
Greenfeld does not question that nations are homogeneous. Rather, she differentiates
between two types of homogeneity. The first is the “collective” or “ethnic”
homogeneity characteristic of, for instance, German nationalism. Membership in the
nation erases one’s individuality — one is merely part of a given group, based on forces
and factors beyond one’s control. The second is a “civic” or “social contract” nation.
Membership is determined by voluntary commitment to the ideals at the core of the
nation (its constitution, legal structure, and the principles underlying them). [444 - 449]
Most nations are the former type, but the United States (and “England” to a large extent)
is the latter. That makes it superior.
Voluntarism must be reflected in the content of the ideals as well as in the manner
in which they are embraced by nationals. Thus, the ideals of the American nation -
inherited from the English — are “liberty,” “equality,” “democracy,” “individualism,”
“ self-interest,” “ universalism,” and similar liberal “ goods.” The nature of the American
nation is voluntaristic commitment to these ideals [see, for instance, 406, 413, 420, 441,
444 - 449, 481, 484], Indeed, “American society was exemplary in its devotion to the
English ideals [just listed]: it turned them into reality” [409].
Competing Ideals
The first problem, of course, is that it is very clear that not all those who must be
counted as Americans really have shared such ideals - at least in concrete terms, not just
through lip-service. For Greenfeld’ s claim that the essence of the American nation has
been adherence to these ideals requires accounting in some way for the fact that many
Americans did not or do not so adhere.
Greenfeld narrates the history of the United States as a development in which the
ideals in question become dominant over a period of two and a half centuries (1620s
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through the 1 860s). From the beginning of the “ national” narrative, these ideals are the
”hero.” They are presented as the essence of the nation; all that remains is the telling of
their dissemination throughout the nation.
( 1 ) Competing sets of ideals - or, more generally, alternative concepts of the
“American nation" - are thereby rendered inessential. They can be acknowledged as
significant at this or that point in the narrative, while at the same time not being definitive
of the nation. For instance, Greenfeld attributes more developed forms of the defense of
slavery to a “nascent Southern ideology.” The emerging ideals of this nationalism were
the anti-umversahst positing of one’s racial group above others, the anti-capitalist valuing
of “honor above wealth,” hierarchy, and obedience. [476] Because these were different
from the set of ideals that she claims for the core ofUS national identity, Greenfeld
tautologically concludes that the nascent Southern nationalism was “no longer
American” [476].
She then portrays the Civil War as the battle between these two sets of ideals, in
which the properly American ones emerged victorious and the un-American ones were
purged.
It is unclear why these “ Southern” ideals are not properly part of American
ideology. First, prior to the Civil War, they certainly were important in the general
ideological structure of the United States. They seem “un-American” only in retrospect,
even under the supposition that “typical Northerners” already did not share them. A
commitment to pluralism would seem to require taking divergent opinions and ideologies
seriously. Only an anti-pluralistic history would require that just one set of ideals be
allowed as legitimate. One the one hand, Greenfeld touts pluralism, individual liberty,
etc., as key American ideals, while on the other she denies the legitimacy of any opinion
or ideology that diverges from a strict liberal line. The pluralism she finds in US history
is then a pluralism ofcontent, not one ofform. She claims that people valued pluralism
and liberty, and that the formation of the American nation was through dissemination of
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these core values throughout the society. But, as she admits [see 423], the reality of
pluralism and individual liberty undercuts the possibility of their being adopted as ideals
uniformly, by all in a society. Rather than recognize in this tension perhaps a key to the
complexity of the United States (at least from a liberal perspective), she resolves it by
delegitimating and excluding all discourses, ideals, etc., that do not accord with her
“core” liberal values. She imposes a certain kind of liberty, forcing the objects of her
narrative to accept pluralism by negating their exercise of it.
Greenfeld might counter that she is merely retelling the history of the organic
process by which these core liberal values came to be held by most or all members of
American society. This brings me to my second point. With respect to slavery, it is not
clear that these supposedly Southern values have not been held by at least a significant
part of the population since the Civil War. Most of the social and political movements of
the 1960s - including civil rights, feminism, and anti-war - were reacting against a
predominant authoritarianism in US culture and politics. These movements were often
feared precisely because they undermined “authority.” Given the widespread protesting,
this authority cannot be said to have been voluntarily acceded to. Furthermore, to take
one example, the continuing, half-century appeal of perhaps the most “American”
filmmaker, Frank Capra, directly contradicts any claim that the valuing of honor over
wealth is “ un-American” or a purely “ Southern” divergence. Through his films, in fact,
Capra seemed to be claiming this valuing of honor over wealth as central to American
identity, in much the way Greenfeld claims the opposite. Clearly different visions of
“America”
;
if Greenfeld’s is a legitimate representative of some Americans, so is
Capra’s.
Third, even assuming that these really were the ideals of the South only and that
they were purged from the United States, this need not mark the emergence of the proper,
legitimate American ideology as dominant. It might mark simply a change or
development in a complex of American ideologies. Before the change, these values were
160
part of America, but for one reason or another, it evolved away from them. What is more,
this does not mean that America thereby became committed to a single, unitary ideology.
Just as the “ Southern ideology” might have passed out of existence (which I allow for
argument s sake), other beliefs and ideological tendencies might have emerged to
maintain the initial complexity.
Greenfeld assumes that the nation was an ideal nation, and so this conflict of
ideals alone could generate the war. However, at one point, she is quite clear that
political changes occur only when specific interests are linked to ideals. Only when a
specific interest will benefit from a given ideal, will that ideal be asserted as central to
American identity. She intends this as an explanation of how slavery could have been
resolved for so long with the pure American ideals of liberty et al. But, if this argument
is to be allowed, it also follows that multiple sets of ideals might coexist within a general
national framework without fracturing the nation. It is only when specific interests are
linked to different ideals that conflict comes about. That sets of ideals continually fall by
the wayside does not mean that ultimately only one set will remain. New sets might
emerge continually, taken up by other interests.
(2) This implies, further, that it is not ideals that drive American nationality, but
interests that use the ideals for specific agendas. Greenfeld devotes relatively little space
for arguments against other sets of ideals. Much more of a focus is establishing that the
ideals she views as definitive of the United States are actually the potent unifying force
she claims. The “hero” ideals must also overcome more practically-focused,
“ realpolitical” forces.
This tension between ideal and practical is explicit in Greenfeld’s representation
of US history. According to Greenfeld, in the early years of the Union, there was a
tension between Jeffersonian idealists, who remained committed to the liberal values of
“freedom” et al absolutely, and Hamiltonian realists, who tempered their commitment to
the ideals by placing a value on the preservation of the Union simpliciter. For
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Jeffersonians (including Jefferson), individual liberty and self-determination were the
ultimate values, and to sacrifice them was to dissolve the Union that was based on them,
Hamiltonians (including Hamilton) believed some sacrifice of individual rights was
necessary in order to strengthen the Union economically and politically. “ Hamilton
thought the compromise of national principles a fair price for the welfare of the nation ”
[44
1 ] Indeed, " he sacrificed the individual to the collective” [44
1 ] in order to ensure the
power and welfare of the collective, which is, of course, directly contrary to the core
ideals of Greenfeld’s claims for the “American nation.” 17
Greenfeld admits that even Jefferson at times took on the welfare of the nation as
an end in itself, losing sight of the ideals that made it what it was [442], Based on this, it
would seem appropriate to re-evaluate the nature of the “American nation.” Could it
really be “ idealistic” if even its idealists engage in realpolitics? Greenfeld does not
follow up this line of enquiry. Rather, she goes to great pains from there on to explain
why the practical failings of the United States do not reflect a lack of commitment to its
“national ideals” or a more complex nature of the nation.
Jefferson, of course, was unaware of his lapses, and did not intend them [442],
More importantly, Americans in general - whatever the concrete failings of their grand
quest for liberty, equality, et al — remained fully committed to the ideals. It was not their
lack of commitment, but rather the great absoluteness of the ideals themselves, that
created the gap. Americans were “committed to equality to an extent unimaginable
l7
This is, in some sense, a misrepresentation (and misperception) on Greenfeld’s part. Though one might
counterpoise a “ collective” to “ an aggregate of individuals,” it is not true that liberalism shuns the former.
In fact, central to liberal capitalism is one form of collective individual, the corporation. Individual owners
are fully absorbed into this collective, and lose their legal identity with respect to it. There is a key
difference, however. In the case of the collective nation, Greenfeld views the individual as lost,
suppressed, etc. On the other hand, in the case of the collective corporation, the individual directly
benefits from membership. When he/she makes bad business decisions, only corporate assets are affected;
indeed, in most criminal cases and lawsuits against a corporation, corporate officers and others are not
directly involved — only the corporation is touched. In this way, the collective is a construct that shields
individuals who might bear direct responsibility for crimes and dishonest acts. To say that the corporate
collective allows an “excess” of individuality beyond it is merely to recognize its role in shielding
individuals from their individual responsibility.
This is hypocritical. So long as the collective serves individuals, Greenfeld apparently approves.
Only when it does not have such clear benefits, does she object. Her case against the “collective nation” is
based on the general features of collectively, which are fully present in the implicitly approved corporate
collective.
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elsewhere.” What is more, concrete “equality in American society had advanced beyond
anything imaginable elsewhere ” Unfortunately, its “brilliant ideal” was so high, so
pure, that the gap remained huge. [452] This, of course, is a strength, not a weakness of
American nationalism, and to criticize it for the gap is quite misleading.
Unfortunately for Greenfeld, the nature of the gap between ideals and reality in
the case of the United States is truly gaping, and belies a full commitment to the
supposedly core ideals. She avoids this criticism by claiming continually that conditions
in the United States were very egalitarian, and social and economic differences minimal
compared to other societies. Abuses of this equality, in the form for instance of
sweatshop labor of women and children, can be attributed to such forces as the un-
American realpolitics of Hamilton [see 441], Labor unrest becomes not an expression of
legitimate discontent with a system that tends to support exploitation, but rather as the
assertion of a “particularistic interest” against the true national one [439], Labor leaders,
such as Seth Luther in 1832, “refused to see national interest in anything that did not
promote the welfare of the workers, and interpreted appeals to the nation that did not take
this welfare into consideration as thinly camouflaged attempts on the part of some
Imperial and Kingly sympathizers to subvert the American national purpose” [439].
Greenfeld’s analysis here is problematic in a number of ways. First, she dismisses
labor organizing as the hysterical spinning of conspiracy theories, by and for those
resentful of their lowly socio-economic position. This ignores the history of American
business, in which political forces aided economic in producing a serious level of brutal
exploitation. Certainly the 19th Century gap between rich and poor was profound (as it is
today). Workers in coal mines, in sweat shops, in factories, lived in squalor, a step away
from starvation, with no medical treatment. “ Bosses” constantly squeezed wages down,
even as workers died at young ages from the working conditions. It is hard to dispute the
horrific conditions under which most Americans labored, and all-too-many continue to
labor today. Greenfeld dismisses a very persuasive, well-grounded, historically important
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challenge to the American order (the labor movement) by ignoring the reality it
manifested/
s
(not asserts). A strange form of social history.
Greenfeld portrays wealth differentials as an inevitable by-product of benign
equal competition among individuals possessing different levels of ability [see 438 -
439], “Those not specially endowed in any way” were naturally disappointed at their
failure to gain wealth, especially in times of “scarcity” [438], In a classic, discredited
liberal formulation, this delegitimizes any claims that the situation of workers was unfair.
It transforms the protests into the mere resentment - psychological understandable, but
philosophically ungrounded.
She does not extend the courtesy even of psychological understanding to the
participants in Shays’ Rebellion. She does not recognize this as instance of popular
protest against the consolidation of economic and political power by power-
Revolutionary American elites who profited directly and indirectly from the war, over the
very population that made great financial and personal sacrifices in the war against the
British. It was, rather, terrorism [430]. Its only appearance in her narrative is through a
quote by John Adams, to Thomas Jefferson, admonishing him for supporting too much
individual freedom — implicitly, among common citizens: “ ’You have never felt the
terrorism of Shays’ Rebellion” [my emphasis]. And this comes within a general
discussion of the extremes of individual liberty, juxtaposed to the Terror ofthe French
Revolution.
Second, Greenfeld characterizes labor interests as a “particular interest” against
the properly national interest. But, this “particular interest” (1) was that of the vast
majority of Americans and (2) was an interest utterly ignored in the John D. Rockefeller,
Sr., type of quest for obscene profits in Dickensian 19 th Century America. If “American
ideals” were producing a society that allowed hyper-exploitation of most Americans
(even if colonial-era America was somewhat egalitarian, this did not continue in the 19th
Century), then how could it be illegitimate for the vast majority of Americans to assert
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their views on how America should be? This would appear to be an exercise of
democratic participation.
Yet, again, Greenfeld dismisses it as an almost sinister operation of un-American
self-interest and perversion of properly American values. It appears that only
commitment to Greenfeld's ideals counts as properly American idealism.
Self-interest is part of the core values of America according to Greenfeld. It
seems, however, that Greenfeld recognizes it as legitimate only when it does not interfere
with her grand narrative of America, and when it does not threaten the power of elites.
There is a deeper issue. Greenfeld holds that the core American values are
universal. ’ That they appear universal in abstract content I will grant. As I began to
suggest above, however, Greenfeld appears to conflate their content with theirform. If
workers concepts of the nation are particularistic, how much more so are the interests of
the elites who produced its guiding ideology, constitution, and economic structure? That
the mere content of their political ideology is “universalistic” - makes claims about the
universal applicability of certain principles, and universal rights of mankind - does not
mean that it was the proper or actual ideology of most people. As many labor leaders,
slaves/abolitionists, and particularly Native Americans have been aware, the rhetoric of
American universalism often operates in the very particular interests of a very narrow
class. That such leaders as Jefferson might have been “sincere” in their commitment to
spreading liberty to (some) other Americans does not mean that their own self-interest did
not blind them to the failings and limitations of their “universalistic ideology.” After all,
if / have freedom to act, and benefit from it, I experience the society I am in as liberated
and free. “ Self-interest” can also mean self-absorption. It is easy to ignore the situation
of others. I will see what it is in my interest to see. The lower classes do not have a
monopoly on the conflation of national and particular interests.
Further, if these universal values have become widely held (if not widely adhered
to) in American society does not thus represent some automatic universal form.
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Membership in the American nation was not purely “voluntaristic,” but was imposed
through direct means — including threats ot and actual violence against any who opposed
them - and the indirect means of cultural persuasion considered by that paragon of
liberalism John Stuart Mill to be more sinister than direct force. Greenfeld even admits
the operation of such mechanisms, at least in colonial America [see 406], She also
recognizes this point in principle: when she says that a “significant interest” needs to be
attached to an ideal for it to become prominent, she is really saying that a powerful
interest must. It does not matter what the majority feel or think.
Though one might debate endlessly over the facts of whether those in power have
used direct and indirect means to impose an illusory concept of America onto the general
population, it is quite likely that something besides pure voluntary acceptance was
required to change the positions of workers from their critical stance, if it has indeed been
fully changed. Not only was the “universalism” of the supposedly original American
ideals a very particular universalism, but it might well have been imposed through means
inconsistent with its content.
It is important to add that Hamilton’s “practical” ideas on how America should
function were no less an example of “ idealism” than Jefferson’s, in the proper sense of
the term. They were ideas on how a society should be organized. Whether the content of
those ideas was abstract and glorious, or realpolitical and base, makes no difference.
Again, Greenfeld conflates form and content. Idealism does not refer to the content of a
set of ideas around which a society should be organized, but rather the fact that it should
be made to correspond to a set of ideas at all. Hamilton’s vision of America was not at all
a description of it. It was, rather, an alternative suggestion for its future political and
economic structuring, a different vision. It was a different concept of what America
should be, that is, a different American nationalism. One might even argue that, it
Greenfeld’s claims that early 19th Century America really was relatively egalitarian, then
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Hamilton was more ot an idealist than Jefferson, in pushing for a concept of the nation
that was farther from that which actually existed.
Again, the abstractness of the liberal ideals Greenfeld touts as the core of
American nationality is not a counter to this argument. After all, an ideal of the nation as
an end in itself, or of the general welfare of the nation as the supreme value, is certainly
an ideal as much as the valuation of individual self-determination is. There is here no
direct conflict between “ reality” and “ ideal.” Rather, there is a conflict between two
sets of ideals — both of which presumably have operated in the “American nation” — that
is made to look like a conflict between ideals and reality. It is, however, nothing more
than the conflict between the idealisms of “abstract liberalism” and “economic realism.”
The “ universalism” of the liberal ideals was limited in another way, as well.
They were from the beginning only to be applied to some inhabitants of the United States.
The excluded, in fact, were forcefully, brutally, and continually barred from sharing in
these ideals, from accepting them as their own, even as many devoted themselves to
gaining access to them. From the beginning, slaves and women were excluded.
Greenfeld goes to great lengths to explain these exclusions away as inessential to the core
values, which I will take up below. But there is an exclusion so blatant that Greenfeld
does not even attempt to explain it away. Rather, she completely ignores it, either
because she herself is the victim of an American ideology that cannot admit it, or because
she consciously or unconsciously recognizes the danger it poses to her normalizing
narrative of American history. At no point in the 90-page history of the United States,
which includes discussions of its settlement, immigrants, and every other segment ot the
population, does Greenfeld even mention Native Americans. While Greenfeld argues, in
good 19th Century liberal fashion, that things have gotten better all the time in America,
and the slaves were eventually freed, women eventually granted the vote, etc., she
cannot
make the same claims regarding Native Americans. Wherever the United States spiead.
Native Americans were purely excluded. They were generally killed, or deported,
or
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imprisoned in concentration-camp inspiring reservations, where many subsequently died.
Even the small residual populations of the tribes that survived (many being utterly wiped
out) continue to live in horrendous and oppressed conditions, continue to have naked
military force applied against them, etc.
I will discuss this further below. Here, suffice it to say that the treatment of
Native Americans calls into question the “universalizing” pretensions of the liberal
ideals Greenfeld touts. Even if one is to accept the argument that participation in the
ideals — the right and ability even to hold them - has been allowed for some previously
excluded groups, for at least Native Americans it was not — if for no other reason than
many Native American groups were genocided and so were not there for bestowal. 18
More generally, it suggests a certain constant principle attached to the stated ideals, one
that is perhaps less stated today, but is nonetheless in full force: there are always limits
on the applicability of the ideals of freedom and equality. Even if, in the United States,
the excluded groups have varied (except for Native Americans), and complex
maneuverings have allowed (some) ex-slave progeny and women to share in the ideal
American nation, groups are always being produced who are excluded: Korean
immigrants, communists, witches, (East) Indians, Iranians, gays, lesbians, bisexuals,
Latinos, Chicanos, Haitians, etc.
Given this, it is crucial to qualify Greenfeld’s claim that “American national
identity was not sustained by the [resentful] hatred of the other” [422], It might have
been and be true that, at least in some instances, American unity was not based on a
resentment of another group -- that is, a feeling of inferiority or tear in the tace ot another
group. But, that does not mean that “the other has played no role in the constitution
and
perpetuation of “American national identity. It is a feeling of superiority
,
not
inferiority, that has characterized “American national identity” - superiority to internal
(and external) “ others.” Greenfeld’s incessant favorable comparisons of the United
l8A “ posthumous” bestowal is at most a clever technique of genocide denial. It is
easy to be respectful ot
those who are long dead.
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States to other states, nations, and societies is a perfect instance of this. Central to
American ideology and self-conceptualization is not resentment of, but arrogance,
condescension, and imperiousness toward, “others.”
I do not mean to presume that Native Americans would want to have participated
in these ideals, of course. For, it was such elements of the ideals as “individualism”
(self-interest) and “private property” that were instrumental in the theft of native lands,
deportations, genocides, and erosion of tribal civilizations. Many Native Americans -
perhaps the only “Americans” in a position to appreciate fully the meaning of the
essential American values Greenfeld touts - have seen their dark implications, and
rejected them. Why would their “un-American” concepts of an ideal society, of what
America should be, not be as essential to the “American nation” as the ideals of Andrew
Jackson? Are they not, of all who can be called “American,” the most so? Greenfeld’s
probable answer is most revealing: American nationality is not based on land, but on
ideals. The Native Americans therefore have no claim on American-ness based on their
habitation here; they are not American. But, of course, this was one of the justifications
of their genocide and deportation, and denial of their right to their traditional lands.
It is interesting how much Greenfeld hides from the Native American Question
behind her ideals. With dramatic irony, Greenfeld cautions that the relationship between
the American colonists and the mother country was not that between colonized and
colonizer. She explains this by appeal to the commitment of each to the same set of
liberal ideals. [412] The actual answer, of course, is much more direct - and more
problematic for Greenfeld. The Native Americans were the colonized, and the
“American” settlers who became independent were merely a splinter group ot the
colonizer. The situation was similar to South Africa, in that two factions ot colonizers
(British- and German-produced) struggled for control of a colony and its colonized. The
great proportion of land in America’s case translated into a great number of laborers in
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South Africa s. Greenfeld s answer thus once again ignores the real instance of
colonization.
The British, for their part, "were never completely convinced that their position
vis-a-vis the colonies was morally defensible” [421], Again, according to Greenfeld, this
is because of their commitment to the ideals of self-determination, liberty, et al. If her
reading is correct, then why did the British hang on to India so doggedly, never doubting
for an instant their legitimate right to hold that colony, to rule it completely? The answer
is clear, as is Greenfeld’ s complete lack of appreciation of the real reason for the relative
“acceptability” of American separation. At the very least, white men, and liberals,
would remain in charge. The ideal of “the White Man’s Burden” - another ignored
central tenet of modem liberalism (espoused even by John Stuart Mill [Mill, 1977: 9 -
10]) — was thereby satisfied.
American Racism
Etienne Balibar has perceptively attributed late 20th Century globally-
disseminated concepts of race and racism to three sources: colonialism, the Holocaust
and Nazism, and the US treatment of its blacks [Balibar, 1991a: 38]. He -- as well as
many Americans — has recognized race and racism as central to American national
identity. Greenfeld rejects this view entirely.
As I have already mentioned, slavery poses a big problem for Greenfeld. How
can it be that the very people who developed the American liberal ideology — which was
supposed to promote universal freedom and equality — could at the same time approve ot
slavery and even be slave holders? How could it be that these people so absolutely
committed to freedom could approve of the bondage of millions? How could it be that
people so absolutely committed to equality could count one type of human being as equal
only to three-fifths of another? And so forth.
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Greenfeld uses many maneuvers to neutralize the effects of slavery on her history
ol the United States. (1) She does not take slavery that seriously throughout much of her
work. Despite slavery, she still makes repeated claims that America was the most
egalitarian society in the world, an “oasis of liberty in the enslaved world” [Greenfeld.
1992: 442], etc. She dismisses the fact that this “liberty” and “equality” applied only to
white men: “To point out that such was reality only for the white male population only
would in our skeptical age be redundant, but it is worth emphasizing that for white male
populations elsewhere such reality could not be but a dream” [409]. First, it was
undoubtedly little comfort -- and might have been “salt in the wounds” - for a slave or
oppressed woman to know that his/her master enjoyed unparalleled freedom.
Second, in arguing that a society enjoyed the greatest freedom imaginable at its
time, it can hardly be redundant to mention that for a majority of members, there was no
such freedom. This would seem to call the claim itself into question, and suggest that the
freedom of some was purchased through the slavery and oppression of others. Yet, on
this key point, Greenfeld has an implicit defense. For her, “ liberty is infinitely
divisible,” so the liberty of some never comes at the cost of the liberty of others. This, of
course, is a naive position. Even John Stuart Mill, to call on him again, recognized that
the liberty of one person is directly impacted by the liberty of others. One can certainly
exercise one’s liberty in such a way as to deprive another of his/her liberty. Thus, any
liberal society must limit the liberties of each individual to prevent them from interfering
with the liberties of other individuals. Liberty is “scarce,” that is, its appropriation by
one individual implies its loss by (an)other(s). That does not prove that the liberty of the
“white males” was gained by oppression of others, but - particularly in a society of
atomic individuals devoted to their own self-interest - it is quite possible. At the very
least, it requires attention to the relations among “ Americans” (or the broader population
of the United States).
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It is clear that the general prosperity of “Americans” was the result of oppression.
Certainly this was the case with slavery. An argument might be made that this benefited
relatively few whites. However, the oppression of Native Americans certainly benefited
cdl Greenfeld makes much of the great abundance of the North American continent,
especially the West (all land off of the Atlantic coast): “in the vast expanses of the West
[opportunities] appeared unlimited” [434], Greenfeld recognized that the “ prosperity” of
Americans (and hence their practical equality) rested on “the American land” [436],
There was a “natural abundance of economic opportunities” [434],
Of course, the “naturalness” of the abundance was an artificial ideological and
material construct. It required the elimination of Native Americans from conceptual and
actual possession of all lands that came to constitute the United States. Greenfeld’
s
narrative, which again completely ignores the existence of Native Americans, is fully
within the ideological vein that accomplished the ideal elimination of Native Americans.
America was, in Greenfeld’s words, a “wilderness” [405], “open” [434] and “vast”
[436]. Her narrative suggests it as a natural bounty. There was nothing but untamed
wilderness for the Pilgrims and all who settled after them. It was there for the taking.
“America’s” prosperity was, in fact, founded on land theft, deportation, and genocide.
Americans were not “self-made,” but a “nation” of thieves.
It is significant that John Locke, whose ideas about individual liberty and private
property were most influential on the “Founding Fathers,” had in On Government [1980]
developed an explicit argument justifying the theft of land from native inhabitants. It
amounted to the claim that, if a group or individual is not using land truly efficiently, to
create wealth - that is, if he/she/they are not using it the way one wishes to use it, or,
more cynically, to produce wealthfor oneself— one has the right to take it away and use
it oneself. Of course, in practice, the theft of native lands was not in the least consistent
with even Locke’s warped justification. It proceeded through deceit, fraud, intimidation,
broken treaties, forced deportation, terror, and genocide.
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One might even argue that the central “ideal” or “national project” that unified
the American nation was not a set of liberal values, but rather the desire to conquer half a
continent. The ideology of “Manifest Destiny” - which Greenfeld also fails to discuss -
was (and is) as central to American nationality as any of the liberal values. It unified
Americans in a grand, century-long project. This conquest, of course, depended on the
“ otherization” of Native Americans, which might also be considered a core value of
American nationalism, and which has found later variations in a perpetual string of
“others” against whom Americans organize their ideological and military might
(communists, Vietnamese, Arabs, etc. The thing that “unified” Americans through the
1880s, if anything did, was their colonialist and genocidal relationship to Native
Americans.
It is worth pointing out that, even if the exclusion of Native Americans from her
narrative could be rectified or revised, the fact of the text as written shows that her
concept of America begins without Native Americans. Their reintroduction would
necessarily be an after-thought, and they would remain marginal to the core concept of
America. They would be merely a “nuisance” for her narrative, to be “explained away”
— not cause for a complete reformulation of its grounding points. This echoes the
genocidal ideology of Westward expansion that viewed Native Americans as merely
nuisances that had to be “cleared away.”
(2) Greenfeld argues that slavery was not materially harsh, but in fact that slaves
enjoyed a reasonable standard of living: “the degree of material deprivation and physical
hardship associated with the denial of equality in America was relatively small” [453],
Indeed, the perception that slavery was physically cruel was Abolitionist propaganda:
“ for propaganda purposes, Abolitionists stressed the mistreatment of the slaves by bad
masters and their physical suffering” [455].
The real issues were dignity and freedom, and the psychological unpleasantness of
being a slave. Indeed, slaves who were uneducated, and so not capable of the abstract
173
thinking necessary to understanding their condition of bondage, experienced it as
significantly less oppressive than did educated slaves who understood the concept of
freedom. It was, again, the gap between the ideals of America and the illiberalism of
slavery that made it appear so bad: “American slaves might have been better off than
slaves elsewhere, but they were slaves in America, which made their slavery appear more
oppressive. It was, in fact, free blacks who felt ‘the weight of degradation’ more.”
[453 -454]
This analysis is wrong on so many levels. First, it reduces the injustice of slavery
to a merely abstract issue. It is not that slavery is wrong because of the harm it does, but
because it does not accord with “American values.” Opponents to slavery “ on
principle, such as Lincoln [see 474] and Greenfeld, seem to have no concern for the
slaves themselves: “ Lincoln hated ‘the monstrous injustice of slavery,’ ‘because it
deprives our republican example of its influence in the world; enables the enemies of free
institutions with plausibility to taunt us as hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom
to doubt our sincerity; and especially because it forces so many good men among
ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty’” [455].
Indeed, the “principled” concern appears to be strictly utilitarian, at least for Lincoln. It
is not the contradiction of “American values” that harms America, but rather the
perception of this contradiction by foreign powers that allows them to dismiss American
claims of liberalism and freedom. And only whites figure in the utility calculation. True
to Howard Zinn’s portrait of Lincoln as a slick, middle of the road politician playing on
both sides of the fence with regard to slavery [see especially Zinn, 1995: 182 - 187],
Lincoln’s argument against slavery is about how it affected the interests of white
Americans. He ignores the “ injustice” done to blacks - for him, all that seems to matter
is the contradiction that it represents, which discredits the United States internationally
and produces conflict at home.
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Second, it appears quite unlikely that slaves did not suffer significant material
deprivation. More to the point, one must wonder how Greenfeld arrives at such a
conclusion. She sites the cliometric data of Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman as her
evidence. Howard Zinn directly addresses such data, and Fogel and Engerman’
s
particularly. “Economists or cliometricians
. . . have tried to assess slavery by estimating
how much money was spent on slaves for food and medical care. But can this describe
the reality of slavery as it was to a human being who lived inside it?” [Zinn, 1995: 168]
Certainly the frequency of rape, torture (whippings, beatings), forced labor under
extremely harsh working conditions, and so forth had to be great - the constant physical
and psychological control, abuse, degradation. By “psychological degradation,”
Greenfeld means the psychological unpleasantness associated with the abstract realization
that one is not able to actualize one’s potential as a free agent. By this term, I mean the
very concrete psychological abuse constantly inflicted on slaves by those exercising
power over them. It does not take a Ph.D. to feel the force of these psychological effects
and manipulations.
Zinn argues further:
One recent book on slavery (Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the
Cross) looks at whippings in 1 840 - 1 842 on the Barrow plantation in Louisiana
with two hundred slaves: ‘The records show that over the course of two years a
total of 160 whippings were administered, an average of 0.7 whippings per hand
per year. About half of the hands were not whipped at all during the period.’ One
could also say: ‘Half of all slaves were whipped.’ That has a different ring. That
figure (0.7 per hand per year) shows whipping was infrequent for any individual.
But looked at another way, once every for or five days, some slave was whipped.
[168 - 169]
I would add that, unless slaves are to be considered unthinking animals, the issue
of whipping is not just about how much it occurred, but how effective a control
mechanism it was. In other words, the cruelty of whipping was not just the immediate
physical pain (which was great, no doubt), but its effect as an on-going threat to all
slaves. The horror of the whipping was as much that it was a constant threat, and so
experienced to some degree at every moment, as that it did occur every few days.
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Further, tor slaves who were whipped, it is probably that even a single whipping caused
psychological damage that did not heal immediately, if at all, in somewhat the manner
rape does (and did undoubtedly among so many of the slaves). Barrow, the plantation
owner, himself recognized this: “he
. . . built a jail and ‘was constantly devising
ingenious punishments, for he realized that uncertainty was an important aid in keeping
his gangs well in hand’” [169],
Zinn further offers Herbert Gutman’s counter to Fogel and Engerman’s claim that
the Barrow plantation slaves became ‘devoted, hard-working responsible slaves who
identified their fortunes with the fortunes of their masters’” [169]. Arguing directly from
their statistics, Gutman shows that in fact “ ’four in five cotton pickers engaged in one or
more disorderly acts in 1840-41’” [169],
Zinn also offers a quote that calls into question Greenfeld’s elitist, even offensive
contention that only educated slaves and free blacks were “human” enough to recognize
their condition as subjugation and suffering. “John Little, a former slave,” says it best:
“They say slaves are happy, because they laugh, and are merry. I myself and
three or four others, have received two hundred lashes in the day, and had our feet
in fetters; yet, at night, we would sing and dance, and make others laugh at the
rattling of our chains. Happy men we must have been! We did it to keep down
trouble, and to keep our hearts from being completely broken . . .” [168].
Greenfeld appears to mistake the psychological defense mechanisms and inner strength of
slaves as evidence that they did not feel the pain of their oppression, rather than recognize
their dignity and strength even in oppression.
She argues that the relatively few slave revolts show slaves’ relative contentment
with their lot. Would she likewise argue that the fact that Jews in concentration camps
did not revolt and overthrow their genociders is evidence that they, too, were relatively
content? Or, would she recognize that the awesome power imprisoning and killing them
physically and psychologically drove down with tremendous force any inclination or
activity to revolt? Surely a similar argument can be made about slaves, even the “ Uncle
Tom’s” who, in good liberal fashion, made a utility calculation trading their dignity and
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obedience tor relative safety and comfort. Faced with life in the cotton fields under the
eye of an overseer with a whip, were their decisions not marks of their oppression itself?
Ot course, Greenteld’s characteristic tactic of separating slavery into abstract and
material components and setting them in opposition is dubious itself. There were not two
types of slavery - the aspects operated together. The material deprivation was intimately
linked with the psychological and these with the “abstract” denial of freedom and
dignity. This abstract denial was made concrete every day, in the outward signs of
obedience a slave had to show, in the prison of his/her shack and field, in the unavoidable
sexual submission to the owner and overseers, in the ripping apart of families and
complete regulation of their relations based on whims or motives of profit, and so forth.
Slaves did not have the luxury of turning off their material existence so as to contemplate
slavery in the abstract. By the same token, every physical cruelty, rape, whipping, meal
of gruel, etc., was the direct result of the abstract condition under which one person could
have absolute ownership (control) over another. To think slaves did not experience even
the most “material” of deprivations as aspects of an abstract loss of freedom is to engage
in an ultimate condescension. It is also to belie the evidence of so many slaves escaping
to the free states via the Underground Railway, of songs manifesting the desire for
deliverance from the condition of slavery, and so forth.
Neither were there two types of slaves, the one mind and the other body. Slavery
was control of and assault on all aspects ofthe humanity ofslaves. It is not a question of
whether the material or intellectual aspect of an individual suffered more. They suffered
as one, together. Indeed, intellectual or psychological control was furthered by physical,
and vice-versa. Slavery was a system of absolute control that employed varied
techniques, some more physical, others more psychological, but all contributing to the
oppression of this and that individual.
This begs a further question. Slavery is wrong, period. It does not matter if
American slaves were better off than slaves elsewhere or industrial workers in the North.
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It does not matter ifits cruelty registered more physically than psychologically, or vice-
versa. The real question is, why does Greenfeld pursue this line of argument at all? It is
like arguing numbers in a genocide. Would the Holocaust have been any less terrible if
only 3 million Jews, Gypsies, gays and lesbians, etc., died? Would the Armenian
Genocide have been any less of a genocide if only 600,000 had?
Why does Greenfeld take this line of argument in support of her normalization of
American history? There are, I believe, two related reasons. First, it would appear that, if
slavery were recognized as too brutal, too cruel, then no amount ofjustification could
make it tolerable within the American framework. It is one thing to say that “true
Americans” were slow to deal with a problem that was in the main an issue of abstract
freedom - that it took white America a few centuries to invite blacks into the house of
freedom. If slavery was actually material harsh and physically brutal, such that slaves
were oppressed in a direct and undeniable way, and felt the immediate, full weight of
oppression, then the contradiction with the “core” American values would be too great.
It would not be a matter of slowness, but of complicity in direct and immediate brutality.
Recognizing the reality of slavery would require a revised, less favorable delineation of
the “core” of American nationality.
Indeed, if the reality of slavery was brutal, then the issue of abstract principles
seems beside the point. Slavery was not just a lack of abstract freedom, but something
more — a system of institutionalized cruelty and degradation. Its remedy would not,
therefore, have been merely a granting of rights, of freedom, but required a change in
other “principles” as well. It would require an eradication of racism, which was the
cause of and not result of the denial of abstract freedom to blacks.
According to Greenfeld, the struggle against slavery was a liberal one, and merely
required a fuller application of core American ideals, not a calling into question of them.
The failure of a mere granting of abstract freedom to blacks to end their oppression stands
as a stark counter-example to what Greenfeld’s narrative seems to suppose. Greenfeld’s
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argument assumes that American racism was exactly equal to slavery. But, the end of
slavery was not the end ot racism. Rather than ending the racism at the core of slavery,
emancipation of blacks merely signaled the liberalization of their oppression. Blacks
could thereafter be granted formal freedom - with the rights to vote, and so forth. But, a
new racist system emerged that reigned for 100 years, before it gave way temporarily to
an apparent lessening of oppression, on the way to what appears to be yet another form
and era of post-slavery oppression.
I would argue, in fact, that the type of liberal society and ideals that Greenfeld
proposes are, rather than anti-racist, at best neutral with respect to racism. Their inherent
contradictions (majority rules versus the sanctity of the individual, equality versus self-
interest, etc.) and abstract nature do not determine the general social structure. On the
contrary, in their abstraction and contradictory indeterminacy, they allow to persist and
therefore buttress oppressive socio-political and economic structures.
There is a general implication for Greenfeld’s typology of nations here. For her,
racism is “collectivist,” versus liberal “individualism,” which is not racist. Yet, if
racism persists within a framework of atomic individualism, then “collectivism” cannot
be dismissed as racist without a similar dismissal of individualism. The forms are
different, but the effects similar. Racism in a “collectivist” context is gross: people are
grouped into races, which are in a hierarchical relationship. Racism in a “ liberal”
context is a bit more subtle. People are not grouped into races. Rather, they are
evaluated solely on their individual “ merit.” Socio-economic status is then taken as an
“objective” indicator of worth: in a liberal meritocracy, people achieve what their
natural abilities allow them to. No racial prejudgment is made. But, what if a society is
characterized by structural racism? The focus on individuals does not allow recognition
of structural elements, and therefore — apparently without being racist
— reinforces the
racist hierarchy implicitly in the society. What is more, when it is noticed that this or that
racial grouping does correspond to lower or higher socio-economic levels, the
success 01
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failure is taken as contingent. A lower-status group, for instance, is not necessarily
lower-status and this makes its failure even worse.
As I have argued above and will argue below, I do not believe America to be free
of the "gross” variant of racism - it is a central to “American nationality.” “American
racism, in tact, is a combination of the gross and subtle varieties, playing off of each
other. Yet, even if America were free of the gross variety, that would not imply an end to
racism, nor the ultimate inessentiality of racism to American nationality.
One might take this line of argument a step further. Greenfeld assumes that
individualism — that is, judging individuals strictly on their own merit, not based on
the color of their skin, their gender, etc. — is inherently superior to a “collectivism.” But,
why is hierarchization by individual any better than that by group? At least within a
group, presumably meritorious members of a lower-status group will be present, with
the potential of helping others in the group attain higher status than they might within a
strictly individual hierarchy. Of course, this is how racism tends to function among
higher-status groups as well — to help raise some individuals of one group over
individuals of another group, when evaluations based on “merit” would not have allowed
this.
Without these “racial-based” distortions, hierarchization is simply more precise
and “objective” — it can be based on, say, genetic indicators that really do contribute to
success or failure (healthiness, mental agility, etc.). But, is the individual-competition
model really the correct context within which to interpret such differences, to the extent
that they exist? Does not atomic individualism actually transform these differences into
justificationsfor hierarchizations, based on a system of socio-economic competition that
tends to produce a socio-economic hierarchy based on these differences?
Greenfeld, of course, does not engage such issues, but prefers to assume the basics
of liberal individualism throughout her work. Yet, these issues have been raised within
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the American context, if they have also been put down through harsh and manipulative
means.
(3) As I have already discussed, Greenfeld dismisses slavery as un-American, and
attributes it to a nascent Southern nationalism at odds with the proper American national
ideals. This, of course, is tautological. Based in part on previous normalization,
Greenfeld defines American ideals not to contain racism - despite the persistence of
racism in every aspect of American life over its entire existence. She then claims
tautologically that racism (slavery) is not part of or inherent in the core American values.
This is made easier by the fact that slavery came to be tied closely with the
assertion of “states’ rights” against the central federal government of the United States.
But, was this decentralization — this belief in local autonomy — not a central tenet of
Jefferson, against Hamilton?
Greenfeld argues that this was not the correct understanding of “self-
determination.” Rather, it was individual freedom that was posed against governmental
power. And, the claim of the “states’ right” to slavery directly contradicted individual
freedom. Who were white Southerners to decide things for blacks?
This argument is fine, but begs questions about the very foundation of the United
States. After all, who were colonial settlers in the 13 colonies to declare independence
from Britain for themselves and the Native Americans still alive in the East -- not to
mention on behalf of the slaves in the South? If the South’s secession from the North
was illegitimate and oppressive, then so was that of the 13 colonies from Britain. Yet,
Greenfeld characterizes it as a step toward the fullest attainment of freedom and equality.
It was, in fact, the fullest flowering of liberal (English) values [Greenfeld, 1992: 420tt.].
This suggests another issue. Who is Greenfeld to determine unilaterally that
slavery was not materially brutal? Her only evidence is one marginal work by two
academics. Who is she to dismiss a wealth of first-hand accounts of slavery by escaped
and ex-slaves? This is not to suggest that these should be taken as absolutely
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authoritative (especially given ditterences among them, based on different experiences
and perspectives). But, certainly their experiences should count a great deal in any
estimation of any and all aspects of slavery. To deny them their role in characterizing
their own oppression contradicts the “democratic” principles of “self-determination” to
which Greenfeld claims to be committed. She denies slaves the right even to characterize
their situation, wresting control from them, granting it to herself in pursuit of a warped
normalizing narrative of American history. She even misrepresents the claims by slaves
of the cruelty they experienced, to be propagandistic claims by (presumably white)
abolitionists acting on behalf of slaves.
Worse still, Greenfeld holds that American slaves were better offthan Blacks in
Africa [453]. She offers no evidence, no studies, just the groundless, ideologically-
generated opinion of the nationalist writer James Fenimore Cooper. Again, who is
Greenfeld to decide this? Again, she decides what was best for the slaves, and how they
should have or did feel about it. She re-imposes control over them, reinventing slavery in
an abstract, intellectual form.
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Surely such things as the establishment of Liberia, the
movement fostered by Marcus Garvey, etc., suggests slaves and Blacks had a much
different opinion — which Greenfeld suppresses.
This “will to control” is powerful, driving her to adopt a position that appears
well-contradicted by obvious evidence. How could anyone argue that it was better to be
kidnapped from one’s home region, from one’s family, etc., thrown in the hold of a ship,
and slowly taken across the ocean in unspeakably terrible conditions? And, even of those
born in the United States, how can it have been better to be a slave? At worst, for those
in bad circumstances in Africa (which certainly had it own internal oppressions), it was
materially no worse, and at least you were “ home.” For most in Africa, life was
presumably better. 01 course, Cooper s argument was not based on a material
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This summarizes the nature ot Greenteld’s revisionist history ot slavery. As Gellner s apology tor
colonialism was colonialism in another form, or a final,
“ discursive stage ot colonialism, so is
Greenfeld’s revision a final, “discursive” stage of slavery.
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comparison, but rather on the difference between living in a “civilized” society and a
barbaric one: slavers were “ better off in servitude in this country, than when living in
a state of barbarism at home” [453], This is a ludicrous position. First, whites might
have treated each other “civilly” in the United States, but they treated (and defined)
slaves as chattel and animals. They were not considered “civilized,” and not really
human, so were not treated so. For them, America was not civilization (if it was for
anyone). Second, to call native African societies “barbaric” was simply to apply the
worst of racist ideology. That Greenfeld quotes Cooper with approval, and without
flinching, is scandalous, and betrays the racist/colonialist underpinnings of her approach
to the United States.
There is another a problem with Jefferson. On the one hand, Greenfeld
continually valorizes him as a hero of American idealism. But, he was also pro-slavery,
and held slaves. In order to preserve his place as a true American and free-fostering
liberal, Greenfeld apologizes for his views. As part of a long tradition of liberal theorists,
Jefferson held that citizenship and humanity of an individual depended on his [not her]
rationality. Now, slaves were from an inferior race, and not rational, so they did not have
the same rights as rational people. Thus, his pro-slavery position was actually a very
noble one, based on his great esteem for rationality, [see 429 - 430] Greenfeld does not
approve of the position, but at the same time rescues Jefferson from being just a self-
interested, unprincipled pro-slavery type — that is, un-American.
Another issue exists: was the end of slavery really the successful assertion of core
American values against oppression? That is the standard nationalist version ot the Civil
War. Greenfeld herself, however, offers the clue to an alternative reading. As mentioned
above, she admits that ideals alone do not effect social and political transformation
— it is
only when they “correspond to significant interests operating at that time” that they
become influential [459], Thus, commitment to “American ideals” did not presumably
account for the Northern push against slavery: the interest ot Northern industry in
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spreading a new economic order and new way to extract labor from lower classes did.
Slavery was certainly opposed by abolitionists on principle (though perhaps not the
principles Greenteld touts), but it was not ended on principle: it was ended because it
became obsolete. The clash between North and South was not the clash between ideals or
ideologies; it was the clash between two economic systems, one reaching back to agrarian
feudalism, the other reaching forward to modern industrial capitalism. The fact that the
slaves were not emancipated until half way through the war - 1863 - is telling in this
regard. And even then the emancipation, at least according to Zinn, was ambivalent and
utilitarian [Zinn, 1995],
Greenfeld would not agree with my use of her analysis of interests. For her, the
supposed contradiction between liberal values and slavery was allowed to persist simply
because most people did not notice it. They did not notice it because the anti-slavery
movement was not linked to a significant interest until the mid- 1800s. Thus, interests on
her account tend to liberate ideals from contradictions and failings.
When they fail to liberate the core ideals of American society - that is, when they
do not correspond to those ideals - they tend either to fade out or to produce alternative
but illegitimate, un-American ideals (as was the case with the South and slavery).
This is, of course, again tautological. The only thing that determines which
interests are legitimate is whether or not they correspond to the core ideals or not. But,
how are these core ideals selected? Greenfeld’s ambiguous text can be read either to
avoid addressing this question or by asserting that they are themselves selected by the
initially dominant interests of a nation. This latter assertion obviously begs the question
of why one set of ideal-producing interests is legitimate and American, and another is not.
Her answer can only be that these liberal ideals are legitimate and American. I have
addressed these claims above.
One might also question why, if the contradiction between slavery and the core
American ideals was waiting to be discovered, abolitionists (according to Greenfeld - see
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above) found it necessary to resort to exaggerating propaganda to mobilize people against
it. In other words, what could it mean that people were motivated against slavery not
based on ideals, but through manipulative tactics? This could not have been merely a
matter of linking an interest to ideals consistent with it; it invoked the ideals through a
false representation of reality, creating afalse interest. Clearly, either this account of the
abolitionist tactics is wrong, or Greenfeld’s presumption that American ideals did indeed
contradict slavery is.
A last caveat regarding the present point: even where anti-slavery activists (slave
and free) used liberal rhetoric, pointing out the contradiction between slavery and
“American ideals,” their politics was not necessarily liberal. It is one thing to point out a
contradiction between a set of ideals and the practices associated by them, and quite
another to be committed to those ideals. Within the dominant liberal framework, the
most obvious and generally comprehensible argument against slavery might have been in
liberal terms, but that does not mean that those making it accepted these terms absolutely.
(4) Perhaps the most extreme ~ almost absurd - normalization regarding slavery
is the linking of it to Marxism. The linchpin of this superfluous maneuver is an analysis
of George Fitzhugh’s sociologically-based defense of slavery. It consisted of two main
points. First, capitalism was based on economic competition that some members of
society — or most — inevitably lost. Second, slavery eliminated that competition through
what might be called “central planning,” though Greenfeld does not use that term. This
made slavery the perfect socialism: “ Socialism proposes to do away with free
competition; to afford protection and support at all times to the laboring class; to bring
about, at least, a qualified community of property and to associate labor. All these
purposes slavery fully and perfectly attains.” [Greenfeld, 1992: 477]
The connection Greenfeld finds exists only at the surface level. Marxism, like
Fitzhugh’s socialism, is based on a strong critique of capitalism and its exploitation of
labor. But, there the similarity stopped. First, slavery - if socialist - was also pre-
185
capitalist. It was, in essence, a racialization of serfdom. Marx hardly had such a “feudal
socialism in mind as the goal of proletarian revolt and the overthrow of capitalism.
While Marx looked forward, beyond capitalism, Fitzhugh looked back, to a held over
economic form.
Second, for Fitzhugh, slavery was much less harsh than capitalist exploitation. In
the latter, the employer assumed absolutely not responsibility for the well-being of
workers, while the slave-owner did — the slaves were in a sense “part of the family”
[477], On the contrary, from a Marxist perspective, of course, slavery was exploitative.
It exacted labor in exchange for the minimal material necessary to maintain the labor
force. In this way, it was like capitalism, though it dispensed with any pretense to
universal liberty and mutual, contractual consent. In effects, it was the same.
Exploitation is exploitation. The “happy family” fantasy of slavery was analogous to the
“universal liberty and mutual, contractual consent” fantasy of capitalism.
What is dramatically ironic is that, on this point, Fitzhugh corresponds to
Greenfeld
,
not Marx. As I described above, Greenfeld argues at length that slavery was
not physically harsh. Indeed, she argues precisely that free blacks and white industrial
laborers were worse offthan slaves, which is the core of Fitzhugh’s case! [see 453ff. and
above]. Though they have quite different evaluations of capitalism, their analyses of
slavery are disturbingly similar.
Third, Fitzhugh might have used a “theory of surplus value” as the basis of his
comparison between slavery and capitalist exploitation, but not in the way Marx would
have. He argued that “capital commands labor as master does the slave. Neither pays for
labor; but the master permits the slave to retain a larger allowance from the proceeds of
his own labor . . .” [478]. Of course, even if this was true, it was not true by much.
Further, its “truth” depended on the Greenfeldian position that slavery was not physically
harsh, and that more was spent on the maintenance of slaves than paid to industrial
workers.
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More importantly, it tails to understand what is meant by the statement that “ ’free
labor is cheaper than slave labor"' [478], Contrary to Fitzhugh, the key to this
differential was not in the relative material condition of workers and slaves. Rather, it
was based on the greater efficiency of capitalist industrial production, which meant that
workers produced more “wealth" than in an agrarian mode of production. Thus, more
“surplus value" could be taken from industrial workers. The battle between American
capitalism and slavery was between two exploitative systems; the winner was not more
exploitative, but more efficient.
Finally, Marx was absolutely clear that the overthrow of capitalism depended on
the seizure of power by laborers. Fitzhugh’ s rejection of capitalism depended on the
exact opposite, the loss of all power by laborers. On this score alone, Marxism could not
have been pro-slavery.
Beyond these points, there are more basic issues of logic. First, Greenfeld must
admit that her arguments are not based on any type of concrete historical link between
Fitzhugh and Marx: “it is highly unlikely that Fitzhugh was influenced by Marx” [477],
So, her argument is that independently Fitzhugh came up with Marxist arguments in
favor of slavery. This is actually worse, for it suggests that in the defense of slavery there
is something inevitably Marxist. It also suggests that Marxism is somehow inherently
pro-slavery.
Second, of all the defenses of slavery, Greenfeld only examines Fitzhugh’s in
detail. It thereby becomes a representative of defenses of slavery in general. But,
Fitzhugh’s apology was at best a marginal one, and it is difficult to understand how it
could have had any influence on Southerners with the value system she describes. The
sinister connection between slavery and Marxism depends completely on the assumption
that Fitzhugh’s was a typical, not marginal, apology for slavery. Take this away, and
Greenfeld’ s argument becomes the extremely weak one that, because one apology for
slavery contained socialist elements, a pro-slavery position is socialist.
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By the same logic, all industrial capitalist theory is inherently genocidal. After
all, Heidegger valorized the structure of the use of slave laborers from secondary
concentration camps linked to German factories as a perfected form of industrialization.
Are all industrial theories or structures therefore genocidal? Are all genocides dependent
on industrialism? Surely Greenfeld would not want to argue for this.
As a correlate, Greenfeld seems to suggest that all critiques of capitalism are
Marxist. But, her beloved Nietzsche critiqued liberalism and capitalism just as harshly as
Marx, and much in Fitzhugh’s feudalist argument corresponds to Nietzsche’s ideas on
proper social organization. Nietzsche held, for instance, that democracy was inherently
bad, and that obedience to an aristocratic master the virtue of any commoner. He also
assumed the indifference of such masters in reference to commoners. Certainly
Fitzhugh’s critique of capitalism is Nietzschean in its valorization of a pre-capitalist
order.
The Gap
Greenfeld excludes both “good” and “bad” competing concepts of American
nationality and strains within it (Native American, labor, women, as well as racist, anti-
immigrant, imperialist/colonialist, and so forth) from participation in the “true”
American nationality. I have touched on just the more salient exclusions — multitudes of
other strains and concepts, most not even mentioned in her limited narrative, abound.
Those aspects and elements that she cannot ignore — such as slavery — she marginalizes
as inessential to American nationality.
The “plot” of her narrative is simple: as these inessential elements fall away
through the hard work of those committed to the true American ideals, the “reality” of
America has slowly approached the ideals. The great step forward was the Civil War,
which ended 80 years of post-Revolutionary “adjustment.” Since then, the path has been
clear, and progress steady. Though the approach cannot be perfected — though reality can
188
never come into total correspondence with ideals - it is close, and always closer, [see
especially 483 - 484]
I have presented an alternative view of the history of the United States. It has
been a “nation” of multiple aspects and strains. Its multiplicity has not simply been a
split between oppressed and oppressor, but within them as well. For instance, the elites
ot South and North struggled against one another, the former for a mere position within
the United States, the latter for pure dominance of it. Though my political commitments
have no doubt been clear throughout, my argument has not depended on them. It has not
required that one view be take as correct over another, but rather that the variety of views
and forces that have clearly characterized United States’ history be acknowledged. 20
Though different views and forces have come and gone, the multiplicity has remained.
And some elements - such as racism - have remained, if in mutating forms.
My view implies a very different understanding of the gap between “American
ideals” as stated by Greenfeld and reality. I will not deny that these ideals are often
invoked as the core of American nationality (though they are just as often challenged). In
fact, Greenfeld s history of the United States is more a restating of the standard points
of its official propaganda — with these “ideals” as a centerpiece, and complete with such
elements as the “melting pot” [see 437 - 438] -- than an analysis of historical data. But, I
insist on taking the reality seriously, as seriously at least as the ideology. How can one
evaluate an ideology by dismissing its relationship to reality, by not taking seriously the
historical relationship between the two?
I have already argued that Greenfeld’s case depends on explaining away much of
the reality that opposes these ideals. Her defense has been to delegitimize these, to view
them as resistant to the full instantiation of the worthy ideals. Even as she argues against
the claim that these ideals cover over an oppressive reality — her narrative in fact
accomplishes this very covering.
20
This, of course, is a specific interpretation of that history.
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Here, I wish to extend my critique, to comment on the nature of the gap between
ideal and reality. For Greenfeld, the history of the United States is the closing of that
gap. For me, the United States itself is the gap. It, not the ideals, defines the United
States. The gap is ever-fluctuating and changing, and US history is the history of those
fluctuations and their production - through the application of force and propaganda, as
well as the playing out ot material forces in given circumstances.
This position hinges on the fact that things are not “getting better all the time.”
Greenfeld’ s work is filled with admissions that this or that shortcoming was not central or
was decreasing. I have commented on a number of these points already, and here add
only cursory examples. First, in many instances, she tries to dismiss negative criticisms
of American society - of its racism and slavery [see above], sexism [455], exploitative
economic system [see, for instance, 452], anti-immigration [see 438], etc. - by stating
that, even if it had its shortcomings, it was infinitely better in these regards than all other
societies and nations in the world. This, of course, is a weak excuse - the type children
make when caught “red-handed” doing something wrong. Whether they were really
better off than slaves elsewhere could hardly have been a comfort to slaves in America. I
have also raised the question about whether that was true. Was Africa really worse for
Africans? Was “Native America”?
Second, she characterizes failures as temporary, without following their
transcendences to their conclusions. For instance, she admits that the reality of America
quite often failed to live up to the expectations of immigrants. Still, she stresses that this
was a temporary failure. [436] The problem is, she never explains how and at what point
this “temporary” failure was overcome. Again, even if one group or another did
overcome initial exploitation, official discrimination, and widespread prejudice (which
yet stands ready for re-deployment), there is always another group taking its low-status
place. Thus, some America is always failing some immigrants.
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Third, she marks the progress ot enfranchisement in America by its gradual
overcoming^ of the “artificial” distinctions of class privilege, and then to the
natural distinctions of race and gender [452], To Greenfeld, it is understandable that
progress would run this course, tor disenfranchisement based on natural distinctions
would have been more difficult to extirpate. But, what does it mean to say that these
distinctions are natural,’ especially by comparison to class?
Take race. In American, race was a construct that legitimized a system of slavery.
Originally, bonded laborers of various “races” came to the colonies to work. Soon,
however, race became used to mark those who were enough like the bosses to be allowed
to complete their bondage, and those who were not allowed to pay their debts, but
became perpetually bonded. In the American context, race itself was a construct that
appeared naturalized. It was not a pre-existing natural condition. Thus, as class
differentials were leveled a bit in colonial America, and ex-bonded servants became small
farmers and so forth, racial distinctions developed to replace them. Progress in class
meant regression in race. The merely apparent naturalness of race — which Greenfeld
uses to explain the continuation of slavery after the alleged lessening of class distinctions
— was in fact the justification of this continuation. Her “objective” explanation of
oppression in American history again repeats the clearly ideological justifications given
for the oppression during its imposition.
If gender appears more natural than race, that is only because the specific
European systems of gender oppression pre-existed colonization of America. Thus, they
were not produced in America. However, the same case can be made for class
distinctions. Classes in medieval Europe were fully naturalized, and the key to liberalism
was their partial exposure as artificial. Why for class and not gender? What is more, in
early colonial times, necessity often drove just such an exposure; that is, quite often
necessity forced (or allowed) women to take on roles that called into question the
reigning sexist ideology — as occurred again in the United States during World War II,
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for instance. Just as with the initial colonial opening of class, this opening of gender was
closed off during the 19th Century precisely with the rise and consolidation ofthe "core
"
American national ideology [see, for instance, Angela Davis, 1983],
There was no “natural'’ or understandable progress here, but a playing off of
different forms of oppression against one another, which has continued to this day. The
recent film “G. I. Jane” is a perfect example. In this case, a woman proves herself fit to
be a member of one of the most “elite” elements of the US armed forces. What does
membership mean? It means that she can and must be a participant in the unprovoked
invasion of a sovereign country and the killing of many of its soldiers (who are just
Muslims, after all, and so not really people with rights). The pretext for this violation of
international law is a mistake by the United States', one of our nuclear-powered satellites
fell from orbit, into the Libyan desert, and there is no telling what that “madman”
Qaddafi might do with the plutonium. As she proves herself fully capable of war crimes,
“G. I. Jane” bonds completely with her new comrades -- even becoming buddies with her
would-be rapist a few scenes before. Thus, all difference within the American “in-
group” is overcome, unified against yet another “out-group.” 21
Yet, despite this maneuvering and trading, there are still obvious problems. If
America in the 1700s was characterized by a strong “ ’leveling principle’” [408], then
why after 250 years, do absolutely stark class distinctions and poverty remain? Why do
women still make less than 75 percent of what men make for the same work? Why are
Blacks still randomly killed (lynched)? Why are Native Americans still on reservations,
their land still taken when it is found to have mineral resources or a fit site for nuclear
waste dumping? Why is it even an issue whether “gays” are in the military or not?
Given these issues and the other instances abounding in her narrative, it cannot be enough
to say that “things are getting better.” They should have gotten better already.
Apparently, as Greenfeld has her freedom, she finds it acceptable to tell others to wait . . .
21 Which may, as I have said, be inside or outside the borders of the United States.
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just a little more - just as it was fine for America to tell the slaves to wait, first 240 years,
and then another 100, then another 30, and then
Ironically, the position that “things are getting better all the time” in America
requires a maneuver directly critiqued by Nietzsche - a self-acknowledged major
influence on Greenfeld s analysis of nations and nationalisms. It requires a perpetual
shifting of the perfected world into the future. It is “ otherworldliness”
: the real world is
always flawed, but it will become perfect in the future. The sins of the present are
forgiven by reference to the perfection of the future. Yet, the future is always ... in the
future, always another world away.
Greenfeld s history — even though it is sanitized of every problematic detail
possible - is riddled with excuses for the oppressive reality of America. Some might be
acceptable, but after a while, the sheer volume of exceptions and explanations calls her
central claims into question. Her narrative is a Ptolemaic effort to account for all the
counter-examples and difficult data.
To put it another way, exclusions, exceptions, and excuses are the rule of her
narrative. The story it tries to tell is of the smooth instantiation of a set of ideals. But the
story it enacts is of the perpetual gap between these ideals and reality. Just as Greenfeld’s
narrative absorbs problematic data by making claims about the shrinking of the gap at
this or that point, the United States has absorbed assertions of the reality against the
ideals by enacting the ideals better regarding this or that piece of society, but opening the
gap up in other existing or new areas. Thus, when one immigrant group begins to
assimilate, and to improve its average socio-economic status, another is brought in to fill
its former lowly role. There has always been another group, either “naturally” produced
by economic and political forces and conditions elsewhere, or created by the United
States by indirect and direct influence on these forces and conditions (for instance,
Vietnamese) or ideology.
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Regarding racially - as opposed to ethnically _ distinct groups,22 the line
fluctuates mnthin the group. Thus, some Blacks are allowed upward mobility, enough to
undercut somewhat claims of totally clear racism. In either case, the fluctuation of the
lines separating ranks in a hierarchy is the key to maintaining hierarchy in the face of
what would otherwise be anti-colonial or civil rights-style collective conflict, against
clear divisions. Further, in both cases, acceptance is often predicated on the abandonment
of claims to membership in the alternative collective. An ethnic group must make clear
its general commitment to participation in American society at large, while a “token”
must not appeal to their membership, at least outwardly.
A similar analysis holds for gender.
Given her absolute valorization of certain ideals despite the reality that conflicts
with them, Greenfeld’s distinction between “civic” and “collective” or “ethnic” nations
becomes meaningless. The civic nation of the United States that she narrates is grounded
on just as rigid an imposition of homogeneity, and just as ideological a reading of history,
as any ethnic nation.” 23 The ideal of “liberty” is merely substituted for the ideal of this
or that group. The structure and oppressive functioning are the same. As Hobsbawm
would no doubt point out, the same reductions, assumptions, and exclusions are necessary
to her version of the civic United States as to the most extreme examples of “ethnic
nations.”
Greenfeld’s last line of defense is the “good intentions” of Americans. As I have
mentioned, she believes that Americans have an unparalleled penchant for self-critique,
toward improvement of the nation [452]. If this is true, why does she echo American
ideologues in dismissing and delegitimating a number of central, well-grounded critiques
of American society and ideology?
22
I follow Omi and Wynant in observing this important distinction [Omi and Wynant, 1985].
“These remarks are not meant to suggest that her typology of nations is accurate or complete.
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Retargeting and Retooling
Ultimately, Greenfeld’s treatment of the nationalization of the United States is not
the theorization of that “nation,” as part of and toward a general account of nations and
nationalisms. It is, rather, the use of the rhetoric or appearance of theorization of the
nation and nationalism to advance her own ideological agenda, which she represents as
the core of the “American nation.” Her general theory of nations and nationalisms is, in
fact, a function of her “Americanist” ideology, and works to buttress and consolidate the
supremacy of that ideology. Her work in general asserts (1) the ultimate and nearly
absolute purity and goodness of the “American nation” and (2) its great superiority over
all other “ nations” - and, indeed, all possible nations not organized around the same set
of ideals. I have pointed out explicit statements of this superiority above. Her general
theoretical work is a manifestation of American arrogance and disrespect for every other
nation, state, and society. It forms a powerfully anti-pluralistic attack on all alternative
concepts and manifestations of the nation, in perfect accord with the standard tenets of
American foreign policy and neo-imperial ideology.
Central to these, of course, has been an antipathy to Marxism - as manifested by
her attempt to link US slavery to Marxism. Her engagement with Marxism does not stop
here. According to Greenfeld, Marxism as developed by Marx was, in fact, a complexly
sublimated nationalism, and, indeed, an extreme nationalism akin to National Socialism:
[T]he supposition that an internationalist doctrine, such as Marxism, conceived by
a Jew and carried on by scores and scores of other Jews, which called on
proletarians of all countries to unite, may have something in common with that
most horrible variety of militant and xenophobic nationalism, for which anti-
Semitism was the driving passion, seems utterly preposterous. Yet the two are
close kin; they are, one can say, brothers—they come from the same parentage
and are products of the very same upbringing. They are both elaborations of the
matrix of German nationalism, a system of beliefs and aspirations, which was
profoundly socialist, and while socialism, however obscured, is nevertheless a
central element in National Socialism, so is nationalism (and very specifically
German nationalism) a central element in Marxism. [387]
The way this worked was simple: The “young Karl Marx” was a “German nationalist,”
“ in the sense that he completely agreed with the fundamental tenets of German Romantic
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nationalism.
.
.” [56], Yet Marx was also a Jew, and as such, he could not comfortably
espouse a German nationalism that “ from its earliest days in the late eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth century
. . . had strong racist and specifically anti-Semitic
connotations” [56] Therefore, through a subtle psychological movement, Marx
substituted “class” for “nation" [393], which substitution is evidenced by the fact that
[i]n Marxism classes took on all the characteristics of the Romantic nations” [393], as
conceived by German Romantic nationalism. 24
Greenfeld extends this line of thinking to consider Marxist-Leninism in the Soviet
Union. Echoing her position on the origins of Marx's revolutionary theory, she argues
that Marxism gained hold in pre-Revolutionary Russia as Russians recognized that they
could not, as a traditional nation-state, compete with the Western powers, most notably
Britain, France, the United States, and Germany. Led by Lenin, some Russians adopted a
critique (the Marxist one) of these powers that did not depend on a direct competition
among nation-states that they would lose. The “spreading of the Revolution” beyond
Russia after its success in Russia Greenfeld thus retrospectively reduces to simply a
scheme for extending Russian power. [Greenfeld, 1993: 58 - 59]
There is, of course, something to this last point. But, the point is perfectly
consistent with the position that Russian imperialism continued under Marxist-Leninism
not because the latter ideology was fundamentally nationalistic, but because it was not
powerful enough to extirpate Russian imperial nationalism fully from the society that
adopted Marxist-Leninism. While proponents of one might have used the other as a tool
to advance their agenda, and through a long process they might have become closely
linked, this does not mean that either is reducible to the other.
24There is an important difference between my criticism of Kristeva’s and Greenfeld’s universalism, and
Greenfeld’s critique of Marx’s. Theirs are based on an explicit universalization of a particular nation(-
statefs set of values, and the imposition of these on the rest of the world. They thus explicitly extol the
superiority of their own nation. Marx, on the other hand, does not argue for the superiority of this or that
nation. That Greenfeld interprets the motives of his socio-economic theory to be nationalist suggests that
Greenfeld is disavowing her own suspect nationalism by projecting a valid critique of her own work onto
Marx. At the very least, the attack on Marx is hypocritical.
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We may make a similar claim about Marx. There is little doubt that Marx had
strains of something akin to ''German nationalism” in his theoretical work. But this
Claim is nothing new-it was leveled agatnst Marx long ago by Mikael Bakunin [1972]
among others. Bakunin's writings in the early 1870s showed much more convincingly
than Greenfeld the “Germanic” nature of Marxism. He examined Marxist theory and
practice as instantiated in the Internationale instead of basing his critique on psycho-
analysis of Marx himself. His critique of Marx keyed on the point that Marx-led
Marxists from industrial countries were too close to Western capitalist and political
sensibilities. Thus, Greenfeld may be correct to assert that Marxism was “nationalist,”
but not to assert it as a nationalism fundamentally opposed to other Western national
conceptions based explicitly on liberal individualism. For Bakunin (and most of the rest
of the world), the key point about Germany - and France, and Britain, and the United
States - was that it was fundamentally imperialist/colonialist, and that Marx, both in
theoretical work and by pushing for German leadership of the Internationale and by
ignoring the issues specific to workers and peasants from less industrially developed
regions (particularly in Eastern Europe and Asia), echoed this basic “proto-First
Worldism.”
In this sense, Marx s theories were not sublimated nationalism but rather tainted
by the position of his society in the world. In this way, his nationalism, though present,
was not specific to his theory, but the almost inevitable baggage of any writer in the
advanced countries of nineteenth-century Europe and America. Greenfeld’s analysis of
Marxism-as-nationalism floats on the intellectual level, and is based on a psychological
analysis of a few individuals, namely Marx and elite Russians, who certainly might have
had an inferiority complex vis-a-vis “the West.” However, completely missing from her
analysis is an account of the actual “peasants” and “workers” who took up Marxism or
Marxist-Leninism in Russia (as well as other places). What was it for them? Were they
really concerned all that much with the place of their culture and state vis-a-vis “the
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West,” or were they a bit more concerned with the fact that their children were starving,
they were always cold in the winter, they were subject to an arbitrary, all-powerful
bureaucratic structure, and so forth?
The problems with Greenfeld's argument, however, run much deeper than being a
last stab at a retreating Marxism or a reductive reading of twentieth-century
Russian/Soviet history that “explains” the fall of communism there. Her argument is in
fact a brilliant Cold War maneuver. At the point in history where we are being told that
communism as a vital social force is dead, Greenfeld consoles us. For, “communism”
was always really nationalism. The threat we (the West) faced for so long we mislabeled
as “communism”
;
now that communism is gone, its real nature emerges - nationalism.
And there is plenty of nationalism around, so we do not have to scrap our anti-communist
propaganda, attitudes, war preparations, etc. We merely have to reconfigure them to be
aniwational-ist propaganda — just as we might retarget our nuclear missiles away from
the Soviet Union to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Rather than scrap the anti-communist
social, institutional, and psychological ideological complex that has been nurtured in the
United States since the 1920s and before, and which has penetrated so deeply into our
consciousnesses as to approach being foundational of the “American psyche,” we need
only reconfigure the elements of the complex to apply to a slightly different “threat.”
Most of the attitudes and conceptions easily fit the “new” threat, not only because most
of our old enemies coincidentally show up as our new ones, but also because our rather
abstract ideological notion of “nationalism,” which calls up vague images of Nazis
goosestepping, an (apparently) maniacal hoard of indistinguishable Palestinians shouting
at a news camera, and so forth, has no trouble being fit into our equally vague concept of
“communism.” 25
25The recent James Bond film GoldenEye explicitly focuses on this retooling of a Cold War implement
(Bond) for the post-Cold War. The film attempts to convince the audience of this transformation precisely
by portraying an element of the old enemy we thought were fully indoctrinated Soviet communists to have
always been corrupt criminals (though, in the film, not Russian nationalists).
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This is not to say that Greenfeld's condemnation of “nationalism” catches all
nationalisms. This is its subtlety: her analysis in Nationalism actually distinguishes two
types, good and evil types if you will. Western (British, French [with reservations], and
US) and Eastern (German = fascistic, Russian = communalistically totalitarian). This
analysis is even extended to link Eastern nationalism with aggression and show it to be
the cause of war and genocide. In “Nationalism and Aggression” Greenfeld (with Daniel
Chirot) [1994] shows exactly how her good/evil distinction should be used, in cataloging
good versus bad nationalisms. It is no surprise that the traditional and new enemies of the
United States end up on the “bad” side (Russia, Syria, Iraq, etc.).
Predictably, good, “civic” nationalisms are those based on “individualism,” and
bad ones are those based on “collectivism.” For individualistic nationalisms, “the
borderline between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is frequently blurred” [86] due to the primacy of the
individual, while in collectivistic nationalisms, the “group” is the basic unit of
perception, and “we” and “they” are always clear, discrete units. What is more, civic
nationalisms see “foreigners” at least as “fellow-men,” if not as fellow nationals, while
collective nationalisms view “ foreigners” as a fundamentally different species outside of
the bounds of moral imperatives governing decent human interaction. Thus,
individualistic nations tend to be more humane toward “enemies” and less given to
genocide and nationalist violence than collectivist nations.
With telling irony Greenfeld claims that “individualistic nationalisms are by
definition pluralisms” [86], But this is a sophistical logical error: there is nothing about
differentiation of a group into individual units that implies that these units will be
appreciably different from one another. More than this, Greenfeld's ideology of civic
versus collective nationalism is itself blatantly anti-pluralistic. She dictates that there is
one type of legitimate nationalism.
This distinction is particularly devastating for small and minority nation national
movements. It requires emerging nations, which do not have the power to determine the
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nature of “acceptable” nationalism, to conform to what is given to them as acceptable, or
to be rejected as illegitimate and disallowed through indirect and direct actions. Further,
Greenfeld s theory assumes and allows one unified nationalism per nation. This is true
even in the case of “civic” nationalisms, which are pluralist not in containing contending
nationalisms, but insofar as an essential, unified nationalism allows plurality at a
shallower level.
As I have argued, a nation often contains many, quite different, and even
fundamentally opposed nationalisms, that is, different, explicit, established conceptions
of the nation and agendas for it. But even these nationalisms tend to fracture as one looks
more deeply at different individuals with different perspectives on the nation, different
conceptual frameworks, and so forth. The dynamic interrelation of these distinct (though
potentially overlapping) nationalisms can contribute much to the richness of the nation.
Greenfeld's theory forces a reduction of the possibly rich plurality of nationalisms of a
given nation to a single, unified, and therefore limited nationalism. By assuming a
unified nationalism as the essence of a nation, a perceiver performs a reduction of the
nation. If this perception is a Great Power's expectation of a nation, the nation might be
reduced in actuality, through manipulation, influence, and force.
Greenfeld's theory codifies the litmus test applied to emerging states by the
United States and other powerful Western countries to determine whether or not they are
suitably “ democratic.” Indeed, her recent work on the link between non-civic
nationalism and aggression both legitimizes and expresses a more general attitude
prevalent in US and other foreign policies. If the “ideology” of an emerging state is not
“civic nationalism” so defined, then that state is a threat to all the “good” nations.
Second, if an emerging state displays a plurality of possible ideologies, it is forced toward
eliminating all but one, the one “in line with” civic nationalism. In practice, the
“nationalism” selected out through pressure and interference by the United States is a
strain of power, usually elite (Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, the former Shah of Iran,
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Nguyen Thieu and Nguyen Ky in Vietnam, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, various
figures in Turkey, etc.) and so the least legitimate, if a single nationalism must be chosen,
as well as generally dictatorial.
Thus, Western democracy often manifests itself in small and minority nations
as a limiting, dictatorial (non-collective to be sure) authoritarian exploitative ideology.
This is not due to the flawed nature ot non-European or “ lesser” nations, for in their
origins most demonstrate a range of possible ideologies, many of which are quite
progressive. Rather, it suggests that the criterion for determining whether a nationalism
is good or bad is not a measure of its content, but the extent to which it advances Western
Great Power interests. This suggests that the groundless antiWestem-ism that Greenfeld
perceives among many non-Westem nations - the resentment that she claims is absent
from US nationalism - is actually a quite understandable and legitimate reaction to those
who, through implementing a particular ideology in a particular way, deny non-Westem
nations the plurality, complexity, and self-determination enjoyed by the Great Powers of
the West.
Greenfeld's essentialist analysis of nationalisms of East and West boils down to a
quaint old notion that Russians are this way, French are that, Germans another way, and
so forth. Especially in its gross simplifications of the natures of “East” and “West,”
Greenfeld blatantly displays precisely the “us” versus “them” mentality that she
lambastes as one of two key results of collectivism that lends it to aggressiveness. In her
theory, there is no blurring of the borderline between (our) Western and (their) Eastern
nationalism and no hesitation at harsh, blanket condemnations of “them.”
In the end, Greenfeld's critique of communism for being a bad form of
nationalism itselfqxpresses a nationalism that is misleadingly presented as a progressive
intellectual and political critique of regressive social forces. If Soviet communism
mystified its nationalist agenda, then so do critiques such as Greenfeld's.
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What is worse, Greenfeld's “civic” (Western) versus “collectivist” (Eastern)
nationalisms is in the end just itself a retooling of an original Cold War instrument. It is a
rather unoriginal reiteration of Hans Kohn’s 1945 analysis of nationalism [1945] that
helped reorient US wartime propaganda for the Cold War, in critiquing both Russian
nationalism as well as explicitly Asian (anti-colonial) nationalisms that were emerging.
For Kohn, Western nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the concepts of
individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism.
.
.” [330], Greenfeld unabashedly
incorporates the former almost directly and loads the latter into a universalistic humanism
that causes the civic nationalist to see “humanity as one, fundamentally homogeneous
entity [Greenfeld, 1994: 87], For Kohn, the later, derivative Eastern nationalism
“lacked self-assurance” and indeed came out of an “inferiority complex” [Kohn, 1945:
330]. This Greenfeld reflects through her reading of Friedrich Nietzsche's Genealogy of
Morals to produce her concept of “ ressentimentf “a psychological state resulting from
suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of
satisfying these feelings” [Greenfeld, 1992: 15], the psychological basis for the
development of Marxist nationalism, Russian nationalism, and the like.
As Kohn at the beginning of the Cold War retooled anti-fascism for its expanded
role in the fight then brewing against communism, so does Greenfeld at the end of the
Cold War retool the retool for a fight against communism's successor.
The Poverty of Philosophy
What does philosophical analysis have to offer the study of nations and
nationalisms? Philosophers claim to reach to the fundamental issues, problems, and
principles underlying our natural and social worlds. Philosophy of Science claims to
explore the deepest issues of the basis of scientific knowledge, Ethics the possible
justifications for and causes of moral positions. Logic the basic form and possibilities of
rational thought, and so forth. Political Philosophy is supposed to engage the deepest
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levels of political principles, structures, activities, and so forth. Its analyses are meant to
interpret the fundamental nature ot these, and to ground or justify practical positions and
actions in the concrete political realm.
This claim to foundational enquiry, consolidated by Kant, exploded by Marx and
Nietzsche, is at the origin of Western Philosophy, in the figure of Socrates. The
complexity of that role is perhaps more present in the work of Descartes.
The Meditations the relevant text to understanding this. Was the Meditations his
own honest presentation of intensively subversive possibilities that undercut the very
foundations of the Catholic ideological complex that dominated Europe. Were
Meditations 2 through 6 merely a cover for the devastating possibilities opened up in
Meditation 1 — even his way of resolving the exploration of Meditation 1 with his
perhaps genuine Catholic faith? Did his honest enquiry unleash demons that would
eventually wreak havoc on the pre-modern belief system, regardless of his intentions?
Or, was the Meditations an attempt to contain the new radical possibilities that
Descartes was merely the first to glimpse and formulate clearly, but which already were
beginning to form around him? Were they an attempt to subjugate the new spirit of
enquiry to the pre-modern, Catholic ideological complex?
One might choose the more favorable, radical interpretation of Descartes’ texts,
despite the inevitable protests of those who have read all his letters, know his explicit
intentions, and so forth. They perhaps are not qualified to speculate on what was beneath
the merely explicit, what was really going on — and anyway, they for the most part
represent the type of scholar who tends to buttress reigning ideological authority, whether
in the discipline or society.
Whatever one’s ultimate appraisal of Descartes (and the same holds of Socrates),
it is clear that the questions above at least mark a possibility implicit in Descartes’s work,
even if one assumes it to cut against his explicit and underlying, conscious and
unconscious motives, desires, beliefs.
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What is more, no doubting - no interrogation of the presuppositions and pre-
reflective conceptual frames of oneself, one’s discipline, one's society, etc. - is pure.
There are always blind-spots, and points that are not pushed through chance or denial.
But, it is always possible to push doubt to an uncomfortable level, the level at which
structures of domination begin to be perceived and alternative possibilities open up.
What the Meditations do is to set a possible standard of reaching to the very
foundations of ideological systems and challenging them to justify themselves. Indeed.
Descartes calls upon one to doubt what is most assumed, most obvious, most apparently
given in one’s world - to de-naturalize what appears the most natural, de-rationalize what
appears the most rational, and so forth. It is a call that philosophers such as Nietzsche
and Foucault have heard, despite its origin and perhaps their disavowals.
A look at mainstream contemporary Anglo-American Political Philosophy,
however, would suggest the second interpretation of Descartes to be more credible.
Granted, philosophers are people, influenced by their surrounding culture and
state/political structures, indoctrinated in certain ideological complexes, and so forth.
Yet, despite this, one would hope that the Cartesian call would still echo in the halls of
philosophy departments. One would hope that Political Philosophers - in approaching
that realm in which ideology has played such an important role -- would engage in their
own Cartesian projects, as a prerequisite for engaging particular political objects.
If this does occur outside of the mainstream, most frequently within Feminist
Philosophy, a look at recent "philosophical perspectives on national identity" suggests
that it does not at all when philosophers engage the nation and nationalism.
On the contrary, they import the same old ideas they have been using in political
theory for centuries, merely applying them to (imposing them on) the "nation" and
"nationalism." The one place where one would expect some respite from the ideological
tainting of approaches to nation and nationalism is the place where it is perhaps most
prevalent and complete.
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Philosophers have, in the vein of Kedourie, rejected such things as nationalism.
What makes recent philosophical work on the topic noteworthy is that the old blanket
rejections or ignorance has been displaced more and more by a concerted effort to
"understand" the nation and nationalism. This "understanding-' is active, and generally
effects a conceptual transformation of the object into existing philosophical terms and
concepts, thereby robbing it of its interesting distinct features, which make it a worthy
object of study in the first place. This transformation tends to be the ideological buttress
of a more practical absorption and control of the nation and nationalism by the dominant
political forces of the contemporary world - most notably "liberalism" and the liberal
state.
Rather than taking the conceptual richness and novel elements of the nation as a
spur to develop new philosophical ideas and methods -- opening new possible alternative
to established and threadbare political ideas and analyses - recent approaches implicitly
deny any richness or novelty. They stick rigidly with the given available ideas and
concepts, squandering the opportunity to overcome their obsolescence. In contemporary
liberal philosophy, the liberal spirit of discovery" has given way to a rigid conservatism.
It is not fear of the new - which would imply at least recognition that there was
something new - but self-satisfaction - that one understands the nature of people,
societies, political structures, etc. — that grounds this conservatism. The result is
somewhere between inbred philosophical sterility and intellectual laziness.
In a Greenfeldian move, one might remark that, because the promise of
philosophy is so great and its claims so extravagant, the disappointment at its broken
promise and falsity of its claims is that much more intense.
Why do I focus on "liberal" philosophy? Simply put, mainstream philosophy is
liberal philosophy. There are variations, such as communitarianism, that maintain the
general conceptual framework of liberalism, while flipping this or that tenet upside down.
And there are those strains, such as Feminism, Post-Structuralism/Post-Modernism,
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Marxism, etc., that have carved out significant space within philosophy. But this space is
always in alternative philosophy, as Continental, or "Social and Political," etc.
Liberalism has even made incursions into these alternative spaces.
But, particularly in the approach to the nation, mainstream Political Philosophy is
liberal. One need only recall the 1994 American Philosophical Association Eastern
Division Meeting's Panel on "Nationalism and Internationalism" [December 28, 1994] to
see this manifested. Ten of 1
1 participants espoused some type of liberal line, though
with varying political commitments. The main debated following their presentations was
about whether the (liberal) right to self-determination was properly an individual right
only, or could be legitimately exercised by a group. All discussion was strictly in liberal
terms and with the general tenets of liberalism assumed.
Other recognized philosophical work on the nation and nationalism is likewise
liberal. This is suggested strongly by the contents of the Fall-Winter 1996-97 issue of
The Philosophical Forum
,
a "Special Issue on Philosophical Perspectives on National
Identity." Most mainstream philosophical analysts of the nation and nationalism are
represented among its authors and the sources they explicitly draw on. Its various articles
describe and/or take a comprehensive range of the different positions current in
mainstream philosophy. This issue is especially pertinent because it is supposed to bring
together the range of philosophical perspectives on the nation and nationalism; what is
represented in its pages can be taken as a leading journal's belief about the mainstream
consensus on what is part of this range. An examination of its contents will support my
contention of the "poverty of philosophy" on the nation and nationalism, and offer further
important insight into the manner in which the nation is used and manipulated in
academic approaches to it that claim some sort of positive engagement with it.
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Can the Nation or Nationalism Be Liberal?
This question is central to a number of essays in the Forum. Kai Nielsen is
concerned with the status of the Quebecois movement in Canada. He wants to show that
it is a legitimate and justified movement. He assumes that this depends on whether or not
establishment of "a sovereign Quebec[] will destroy Quebec's liberal democracy"
[Nielsen, 1996 : 42 ]. If nationalism is necessarily "illiberal," then no nationalism is
justified. And, if Quebecois nationalism specifically is illiberal, it is not justified.
He admits that some nationalisms are of the "fanatical, antidemocratic, and
antiliberal form" that subverts all interests and rights to "’the pursuit of the national
interest'" [43], Such a nationalism is "incompatible with liberalism
. . . which affirms
moral equality [for all people]" [43],
Nielsen argues that not all nationalisms are illiberal. "'Some nationalisms are
peaceful, liberal, and democratic'" [44]. Thus, there are "good" nationalisms and "bad"
ones; the "good" are liberal.
Nielsen then argues for the liberality of Quebecois nationality. Though it appears
to be "ethnic," and thus to deny membership to and in fact utterly disregard non-ethnics,
it is actually liberal. It allows immigration and full participation of immigrants, so long
as they learn the dominant language and history of the society. [48 - 49] It is a "cultural
nationalism": membership is defined in terms of participation in a common culture. The
culture is open, so it is consistent with liberalism.
I have already argued, in the previous section, that an explicitly "liberal" nation
might still be oppressive and, by supposedly liberal standards, illegitimate. Thus, the
assumption that liberalism is inherently good is dubious.
What is more, the assumption that any non-liberal nationalism or nation is
illegitimate is ungrounded. Nielsen assumes there are two types of nations or
nationalisms, liberal and anti-liberal. The anti-liberal is any non-liberal
nation/nationalism. In doing this, he assumes that "liberalism" is equivalent to or
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necessarily linked with "democracy" and respect for others, and that the only way to
respect others and be democratic is through liberalism. Indeed, any position that is not
liberal "is at odds with some beliefs and principles which are an essential part of any
civilized moral outlook" [43 — my emphasis].
But, what if the non-liberal nation is not necessarily
"anti-democratic" and
monomaniacally self-devoted? There are many forms of democracy, and liberalism with
its representative form is not even fully democratic. Certainly a range of equally or more
legitimate forms of popular participation in one's political community is available. This
might be through institutional politics, but might also be through other forms of
substantive participation, as I suggested in my Chapter 1 treatment of Thom. The nation
might represent an alternative, non-liberal form of political organization. 26 That is not to
say that it is always "democratic" or participatory. It might be "democratic" or not, just
as liberalism might be oppressive or not (I allow this here).
The denial of this alternative possibility produces a double-edged conceptual
poverty. First, as with Greenfeld, it limits the options available to national movements:
to be legitimate, they must be or represent themselves to be (and thus tend to become)
"liberal." Second, the complexity of the nations and nationalisms is flattened into a
purely liberal framework. Even those nations that can be represented as liberal (such as
the Quebecois) are reduced in this way. And any that cannot be or refuse to be — often
because they are resisting liberal oppression (colonies of liberal states, for instance) -
become a conceptual "other," maligned and dismissed without true analysis or
understanding.
While he appears to be opening the door to some nationalisms, and showing good
hospitality by inviting them into the liberal house, he is in fact forcing the invitation on
2<This is a tricky point. It is not that - as I will discuss in Chapter 3 - the nation cannot take a liberal form,
but that even this form cannot be explained by appeal only to liberalism. It is not generated by liberalism,
but a liberalist deformation of an externally-generated social form. The concept of the nation in general --
as a set of potentials that include fascism and liberalism - is a conceptual alternative to liberalism that
potentially overlaps with it.
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them. There is an "option," but a coercive and exclusive one. Some nations will be
excluded, and some will refuse to come - and they will pay a conceptual and possibly
actual price. His granting of the possibility of liberalism to nationalism might be a gift,
but one that comes with serious conditions and obligations.
That is not to say that the very limited terms Nielsen sets are bad in themselves.
Certainly cultural openness and respect for others is a legitimately desirable national trait.
But, by linking these necessarily to liberalism, he forces nations conceptually and
possibly actually to accept a whole complex of associated liberal characteristics. He does
not explore what such a nation is in detail, but other authors do, whom I will treat below.
Judith Lichtenberg offers a similar analysis of the possible liberality of the nation.
Like Nielsen’s, her argument assumes that liberalism - maintaining (1) “a certain
conception of the equality of human beings” and (2) “an emphasis on individual
freedom or autonomy,” which result in (3) “tolerance, respect for individual rights, and
pluralism” [Lichtenberg, 1996: 54] - is “good.” Indeed, she refers to liberal politics as
“the forces of good” [53], She then tests various (liberal) formulations of the nation
against the various criteria of liberalism.
Her conclusions are more restrictive than Nielsen’s. Beyond just the issue of
whether a national culture is democratic and open, she looks at whether it actually
promotes the well-being of individuals within it. Her answer is hesitant. There is nothing
particular participation in a single national culture that makes it necessary for individual
well-being. Other attachments (such as religion) and access to multiple cultures might
serve as well or better. What is more, cultures are given, not chosen, and so do not
necessarily increase individual life-options. At most, a culture is “good” because one is
used to it, grew up in it, and it makes one feel comfortable and secure. [56 - 59] Not a
strong case.
She also questions the “nationalist” commitment to his/her nation’s interests
above all others more strenuously. For her, the privileging of “one’s own" can only
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come after ensuring a fair distribution of resources globally. Only then can each
individual have access to a supportive national culture, and the distinctiveness of one’s
not mean an exclusion of non-nationals. She sees this as a big limit on the liberality of
nations, given “the facts of national selfishness and greed.” [64]
Finally, she raises the issue of pluralism. There are too many nations for each to
have a state, and all land is taken already anyway. Further, nations overlap on territory.
This requires that nations share states. Thus, a nation must be tolerant of other nations
within a state. But, does nationalism undermine state unity? If there cannot be a
commitment to deep diversity, ” then it does. This is an open question. [68 - 69]
Besides the general liberal assumptions that prevent a genuine concept of the
nation (which I take up below), there are certain obvious problems with Lichtenberg’s
analysis. First, an obstacle to nationalism is the differential of wealth and freedom
among states (and national cultures). Her analysis seems to assume that all national
movements are in rich states/nations. But, one of the key motivations for nationalist
movements has been resistance to economic exploitation and oppression perpetrated by
stronger states, especially in the form of colonialism.
What is more, one of the key liberal justifications for colonialism (as it is for
invasive development projects today) was that the colonized needed help in forming a
society capable of economic and political parity with colonizing liberal states. 27 Thus,
where the differential argument once justified colonialism, it now continues in this vein,
but delegitimating the autonomy of the colonized.
Even if Lichtenberg does not intend this application, the complete failure of fair
distributions of wealth within liberal societies serves as a stark warning to all about the
results of a global liberal system. Nationalism that blocks this global reach, to bracket off
non-liberal space, might not be justified liberally, but it might be justified against more
objective criteria. Lichtenberg’s restriction on nationalism — that its liberal legitimacy
:7See especially John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty [1977: 9 - 10],
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depends on a previous redistribution of wealth and social “goods” - means that nations
and nationalisms are legitimate only in contexts in which they can have none of the
resistant and revolutionary political meaning that has often been their core. Rather, they
will be politically irrelevant “ lifestyle choices.” Lichtenberg’s insistence that they be
recognized as “political” and not merely cultural [60 - 61] is not meant to claim that they
are meaningful politically, but rather to serve as a warning about their potential
deleterious political effects.
Ultimately, Lichtenberg makes it difficult though not impossible for a nation to be
liberally legitimate. She requires a very particular type of nationalism and nation.
Indeed, her criteria resemble an IMF restructuring plan, requiring deep changes in the
traditional concept of the nation and strict adherence to an external form. Indeed, a
national community must effect liberal change in the world - further liberal goals even
beyond its borders - to legitimize itself. Her treatment is thus not so much an analysis,
but rather a conceptual “border patrol” around political legitimacy. The only concepts
allowed in are liberal. Yes, concepts of non-liberal origin may enter, but they must learn
the language and customs of liberalism (that is, become liberal).
The “ Right” of Self-Determination
A central issue in recent political debates and public policy regarding nations and
nationalisms is the “right” of self-determination. The questions often engaged by
philosophers have been, What is meant by “self-determination”? and What determines
which nations have the “right” to it?
A number of Forum essays deal explicitly with the latter question. Darrel
Moellendorf sets out certain criteria which must be satisfied for a minority nation to have
a right to secede to form its own state. He argues that the right to secede is not an
individual right, but can only be exercised by a group. In this way, the size of the group
is irrelevant — only the justness of its claim to self-determination does. [Moellendorf,
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1996: 88] Of course, ‘'the moral justification of the right
.
.
. derives from its service to
legitimate interests of individuals” [89], In other words, only a group can exercise the
right, but it can do so only if doing so benefits its individual members.
The first basis of the right is the “individual’s interest in being governed by state
structures to which she consents” [90]. The linchpin of his argument is that “cultural
membership” is a “primary good” for individuals. Cultures offer meaningful options
and supports for the exercise of autonomy. And, they are not easily replaced - one
cannot just move from one culture to another without difficulty. [90] Thus, if members
of a minority national culture no longer wish to be ruled by the given state, but national
self-determination is blocked for them, they would have to emigrate and abandon their
culture. Thus, they would have to choose between abandoning their culture or being
subjects of a state to which they do not consent.
Of course, the new state must be neutral with respect to culture. It must allow
membership in the separated culture, but at the same time allow the individual autonomy
dictated by liberalism.
There are further caveats. First, the secession should not result in injustice to
those left behind in the rump state. The secession must not undermine the security of the
rump state, nor deprive it or its citizens of their just share of original resources. What is
more, it must not result in the oppression of residents of the new state, including new
minorities. [92 - 93]
Second, a nation's case for secession is not strengthened if its members are
suitering oppression by the state majority [93], All this does is allow the seceding nation
to disregard the security of the rump state - nothing else.
(1) First, I make a relatively minor point. Moellendorf s language regarding the
preservation of a just resource distribution despite secession is sloppy. Presumably, he
does not mean that, if there was injustice in the initial state that was not specifically
arranged along national lines, then the secession should correct it. The requirement
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should be that injustice would not be increased by the secession. But this suggests that
the relative level of injustice is important. It would seem obvious (and perhaps even
defensible on a utilitarian argument) that, if “injustice” is not increased by a secession,
then it should be allowed.
Moellendorrs intentional disregard for conditions of oppression appears to
generate even this error. Though the error is minor, the disregard has much deeper
implications for his analysis.
The main argument ignores the reality that is most often the motive for secession:
a national minority is denied either option. The nation is being destroyed or repressed
precisely because it has no say in the government of “ its” state, and it has no say
precisely because it is oppressed or discriminated against. Even though Moellendorf
explicitly denies that oppression has a bearing on the right to secede, it is difficult to see
how even the forced choice between culture and consent to the state (which is his model)
is not oppressive in a liberal sense, since in either direction it involves an inevitable
suppression of autonomy. This level of oppression apparently does have a role in his
model, even if he does not recognize it. Without it, there can be no justification for
secession.
What is more, in most situations where the minority nation has any kind of forced
or limited choice, this is the result of the activity of the state majority. To pose the
question of whether the minority should act to secede or not ignores the activity of the
state majority, and assumes the minority is making a decision at some “zero point.” On
the contrary, under conditions of oppression — or even milder forms of historically
determined constrained options — the historical dynamics are already under way, and not
controlled by the minority. Indeed, if the minority actually were in such control, the
question of secession would be moot. The oppressor group has already acted and is
acting. The moral burden would seem to be on it.
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Furthermore, tor the minority it is not a question of acting or not, but of what type
of action. In this context, no
,
acting is as much if not more of a decisive action as acting
toward secession. Moellendorf assumes that an act toward secession is all that needs to
be evaluated; a negative evaluation requires the minority to remain at the “zero position”
of not acting. But, in a context of dynamic historical change, especially one in which
oppressive forces bear down on the minority, not acting is an action that must be
evaluated as much as acting (toward secession). The former is not a morally neutral
position. This does not mean that the oppressed minority’s actions are fully determined
by the situation. It can act in different ways, but the reality is that it will pay a price no
matter which option it chooses.
Given this, the dichotomy of perfect agency and full determination is not
applicable, and a different manner of evaluating a nation’s “right to secede” - if one can
still use the term right — is necessary. What Moellendorf does is to abstract the issue
of this right from its real context, and thus to transform it into a very simple question,
rather than the complex and difficult question it really is. There is no easy formula, and
the liberal tendency to force such formulae on complex reality proves quite problematic
here. One cannot even be clear on which entity is the true “ agent” of a given situation,
nor of what that agency really means.
(2) If, under the theoretical and institutional structure Moellendorf proposes,
secession must be justified without reference to oppression, oppressed groups whose very
survival might depend on secession might not be allowed to secede. Moellendorf would
probably counter this by claiming that any such group would probably fit the other
criteria. However, he admits that in some cases it is not clear whether this or that group
constitutes a nation [96]. I would argue that it is precisely in situations where oppression
— especially efforts at forced assimilation, historical revision of a group’s very existence
(the Turkish government’s portrayal of Kurds as “mountain Turks” without a distinct
ethnic or cultural identity, for instance), genocide, erasure of historical monuments, etc. —
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are most intense, and the “ national identity” of a minority most under siege, that the
uncertainty is greatest. This means that the most oppressed nations would have the least
recourse to “justice.”
This is something like the situation tor the poorest, most inarticulate and
marginalized defendants or complainants, versus rich and articulate ones, within the court
systems of liberal democracies such as the United States. The “flat” treatment would
favor those nations with the most resources and secure identity, that is, the least
oppressed. This would most likely not change even ifthe legal andpolitical institutions
he calls for to decide about claims to this right were created', we have a court system that
claims to adjudicate cases on the same liberal principles of rights, and in front of it rich
and poor, oppressed and free, are treated differently. The very possibility of presenting a
viable case in front of this institution would depend on the relative strength of the
minority, which is the inverse of its need for independence.
The liberal concept of “right” itself is fundamentally problematic in this way. It
becomes tied to individuals
,
and whether or not it is enforced depends essentially on an
individual’s ability to protect his/her personal property, this right. Though some societies
are better than others in assisting the poor, marginalized, etc., in defending their rights, in
no society is an individual’s status, wealth, race, gender, etc., not a (or the) determining
factor in the enforcement of their rights.
An “politico-ethics” that views a “right” as property — that is, liberal theory —
cannot avoid this. I have commented on and will comment further on the negative effects
of conceiving of “national identity” as an individual possession — with a focus on what
this does to the nation so conceived.
Here, I focus on what this does to what might be called “social justice,” if this
term can be used outside of a right-rhetoric context. As Moellenberg’s essay
demonstrates (and Lackey’s, below, will demonstrate), when a right becomes property, it
no longer manifests an ethical judgment. Liberalism transforms “right” and “wrong”
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from an evaluative judgment about a situation - and 1 am concerned here with the
oppressiveness of a situation - to a mere possession in the hands of one of the parties.
Moellenberg is unconcerned with what is “right” and “wrong,” and only concerned with
what “rights” an individual or group has as its property. This abandonment of an
evaluative ethics makes it impossible to fight against oppression as oppression. Indeed, it
makes unconcern about “right” and “wrong,” and specifically oppression, acceptable
and even the sign of enlightened, objective social consciousness.
(3) If a nation s claim to secession is based on the individual rights and interests
of its members, then presumably any dissension within that nation would disallow
secession. Moellendorf s claim that the right to secede is a national or group right but
derives from individual rights completely ignores the inevitable tension between them.
One option would be to allow dissenters to stay with the original state, but Moellendorf
has already argued that culture is a “ good” to which they have a right. Add to this the
fact that, if the minority is geographically contiguous, the dissenters will have to leave
their homes, and the right would not appear to stand.
Of course, Moellendorf might argue that the issue could legitimately be settled
through democratic vote. But, he has also argued regarding the dissent within the
original state, the numbers of the minority are not supposed to matter [88 - 89], Though
the dissenting minority of the minority might not constitute an independent culture
(though a more sophisticated and complex grasp of culture than Moellendorf s might
open this as a possibility), a democratic vote forcing it to join in the secession would
produce a “Tyranny of the Majority” - reflecting the very tyranny that, presumably, led
to the push for secession in the first place. On his own argument, it would seem that the
dissenters would have an absolute right not to secede, regardless of their numbers.
I will argue in detail in Chapter 3 that nations without states tend split on the issue
of secession or independent statehood. Moellendorf s argument -- and any argument that
rests national rights simply on the rights of individual members qua individuals — is a de
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facto denial of self-determination to any nations with any internal complexity (which,
ironically, is necessary to a truly dynamic, diverse, or “ pluralistic” nation). One might
have expected as much: if one assumes that the individual is the sole fundamental unit of
rights and agency, then no group can be asserted that can stand in any kind of tension
with the assertions of individuals. It must fall.
Fortunately, as the model of the nation I develop in Chapter 3 hopefully will
illustrate, the notion of the absolute atomic individual is ontologically inaccurate. As
such, legitimate decision-making processes that recognize that people are in fundamental
social relations and cannot simply ignore these when making decisions are not only
possible but the norm. Individual agency itself is tied up with group structures. This is
not to say that the group has priority over the individual, but rather that their relationship
is complex, tense, and dialectical.
It is not clear that Moellenberg would be concerned about these problems with his
theory. After all, he is not concerned about oppression. Ultimately, what is at stake for
Moellendorf in decisions regarding which nations have a legitimate case for secession is
whether or not they advance the liberal cause. A secession must preserve or extend the
liberal rights of all concerned. And, it must be put forward in liberal terms, focusing on
abstract rights. It is regulated by these rights, and the regulation is imposed by an
institution.
Indeed, under his schema, national revolutionary movements would become
subject to a regulatory agency and liberal criteria. Yet, these movements often challenge
the political structures and theories in dominance, as much as concrete oppression. Anti-
colonial national movements were directed for the most part against liberal colonizers,
employing liberal justifications (recall again John Stuart Mill). From Fanon to
Chatterjee, they have been conceived as deep critiques of liberalism. To regulate them
according to liberal principles and by liberal institutions would be almost automatically to
delegitimize them. At the very least, it would undercut their “self-determination” at a
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fundamental level: they could not determine their political principles or even the reasons
for their claims to independence; these would have to be the uniformly imposed liberal
principles laid out by Moellendorf.
Revolution is a challenge to an existing framework that cannot accommodate
emergent or repressed social structures and political aspirations. Under Moellendorf s
system, revolution - that is, a change in basic political structures and ideology - would
be impossible. All national movements would be reformist, and the establishment of new
independent states would become trivial. Rather than serving legitimate cases for self-
determination, the system would absorb revolutionary tensions and critiques into a
relatively stable state system based on liberal principles. By controlling the changes in
the state system, it would preserve that system in general terms (and in most particular
cases, as well) against what are — again as I argue in Chapter 3 -- actually at their deepest
level, “national” tensions with and revolutions against it.
Philosophers such as Lichtenberg and Moellendorf seem to conceive liberalism as
some sort of exclusive (elite) club. In their jealous protection of its membership rolls,
they fail to consider the possibility that many national movements do not want tojoin
,
and with good reason. Though they believe in the absolute superiority of their club, those
outside it tend to see it for what it is.
Moellendorf s work extends the work of Nielsen. Beyond simply requiring a
liberal form for “legitimate” national independence, it requires liberal justifications and
results in support. It lays the groundwork for imposition of liberal evaluative criteria
(liberal control) through institutional means.
Douglas Lackey takes the issue of self-determination one step further. Where
Nielsen determines the legitimate form of an independent nation, and Moellendorf
determines what arguments can justify self-determination by a minority nation, Lackey
considers what means a seceding nation can use to secure its independence.
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Lackey grants tor argument that a national group has a rightful claim on its own
state. He conceives this claim as a “claim right,” that is, as the claim to property. It is
not the same as a “ liberty right," that is, the right to act in a certain way. [Lackey, 1 996:
102 - 103] Now, just as liberal rights theory limits what a person may do in defense of
his/her right to his/her property. Lackey limits what a nation can do in pursuit of what
should rightly be its property. Of course, there is a further limit: a state is generally not
something that a nation has recently lost or that it had in a meaningful sense, so its cannot
claim the right of self-defense (through violence) [103 - 104],
Lackey then takes things in a different direction. He argues that the “justness” of
the cause is not relevant to the methods that can be used in support of it. It is the manner
in which nationalists carry out their fight that determines whether their methods are
legitimate, not the reason for it. [109] His argument is based on an examination of the
1977 additions to the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war. He looks specifically
at debates about the status of irregular soldiers not representing existing state
governments. Are these legitimate fighters? This, he believes, hinges on whether they
are granted Prisoner of War status if captured. The answer is, they have it if they meet
certain guidelines, most notably by not attacking civilians and by distinguishing
themselves fully from civilians.
As delegates from post-colonial states were well aware, this last provision would
greatly increase the chance that an irregular would in fact become a Prisoner of War.
Though a minor point, this is an entry into the deeper issues at stake. Who was
instrumental in decoupling the reasons for which one fights and the legitimacy of
fighting? As Lackey admits, it was “especially European delegates” [106] Why would
they advocate such a stand? As much as it was in their interest(s) not to favor liberation
struggles — particularly in the years after they had lost their empires — it was also very
much in their interest(s) not to compromise the ability of state-sponsored militaries to act,
regardless of the justness of their cause.
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This should have “raised a warning flag” for Lackey. It has two serious
implications. First, and obviously, basing a consideration of abstract, absolute rights on
the proceedings and results of international negotiations is beyond naive. Such
negotiations are merely and completely the playing out of state interests in conflict. The
agreements never have anything to do with principles, but are the resulting vectors
determined by all the different interests/agendas and the military, political,
propagandistic, and economic forces behind them. This is indicated by the fact that
while initially delegates came discussing the “right to national self-determination” and
other abstract principles [105 - 106], in the final agreement, there is “no mention of the
right of national self-determination” [109], Does this mean that it is irrelevant to the
issues at hand? Or does it mean that the negotiations became unconcerned with abstract
principles and fully occupied by realpolitical maneuvering, such that even the rhetoric of
“rights” and “principles” was dropped?
Of course, even were this rhetoric present, it would have been just that. Lackey
betrays himself on this point decisively. He states that “the American Civil War only
became just in 1863” [1 10]. His reason is that the Union did not have the right to use
violence to suppress Southern secession. For the War to have been just, required a
different justification, which he sees in the Emancipation Proclamation. But, as I have
suggested above, was the freeing of the slaves done on principle? Was it not instead an
act done for the most cynical of interests, specifically to disrupt the Southern economy
and social structure, in the hope of undermining its success in the War? If it had been a
statement of principle, why was there no statement in 1860? Or 1850? Or 1789?
Talk of rights and principles in such contexts is inevitably the application of a
“philosophical deodorant,” to cover over the obvious, unpleasant odor of realpolitics,
hypocritical maneuvers, and base self-interest.
Second, what was the dominant or ultimately prevailing interest at the
conference? It allowed military force to be legitimate, even if it was oppressive. This is
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a short step away from the justifications given by major Holocaust perpetrators in the
German military, of their participation in that genocide: they were just following orders.
If the orders were wrong - indeed, morally repugnant to the greatest degree possible -
that was not their responsibility. This is the potential result of any decoupling of military
force and the reasons for which it is used.
He fails to take this up, except for an obvious ending caveat, that the state from
which a nation is seceding does not have the right to use force to oppose the secession.
Military force requires some other justification. [109-110] The problem is, such
justifications are quite easy to generate. Any good lawyer or philosopher can come up
with some grounds for suppression. Quite often, nationalists are branded as criminals
disrupting civil order, and so forth.
Lackey might counter that he cannot be responsible for such duplicitous or
inappropriate abuses of law and power. Yet, he cites with approval one absolutely clear
example of the repression of a population justified by appeal to normal law and order.
For him, there was nothing wrong with the French treatment of Algerians prior during
(and presumably before) the war of independence. On the contrary, according to him,
(starting in 1954) France had offered full French citizenship and representation in the
government for Algerians. The issue was solely that Algerians did not want to be part of
France, but wanted their own state. [103]
This, of course, ignores the whole reason for the Algerian national movement, the
oppressive colonialism of the French. After centuries of domination by the French, the
Algerians understood exactly what “democratic participation” in France would mean - a
continuation of their oppression through different means. A simple granting of
citizenship did not and would not have eliminated the pervasive racism of the French,
their colonialist mentality, and so forth. It would have not eliminated the general
structure of power in which French dominated Algerians economically and culturally.
These would have been the reality of any formal political enfranchisement. Lackey fails
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to see this, because he - in standard liberal fashion - looks only at the formal political
structure.
This means ignoring the weight of history. A power-relation as deep and complex
as colonization is not remedied merely by the granting of the vote. The deep scars of
oppression; the damage to Algerian social structures, culture, etc.; the psychological
effects of colonialism, in their internalization in Algerian subjects - all those things
described so compellingly by Fanon [1963] - would be unaffected by a merely formal
change in governmental structures. Indeed, the effects of this history would most likely
ensure that the change in formal structures would have little impact. The weight of
history (in conjunction with the contemporary extension of non-formal colonial power)
would have prevented Algerians from being able to exercise their formal citizenship.
Perhaps more importantly, such a simple change would in effect have been to
reward France for its brutal colonization and domination of Algeria. It would have
wiped the slate clean,” by leveling all individuals. But this leveling would have
consolidated all gains made by the French majority - as individuals, businesses,
institutions, and so forth - at the cost of the Algerians. It would have been like one
individual stealing most of the assets of another, and then inviting the other to join
him/her as a minor partner in a jointly owned company. It would, in fact, have been to
consolidate the annexation of Algeria. Even if the French offer of enfranchisement was
not a violent act in itself, the very conditions under which Algerians wrere forced to
choose were determined by the violent conquest of Algeria centuries before, as well as
the constant application of force necessary to prevent the frequent expressions of
Algerian resistance and discontent from threatening French domination.
For Lackey to examine this complex situation only in terms of formal politics is to
miss the very heart of the power relationship and oppression. If colonialism is liberal and
makes a pretense of democracy, then it is acceptable.
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He might counter that, despite a mistake regarding the history of France and
Algeria, his basic principles are sound. Yet, the misunderstanding of the history of
France and Algeria is grounded in his problematic differentiation between “colonial
administration” and “colonial domination” [104], He argues that the delegates to the
1977 negotiation on the Geneva Convention additions chose “colonial domination”
purposely, in order to distinguish situations of serious domination from other “colonial”
situations. But, how can a colonial administration not dominate? It is the perpetuation of
a conquest. It is inherently violent. Even if it no longer needs to use violence on a daily
basis, its very presence is on going violence. What is more, even if it does not need to
use violence at every moment, its ever-present threat of violence is not “neutral.” This
deferred or delayed physical violence is a mental or psychological violence. It is the use
of violence without directly performing it. Any colonial administration is perpetually
violent. Of course, most dominating regimes - even liberal ones ~ use actual violence
daily. And, as I have mentioned, this is often hidden from view, by criminalizing and
marginalizing victims.
What is more, the very structure of “administration” is violent. It itselfis a force
that limits the “autonomy” of those subject to it. It is more subtle and in fact more
potent than direct physical violence. It limits and manipulates the very options presented
to individuals. It regulates actions without even making alternatives available. It can be
“ legal” and “just,” and yet violent and oppressive.
Lackey’s analysis is a stop-gap. After all, some nations will be able to “prove”
their right to self-determination even under restrictive liberal criteria. Lackey adds yet
another obstacle to national liberation: now, even if a nation has the “right” to it, it is
limited in the means it can use to secure it. This is a standard maneuver of those in
power. They ignore the oppression that is the cause of a liberation movement, and
instead focus on the methods employed by that movement. Indeed, focus on these
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removes the real justification for resistance to oppression, and deflects attention away
from the genuine issues at stake.
To the extent that Lackey’s liberal agenda is linked to that of the “European
delegates, former colonial powers, and other liberal powers, the very oppressors against
whom self-determination movements are struggling determine the form in which these
movements may act.
In general, it is those powers that create the need for violent liberation movements
in the first place. For instance, two decades before the Vietnamese rose actively against
the French, Ho Chi Minh spent years in France attempting to convince French politicians
and citizens that, under their liberal principles, Vietnam should be free. He patiently and
non-violently talked with whomever he could. He got absolutely nowhere. And even
then, in 1946, he implored the United States (whom he had just helped defeat Japan) to
put pressure on France to free Vietnam. Only after these efforts had long proved
impossible did he begin organizing for a military resistance.
This pattern has been repeated over and over. National and other groups attempt
peaceful solutions to serious oppressions, only to be rebuked or ignored. Peaceful means
are thus blocked off by their oppressors. Their only option becomes violence. Yet, on
Lackey’s liberal analysis, they should just keep trying peaceful methods -- forever. In
this sense, the less explicitly violent the oppressor, the weaker the position of the
oppressed. On this analysis, the oppressed still have the option to fight or not to. But,
this second option is really no longer one. Thus, even though the oppressed group can
keep pursuing it - and thus has abstract autonomy — in reality it has limited options. On
Lackey’s analysis, the burden is still on them. But, what of the power that has eliminated
their peaceful options? Is it not responsible for creating a situation in which only
violence is possible for the oppressed? Is it not up to that power to restore the
oppressed’s options? And, is it not its own fault if the latter turn to violence?
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Joseph Carens rounds out the treatment of self-determination, by ignoring it as a
viable possibility. His locus (as Nielsen’s) is Canada
.
28
His project is to understand how
the Canadian system can better accommodate the minority cultures of the Quebecois and
various native peoples.
He begins by recognizing a federated nesting of social commitments and political
citizenship [Carens, 1996: 111]. Quebecois individuals, for instance, are at once part of
a distinct cultural group, and also citizens of Canada. How can one make sense of the
sometimes conflicting memberships?
Carens recognizes three dimensions of citizenship. The first is the legal
dimension. In this dimension, all citizens of a state generally have the same legal status.
[112] This dimension is often in tension with the second, which is the psychological. It
depends on an individual’s emotional commitment to a group or identity [113]. Again,
“ francophones living in Quebec tend to identify more strongly as Quebecers than as
Canadians” [115]. How can the tension be resolved?
One possibility is that minority cultures be granted special rights or statuses
within the formal structure [112, 114]. This is acceptable only to the extent that these
special rights or statuses counter the effects of oppression, and create concrete equality in
the political sphere [1 12, 1 14 - 115]. Following a standard justification of Affirmative
Action, Carens means that any differentiation should be an instrument to effect a genuine
equality that would have been produced by formal equality in the absence of oppression.
That the Quebecois-Canadian tension is also among levels of a federal system (I
am organizing a rather confused passage by Carens here), it is possible to (1) “adjust the
institutional arrangements of federalism ... so that they reflect the psychological realities
of differentiated political identity” [115-116]. In other words, a system can allow the
Quebecois to identify more strongly with Quebec, but anglophones with Canada as a
28Apparently, the only area some of these philosophers concern themselves with is Canada. Perhaps --
especially when its native population is considered, as Carens to his credit does — Canada is an interesting
case to look at. But, as the focus of one-fifth of the authors, as well as a running concern for some of the
others, the North American provincialism of much of this thinking is clear.
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whole. It is also possible to (2) emphasize other provincial identities as well, and thus to
decentralize the federal system, generally weakening Canadian identity [116]; (3) leave
the system as is, with Quebecois reluctant members of Canada, without a positive
attachment; (4) use the deep diversity of Canada as the basis for some sort of “unity and
.
. . common identity"
[ 1 1 7]; or (5) “ try to find a positive, rather than a critical, basis for
strengthening the identification of Quebecers with Canada” [116],
Carens decides (4) is too vague and cannot see any concrete form it might take
[117], He decides (3) would be “unfortunate” [116-117], And, he decides (2) would be
"politically unattractive” [116], (1) and (5) are possibilities. (1) unfortunately has a
tendency to undercut a genuine unity [1 16].29 So that leaves (5), and Carens thinks “there
is a lot to be said for this approach” [116],
Many questions arise. First, why is separation mentioned only as an option so
obviously bad it need not be considered [see 116-117]? If there is no obvious legal or
psychological change that can resolve the difficult issues of Quebecois identity in
Canada, that might suggest that separatism is a legitimate option. Though Carens decides
for all concerned that Canadians are better off sticking together, it would seem that the
only justification - at least for Quebecois - has been the 1995 plebiscite.
Second, Carens rejects structural change in the state; what he is after is
psychological change. Rather than really addressing the deep issues underlying the
“psychological” manifestations, his plan is to change the psychology of Quebecois.
What will it take to preserve Canada basically as it is, but with a genuine positive
commitment on the part of Quebecois? The question is pressing, because another
plebiscite might yet occur. In concrete terms, he seems to call for some sort of marketing
of Canadian identity - around something like the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
In this way, the essence of a genuine, universal Canadian citizenship could be packaged
in a form appealing to Quebecois.
2
''I would assume it is as bad as (2), but Carens does not seem to agree.
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This approach is problematic to say the least. It assumes that all that needs to
happen is tor Quebecois to change their minds somewhat, and things will be fine. In
some sense, the difference between a direct enforcement of unity and this marketing
approach is that the hunted is not shot but rather given a very appetizing dinner — with
poison in it.
Regarding “aboriginal'’ Canadians, Carens at least recognizes that the deeper
differences require some sort of change on the part of majority Canadians. Again, he
ignores the possibility of separation, which is much more justifiable, given that the
“aboriginal” peoples were brutally conquered and their lands stolen. He is concerned
with how to get these “ others” to buy into a general Canadian system. He recognizes
that natives might be justifiably very suspicious of such a system and its “justice,” given
the history of oppression by similar systems. [1 1 7 ff.
]
At the same time, he represents this as an issue of “cultural differences between
aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada,” not part ofa continuing tradition of
oppression. [117] That is not to say that the differences do not have concrete effects: for
instance, the Charter (as a the basis of a common legal system) will be put into practice
by generally non-native people, “people selected and trained in certain ways (and not
others), people attuned to certain considerations (and not others), people taught to regard
certain forms of communication (and not others) as intellectually respectable and
relevant” [1 18]. The oppressiveness of the system will be an effect of the cultural
difference, not a flaw in the system itself (such that any implementation of it will tend to
operate differentially over a population, to the detriment of some [perhaps arbitrarily
selected] subgroup) or a function of a societal racism against natives.
Carens accepts that insistence on the Charter is unacceptable, because it has been
experienced by “aboriginal peoples” as another iteration of former systems of
“hegemonic and alien control” [119]. In place of this, he has no concrete solution. This
would seem to open up again the possibility of separation. If majority Canadians would
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be worse off alter separation, it is difficult to imagine natives being so. Of course, this
would require reparations as well, as Fanon stresses [Fanon, 1963],
Carens offers instead an ideal process of public deliberation, of the type advocated
by Ins Young [120]. This would entail a sincere attempt to negotiate the nature of
justice, citizenship, etc., among the different groups constituting Canada. He states that
this is “doubtless a utopian and unrealistic view of the possibilities of shared public
deliberation,” but finds it useful as a measure against which to evaluate any attempts to
impose the Charter or other one-sided universalisms. What is required is deliberation that
builds a “ shared identity,” a conceptual shift that creates “genuine common bonds”
[ 120 ],
One might characterize this as a “puzzle” theory of multi-culturalism or -
nationalism. The task is to fit a number of nations or cultures onto one geographical
territory, and into one conceptual identity. If the pieced do not fit together (perhaps
because the table is warped), then one should simply cut off the hindering protrusions of
the pieces, rub some grease on them, and push them into place.
That he thinks this approach is hopelessly idealized and utopian should clue him
into the deeper issues at stake. The process he suggests seems almost a “that which” will
produce the desired unity. But, something stronger is necessary. It is the relationship of
oppression that exists between majority Canadians and natives that dooms such a
dialogue to failure. As I argue at length in Chapter 3, cultural negotiation without
concrete changes in power relations does not eliminate oppression. In the Canadian case,
this would mean fundamental changes in the institutional/state structure.
Finally, Carens addresses the third, “political dimension of citizenship.” For
him, the issue is whether or not an individual or group feels represented in the
government of their state. In other words, what can be done to help Quebecois and
natives feel represented in the politics and decision-making structure of Canada? For
Quebecois, it has depended to a large extent on having a Quebecois prime minister. He
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infers from this that a teeling ot representation depends on having someone from one’s
group prominently figuring in the government, which seems rather obvious.
This has not occurred for natives. Rather than consider why it does not occur -
that a racist structure prevents participation in or identification with the state - he seems
to suggest that the solution is a “prominent Aboriginal Trudeau might not feel
represented in their government because they are not. And, especially regarding natives,
it seems unlikely that a substantive presence in the government is possible, under the
current system.
And this, again, begs the question, Why maintain the current system? A systemic
change that would preserve Canada but also represent natives substantively in the central
government seems to require a Ptolemaic structure. Separation in some form would
appear at least a plausible alternative.
Yet, even this assumes a certain conception of the groups involved. It assumes
that communities are constituencies of individuals, each of whom should feel connected
to the central government via a representative with whom he/she identifies. Identify with
the representative, and thus identify with the government. But, it is not clear that national
minorities can be conceived only as a constituency. The nation itself is a structure. If it
is not one that is perfectly independent of the overall state structure, nor one discrete from
other sub-state groups, that does not require that its structure be ignored. It is not simply
competing individual loyalties nor of individual experiences of oppression that hinders
identification with a central government; and it is not thus some individual change that
can create the identification.
It is unclear how, in anything but a loose confederation, differences that are
conceived in terms of groups structures, and not individual identifications, can be
integrated. One can be part of different relational structures, no doubt, but to the extent
that the structures themselves are related in a structure of domination, they tend to
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conflict. This conflict is not ameliorated by an individual commitment to both structures,
as captured in abstract concepts.
Ultimately, Carens goal is to figure out how to plug Quebecois and native
Canadians into a basic liberal state structure, and make them like it. Rather than
questioning that structure itself, he seeks to transform the individual psychologies of
members of each group. In doing so, he engages them directly, reducing their group
membership in their nations or cultures to merely individual characteristics. It is in this
way that, with adjustments, they can be fit into the individual slots of citizenship in a
liberal state. It is in this way that the state becomes the essential group in which they
participate. Though he does not intend to call for a weakening of Quebecois or native
group structures, that is the result of the program he suggests.
To recognize minority groups as groups30 requires a move beyond the liberal state
structure to which Carens is committed. Even granting quota blocs within the
representative system (which is implicitly suggested by his analysis of political
citizenship) does not recognize the group itself. It merely sets aside a number of
individual slots in its legislature or government, to contain a set of identical (group-
determined) individuals. Beyond negotiating the concepts of citizenship and justice, it
would require a transformation in the understanding of the very concept of (minority and
majority) group, which would necessarily leave behind Carens’ desired state structure.
What Is a Nation?
None of the authors I have treated develops much of a concept of what the nation
actually is, before they deliver their analyses of how it and its members should act and
what “rights” they have. Nielsen, Lichtenberg, and Moellendorf invoke leading liberal
concepts of the past decade — of Yael Tamir and/or Will Kymlicka, usually — which
equate the nation with a “ culture” [Nielsen, 1996: 45ff.; Lichtenberg, 1996: 55;
•’“This does not mean viewing them as discrete, rigidly bordered entities with some discernible essence, as I
will argue in Chapter 3.
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Moellendorf, 1996: 87]. For Lichtenberg, it is a zone of the familiar and comfortable.
For Moellendorf, it is a set of practices and/or beliefs that are a meaningful for the
exercise of individual autonomy. For all, culture is a “thing” that exists apparently
independently of individuals “in” it, akin to a physical environment, the possession of or
participation in which has value for the individuals.
Lackey has an even vaguer definition: The nation is a “ ’people,’” and a people is
a group of human beings who “ view themselves as having a common ancestry and a
common history” [Lackey, 1996: 100 ], This, of course, could refer to an extended
family as well, or even a club like the “Daughters of the American Revolution.”
Presumably Lackey should have supplemented his definition with the idea of a unique
culture or language, and other elements specifically mentioned by Nielsen: a nation must
also be “a historical community,” one that is “more or less institutionally complete,” and
occupies “a given territory” [Nielsen, 1996: 45]. 31
These definitions treat the nation as a readily identifiable set of individuals who
share certain basic features: living on the same territory; and/or speaking the same
language; and/or having the same social environment (culture); and/or having the same
history (or thinking they do); etc. The nation, on this type of definition, is quite simply a
group of people identified by some shared characteristic. In this way, it is not a social
structure, but a category of individuals. This is the basic form into which a liberal atomic
individualist account flattens any group.
To say that the national culture is an environment that offers meaningful options
to individuals is only to further isolate the individuals. The individuals are given, and the
culture is given, and individuals simple swim about the culture as if in an ocean (or
swimming pool). Weather and currents (or pool rules) allow certain strokes and paths. Is
a nation just a set of individuals in some sort of given condition or container? This begs
3
1
Interestingly, this layering of aspects (history, language/culture, institutional structure) recalls Stalin’s
definition of a nation, as a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life
and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture” [as quoted in Hobsbavvm, 1992: 5].
Stalin’s definition is better, but all are decidedly poor.
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all sorts of questions, particularly in light of some of the issues I have raised and some of
the features of the nation I have suggested in preceding sections of this and the first
chapter.
Further, the culture is still the same for everyone, and they still have the same
relationship to it. As I have (following Hobsbawm) argued in this and the previous
chapter, and will argue further in the next, such homogeneity does not occur, least of all
in any group that is considered or considers itself a nation.
Surely nations are more complex than this. Certainly it has an internal structure
,
as well as a more complicated relationship to history, geography, language, and culture.
Clearly some further, deeper explanation is necessary.
Two of the contributors to the Forum
,
to their credit, at least recognize these
points. Paul Gilbert attempts to determine this internal structure, recognizing that it is not
enough to say that the nation is a “ community” — one must also specify what type of
community [152].
Gilbert offers three models, “the family model, the civil society model and the
state model” [153]. The family is a given group, into which one is bom or forced by
sexual desire. The relationships are “valuable in themselves,” because they provide
certain unique “social goods” (presumably such things as security, belonging, etc.). The
commitments are concrete, to particular people. The commitments are not to “the
family” over and above the individuals that constitute it; they are to those individuals as
individuals. Finally, they are the product of a primary affection toward other family
members that is given. [153 - 154]
The obvious problem is that this model lends itself to an ethnic or racist
nationalism [154, 156], One has a commitment only to those one is naturally connected
to. Beyond excluding “others” from membership, it de-emphasizes other types of
associations as well: the family-nation is the primary identity [155 - 156],
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A subtler problem is that the tamily-nation does not exist independently of the
concrete relations. A member has "no necessary obligations to an entity - ‘the family’ -
over and above” my obligations to individual members. “There is no room here for any
conception ot the nation as a persisting entity with a particular history that shapes the
identity of its members.” [154 - 155]
Gilbert’s is a very limited concept of the family. It seems, in fact, to be a 200
year-old Hegelian one. Not only have fundamentally new critical tools been introduced
in the intervening years, but the very nature of the family has changed. More than this,
Hegel’s concept of the family was just as it existed in bourgeois and industrial laborer
contexts in Western and Central Europe. Obviously, references to a “ familial” nature of
the nation by nationalists and others do not refer only to the typical Western nuclear
family.
First, the idea that the family is simply “given” is an Hegelian abstraction.
Families and membership in families occurs in all sorts of ways and due to all sorts of
causes. (1) Arranged marriages, YUPpie mergers, and dating-club selections are
produced through what would have to count as “reasonable” methods, on Gilbert’s
concept of reason. The first two are not “sexually” driven, but based on some type of
economic or social logic. And the dating-club selection transforms random sexual
attraction into a reasoned process, where certain criteria are selected and then potential
mates evaluated against those criteria.
(2) The psychology of family obligation is very complicated. It is not some
natural, unanalyzable feature of a human need for close social relations. Gilbert seems to
ignore all of psychoanalytic theory and the field of psychology on this point. The internal
dynamics of a family are incredibly complicated, and anything but reducible to such a
one-dimensional form. All sorts of internal forces develop and external forces impinge.
Gilbert also ignores feminist critiques of the family. “Obligations” can occur through
oppressive coercion, internalized oppression, and even the direct use and/or threat ot
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violence. The “desire” for a husband can be produced by a patriarchal socialization,
including forces that undercut confidence and a sense of security, as well as more external
forces, such as economic necessity.
( 3 ) As for chlldren being “ born into" the family, this is merely the condition of
their entrance. Though such a member may have an affective reaction to her/his family
indefinitely, that does not mean that this reaction will be one of obligation or
commitment. Family members alienate, abuse, let down one-another in all sorts of ways,
with all sorts of long-term emotional and structural effects. A child might eventually
choose to break with her/his family for these or other reasons, or that break might just
happen.
There are also other types of families, often specifically referred to as “chosen”
families. Same-sex relationships are never given
,
because they must be asserted through
effort against dominant oppressive norms and forces. That is not to say that coercions
and abuse do not occur in some, but that in general they are chosen - and on many
different levels. Children are adopted. Though the adoption might fill some “need” of
both parents and child, this contradicts Gilbert’s claim that family relations are not
“transferable to others who stand in” for traditional members [ 153 ],
Gilbert presents the situation of the child (and a partner) as an either/or: either
relationships are entered into voluntarily or not. The reality is much more complicated,
and involves a dialectical relationship between volition and external determination.
Children are born into a family but exercise volition relative to that situation; children are
adopted but perhaps through some external necessity; one chooses a partner, but in part is
driven by internal and external forces; one “ falls in love with a person of the same
gender” and cannot live without that person, but must assert the relationship on a daily
basis against oppressive forces toward its dissolution, etc. This type of dialectic is,
obviously, something basic to Hegelian philosophy, but to which Gilbert seems oblivious.
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Second, the preceding - especially the remarks on the internal oppressive
structure possible in families, as well as the distinction between parents and children -
suggests that the specific form of relationship between different family members varies
within a particular family and even moreso over the range of types of families. These
remarks by and large refer only to nuclear families: certainly additional types of
relationships exist in extended families, which themselves vary by culture and context
Third, the members of extended families in particular tend to view their family as
an abstract category in addition to its constituents. Many, many families are aware of
their history, in specific and geopolitical terms, and recognize a lineage from concrete
people (genealogical charts) and from unknown people from this or that area. The history
is known and passed on, but it is also added to with an understanding of members’
participation in the history. Often, the history is precisely in terms of the persistence of a
family, despite difficult or destructive circumstances. In many cultures, ancestors come
to symbolize the abstract “ family,” which is revered and served, as well as a source of
strength. Gilbert might claim that the naming of ancestors indicates that commitments
remain concrete, or that such a commitment merely extends the concrete family
obligation past death, across worlds. Perhaps this is in part true, but the abstract
symbolization is also an element. There are complex variations as well — for instance,
the belief that ancestors are present in or acting through one.
One wonders, indeed, if Gilbert has ever watched one of the “Godfather” films.
They are filled with references to “the family” that make clear its transcendence of
particular relationships or individual members. Though fictional films can hardly be
taken as “hard” data of actually existing types of families, they often do express beliefs
about families that are held by some people. If this belief in this type of family exists,
then it is likely that, within some families, this belief in their abstract nature exists. But,
that means that this type of family does exist. Of course, one need only listen in on or
participate in such families, which do really exist, to confirm this more directly.
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These all are much more complicated senses of the family than Gilbert allows, as
well as marking types with histories and an abstract, persistent existence. Why this
limited concept of the family? This is, presumably, a function of Gilbert’s conceptual
frame, which is determined by a reductive reading of Hegel through a liberal lens. The
concept he holds is precisely the type of nuclear family of members without self-
consciousness of their family as a structure in itself, that is consistent with liberalism, in
its atomic individualistic and capitalist aspects. There are three points that are relevant
here.
First, the family is not an entity in itself, but merely a network of relations. Thus,
it is not a group that can stand against the atomic individualism of liberalism. It is not an
alternative to this atomic individualism, but rather something that can be accommodated -
- as a network of discrete individuals - within it. It is no accident that the family form
typical of advanced liberal-capitalist states is the nuclear family Gilbert tries to describe.
Second, the family is based on unanalyzable, “natural” affections. This serves
two functions. On the one hand, it hides the oppressive or societal causes of many types
of family relationships, protecting those oppressive structures and that society from
criticism. On the other, it further undermines the legitimacy of the family as an
alternative to liberal social structures. It is merely given and emotional. It can be nothing
but a tolerated irrational necessity (at most) within an ideology that valorizes “rational”
and “chosen” activity and structures.
Racism might be, in some instances, driven by a “ familial" mentality, and this
might operate in some or all nations. However, there is a hidden suggestion in Gilbert's
remarks: racism is produced solely by such a mentality. There is no mention of racism
with reference to civil society, state, or culture, except as driven by a familial mentality.
This is at most one form of racism, and to imply that it is the sole key to understanding
(1) nationalist racism and (2) racism in general is quite problematic. This, of course,
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implicitly protects liberalism from an implication in racism, though Gilbert’s implicit
logic might run in the reverse direction. 32
My point is not to claim that the family, properly understood, is the correct model
of the nation. Nor is it to valorize the family against the liberal order, as my remarks on
its frequent oppressiveness suggest. Rather, I wish to point out the reductive nature of
Gilbert s concept, as an effect of a pre-accepted liberal conceptual frame.
If the family is really this varied and complicated, one would expect at least as
much from the nation. Thus, Gilbert s model is not even defensible as an abstraction
that, however inaccurate, offers insight into the nature of the nation. That he rejects it
because it does not address certain features of the nation, such as its being a “persisting
entity,” does not mean that his concept of the nation will be any less reductive. On the
contrary, his reduction of the family to one type of relation and his gross, undialectical
understanding of the role of history in a social group does not bode well.
The ultimate issue is why invoke a “ family model” at all? Why does Gilbert
attempt to understand the nation in terms of an entirely distinct social form? One reason
might be that “nationalists” sometimes refer to their nation in familial terms. But, as I
take up further in Chapter 3, this hardly amounts to an equation ~ even by “nationalists”
— of the nation with the family form. What of “non-nationalist” nationals? What of the
“objective” reality beneath? Even if the nation corresponds to the family in some
features (such as its relationship to history), and even borrows some, that does not in the
least prove an identical form. That Gilbert uses a reductive, 200 year-old, culturally
specific (Hegelian) concept of the family makes the possibility of identity that much more
remote, and the application of the family that much more obviously inappropriate.
This question can be generalized: why try to explain the nation simply by
reference to other types of social forms. Presumably something as significant and
widespread as the nation would have its own form. The attempt to describe it in terms ol
32
I treat the relationship of racism and the nation at length in Chapter 3.
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something else can only signal a conceptual poverty that (1) does not allow a direct
engagement with the object of study, but instead (2) requires that it be reduced to some
"known” and previously-generated social form. Would not some historical tie be
necessary, to justify the linking of the nation to the family? Some historical derivation of
structure or concept?
Instead, Gilbert invokes in turn three other types of social structures, as possible
forms of the nation. He invokes three of the very few genuinely available in liberalism. 33
He excludes the corporation for some reason, perhaps as a function of the structure of the
Philosophy ofRight. Of course, the very equation of these Hegelian structures with the
nation appears to be doubly culpable, given that Hegel himselfconceived the nation as
distinctfrom them. The second is even more suspect: civil society.
Civil society is the core of liberalism. It is the field in which atomic
individualism is realized, and the justification for all state and other social structures.
Gilbert presents the standard liberal account of civil society, as a field of economic and
social exchanges through “reciprocal obligations” executed because of a perceived
“common interest” in fulfilling them. Civil society is necessary to individuals, because
it allows them to fill their needs - it is a “public good,” in addition to fulfilling the
private needs of individuals. The “reciprocal obligations . . . spring from the
interdependence . . . among members.” [156 - 157]
Though for Gilbert “civil society furnishes what is, in many ways, an attractive
model of the national community” [157], the fact is that a civil society cannot be a
nation. Gilbert recognizes, the “social cohesion” generated by the “common interest” of
members in preserving the necessary civil society might not “predominate" over other,
individual interests [158]. Indeed, the system might emphasize some interests over others
33This does not mean that a familial society is considered good by liberals. On the contrary, it would seem
quite objectionable. What it does mean is that liberalism recognizes the family as a real social formation, if
a non-liberal one. It then conceives of the family as best it can, given its limited conceptual tools. The
conception is not a liberal type of group structure, but a perspective on a non-liberal one that is,
nonetheless, acknowledged to exist by liberals.
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in an exploitative manner [158], At the same time, there is nothing that requires a nation
to be egalitarian, as Hobsbawm argues forcefully and I take up in Chapter 3. That is not a
fortunate aspect of the nation, but it is the reality.
Gilbert also recognizes that “ it might be legitimately doubted whether the
national community as conceived under this model has the kind of unity required for us
to speak of the actions of the community” [158], A more obvious doubt is whether the
“ interdePendence” or sense of “ common good" can really suggest a group structure. It
is not a matter of some people rising within that structure that disqualifies it, but the fact
that it is not a group. Civil society seems more a milieu constituted by individuals who
do not given themselves over to it as members, but rather enter into it as individuals.
Obviously, the competition among individuals, and the selfish nature that individuals are
assumed or required to have, undermine any sense of group identity.
It is unclear how such a social structure can even be considered a group, except in
so far as its “unity” is compelled by a container
- generally a state. But, this means that
the “group” is constituted through this container, and the individuals’ relationship to the
container determines their membership in the group. The relationships of “civil society”
are irrelevant to this, and can never constitute group relations, contrary to Gilbert’s belief.
It is not just a matter of regulating relations of exchange so that they are fair. In them,
individuals exchange goods and services; it is a purely economic exchange, which cannot
begin to capture the complexity of national (or most genuine group) relations. The very
arbitrariness of what “civil society’ one belongs to [see 157 - 158] is clear evidence of
this. That “civil society” can even be considered a “group” [156] is proof of the poverty
of at least Gilbert’s liberal conceptual frame.
That is not to say that a nation cannot have an internal structure of a civil society
form. But, the relations of civil society cannot be said to constitute the nation. As I lay
out in Chapter 3, at most such relations can be one type of relation among many. More
importantly, they can function as national relations only as part of the general structure of
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the nation. They are not present in that national structure as constituents of a civil
society. At most, a network ot economic relations that is not a self-contained “unity”
(not equivalent to a “civil society” ) can be a part of the nation (not coterminous with the
nation) area of the national structure. This is not just a matter of grafting cultural
elements on top of a civil society. The nation and civil society are distinct social forms,
and cannot be reduced to or fully absorbed into each other — at least without a destructive
reduction of one or the other into a flattened, dependent version.
Gilbert last tests the “ state model” of the nation. As expected, the state he
discusses is the social contract-type liberal state, though not necessarily democratic. It is
good, because it can act collectively (through a government), has a clear membership, and
demands clear obligations from members (to itself and to others as members of the state.
Through institutions, it has a continuing existence that is clearly distinct from the
relationships of individuals to it and each other. It can even support a range of social
structures and relationships beyond the merely political. [159]
Gilbert’s problem with the state is that it demands the allegiance of its citizens
over other possible state units arbitrarily. Why this state, and not some other. It seems an
arbitrary formation, and thus not one that whose existence captures the depth of meaning
presumed in the nation. [160] This does not mean that a nation cannot manifest itself as a
state, but that a state does not produce a nation simply out of itself. 34
Gilbert solves the problems he raises predictably, by appeal to “culture.” Culture
alone is just a way of acting and living, and so it does not produce unity [1 6 1 ],
35
which
might be conceived in terms of values or language [162]. But, when it is grafted onto one
of civil society or the state, the union is a social structure that connects people into a unity
and that has or protects unique (cultural) features to which people are attached, thereby
guaranteeing their attachment to the structure. Grafted onto a family structure, it
34Such a contention would seem to be very historically inaccurate, and a reference to Hobsbawm in order.
But, I leave this point aside.
“This is a good criticism of the liberal concept of culture, but the proper conclusion to draw is that the
concept is not good, not that culture is limited in this way.
240
accomplishes the abstraction necessary to the nation - focused on values or language.
[162]
This type ot simplistic grafting does not change the fact that Gilbert has still yet to
engage the nation directly. There is little difference between imposing one non-national
concept on the nation or two. The nation is not culture, any more than it is state, civil
society, or family. In fact, this tendency to reduction trips Gilbert up. In the opening of
his essay, he argues that the nation has a special relationship to the state. The test of
whether something is a nation is whether it can support or produce a state [149-151], To
do so, Gilbert argues, it must be a community that supports a “common life” [151 - 152],
The nation produces the state in order to preserve and regulate the social structure of the
nation through institutional means — to enforce “performance of communal obligations”
[152]. The state, in turn, relies on the nation to provide the motivefor participation in
the state [151]. Yet, in the closing of his essay, he attributes this function to culture.
Obviously, he cannot ascribe it to the “nation,” as he as been investigating the state as a
possible structure of the nation. At the same time, in the opening he claims that the
nation supports a “common life.” In the conclusion, he has attributed this feature to the
state (and civil society and family), which is necessary to augment the limits of the
culture.
Though this confused circularity is certainly not a function of liberalism, the
insistence on not engaging the nation directly, but instead through other already
articulated and comfortable concepts. Gilbert’s work, unfortunately, is a perfect
illustration of the claims I made in the introduction to this section.
To his credit, Gilbert does recognize the need to consider the relations among
those who constitute a nation. In a communitarian departure from mainstream liberalism,
he recognizes that the nation is something more than an aggregate of individuals. The
problem, as I have said, is that his ideas about those relations are purely liberal. As with
others, culture is a way of life that individuals enact - a cultural group is just the set of
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individuals who enact a particular culture. Individuals participate in a state, and
constitute civil society. Indeed, the problem in each case is how to get the individuals to
feel attached to a state or civil society, to overcome an inherent individuality against the
group.
His concept of the family is in some ways the most promising. Though in some
cases individuals combine to form a family, in others it pre-exists their entrance. Thus,
within a family, the individual is not quite the atomic individual of liberal theory. The
problem is, rather than explore the possibilities this opens up, Gilbert rejects this as a
feature of the passivity of the family.
Carol Gould seeks a concept of the social group, applicable to nations, that does
not reduce it either to an aggregate of individuals, or to a collective that in turn reduces
the individual to a derivative. She claims to locate the middle ground between these in
the idea that groups are formed by '"individuals in relationships'" [Gould, 1996: 75],
On this account, individuals are recognized as in part constituted through their
social relations. Specifically, "an individual's participation in some mode of cultural life
as a form of common activity is a condition for self-development" [76]. This means that
individuals need participation in a group in order to develop fully as individuals.
By "cultural life," Gould means "joint participation in explicit and organized or
institutionally-defined practices, such as the celebration of holidays or historic events, but
also the more tacit forms of activities expressing shared beliefs or values, such as modes
of social behavior, styles of dress or speech, etc." [76]. The problem here is obvious:
Gould invokes the concept we have already seen, of culture as individual practices of a
number of individuals. Though Gould states that these activities are done "with others"
[76], this suggests a herd mentality much more than an interesting cultural structure. All
do the same things, together. This, I would think, would not assist in the development of
the individual, either as individual or as participant in the group.
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This hints at deeper problems. On Gould's account, the social relations the
individual is "in" or her/his culture exist merely for the benefit ofthe individual. The
culture is justified because it benefits individuals [77 - 78], It is true that the right to this
culture cannot be considered a purely individual right, because it can only be claimed by
an individual actually in the culture - an isolated individual does not have a culture to
claim a right to. 36 Yet, there is no sense of a genuine reciprocal commitment to others in
the cultural group. Even the necessity of the group in asserting the right to culture results
because the individual needs the culture in order to assert a right to it.
Some type of genuine lateral commitment would be necessary for meaningful
relations out of which something like a nation could be constituted, and recalls certain
features of Gilbert’s concept of the family. Even if Gould wanted to correct this problem,
it appears that this commitment would only be out of self-interest, (1) as a means of
preserving the culture, which leaves the actual connection to others as a secondary
consideration, or (2) as a payment to others for their participation in the culture, which
benefits the individual.
Perhaps more importantly, Gould has not described some new or useful concept
of the group. Rather than describing genuine relations that exist among people in a
culture or nation, she reduces relations to the fact of having something in common: "for
example, sharing a common purpose or having a common intentionality, or acting
together, or at least having a common interest" [74], She has merely offered an
identity group, which is to say, an Aristotelian category of people who share some
characteristic(s). In this case, that characteristic is the set of cultural practices a number
of individuals engage in.
This is a third concept of group that has been fully available in the Western liberal
tradition. It is distinct from the Aristotelian organic whole and the Hegelian essential
whole, but is the Western philosophical tradition's standard understanding of large
36
I set aside the obvious objection that such a person might still have a right to a culture, all the more
pressing for not being in a culture.
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groups, as "identities." Gould's insistence that the individual is ontologically prior to the
group [74] prevents her truly transcending the aggregate: the only change is, all members
ot the aggregate are alike. While it allows a unity based on sameness even in action, and
thus overcomes certain problems with the aggregate concept, it maintains individuated
self-interest, while undermining individuality or difference. On the one hand, just because
everybody is the same, does not mean that they are not atomic, self-interested individuals
— as they are on Gould's account. On the other, each individual acts like others in
fundamental ways, and may even think like them. It is on the basis of this that those who
take this to be the form of a nation (or nationalism) or the nation (nationalism) in general,
condemn the specific nation (or nationalism) or the nation (nationalism) in general.
In some sense, this concept combines the worst features of individual and group.
On the one hand, individuation becomes almost stressed, in the sense that every member
of the group is the same. The characteristics of the individual member of the "group" are
thus reiterated by the existence of each member. On the other hand, the group is over-
powering: individuals within it act the same and are the same. In some sense, their
nature is defined by the shared characteristics that define membership in the group. One
loses even the complexity of an organic or, in Gould's terms, a "holistic" group. And, one
loses any chance at real heterogeneity, which is at least allowed by an aggregate of
individuals — though not at all guaranteed. 3
'
This concept reduces the social relations that exist among members of a group to
merely formal relations of identity. In concrete terms, it is difficult to see their
"togetherness" as anything but an aggregation. Their "togetherness," or direct
connection, is mediated through their common characteristics (activities, practices,
beliefs, interest, etc.). Though in reality, being together even because of shared
"Indeed, the mere fact of individuation does not imply individuality or heterogeneity. I would argue, in
fact, that in post-industrial consumer cultures, individuation has not in the least inhibited a marketmg-
driven homogenization. Even atomic individualism without a homogenizing group structure tends toward
homogeneity - though its ideologues still often blame the homogenization on some type of group
mentality.
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characteristics is bound to produce some genuine lateral relations, Gould's analysis does
not describe or account for these - nor does she perceive the group in these terms. In
reality, these relations themselves might drive the recognition and "valuing" of a cultural,
linguistic, or institutional milieu, but what is important remains the relations.
In a Gouid.an group, individuals are not together except insofar as they are alike,
and recognize one another in one another - that is, identify with one another. Their
relation is driven at most by a need ,o be like o,lher people, not to be wilh or connected to
other people. This might even be taken as evidence of an insecurity; group membership
on Gould s model merely allays the insecurity, rather than fostering individual
development beyond it.
This relation is also uniform over all pairings. This would appear to restrict
options for living. There is nothing in "culture" as Gould has defined it that allows for
the heterogeneity (not only in terms of individual characteristics, but in social positioning
and the relations themselves) that is, of course, strongly present in any large group. A
focus on concrete or lateral relations, rather than abstract identity, allows for that, without
at the same time reducing the group to its individual components in aggregate.
Given these problems, one is left to wonder what exactly the benefit is that Gould
believes cultures provide to individuals. Indeed, her very focus on benefits to individuals
is misguided. If social relations are fundamental to individuals, such that they in part
constitute individuals, it is not clear how the issue of benefits can be central. For,
individuals would necessarily be in social relations. These could be good or bad, have
good or bad effects. But, this will not determine (though it might affect to some degree)
whether or not people are in them. And, it will not impact on the fact that the relations
and group memberships affect the individuals. Some social relations - including group
relations, such as national — are not productive; yet the social connection or group exists.
To claim it is not "justified" seems beside the point. This becomes point of logic when it
is recognized that groups and relations have different effects on different individuals.
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Gould is concerned with establishing a "right” to culture, and does so based on its
benefits tor individuals. Of course, this is to remain in the same old self-interested
atomic individualist frame. The question is not one of benefits, but choice. Whether a
culture or nation "benefits" an individual or not, the individual should not be forced to
abandon it. For some members of oppressed nations, membership is much more of a
burden and commitment than a benefit. It might be true that this commitment and the
bearing of this burden improves the character of the member, or something like that, but
that is not the reason for the commitment. Being a member of a nation can involve
sacrifice more than benefit. More importantly, it the case of an oppressed minority, it can
involve a lot more sacrifice and a lot less benefit than assimilating or abandoning the
group. If group membership is externally enforced, that is another way in which
"benefit" is not part of the picture.
Instead, Gould reduces culture or nation to a sort of club that one joins for some
benefit. Yes, one might sacrifice in some way for the club, and come to feel committed
to it and its other members, but the reason one does all this is for benefits. When
someone realizes that no benefits are going to come, he/she usually quits the club. For
some, perhaps, a minority or oppressed culture or nation is like a club, but this is certainly
not true universally. It also, as I argue in Chapter 3, tends to be the result of the
absorption of that culture or nation into a broader individuating (liberal) political
structure.
On Gould's model, the group exists only so long as individuals constitute it. It has
no independent existence, and ceases to exist with the dissolution of the "relations"
among its constituent individuals. [77; see also 79] Yet, as Gould describes it,
participation in the group is passive. One acts in certain ways as prescribed by the norms
of the group, but one does not participate in the project of creating or re-creating the
group. Again, the activities that Gould cites indicate that a "culture" exists, and
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individuals merely tap into it. That it would not exist if all individuals stopped practicing
it does not mean that it does not exist beyond the individuals, as a set of practices.
That Gould does not ascribe to members of a culture agency in its constitution -
in some sort of dialectical tension with what has been previously given — also suggests
further the poverty of her notion of a cultural group. She excludes one more aspect of the
complex structure of actual cultures. The only "agency" a member appears to have is the
"volition" to choose between leaving or remaining in her/his cultural group. This
preserves both individual and group as rigid opposites, rather than complexly related and
interdependent terms.
In the end, Gould's pretensions to the rhetoric of a deep challenge to existing
concepts and of insight into new alternatives is just that - rhetoric. She winds up
reiterating a hackneyed concept of the group, by in fact eviscerating some potentially
innovative perspectives on it - such as the emphasis on relations. Of course, non-liberal
theorists from a variety of perspectives have focused on this very question of the nature
of the group, not the least of whom is Sartre, in The Critique ofDialectical Reason.
Gould's self-enthusiasm seems to depend on ignorance of such work. Indeed, it is hard to
see how the ideas (1) that groups and social relations fundamentally affect individuals
and (2) that groups are formed not just of individuals in aggregation, but through their
relations to each other, could be seen as particularly novel. The first is fundamental to
most every perspective in social and political theory that considers oppression and
resistance, as well as fundamental to entire branches and schools of psychology and
psychoanalysis. The second has been readily available in much alternative social and
political theory that considers the nature of community. That these ideas are not present
within liberal philosophical circles does not mean much, except that these circles are
limited.
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Putting the Nation to Work
Frank Poole extends and complicates the position that Gilbert takes, according to
which the nation is necessary to guarantee the unity or cohesion of the state. For Poole,
modern state freedom is "negative," that is, does not enforce participation of individuals
m government, but rather tends to prevent governments from interfering with individual
(private) activities. He takes the opposite position from Thom, valorizing this modern
negative freedom against the "positive" "Liberty of the Ancients." The latter was
coercive, requiring "an enormous amount of surveillance and control over the details of
.
. day-to-day existence, including [individual] opinions,
. . . religious beliefs,
occupations, and even
. . . family lives." The former emphasized freedom in just those
areas. [125 - 130]
Poole s state" resembles Gilbert's "civil society" very closely. And the same
problem arises: for a state based on negative freedom, there is no inherent motivation for
its citizens to support it. Of course, this support is just as necessary as in classical
times, to preserve the private or individual freedom that the individual enjoys and wishes
to. [131]
What can justify a civic commitment in the modern state? Classical theorists
could assume that social commitment was inherent in the nature of the individual.
However, for the "proponent of negative freedom," the nature of the individual is
individualistic, and does not presume anything social about the individual. [131]
An instrumental justification is clearly possible: the individual must support the
state in order for it to protect his/her private freedoms. Unfortunately, the larger the state,
the more the room for individuals to not fulfill their civic obligations, without any
significant detrimental effects. 38 [131 - 132], What is needed instead is a choice by the
individual to identify him-/herself as a citizen of the state, and to desire to fulfill civic
18
I am not sure why this is a problem. It would seem that a perfect freedom exists in a situations where
individuals may either participate or not participate in the state, without detrimental effects either way. Of
course, Poole might have in mind an indirect coercion, in which some people must serve the state because
they realize others are not.
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obligations. The nature ot the individual does not determine this commitment, and for it
not to undermine the negative freedom that it is supposed to serve, it must be freely
chosen. [133]
Hegel s solution to this problem, as he understood it, was in the
rational identification of the free citizen with the rational laws of the state governing him
(not her for Hegel) [135], For the purely self-interested individual, who "can only
conceive of the requirements of citizenship instrumentally" [134] and who will violate
them as possible in pursuit of his/her interest, the laws of the state (and its organization of
society, presumably) are experienced as constraints [135].
But when [such an individual] acquires the perspective of the citizen, he
recognises these not as constraints but as conditions of existence of activities,
pleasures, forms of knowledge, and meanings which are not otherwise available to
him. The individual qua citizen accepts, indeed wills these conditions, much as
dancers, chess players, and language speakers, and language speakers accept and
will the rules which make their chosen activity possible. They are no longer
experienced as external constraints or duties, but as the objective correlates of the
citizen's own identity .
. [135]
Though a strict interpretation of Poole's words would suggest a preservation of
instrumentality, the last line allows a (very) charitable reading. The idea is that these
rules express the essence of an individual's activity — they are not a means to it, but in
fact express the (chosen) nature of the individual that is that activity.
Poole rejects the Hegelian optimism that a properly educated individual will adopt
the citizen's perspective. He is more pessimistic "about the possibilities of democracy"
[137]. Some other means is necessary to ensure a citizen's "willing" commitment to the
state. That means is the nation, which emerged almost with Hegel's philosophy, but quite
distinct from it.
For Poole, the nation is in reality nothing much. It is "nothing more than a group
of people who are conceived of, and who conceive themselves, as belonging to an
historically formed and geographically located community" [137]. "Nationalism" is the
simple doctrine that the nation should have a state, and, for a state to be legitimate, it
must represent a nation [137]. Why then have the nation and nationalism been such
249
powerful forces in the past two centuries? And how can they be the vehicle for
guaranteeing the cohesiveness of the state? Why not class, or religion, or political party?
[137]
Poole opts tor a slightly revised Herderian version of linguistic nationalism, with
appeals to Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. As Gellner argues, in the 19th Century
a uniform culture became crucial for the interchangeability necessary to industrial
society. As Anderson argues, social conditions created a context in which language
communities became larger, and a common language itself a crucial medium for social,
political, and economic linkage. Thus, culture and language became central to
individuals' daily lives, and the foundations of individual "identity" itself. [138 - 139]
"National identity" became central over competing identities (which are still
adopted), because it "successfully appropriated the linguistic and cultural resources in
terms of which other identities are articulated. National identity provides the inarticulate
ground of other identities." [139] All other identities are articulated on top of national
identity, which becomes assumed. It is, after all, the linguistic and cultural medium of
social relations themselves.
"National identity ... is not fully available to rational reflection" [139], It is,
instead, a conceptual frame that is given by the accident of language and culture, yet
structures our communications and even perceptions of the world. One's "national culture
has inescapably formed [one's] voice and [one's] vision" [142], Co-nationals "speak the
same language, experience the same emotions, and experience the world in the same
terms" [142], It is the "essen[ce]" of an individual, not as a set of rigid defining criteria,
but as the form and context of free activity [140].
In this way, national identity is the foundation of subjectivity. For this reason, it
does not have to be emphasized. If a state reflects their nation, national subjects
"recognize themselves in the political form of the nation-state" [140]. They do not have
to actively participate, but submit freely as to an internal power [140]. National identity
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IS not "freedom" in the liberal sense, but rather exists as the "necessity" that grounds a
space of free activity (the negatively-free state). It is the unfree condition of freedom
[141], 39
Poole's concept of the nation is very poor. As 1 argue in Chapter 3, "nationalism"
ts a much more varied phenomena than a mere demand for the coextension of nation and
state. What is more, the ,dea that the nation is just a group of people on a given territory,
and/or the mere self- or external perception of a shared history, has been problematized
from all sorts of perspectives on the nation - to the point where it cannot be offered as a
serious position without a great deal of supporting argumentation. In Chapter 3, 1 also
discuss the limitations of such a view.
In this chapter, I have already called into question the idea that members of a
nation all think or act or in some other way are alike. Given the obvious heterogeneity of
nations - as described by Hobsbawm, and further developed by Bhabha (as discussed in
Chapter 3) - this is simply not a defensible position. Even if its focus is on individuals'
structures of consciousness, and not more concrete characteristics, it is still the reduction
of the nation to an identity group. That Poole explicitly notes that a given "national"
population does not really share a given language or culture [138 - 139] is misleading.
There are three possible interpretations of Poole's vagueness on this point. First, it is
possible that he recognizes the heterogeneity out of necessity, but then maintains his
original theory of homogeneity.
Second, it is possible that Poole has something like the following argument in
mind: Even if objectively co-nationals are not identical, they think that they are [139],
Thus, they perceive themselves to have the same language and culture, and each sees the
common national state as reflecting these. They thus have the same (committed)
relationship to the state. Of course, the perception of likeness drives them toward actual
likeness.
w
This represents a variation on the previous arguments we have seen linking liberalism to nationalism.
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Third, it is possible that this perception itself determines their structure of
consciousness. They perceive the world as if they form an identity group, as if their
language and culture were uniformly experienced by each. This, in effect, means that it
is: the "shared fiction" in some sense corrects for any difference, producing the effect of
perfect linguistic and cultural identity. Under the force of this common fiction, the group
tends toward homogeneity.
A generous rejection of the first possibility and attention to Poole's frequent
references to the fact that people really act and think the same suggests the third
possibility. The vagueness of this description - specifically, of how this correction is
accomplished - reflects the inevitable problems with the type of theory Poole has
advanced, no matter what adjustments are made. In any event, each represents a variation
on the problematic nation as identity group position. None is tenable.
More importantly, this account flies in the face of the obvious data. Within every
state that is presumed to be a nation — and even every nation that is not a state - there are
a variety of opinions on why or why not the national state or a proposed path to statehood
truly expresses the "national character" (or will of the people) - because there are so
many different opinions on what that is. Clearly, if people really share some basic
structure of consciousness, and it is reflected in their actual or desired state (as Poole
believes happens), then such debate would not occur. Just as clearly, such a contentious
"national identity" prevents it from being the key to the universal commitment of citizens
to state.
Poole's account portrays the nation as the guarantor of the state. This itself
suggests the genesis of any nation that does tend to solidify citizens' commitment to a
state. It must be produced by the state, for the express purpose of binding individuals to
it. It must manipulate the structures of consciousness of its "citizens," to produce there a
cultural basis that necessarily identifies the state as the proper object of commitment.
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This is precisely what Hobsbawm criticizes. What Poole's account of the nation
actually does is put it to work for the liberal state. The nation fills a gap in liberalism. As
he admits, ' a liberal political order does not create" but requires "a degree of social
cohesiveness and commitment" [143], If this commitment does not exist organically, it
cannot be "presuppose[d]," contra Poole, but must be created. Thus, the liberal state
creates a nation to overcome its shortcomings. The "necessity" that Poole ascribes to
national identity - through a very problematic "language" = "structure of
consciousness'V'essence" argument - is a necessity specific to liberalism. It is a
necessary failing of liberalism that it cannot produce a state structure to which people can
be committed without being coerced. It is necessary for the liberal state to produce
something like the nation as the means of this coercion. Not only does Poole leave no
room for alternative concepts of the nation, but he also puts the one form of nation he
does allow to work as a tool of coercion and psychological enslavement. While for
Poole, the sole function of the nation is to buttress state authority, it is precisely
intentionally alternative concepts of the nation that often drive movements against this
type of coercive state power.
The nation becomes the sole repository of what is not rational and chosen. It
becomes a scapegoat for the gaps of liberalism. Liberalism cannot account for the
realities of power and coercion even in a formally "free" society. It looks only at the
formal political structures, and closes its eyes to the informal realities below. In some
cases, it relegates coercion or bondage to the private realm. For instance, historically
women and children enjoyed no freedoms in the home run by the free husband and father
— at least none that were not at the whim of that man. In this case, Poole relegates it to
the nation. He fails to see that the realm of "negative" freedom is simply an abstraction
that ignores the real power relations among individuals. They are already not free,
regardless of whether they are forced to participate in a state or not. The state may
exacerbate their bondage, but it is no more responsible than the liberal realm of negative
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Ireedom tor it. And, neither is the nation, which under such circumstances is just as
likely as not to be the means or expression of a drive tofreedom against the bondage of
negative freedom" Poole's optimistic claim that "the truth of liberalism" is its openness
to change [141] misses the reality that in all realms - including that of liberal negative
freedom - there is a tension between the forces that allow options and those that
foreclose them deterministically. These two forces cannot be distributed the former to
liberalism and the latter to the nation.
Poole hides the ideological manipulation central to his concept of national identity
by naturalizing the latter. By placing it outside the realm of rational reflection, he makes
it appear necessary or inevitable. What he neglects to acknowledge is that not all
citizens are identical in this respect. While some are manipulated unwittingly by
propaganda, and to some extent internalize an ideologically tainted structure of
consciousness, others arq performing the manipulations. In some cases, these others do it
out of missionary zeal. But, this zeal is often produced through a reinforcement that
comes with the power of manipulating minds, and gaining power in a state through
exercising power over others. 41 In other cases, the line is even more clear: there is a
relatively conscious effort at manipulation. In either case, de facto representatives of a
state manipulate its "average citizens." It is not enough to note the existence of a
"national" language or culture. One must ask. What typically creates a "national"
language? What typically institutionalizes and regulates culture? What inculcates and
enforces the "national" language and culture, through education, laws, and so forth? The
answer quite often is, an existing state (or, occasionally, an institutionalized movement
toward a particular conception of a state).
This naturalization denies the agency of individual citizens. They are pretty much
powerless in the face of "national identity." This naturalistic and mechanistic view of
40
This recalls Thom's relegation of all passivity to the nation and all activity to the republican citizens
assembled.
4lAn example of this might be the type of American idealist central to Greenfeld's account of the United
States. Belief in this case requires a (willing) gap between ideals and reality.
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identity formation supports his "pessimism about the possibilities of democracy"
[ 137 ],
By refusing to acknowledge the agency of individuals in the production of propaganda,
he transforms apparent failures of democracy into metaphysical necessities. By refusing
to acknowledge the tremendous force of propagandistic manipulation on "average
citizens," he views the "failures" of "democracy" to be their failures. He blames the
victims, though he does not allow them enough agency even to choose their failures.
At the same time, this inverts the actual relation of agency and the nation. For
Poole, national identity is a given, pre-conscious backdrop of life. It may be so for those
whose states are powerful. For those whose states are weak, or who are prevented from
seeing their identity reflected in their state, national identity is a constant struggle, a
constant fight against its dissolution — as I have argued above. Poole might counter, at
least regarding minorities, that it is the fact of non-identity that drives such minorities to
secede. But what of those who do not try to secede, and neither try to impose their
identity on the whole - but who also will not or are not permitted to assimilate? Here
Poole's theoretical prejudice for statist nations is clear. He cannot account for alternative
forms, yet does not recognize the huge gaps in the form he advocates.
Indeed, his account of the nation is, to use Gore Vidal's term, "crypto-fascist." If
the majority in a state identifies itself with the state, and sees the state as the reflection of
its identity essence, it is a short step from there to the view that those who do not share
this essence are undermining or polluting the state, and do not belong in it. The best
alternative in such a situation is bad enough — forced assimilation. The worse
alternatives include deportation and genocide. That some nations do tend toward this
form, and others to milder forms of liberal appropriation, is a function not of some
inherent tendency in the nation, but rather the openness of its the concept of the nation
itself.
Finally, this placing of national identity beyond access by rational reflection
weakens it. This is a variation on the frequent "non-rationality" or "irrationality" of
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national identity. For the nation to legitimate - for it to be "rational," at least indirectly -
it must attach itself to a rational (liberal) state. While Poole appears to make the state
dependent on the nation, he at the same makes the nation - for its legitimacy -
dependent on the state. For a nation to reject service to a state is to lose its connection to
rationality, and thus its legitimacy.
This naturalization also re-instrumentalizes the nation. The instrumentality is
rationalized and generalized to the state as a whole, rather than attributed to individual
citizens. The rationality of the nation depends on its utility for the state: its legitimacy is
in serving the (liberal) state.
One question that Poole does not address adequately is why the nation needs the
state. He assumes the presence of the state, and his only question is how the nation can
serve it. This assumption of the state naturalizes it, as well - though Poole does not
intend this. The state is just as "irrational" - despite a form of "rationality," in the case of
properly liberal states — as the nation. Indeed, from his perspective, it is the assumption
of the state that is the truly pre-reflective ground of social and political life. This is part
of the reason he cannot or will not recognize alternative conceptions and forms of the
nation. On his logic, this would require accepting the possibility that a non-statist nation
might foster a non-state socio-political structure in which its members might see
themselves reflected.
Poole's reductive subjugation of nation to liberalism, in support of the liberal
state, is either a function of or generates his poor reading of Hegel. There is certainly a
strain in Hegel that subjugates disparate terms to one organizing schema. But, at the
same time, the dialectical nature of Hegelian philosophy mitigates against this. In
dialectical dynamics of Hegelian philosophy, an external perspective on a social object
(such as the nation) is always giving way to an internal perspective. As the subject
engages an object, the object itself affects the subject. The power of subject over object -
- to command a meaning - is inverted, as the object reconfigures the interpretive frame of
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the subject. The subjugation of a social object to the general schema of Hegel's system (a
perspective) itself transforms that system and subjugates it. The Hegelian dialectic
perpetually turns conceptual frames inside out. This is a productive, if idealized, model
of how social science should proceed.
Unfortunately, a typical Anglo-American/analytic reading of Hegel such as
Poole's focuses entirely on the rigid subjugation of disparate social objects, and ignores
the dialectics. The result is bad social science, and worse political theory.
Meta-Nationalism
Omar Dahbour, in his introduction to the Forum, lays out the "philosophical"
issues related to the nation and nationalism. These reflect the general presumptions and
limitations I have already treated at length in this section. This is to be expected: as
"Guest Editor" of the Forum, Dahbour presumably had a big hand in selecting its
contents - which, unfortunately, are limited by his limitations.
There are two distinctive elements to his introduction, however. First, he ties his
survey of the "philosophical" issues regarding the nation and nationalism to certain
canonical texts in the history of Western philosophy. Second, based on this survey, he
offers some general conclusions. These apparently are meant as some sort of starting
point, or common reference point, for the other essays in the Forum. Unfortunately, these
conclusions are mere restatements of central tenets of Elie Kedourie's antinational-ist
theory of the nation and nationalism. [13-14] If this is the best a self-described novel
philosophical engagement with these objects can produce [see 1], "philosophy" is even
more poor than my introductory comments suggest. At the same time, I have fully
treated Kedourie in Chapter 1 and the limitations on the general analytic philosophical
approaches in detail in this section; at this point, these do not require more than a
mention.
257
It is Dahbour's manifestation of certain beliefs about the relationship between the
history of philosophy and the nation/nationalism that requires further comment. There
are two dimensions to that relationship. First, such philosophers as Locke, Rousseau,
Kant, and Hegel provide the key concepts with which to approach the nation today. This
is clearly manifested in the essays of both Gilbert and Poole, whose common reliance on
Hegel is explicit. Gilbert's three options for group structures are closely adapted from
Hegelian concepts, and Poole's analysis of the necessity of the nation is entirely in
Hegelian terms, and based on analysis of Hegel's philosophy. 42
Dahbour extends this dependence. For him, the main contemporary debate
regarding nationalism — whether nations are "primordial" or "modern" in origins - can be
described as the question of "whether national identities are formed in a Lockean or in a
Hegelian fashion [Dahbour, 1996: 2]. That this debate has not been central for many
years - most serious theorists agree that, however much "nationalism" might appeal to
pre-modern cultural elements, nations and nationalisms are a modern phenomenon -- is
not the important thing to notice. What is the reduction of a contemporary debate to
philosophies developed two and three centuries ago, in ages where the nation had become
barely noticeable and was at best in the early stages of its evolution as a social form.
Perhaps this debate appears central to Dahbour precisely because can be construed in
terms readily available in the philosophical canon.
I have already argued that ultimately Lockean liberal concepts and Hegelian ones
(as interpreted within a liberal conceptual frame) are not appropriate to the nation. What
is necessary is the development of new philosophical concepts and frames through which
to engage the nation. Dahbour mines the same old canon for as yet unused pre-existing
concepts for application to (imposition on) the nation.
Second, he repeats Kedourie's position that Kant is the ultimate creator of
nationalism [6], Dahbour adds in Rousseau [3], Fichte [4], and (presumably J. S.) Mill
42Though in both cases apparently focused on the Philosophy ofRight , which is much more limited than the
Phenomenology ofSpirit.
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t5] ’ 35 We"’ Crea ‘ing an eVen stro,,ger impression that the history of philosophy marked
by these thinkers is the history of the genesis and evolution of the nation and nationalism.
I have already strongly criticized such a restricted position on the origins of the concept
and reality of the nation and nationalism, in my discussions of Kedourie and Thom (as
well as, less directly, Greenfeld). There was a much more dialectical relationship
between emergent concepts of the nation in general and specific nations, and the proto-
national social formations actually coalescing without full association with the concepts
of nation and nationalism. Even granting that such thinkers had some role in interpreting
emergent national phenomena - or even creating a context for their conceptualization -
nations and nationalisms were not just ideas that were imposed on reality. They did not
Athena-like spring from the foreheads of philosophers, but depended on complex social,
economic, and political transformations and developments.
This point eludes Nicole Fermon perhaps even more than Dahbour. Her treatment
of the nation and nationalism is an extended interpretation of various texts by Rousseau.
She offers these not even as merely one perspective on the nation - which of course
requires that one overlook the tact that there really were not nations when Rousseau was
writing - but as a path to central insight into the nature of the nation, up to and including
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [Fermon, 1996: 26],
Even granting that Rousseau was writing about nations, his focus on laws and
government - however related to "customs" in the Hegelian sense - make his concept of
the nation very narrow. He may have recognized the emerging importance of the various
elements of nationally-specitic historical, cultural, and popular consciousness in state
formation and legitimation, but that does not mean that he understood it well. In fact, his
concept of the nation is purely organic, in which the individual is absorbed into a greater
whole. That, as clarified by Hegel, the individual somehow finds his (not her)
"individual freedom" in this absorbing organism has remained a highly problematized
point in Rousseau scholarship, and absolutely cannot be taken at face value.
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Rousseau is absolutely explicit and concrete about this organicism. The "nation" 43
is a great body'" [25], Fermon takes this concept and runs with it. The nation is a
political body" [28, 34] or "body politic" [30, 34], a "sovereign body" [30], and so forth.
According to her, Rousseau's central concern is how to get the individual to be
committed to the nation [see especially 24].'44 As evidence that Rousseau is writing of the
central feature of the nation, Fermon offers a quotation by Benedict Anderson, about the
profoundly self-sacrificing love"’ often felt by nationals for their nation [24], This,
however, is not central to Anderson's account, and comes as a concluding caveat against
possible charges that he has made the generation of nations too material or mechanistic.
Fie just wants to say that people feel a positive attachment to their nation, based on its
imagination as a community. The nation is not generated by this love, but by the
imagination of community. The love is a result.
On Fermon's reading of Rousseau, however, it is this love that produces the
"nation." And what is this love, really? "Because la patrie is feminine in French, this
is ... a highly charged and personal love" [23], Indeed, the love of one's "nation" is
simply a transference of love for one's mother onto one's "'mother tongue"’ or motherland.
[33 - 34] This displaces properly sexual love, being a "'a thousand times more delicious
than [love of] mistresses" [33].
The evidence of this transference by Rousseau is a psychoanalytic reading of his
texts, based on the fact that his mother died giving birth to him. In simplistic
psychological terms, he had to replace his mother, and did this (at least intellectually)
with the concept of the "nation." [3 1 - 32] This might be a defensible reading of
Rousseau. But the peculiarities of Rousseau's atypical psychology, it is hardly
generalizable to all commitments to a nation, or to all aspects of the nation (beyond the
issue of individual commitment). Let us not forget that Rousseau was quite atypical and
^Fermon's interpretation.
44
This, of course, was Poole's concern for the state, and reiterates the question of why Fermon thinks this is
about the nation.
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even in many respecs bizarre. That is no fault, but undermines any attempt to generalize
from Ins psychology to that of all nationalists (in their "normalcy" and distinct forms of
particularity).
More importantly, this is a gross misapplication of psychoanalytic
“literary”
theory. What a psychoanalytic reading does is tell us about the author - it does not tell
anything about the author’s subject. Nietzsche makes this absolutely clear in Beyond
Good and Evil, he recognizes that his proto-psychoanalytic analysis of philosophical
texts to reveal the desires and wills behind them tells us nothing about philosophy, and
everything about philosophers.
Yet, Fermon presents her reading as a basic insight into the fundament of all
nations. In the vein and citing Julia Kristeva, she extends Kristeva's fetishization of the
use of the term "mother" in "mother tongue" [see 31, 33 - 34] to a Rousseauian variation.
This is a limited approach to the nation not because women are not used and
oppressed by nations and in their construction. Fermon is right to point out the ways in
which women, as mothers, wives, etc., are coerced and exploited into producing
citizens through a national moral education [35 - 37], She is also correct to point out
how state hegemony is produced in part by regulation and control of women's activities
and sexualities [33, 36 - 37], and that assertion of independence from these roles, and
challenges to patriarchy, are quite often experienced as threats to the "nation" [31].
But, first, she fails to recognize that this use and control of women is universal
across all types of political and social structures. To view it as the key to the nation
requires (1) that it be effectively the exclusive nature of the nation and (2) that it be
unique to the nation, generated with it, and not a more general feature of social and
political structures that is imported into the nation. 43 Second, she conflates these concrete
effects of construction and maintenance of state and cultural power with the relatively
limited use and significance of the metaphor of the mother in nation-formation and
JS
I expand this point in Chapter 3, where I make clear that this does not mean that "nationals" are not
responsible for engagement in gender oppression, or that nationalisms do not extend this oppression.
261
national consciousness. No doubt it would possible to find it used with reference to every
actual nation, but that use is just as doubtlessly not generally or often a central feature in
the constitution of the nation. Indeed and again, it is often more likely a secondary
import of sexist conceptual structures into the nation
.
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The upshot of Fermon's article is that the nation must be understood through
Rousseau's texts, and moreso through a limiting psychoanalytic reading of them. This
control of access through canonical philosophical texts is a variation on Dahbour's
general project. Dahbour, Fermon, et al's "history" of the nation and nationalism is not
merely inaccurate. It is a normalized history, that transforms the nation and nationalism
into philosophical constructs best understood in canonical philosophical concepts. Rather
than developing philosophy to engage the nation and nationalism, this normalization
transforms them to fit prefabricated slots in philosophy. "Philosophy," in its
condescension to the realities of the world, does not deign to step into that world, but
rather demands that the realities conform to it.
In light of this, it appears that the failure of "philosophy" to produce genuine
insights into the nation and nationalism is not merely an unfortunate shortfall. It is a
chosen path, based on the presumption that "philosophy" already has within it - in its
wealth of concepts, systems, and methods — all that is necessary to understand
everything.
One of the most serious critiques of national self-conception is that nationalist
histories are normalized. They emphasize only data that is consistent with the existence
ot their nation in history, such as the existence of cultural elements that only later became
associated with the nation, while organizing their narrative around the emergence and
activity of "the nation," at historical points where no such nation can be said to have
existed. This false history often contributes to the construction or consolidation of the
"it is telling that elsewhere in the Forum, there is barely a mention of gender or gender oppression. Is this
another foisting of problems with liberalism (as much as nationalism) squarely onto nationalism — a subtle
and devious use of the accusation of gender oppression as itself a tool of oppression?
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nation at the time the history is produced. I have described this phenomenon in my
discussion of Greenfeld.
Dahbour et al's normalization of the history of philosophy to include the
generation and continuing engagement with the nation and nationalism might be termed
"meta-nationalism." Rather than normalize history around the desired presence of a
specific nation, it normalizes the general history of the nation and nationalism around the
philosophical canon. There is a deep irony here. At the very point at which philosophy
proves itself most incapable of engaging the nation and nationalism with penetrating or
very precise analysis, philosophers reconstruct the history of nation/alism to represent it
philosophy as central to it.
This "meta-nationalism" need not be positive in its evaluation of the nation, nor of
particular philosophers (that is, Rousseau can be sexist). Its point is to establish the
centrality of the philosophical canon in the generation and analysis of the nation and
nationalism.
Concluding Remark
Given these preceding set of analyses, it would seem that an answer to the
question of Descartes' possible paths Anglo-American analytic Political Philosophy has
emerged. Rather than grow through engagement with new social forms and forces (in the
case of Descartes, a new scientific and material approach to the world; in the case of
contemporary analytic Political Philosophy, the nation and nationalism), it has chosen to
defend the old order (Catholicism or atomic individualism), by reworking and
manipulating the new force into support for the old.
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Phoenix Rising
In a recent Daedalus47 article focusing on nationalism - as well as religion and
ethnicity," and to a lesser extent gender and race - in the contemporary, modern age,
Edward A. Tiryakian explicitly challenges the anti-national bias of the dominant
academic literature on these topics. He calls for a shift in “the dominant paradigm,”
from one in which nationalism (and religion et al) is viewed as “a reaction to modernity”
to one in which nationalism (and religion et al) is recognized as a “factor[] of modernity”
[Tiryakian, 1997: 149 - 150], He argues that nationalism, religion, ethnicity, race, and
gender for a cultural bundle, a dynamic set of factors creating modernity, rather
than
. . . constraints or residuals in the general process of modernization” [149], as is so
on the usual “liberal” view.
The key form of the “dominant paradigm’s” relationship to nationalism is theory
characterizing nations as “ invented” communities, artificial constructs with some type of
positive or negative function. Hobsbawm, Balibar, and Wallerstein represent Marxist
approaches, which I have also argued view the nation as an invented social myth
functioning “ in the creation and maintenance of power or the attempted seizure of
power” [156].
Tiryakian represents Gellner’s functionalist view as a variation on this theme, in
that it reduces the nation to an “artificially” created tool of modernization. I, however,
have emphasized the difference between Gellner and genuine antinational-ists. For
Tiryakian, “artificiality” here seems almost to mean simply produced within the past few
centuries. More importantly, that Tiryakian fails to recognize the specific nature of
Gellner’s failing not as a claim of the artificiality of the nation, but of its utility for a
specific agenda is telling. It allows Tiryakian to remain convinced of his own distinction
from such obvious cases, even as his own manipulation of the nation form becomes
apparent.
47
I mention this to stress the importance of the article, at least in academia.
264
His inclusion ot Anderson in this grouping is equally problematic, for two
reasons. First, it is based on a bad reading of the “ imagined community.” According to
Tiryakian, Anderson views the nation as an idea that is disseminated throughout a
population. The key to the nation is the content of that idea, which is of a nation in which
holders imagine themselves to be participants. Tiryakian’s objection is that this idea is
produced by some members of the society, that is, is artificial. This ignores the bulk of
Anderson’s theory, which concerns the form of this dissemination: the “idea” of a nation
is not antecedent to participation in it, but rather produced out of the communicative
structure that emerges with “print capitalism.” The nation is that structure to the extent
that it is recognized by its members. The structure itself can be centralized, controlled,
and manipulated (communication is one-way and through centralized media conduits,
certain people [elites] determine what is communicated and how, etc.), and there are
significant problems with Anderson’s model for this reason and others. Still, Anderson’s
greatest strength, perhaps, is in recognizing both material and mental forces in the
constitution of the nation, but Tiryakian misses the former.
Second, this bad reading therefore ignores prominent alternatives in the literature,
to the restrictive view of the nation that Tiryakian criticizes. His call for a “paradigm”
shift is 20 years too late - there rose, with the rise of Hobsbawmian and Gellnerian
approaches, at least one other particularly European strain. If beginning efforts such as
Anderson’s have their limits, it still has opened up into a set of conceptual possibilities
outside of Tiryakian’s “dominant paradigm.” Further, locked in the dominant European
paradigm (conceptual frame) [see especially 161 - 162], he ignores a whole range of
alternative theories and concepts produced from perspectives and political developments
outside that frame. One should also differentiate post-structuralist approaches, which
Tiryakian collapses into Marxist with the inclusion of Balibar there.
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Tame “Wild Cards”
Tiryakian’s reductive description of the literature clears the field for his own
imaginary paradigm shift.” Against the “ invented tradition” theme, Tiryakian invokes
an “emergent” strain in the literature. These theories revalue the nation and nationalism
as a crucial element in democratic state formation, “a discourse upholding a democratic
order.” They refocus attention on the “nation” aspect of the “«^/o«-state.” [159]
Tiryakian cites a number of theorists in this strain. Edward Shils presents the
nation as a “ ’center’ of the democratic tradition of modernity” [159], The nation - or
national self-consciousnesses of members -- is what sustains the “civil society” that
grounds the state. At the same time, the nation is not a simple function of “self-interest,”
but rather the product of a variety of economic, psychological, political, cultural, and
historical factors. [161]
Dominique Schnapper formulates the notion similarly, as a “ ’specific form of
political organization,”’ that concretizes the abstract state into a “real ‘community of
citizens.’” It blends ethno-cultural relations and open civic participation. [161 - 162]
The product is the civic nation, akin to Greenfeld’s. It is ethnicity, however, that is
democratized and thus egalitarian, making civic not abstract and formal, but concrete and
immediate.
In the first instance, this shift appears little more an assertion of variations on the
liberal concepts of the nation I have been treating in bulk of this chapter. Tiryakian is
especially interested in a tired notion of the “civic” nation as a foil to alternative
conceptions. His initial explicit project was to establish the nation as an independent
variable in modernity, not reducible to other forces, and so to legitimate it. But, to do so,
he has reformulated it precisely in a form that is determined by an extant political agenda
and conceptual frame. Apparently ignorant 19th and 20th Century “liberal nationalism,”
he triumphantly announces the discovery or production of a new understanding of the
nation — which is the same old “civic” or liberal one.
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The specific features he extols relevant to the “civic
nation is contractual, a voluntary political association [162],
stressing the equality of participants - as if this can only be
civic concept, or even guaranteed by it at all.
” nation are familiar. This
It is, further,
"democratic,”
guaranteed by this particular
Yet, it is not motivated by economic or political self-interest. Tiryakian stresses
the emotional or psychological dimension, which exceeds, according to him, liberal
accounts. For Julia Knsteva,4 ' the ''paramount function of the nation
... is to inspire
pride in individuals and groups” - “national pride [is] comparable to the “’good
narcissistic ideal’ the child initially internalizes from the mother, which is then elaborated
into an ego ideal” [164].
The specific form of this psycho-emotional component is not important:
Tiryakian himself describes it in 18th Century France as *freed religious sentiment
applied in a political context, to a political object [167 - 168], What matters is that some
form of psycho-emotional force binds an individual to a group ideal. Tiryakian’s big
move is to legitimate it.
This formulation merely subjugates the nation to a different “dominant
paradigm ” - not within the literature on the nation, but within the general intellectual
tradition of the West. It is a psychoanalytic or even psychological tradition that refers to
and inhabits the “private” space within atomic individualism. Tiryakian merely
reformulates the nation as a function of psychoanalytic or psychological forces. The
nation and nationalism become ""wild cards” within the overall system of rational
modernity, allowed space within the psychology of individuals while at the same time
not requiring a transformation ot that system, or being recognized as part of or posing an
alternative social or political form. The issue become not how the nation represents or
drives a different ""paradigm,” but rather how it operates within the given
4S
Recall especially my comments in opening the Greenfeld section, above.
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paradigm. The paradigm” is not superseded, but merely expanded to include another
element.
The term “wild” is revealing. This characterizes the “emotional” nature of the
nation and nationalism. They are wild, and the implications of their presence in this or
that context uncertain [see 161]. The term “wild card” means precisely this:
nation and “nationalism” are not tixed, but rather have multiple possible meanings
and values within the more fixed realm of “modernity.”
While Tiryakian represents this wildness as the independence of nationalism from
the characteristic constraints of “modernity,” he uses it in a different way. Tiryakian
stresses that his rejection of simplistic versions of “rational choice theory” does not mean
an embrace of “an irrationalist perspective on nationalism” [161]. He interprets theorists
such as Shils’ to call for an expansion of the factors included in analysis of people’s
choices, beyond just economic or cost/benefit, to “psychological, political, cultural, and
historical factors that are given equal or greater weight” [161]. This expands the realm of
“ rationality,” rather than attributing the nation to irrational forces.
He is right, but only partially. This new method for analysis of the nation is in
fact no “paradigm shift” at all. It preserves intact the initial system of decision-making.
The nation is still constituted by atomic individuals expressing some sort of preferences
or attachments — a very limiting and normalizing concept of the nation, as the balance of
this chapter should suggest.
More importantly, this “rationality” of the decision-making is not due to a
“rationality” in the decision-makers, but rather to the comprehensibility of their decision-
making process for theorists. There is anything but respectful acknowledgment of
decision makers. Rather, it is recognition that what is comprehensible is malleable.
Tiryakian’ s ultimate project is not merely to understand national commitment, but to
manipulate it toward an object of his choice. “Nationalism” gains “rationality” at the
price of its free functioning.
268
It is no defense against criticism that Tiryakian claims to be or is positively
disposed toward this other, this “wild card" I have already suggested that this
disposition requires a deformation: if the nation can be bent to fit a slot in “modernity,”
then and only then is it legitimate. Even other theories positively disposed toward the
nation but that do not do this (such as Anderson’s) must be rejected.
Tiryakian has made the nation ’ (and race, gender, religion, etc.) into the “noble
savage" of contemporary conceptions of “ modernity.” It is “ good,” and to be
appreciated for its naturally democratic and humanizing tendencies, but it is still savage:
as a pure tendency, national commitment is unpredictable. It therefore must be
“civilized.” For Tiryakian, that means that the “national sentiment” must be focused on
the proper object.
One Nation — With Liberty and Justice for All?
This issue, as with Gilbert, Poole, and Fermon, becomes for Tiryakian the way in
which the “national” features of societies buttress the liberal order of states. The
significance of Tiryakian’ s restrictive notion of the nation becomes clear in his
application of it. While claiming to put nationalism, ethnicity, and race on new and solid
footing in “modernity,” he actually deploys “nation” against “ethnicity” and “race.”
As his approving treatments of Shils, Schnapper, and Michael Lind indicate, he views a
“nation” as coterminous with an extant state, and the proper role of the nation to be the
shoring up of that state against fractious forces within, including “subnational” ethnicity
and race. [163] He cites with approval the general failure of separatist nationalisms over
the past few decades, and the near non-existence of serious irredentist ones [151].
Indeed, proper nationalism ensures the dominance of a majority nation within a
multinational or -ethnic state, thereby preventing minor nations “ from warring with each
other” [160], Of course, the real issue is usually the tension between an often oppressive
majority and minority nations, which this account ignores, and which nationalism of this
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type decides in favor of the majority (and its paradigm of domination). Thus, even
Kristeva’s apparent pluralism is in line with Tiryakian’s “ majority rule.” According to
her, ‘-immigrants” are invited guests who should be grateful to their hosts, for their
inclusion is by fiat of the •‘welcoming host.” There is no question of who is in charge,
and who has the authority to recognize within the nation even those already internal
“historical components” that have been “ repressed.” [164]
Tiryakian's sole concern is, explicitly, saving the nation - as component of the
nation-state - from such things as “ethnic particularism” [162], Tiryakian cites with
approval Lind’s claims that race and other forms of difference in the United States are
being steamrolled into a new hybrid “ TransAmerican” identity. The only true or
legitimate nation is the majority identity that absorbs all difference within the state
borders, that is, an oppressive nation. Those nations - demoted to “ethnic” or “racial”
minorities — that resist domination and absorption are not legitimate. One would expect
at the very least that recognition of these distinct, “marginalized” groups49 within a state
or presumed “nation” would be necessary to developing an adequate concept of it.
Indeed, one would expect that the presence of minority nations (and ethnic and racial
minorities, which may or may not be nations as well) within the supposed “ nation-state”
would raise questions about just how national such a state is. But, rather than
acknowledge their obvious reality, and work to understand their significance, Tiryakian
(following Lind) calls for their summary dismissal from intellectual consideration and
political legitimacy.
Phoenix’ 0 Rising
The proper nationalism, according to Shils, binds individuals to the central social
and political order and authority [160], For Schnapper, national identity represents the
49To anticipate my treatment of Bhabha in Chapter 3.
S0
At this point, the referent of this term shifts from the commonly understood mythological one — as the
reassertion of the same old theories from the ashes of previous assertions — to its concrete referent in US
military history.
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proper socialization ot individuals into the “community of citizens” that is the
concretion of the state. The proper nation/nationalism is a tool for integration of
divergent individuals and groups into a given dominant political (state) structure. This
new paradigm” obviously functions to preserve the “old” power of state authority.
Nationalism becomes a problem: how can the proper type of nationalism -
one that produces a “nationalist sentiment” for an existing state and its socio-economic
order - be cultivated, and improper nationalism - that seeks to fracture the state,
presumably according to “merely” ethnic or racial lines - be avoided or undercut? The
solution for Tiryakian is simple. The fracturing is based on groupings or movements
different from the nation-state. This is allowed because people have lost trust in the
institution and leadership of their nation-states and associated civil societies. Non-state
nationalism is the result. Restore the trust, and these will be eliminated. [173 - 176]
The credibility of this argument depends first on setting aside the question of how
the current “nation-states” became “national” or formed. For most, it was through
separatism, irredentism, or the systematic elimination or marginalization of minorities.
Tiryakian also seems to forget the obvious examples of elimination of minorities toward
consolidation of a “national” state he cites early in his essay, the Armenian Genocide and
the Holocaust [151].
Second, it depends on assuming that the mistrust of individuals and minorities, of
their governments and the dominant majorities, is not justified. But, as examples such as
the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust and the general track record of governments
and dominant majorities suggest, it is quite justified. Think of the thousands of broken
agreements and promises by the US government and white majority to Native Americans,
leading time and again to land-theft, massacre, internment, and genocide.
One can add to this a more general tendency on the part of governments to
corruption and lies. In the United States, for instance, just the past 30 years have been the
scene of a spate of lies and scandals, from pre-Tet propaganda regarding the status of the
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War in Vietnam, to secret bombings of Cambodia, Watergate, the Iran-Contra Affair, and
so forth and so on. Any lack of trust would seem more than justified - what is amazing
is that so many people (including, apparently, Tiryakian) still do trust their governments
or the promises of majorities. Yet, Tiryakian, in a willfully naive analysis, attributes
distrust in the United States entirely to “the student protest movement of [the 1960s that]
introduced a distrust of authority that has continued to this day” [174] — as if these
students were not reacting very understandably to deep, at times genocidal, deceptions,
which have continued to this day.
The issue is not simply that Tiryakian’s slightly modified liberal “paradigm”
prevents an adequate analysis ol minority nations (and ethnic and racial minorities),
dismissing them (in the familiar liberal/psychoanalytic manner) as perversions or
deformations of the proper form of the nation and “national” devotion. His unique
“ innovation” relative to the reductive and manipulative approaches I have already treated
is that he sets as the priority agenda for contemporary social scientists the analysis of the
purported “ erosion of trust,” in the service of its restoration. In other words, even as
social reality contradicts his expectations of it - as derivative of his
liberal/psychoanalytic “paradigm” - he does not consider for a moment changing his
“ paradigm.” His only concern is that others should change theirsf It does not seem to
dawn on Tiryakian that the simplest solution, as well as the only one that will get to the
root causes of the problem, is to transform the governments and minorities into actually
trustworthy institutions or groups -- or, even more directly, to undercut their great power
over subjects and minorities, thereby making their perpetual trustworthiness mostly
irrelevant. One would expect the sensitivity that he claims to the limits of the “dominant
paradigm” would cause him to take pause for self-reflection about his own. It does not.
Instead, Tiryakian calls on the ranks of social scientists to assist in the
manipulation of that social reality, to force a correspondence between individuals’
5l For Tiryakian, this distrust appears a variation of the “ invented tradition” “ paradigm” in the study of
nations and nationalisms.
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psychological and political commitments and the liberal-democratic-contractarian-statist
or just plain statist expectations of them [173 - 176],
This must start with a change in the attitudes of intellectuals, whose work --
including a “sort of ‘genome project’ to study nationalism” [172] - is crucial to any
paradigm shift. Tiryakian is disturbed by the lack of trust of East European
intellectuals in their new, post-communist central governments [174], He can understand
distrust of the earlier, communist governments, but not of the new, supposedly liberal-
democratic ones. Tiryakian fails to consider that the experience of intellectuals and
others under communism might have engendered in them sensibilities beyond
Tiryakian ’s, including a critical approach to all apparatuses of power that allows them to
perceive the limitations of and dominations by even liberal-democratic-contractarian state
governments and majorities. A genuine “paradigm shift” might have been possible by
building on their unique experiences with different forms of political domination, rather
than bemoaning the reasonable and intellectually textured results of these experiences.
Ultimately, Tiryakian’s manipulative, even cynical, project becomes clear. He
attributes contemporary sub-state minority “cultural movements” (based on “ethnicity”
or “race”) to result from a mobilization of dormant individual national commitment by
“
’moral entrepreneurs’” [172]. These movements are thus reduced entirely to the
products of successful marketing campaigns, using the methods of psychological and
emotional manipulation standard to the advertising industries of consumer societies.
Tiryakian wants these
“
’moral entrepreneurs’” studied, for two reasons. First, in the
current age of post-Cold War “economic, demographic, and technological” “change,” an
understanding of the appeal of such leaders is crucial for preventing them from fracturing
or disrupting the emergent liberal-democratic-contractual states [see 171 - 172], Second,
their techniques can be learned, and then used for the legitimate purpose of producing
national commitment to states. His tone indicates disapproval not ot their methods, but
of the social objects the methods serve.
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Though Tiryakian's agenda is similar to Gilbert, Poole, and Femion, who
conceive the nation as a tool for closing the gaps within liberal contractarianism, there is
a significant difference. While the others believe that are simply describing the nature of
nation, and so can be opposed by exposing the limits of their description, Tiryakian calls
for specific actions to transform social reality into line with his problematic agenda for it.
He recognizes the reality of non-state nations - though his analyses of these, which
reduces them to joint preferences of atomic individuals - and explicitly callsfor their
dissolution and displacement by properly state-associated nations. He wants to eliminate
minority nations, ethnic groups, etc.
This is very disturbing, and provides an intellectual rationale for the forced
assimilation that has become the focus of countless state regimes, and the force behind
many genocides and population displacements. It is almost incomprehensible that he can
explicitly recognize the “ forms of state repression and attempted elimination of
populations” [152] that has been a major part of statist nationalism, and then turn around
and develop not merely a justification for it, but a novel method as well.
The methods Tiryakian uses to advocate for these methods of social control also
require mention. Precisely in order to protect a “dominant paradigm” of state power
against (1) concrete disruptions by sub-state minorities and (2) alternative concepts of the
nation and nationalism, as part of genuine political and intellectual transformations,
Tiryakian appropriates the language that such movements and shifts themselves employ.
He thus displaces a genuine transformation, and passes off in its place a defense of the
status quo, clothed in the rhetoric of transformation. In place of a critical “politics of
suspicion” that challenges political manipulation, he interjects a politics of manipulation
itself.
Whether it is naivete and intellectual limitation, or a deeply cynical duplicity,
that drives Tiryakian to serve of this type of agenda is irrelevant. Even if the former, a
genuine “paradigm shift” is never simply a matter of “new” ideas. It requires as well
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actual political transformation, which is utterly absent from Tiryakian's “conservative” -
status-quo preserving - account of the nation. Without this, the gravity of the status quo
political structure pulls all potential runaway ideas into a safe orbit. Without this political
shift, Tiryakian’s work is the mere appropriation of a radical scholarly style and
positioning, without substance.
Even if naivete, his call for a general sociological project to “study” nationalism
in order to figure out how to generate the “right kind” is part of a tradition of
sociological and anthropological studies in the service of dominant state interests. It is
the Phoenix Program rising again, from the ashes of the corpses of its previous victims.
Conclusion
As in Chapter 1 , 1 have treated a number of different theorists of the nation,
offering a range of perspectives on it. However, the range of Chapter 2 has by an large
been limited to liberal or mainstream Western theories and analyses.
Of course, other approaches exist, including for instance contemporary "globalist"
theories. Though variations on cosmopolitanism, these do not reject the nation outright,
but rather absorb it into the grander global inter-culturality that characterizes our age.
Nations and cultures exist, but always as incomplete, fragmented, and mere parts of a
greater whole. "Nationalism" is the delusion that they are unities in themselves, but
social, economic, and political realities require a revised view, and organization around
non-national concepts of the social. A typical sustained example of this is Frederick
Buell's National Culture and the New Global System [1994],
One might also cite a strain originating with Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities [1991]. In recent years, many literary critics, culture theorists, and others
have analyzed the nature of and psychology behind so-called “imaginary homelands.”
The general claim or assumption is that nations are psychologically or literarily
constructed idealized concepts. They are not necessarily or exactly disparaged, but they
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are not engaged as aspects or components of complex material-mental social formations.
They are, rather, perceived as psychological fantasies, or symptoms. In a Nietzschean
vein, they are reduced purely to functions of the individual psychologies of their literary
or cultural producers. The reality of the nation becomes the psychological and literary
mechanisms of its production.
I do not interpret this as the general meaning of “imagined community,” at least
as described in Imagined Communities. I do not believe that Anderson reduces the nation
solely to an idea that is imagined, but rather balances consideration of the idea with the
form or structure of its production and dissemination. A nation is not just the idea, but
rather the participation in the idea by its members - which participation itself is part of
the content of the idea, the image of the nation, even if this is idealized.
At the same time, in recent work, Anderson strongly suggests otherwise. For
instance, in Exodus’ [1994], Anderson describes precisely this type of “imaginary
homeland.” The only qualifying characteristic is that he focuses on exiles or expatriate,
and might not intend his analysis to be generalized. His point, in fact, is that “long-
distance nationalism” is dangerous because it is “radically unaccountable”
: an expatriate
influences home politics while safely isolated from the consequences of his/her
interference [327].
32 Whether the qualification holds or not, it is clear that he does elevate
the “ imaginary homeland” to importance in an overall-analysis of nations and
nationalisms, with a corresponding emphasis on the individual psychology of the
imagining, and de-emphasis of the social relations producing and marked by it. This
essay opens the possibility that Anderson has re-interpreted himself into line with the
“ imagined homelands” strain, or always was its origin. Whatever the case, it is clear that
this strain flattens the complex potential of the concept of the “ imagined community,”
52This position — or prejudice against expatriates - might be determined by Anderson’s problematic
statism, which tends to identify nations by backreading from eventual states, as is true especially in his
treatment of post-colonial states.
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transforming it from an interaction of material and mental forces and structures, to a flat,
purely mental shadow.
There is also a strain in Marxism - advocated by Lenin, manipulated by Stalin,
and manifested in Vietnam, Cuba, China, and elsewhere - that does not necessarily
oppose the nation. As an inversion of Tiryakian, Gilbert, Poole, and others, it valorizes
revolutionary nationalisms that disrupt liberal-capitalist states. Lenin supported anti-
imperial national movements as components in the global communist revolution.
Through colonialism, subject nations became underclasses, and their nationalist
movements could thus be counted as part of the general revolt of the proletariat (or
peasantry).
Immanuel Wallerstein offers a variation on this linking of class and nation,
through his ^Vo^ld System Theory [see especially Wallerstein, 1991], On his analysis,
the global class structure must be understood not merely as exploitation within states or
societies, but between “core” states and blocs of states, and “peripheral” states, neo-
colonies, etc. This analysis recognizes that the establishment of states through anti-
colonial movements has not altered the fundamentally exploitative relationship between
former colonizers and former colonies, with the exception of some token slippage. The
problem with this approach is that it again simply fits nations and nationalism into an
already extant, fairly rigid theoretical structure - in this case a late Marxist one. For
Wallerstein, the nation and nationalism become either a function of economic
exploitation -- exploiters or exploited. Similar to Gellner, any pre-existing cultural or
ethnic elements are national only when tapped for service in this general economic
structure.
This type of approach can be productive in specific circumstances, but ultimately
replicates the logic of Greenfeld’s “good”/” bad” nation/nationalism split. Simply put,
nations are good if and only if they correspond directly to class struggle, and they are bad
if they do not. The conceptual limit or error is the same as in Hobsbawm, the only
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difference being that he considered all nationalisms at some level to support exploitation,
even if ostensibly linked to socialist movements. Their national component ultimately
undercut their class component.
In Stalin’s hands, this evaluative policy turned sinister. It became more than a
matter of supporting anti-imperial struggles. For Stalin, it meant that any cultural, ethnic,
or national tensions could be used in any way to support class struggle. For instance, in
1905, Stalin was on the scene in what would later be Azerbaijan, organizing resistance
among oil industry laborers. Some owners were Armenian, and Stalin used the ethnic
difference between Tartars (Azeris) and Armenians to mobilize the Tartars against these
owners. Most Armenians in the area worked side-by-side with the Tartars in the oil
fields, and the violence against Armenians quickly overshot its intended target. The
Tartars massacred thousands of Armenian laborers and their families.
In the early 1920s, Stalin was Interior Minister of the new Soviet Union. He
again turned to ethnic difference as a tool for consolidating Soviet hegemony over the
newly conquered “republics.” For instance, he transferred the region of Karabakh,
populated mainly by ethnic Armenians for all of recorded history, to the new Azerbaijani
Soviet Socialist Republic. His logic was simple. First, if Karabakh, which had a long
history of semi-autonomy under and resistance to Russian Imperial rule, remained part of
the Armenian S.S.R. (which itself had just been forced into the Soviet Union by a pact
between Turkey and the Soviet Union to partition it, precursing the future Hitler-Stalin
pact on Poland), then Armenian resistance might be unified against Soviet rule. Second,
if Karabakh were placed under the Azeris, then not only would potential Armenian
resistance be split, but an important faction would be forced under the authority of a
hostile regional group. The Karabakh Armenians (and the Republic Armenians, out of
concern for them) would be forced to look to Moscow for support and the means for
survival. The Azeris, on the other hand, would be equally occupied with a powerful
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minority within their local sphere of power. To keep the Azer.s in line, Moscow could
threaten to increase Karabakh Armenian resources, power, and/or autonomy.
Thus, the current conflict between Karabakh Armenians and the Azeri
government does not have its effective origin in some “natural” antipathy between
Azeris and Armenians, but is the direct result of development and exacerbation of ethnic
tensions by Stalin, that endure because they were institutionalized in the formal political
structures of the Soviet Union and hence the post-Soviet states. In the shadow of the
Turkish Genocide of Armenians, the pride of Azeris and Turks in the Turkish ethnicity of
Azeris, the origin in Baku of the very pan-Turkism that drove the Genocide, and the post-
Soviet pan-Turkic alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan, conflict becomes almost
inevitable.
Yet, these Marxist approaches to the nation are waning in importance. That is not
to say that this approach has no concrete consequences, particularly in the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Non-Marxist forces sometimes opportunistically employed
this rationale, as well. But, I believe that my treatment of the problems with using class
analysis as the sole conceptual tool for approach to the nation in the Hobsbawm section
(with a few additional comments here) treat the issue sufficiently. To pursue extended
critiques of variations ot the general position would add inessential length to an already
lengthy (perhaps too lengthy) dissertation. It would, moreover, resonate with the spate of
annoying victory laps by liberal capitalists, celebrating the “defeat” of communism.
That is a cause I have no wish to further — either toward the full dissolution of socialism
(which yet has much to offer) or the ascendance of liberal capitalism and its consolidation
of hegemony within and across states. Marxism after Marx and socialism beyond Marx
did not get the nation right, but they did get much else right . 53
53Hilmar Kaiser [ 1 997] has argued that the linking of class and nation in general, and Wallerstein’s “ World
System Theory” in particular, were instrumental German contributions to the Turkish Genocide of
Armenians, and have become standard tenets of the denial of the Genocide. Since the Genocide, some
Turkish propagandists have joined with some Marxists to represent the deaths of at least a million
Armenians as the inevitable result of class struggle, in which exploited Turkish peasants and workers
overthrew their Armenian capitalist and agrarian exploiters. This argument has always ignored the fact that
the vast majority (that is, close to 100 percent) of Armenian victims were peasants in villages beside
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More generally, I have chosen to focus on liberal approaches because liberalism is
the dominant and ascending political force in the world. With the "fall" of "communism"
and consumer capitalism’s appropriation of ’‘globalism,” political options have become
quite limited. Recent liberal theorization of the nation reflects and exploits this
ascendancy, driving nations (and states) toward dramatic reconfigure,ons consistent with
liberal capitalism.
I have a more limited reason, as well. As I have claimed, liberalism is so
dominant in contemporary Anglo-American analytic Political Philosophy, that it has
become a generalized assumption rather than a rallying point (as it was during the Cold
War). From my own philosophical perspective, this is oppressive and carries with it yet
greater dangers for oppressed and even not-so-oppressed groups. Exposing this
oppression and danger is essential to any project of alternative political theory, as I intend
my work on the nation to be.
In the long-run, the absorptive power of various liberal perspectives on the nation
is a far greater threat than simple antinational-ism. The latter at least can be confronted
directly. Even when antinational-ism is assumed and not explicit, its form is clearly
antagonistic to the nation, and can be recognized as such. Appropriations of the nation
are much more subtle. They often take the form of approbation or gentle, almost
Turkish and Kurdish peasants, or humble craftspeople in urban areas (see Stephan H. Astourian’s
introduction [Astourian, 1997: viii - ix] [besides ignoring the facts that (1) a large percentage of the
victims were children, whose deaths can hardly have contributed to an overthrow of the fantasized
Armenian domination, (2) Turks and Kurds took on the order of 100,000 Armenian women and °irls
(usually peasants) into sexual or domestic slavery, again hardly a form of general proletarian or peasant
liberation and (3) the German and Turkish governments used 250,000 Armenian soldiers from the lower
ranks of the Ottoman Army as slave labor (generally working them to death) on the Berlin-Baghdad
railway]).
Kaiser builds a case against this use of World System Theory in the service of Genocide and its
denial, based on Donald Quataert’s important work on the class demographics of the Ottoman Empire.
Quataert s research explodes the myth produced to justified violence against Armenians before and after
the Genocide, that the merchant/capitalist (both at the local and empire-wide levels) class in the Ottoman
Empire was mainly Armenian. In fact, u there simply was not a widespread ethnic division of labor’” in
the Ottoman Empire: particular groups generally did not control or dominate particular activities in the
Ottoman Empire as a whole . . . An ethnic or religious group that dominated an economic activity in one
particular region did not necessarily do so in another.’” [Kaiser, 1997: I - 2]
Had 1 before July 1998 become aware of Kaiser’s work on the link between World System Theory
and the perpetration and denial of genocide, I might have reconsidered not treating it in detail.
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unnoticed pushing in one direction or another. They are neither antagonistic nor overtly
demanding.
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CHAPTER 3
A THEORY OF THE NATION
This dissertation has two purposes. First, in Chapters 1 and 2, it is intended to
expose the ideological tainting and limits of much of the contemporary literature on the
nation and nationalism. Second, I mean to supersede this tainting and limits, through
development of a comprehensive theory of these social phenomena built on the initial
critiques.
The first part of the dissertation is not simply a literature review, but grasps
beyond this, toward the type of critique Edward Said levels at “orientalism.” Thus, it
takes as its “data” theories of the nation and nationalism themselves, as discussed in the
introduction.
Throughout the critiques of various theories, I have partially developed or alluded
to alternative concepts of nation and nationalism, built on less ideological or at least anti-
oppressive philosophical and political foundations. Though the focus has been critique,
an alternative concept has been developing throughout. Specific points have peeked out
at different points.
At this point, the balance shifts, away from critique, and toward positive
theorization of the nation and nationalism. In this chapter, I revisit and further develop
earlier positive points, integrating them with other, new components, into a
comprehensive theory.
The development of these new components engages other theorists not treated in
Chapters 1 and 2. That does not mean, however, that they could not have been. For
instance, the work of Etienne Balibar figures prominently in the following, as a set of
points of departure for my own ideas. As will be clear, there are fundamental ideological
problems with Balibar’ s work. At the same time, it has a value in at least raising a range
of issues crucial to a comprehensive and tenable theory of the nation and nationalism —
something most of the work treated in Chapters 1 and 2 fails to do. At some points,
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Balibar is purely anti-national; at others, he exploits problematic theorization and critique
of the nation and nationalism in advancing his own political agenda; at yet others, he
offers interesting insights on these phenomena. Thus, Balibar has a legitimate place in
each chapter. Having ample theorists for use in Chapters 1 and 2, 1 have reserved his
work for positive use here. As I did suggest and in some cases partially explore positive
points in Chapters 1 and 2, my treatment of Balibar's work will also point out the
political and philosophical shortcomings relevant to Chapters 1 and 2 - but without
focusing on them.
Similar remarks could be made of Homi K. Bhabha’s work, which also could
occupy a place in each chapter. In Bhabha’s case, however, the positive aspects of his
theory are much more pronounced than in Balibar’s, and compel inclusion here.
On the other hand, the work of other theorists, especially Partha Chatterjee,
contains little that recommends it for treatment in Chapters 1 and 2. It is cited in a more
traditional manner.
The Margins of the Nation, or the Nation on the Margin^
My analysis of Thom's theory of the nation focused on the tension between the
nation as a historical or pre-historical given, and the nation as the product of the activity
of its constituents. I have referred to the presence of both of these tendencies within the
nation, in a productive tension.
My references to this point, however, have been vague. In "DissemiNation:
Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation" [1990], Bhabha develops an
explicit theory of this tense relationship. Indeed, he sees this tension as complexly
constitutive of the nation.
For Bhabha, the nation is a narrative construct that responds to the loss of fixed
homogeneous cultural communities in the transition from pre-modernity to modernity.
Mass migrations and demographic intermixtures characteristic of the modern era have
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irreparably disrupted the previously given local, direct community and cultural
homogeneity [Bhabha,
,990a: 29,].. Agamst this irremediable heterogeneity, the nation
emerges as the next focal social form. However, i, is not a concrete material social
group,ng, for mstance consisting of a certain se, of 'identical' individuals on a certain
ptece of land, speaking a certain language, and so forth. It is, rather, an assertion of
umfying homogeneity against the apparently fragmented, in,erased structure of culture
m the modem world. As assertion, i, is no, a 'real' social formation, bu, rather a
metaphor" expressing the desire for lost community [291],
The assertion of the nation refers to the people who comprise it, thereby causing
them (in a narrative sense) to comprise it. These referents are the nation as well. Were
they simply the objects of narration, there would be an actual nation corresponding to its
narrative. But, these objects are also subjects - they act in ways that are no, necessarily
consistent with a grand national narrative. The reality of the people of the nation does no,
correspond to conceptions of the nation, its narratives.
The activities of the people, in fact, constitute other narratives. Though material
circumstances might privilege (a) certain narrative(s), this/these narrative(s) is/are not
authoritative. In a perpetual shifting, those who are narrated are always becoming those
who narrate, so no narrative is final. Indeed, by the very fact of being referenced in a
narrative, the people's activities become distinct narratives: the mere existence of
difference from the imposed narrative itself expresses alternative narratives - in a sense
automatically producing them.
These 'automatic' responses are not necessarily "counter-narratives" that assert
competing grand narratives, but rather supplementary narratives that add to and
Page references will be given in brackets. The first time a work is referenced in a series of references to
wm"16 f °rk ’ thf name of t Jie ?u,thor wil1 aPPear > followed by the year of publication for the edition citednd the referenced page number(s). If some ot this information is given in the narrative, then only what is
rhp
?'
Ven V
" i!
’ aPPear
.“] brackets - In cases in which references appear to more than one work by an authorthe year will distinguish which publication is referenced. Subsequent references to a work within a series
will contain just the referenced page number(s) in brackets. When a work is re-introduced after another
work or other works have been referenced, the initial reference of the series will again be in the full form.
Bracketed references within a sentence concern material in that sentence only; references after a
sentence refer to material in more than one preceding sentence.
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complexify the referents of an initial narrative. The latter attempts to fix the people as
this or that, to specify them as national. But, their activities always reveal more than
what is specified - spectfication is limiting, after all - and so adds to the initial,
"totalizing" narrative of the nation, without "adding up" to a new totality [305],
These narratives cannot be integrated into the grand totalizing narrative precisely
because they are already in it, as points of ambiguity or "doubleness"
- points at which
the people are more than 'national' in the totalizing sense, and so not "national" in this
sense (the sense of the grand narrative) at all. They are points of undecidablility. These
differences must be disavowed in order for a narrative to indicate a totality - and their
disavowal itself marks the failure of the totalization. If a new narrative is posed that tries
to integrate the differences, the incessant activity of the people will result in similar
points of ambiguity/"doubleness" within the new referent. 2
For Bhabha, a totalizing narrative references the people of the nation as the
subject of national activity. Is the nation simply their activity? Bhabha does hold that the
nation is the complex of different and divergent narratives of (the) people. However, this
complex is not totalizable, and certainly not as a unified national subject that produces a
unified narrative. Within the 'national' population are "contentious, unequal interests and
identities [297]. Only through the assertion of a totalizing narrative itself are the people
unified into the subject of a totalizing narrative, but this is a narrated subject, and the
actual activities of the people as subjects are at odds with it.
"Totalizing narratives" Bhabha labels as the "pedagogical" aspect of the nation,
while the immediate activity of the people is its "performance." The pedagogy of the
nation is in irresolvable tension with its performance — any resolution must be in the form
ol a totalizing concept of the nation, which is again in tension with the performance of the
people. [297] 3
2
I will explain this in more detail below.
3Though unacknowledged and perhaps unrecognized by Bhabha, his account of the social structure of the
nation appears a modification of Nietzsche’s account of the structure of consciousness in The Birth of
Tragedy. The pedagogy of the nation appears derivative of the Apollinian aspect of consciousness, while
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The tens,on between these two forms of national narrative - aspects of a singie
"natton” - is provisionally minim,zed so long as a much greater difference is perceived
between the "nation" and (an) external group(s). Communities are bound together by an
"ambivalent identification of love and hate.” So long as an external group existson
which internally-generated hate can be projected, love is dominant within the group.
However, if the d.fference that is used to justify projection of hate outward is discovered
m ithin the group, then the hate is turned inward as well. [300] 4
This, Bhabha argues, is precisely what has occurred in the contemporary era. He
reads Foucault to suggest that states in the current era are in a perpetual '"competition"
with other states. As this becomes apparent, political agents recognize that the difference
b6tWeen StateS iS 3 PCrmanent fact Tensions with other states are recognized as static and
futile. Each state is thus thrown back into itself. Difference is no longer found outside it.
In this sense, projecting hate outside becomes insufficient for relieving internal pressures.
Observable difference within the nation becomes the focus of this discharge.
"Difference" within the nation becomes significant. The antagonistic difference that was
presumed to exist between this national culture and other national cultures is found to
exist within this nation. The internal disunity of the nation is revealed. Totalizing
narratives emerge in efforts to control this difference, and preserve the sense of unity that
existed prior to the collapse of outwardly focused aggression. With this, the tension
between the pedagogy and performance of the nation becomes central. [301]
What is the nation after this recognition of internal disunity? No longer can its
internal ditference be obscured by a unity relative to an external other. Neither can it be
the imposition of a state on a population: such impositions are totalizing, and drive
recognition of difference. Nor can difference be relegated to the private realm, versus a
public sphere in which individuals are alike and unified. The inclusion of individuals
the Di°ny s ian is reflected in the performative. This psychologization has significant implications which
will be explored below.
Bhabha bases this analysis on "Freud's concept of the 'narcissism of minor differences.'"
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within the public sphere is an imposition on them, and their resistance is not a matter of a
different kind of difference without reference to the public - that is, their escape into the
private - but rather a difference within the public that cannot be assimilated into the
imposed publicity.
[304 ]
Further, this difference cannot be subordinated to a grander pluralistic unity. One
cannot simply describe the complexity and different narratives of the people within a
single, over-arching narrative. This is simply the imposition of a totalizing narrative onto
the revealed disunity, with the totalizing narrative itself regulating difference (the
different narratives) and thus occasioning difference from the imposed form of difference.
Even if this pluralistic narrative is absolutely minimal in what it imposes, it still
accomplishes a homogenization of difference. But, the activity of the people produces
difference not within the totalizing narratives, but as something that cannot be
accommodated by such narratives— even pluralistic ones. The assertion of difference
through activity occurs after or beyond pluralistic or any other forms of totalization. It is
a supplement to a totalization, that challenges and reworks it without being absorbed into
it. It is "added to" the totalization without the result "adding up" to a total - it is beyond
all totals. It is a revision or editorial comment that cannot be merely addressed by the
totalizing narrative, but challenges the very grounding assumptions and foundations of
this narrative to be rethought and reworked.
[305 ]
A nation is also not the complex of the activities of its people, unified by mere
temporal coincidence and perception of it, as Benedict Anderson might have it. Bhabha
interprets Anderson to conceive the nation as akin to the plot of a complicated "realist
novel," in which the mere simultaneity of the "diverse acts and actors on the national
stage" links them together, though they "are entirely unaware of each other, except as a
function of this sychronicity of time." The "imagined community" is simply abstract
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awareness of this simultaneity.* For Bhabha, the disjunction between narrator and
narrated underm,nes the possibihty of such simultaneity: the narrator and narrated do not
act in the same instant, but the one after the other. [308 - 309]
Finally, a nation is not the product of a mere common will to be a nation, contra
Renan. As Renan admits, any historically existent common will to nationhood depends
on a forgetting of the history of the national population. This history, after all, contains
all the bloody, violent deeds by which disparate groups were coerced into the nation or
driven from its territory, as well as the divergent origins, erasures of languages and
dialects, migrations, invasions, conquests, etc., that had a role. To remember these events
is to remember the difference that existed before and that is implicit in the nation, against
any myth of unity grounded in the past. Indeed, the memory of violence and force might
even produce a reaction against the nation, a rebirth of those divergent groups. [310]
Renan's will to nationhood is simply the will to accept the totalizing national
narrative - with its omissions. Yet, it is not a one-time social contract that imposes
obligations to the nation in perpetuity. It must be continually reaffirmed almost as '"a
daily plebiscite.'" But this continual reaffirmation contains within it the possibility of not
willing the nation. It grants legitimate agency in the constitution of the nation to each
individual, and legitimates a possible 'no' to the nation. It thus opens up the possibility of
the fragmentation of the nation. [310-311]
There is, in fact, no way to save the concept of the nation as a "totality," a unified
culture. Indeed, this impulse itself is merely one aspect of the more complicated nature of
the nation. This impossibility does not cause Bhabha to reject the very possibility of the
nation, as Hobsbawm does. Rather, he sees in the dynamic between pedagogy and
performance an emergent form of national narrative. Their tension was mystified until
the contemporary era. The demystification of the tension was made possible through the
I am not sure that this is an entirely accurate reading of Anderson. This imagined linking might depend
on this simultaneity, but it appears to depend on other factors as well — commonalities of language, media
exposure, experience, etc.
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US fr0m mter'natl0nal t0 lntra-national difference that characterizes the post-
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..self can be mterrupted and (2) of breaking fee from the modernist
concept of the nation as a totality.
In the activity of the people
.ha, is disruptive of to,adzing national narrative
Bhabha isolates a certain form, tha, of "minority discourse." This discourse is the
supplementary chailenge from within and beyond that d.srupts the totalizing narrative
W'thout bemg °r bemg absorbed int0 a totalizing namttive. When it is recognized not as
merely resistance to this or that totalizing narrative (with the possible end of negotiating a
better form of inclusion into the national unity), bu, as resistance to totalization in
general, it becomes the basis of a strategy of resistance. It is not, however, an
oppositional position. It is no, the counter-assertion of an alternate totalizing narrative by
a fixed minority, against the dominant majority. It is, on the contrary, precisely that
which cannot be absorbed into a totality, that which is constantly produced as an excess
ofeVery ,0talizi
"g ^e "minority" or "marginalized" in Bhabha’s sense are no,
a set group of people, but rather the perpetually sh.fting and reformed border of the
nation, consisting of wha, is excluded and/or ’disciplined'* by each successive totalizing
narrative.
At the same time, the production of the marginalized is not a purely unstructured,
immediate activity: the minority is not merely the temporary, abstract product of an
indifferent process, as one might understand the minority position on a political issue in a
J. S. Miilian world. The totalizing narratives function by assigning national significance
to difference - initially external, but now internal. In much the way that racist ideology
creates the significance of certain phenotypal differences, and so constructs race, a
totalizing national narrative creates difference by making certain differences significant
111 the Foucauldian sense of imposing — explicitly or not - a form on the
them into conformity with the dominant discourse.
objects of discipline that deforms
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for national identity. Thus, the margin is produced by totalizing narration, but not as a
purely arbitrary selection of those to include in the nation and those to exclude or
discipline into conformity. The
'signification' of (a) certain difference(s) is influenced by
(1) the characteristic form of the modern nation, which tends to emphasize such things as
language, lineage, etc. - in general, homogeneity - and (2) the particular forces of
oppression operating or predisposed within a society, particularly forces that had been
focused outside the nation prior to the reflection of the nation's "hate" into itself. The
latter cannot be analyzed as a set of forces simply to extirpate: they contain "traces of [a
range of] diverse disciplinary discourses and institutions of knowledge that constitute the
[very] condition and contexts of culture" [313],
Bhabha is explicit about the "strategy" of resistance grounded in minority
discourse, providing multiple examples. His focus is a form of minority produced
through post-colonial immigration into former colonizers and Great Powers.
"Minority discourse acknowledges the status of the national culture - and the
people - as a contentious, performative space of the perplexity of the living in the midst
of the pedagogical representations of life" [307], To the extent that the narratives of the
marginal become present in the nation, the non-totalizable complexity of the nation as the
agency of members despite the imposition of fixed concepts of the nation as given from
the past becomes apparent, and militates against coercive totalization. Indeed,
recognition of the performative aspect of the nation "provides ... a narrative authority for
marginal voices or minority discourse" [301],
The strategy of resistance capitalizes on this authority. The marginalized expose
the failure ot the totalization, show that this or that difference does not support the
exclusion or discipline that the totalizers believe it to. The immigrant becomes more
patriotic, a braver soldier, smarter in school. This forces another attempt at totalization,
another attempt to discipline or exclude. No more bilingual classes — English should be
the natural national language. And yet the marginal disrupt, do not fit: the Indian
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immigrant reads Shakespeare, Austen, and Joyce with penetrating^ understanding,
and writes beautiful letters in English that are the envy of Anglo recipients. She is more
'Anglo' than the Anglos, yet her skin is dark, her religion and history 'strange.' Indeed.
through her, difference is opened within 'the King's English,' that is reflected back into
Shakespeare, Austen, and Joyce - a presumably gay man, a woman, and an Irishman,
none 'properly' Anglo. 7
Or, the immigrant transforms the supposedly sacred national language, the
supposedly meaningful cultural activity, of the new home culture into merely mechanical
activity, with no significance beyond itself. He speaks the language without
understanding of or reference to this 'depth,' merely imitating the sounds he hears without
a deeper purpose. This undercuts the pretensions of totalizing national narratives to a
transcendent national culture, reducing the culture to an "antimetaphoric" mundanity.
[315-316]
This cycle can give way to a process of renegotiation of the basis of the nation
itself, of the fitting of lived, immediate activity into the history of a nation. This history
itself comes into question, the homogeneity presumed in the past (in 'English' (male,
heterosexual) literature, for instance). This transformation of cycle into process is more
and more purposeful, more and more of a strategy that can be guided into a renegotiative
process. As we have seen, the minority "insinuates] itself into the terms of reference of
the dominant discourse." It fits within this discourse even as it is more than what it
should be. it antagonizes the implicit power to generalize," to overcome the instability
that it has introduced into the familiar concept of this or that nation. The insinuation, the
antagonizing can be intentional, that is, a strategy. It need not, however, be a totalizing
strategy, as a Marxist faith in the coming Revolution might be. It need assume no
specific set of players, no specific structure of the 'communities of resistance, 1 no specific
'future history,' and so forth, [see 307 - 308]
'These particular examples are not from Bhabha's work itself, but I believe they are useful in understanding
in a compact manner the gist of his overall account of this strategy of minority resistance.
291
Th ' S reileg0tlatl0n alters the fundamental assumptions and basics of the national
cuiture, without however stoppmg «he attempts a, tota„za„on. Yet, as the assumptions
change, the national culture itself becomes more marginalized, more of a 'zone of
marginality.' It is no, that the inclusion of the marginal.zed changes the nation, but that
the constant renegotiate undercutting of the successive totalizing assumptions
foundations, and history of the national culture opens the national process to include
more and more people. As the nation becomes more and more the product of the activity
Of the people, inclusion depends less and less on reference by a totalizing narrative.
Minoritarian members are no longer manipulated into conformity - even into a fixed
component in a pluralism; neither are totalizing narratives of the nation altered to include
them. Rather, the totalizing narratives are more and more displaced and 'marginalized'
themselves, [see especially 301 - 302].
A Step Forward
Consistent with his critique of totalizing narratives of the nation, Bhabha does not
attempt a general theory of the nation [320], but rather problematizes the received
concepts. Whether or not one with a different understanding of the issues concerning
totalizing national narratives is bound by this totalizing stricture against transforming
Bhabha's work into a comprehensive theory, his insights must be engaged by any such
theory. His work, in fact, marks a noteworthy advance in the literature on the nation.
A key insight is to move the totalizing national narrative inside the dynamic that
constitutes the nation, rather than taking totalizing narratives at face value. Theorists
such as Hobsbawm and Kedourie test the reality underlying national narratives against
the narratives themselves, assuming that, for the nation to be genuine, productive — rather
than a falsifying manipulation of a population — the underlying reality must correspond
with a dominant totalizing narrative. As Bhabha's work makes clear, this correspondence
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IS not possible, and the conclusion of such theorists
manipulation.
is that the nation is a falsifying
Bhabha, on the other hand, insightfully apprehends that the 'reality' of the nation
is not merely the performance of the nation, but rather the dynamic tension of its
pedagogy and performance. The performance itself does not have meaning
independently of the pedagogical - it is the pure activity of the people perceived relative
to totalizing narrative.
Bhabha thus produces a theory of the nation that avotds the pitfalls of privileging
the unity of the nation against internal difference, as a pluralistic, liberal (relegating
difference to the private realm), or dialectical account would, while at the same time
allowing for a form of national culture that, while cut across complexly by difference, is
not destroyed by it. What Bhabha accomplishes is to acknowledge and describe the
relationship between the reality of an individual nation and its grand concept. His non-
liberal, non-pluralist conception of difference is crucial to an understanding of the nation
form, which itself was originally a reaction against the community-destroying,
individuating liberal and pluralist forms of modem social organization.
His description highlights new issues and complexities, such as the relationship of
the nation's present and past, the relationship of the individual to the nation, and the
disjunctions in narrative activity and reference. What is more, he offers an account of the
nation that acknowledges the significance of its internal marginalized, and invests them
with a special role in driving the progressive articulation of the nation.
At a crude level, one might characterize Bhabha's concept of the nation as a
tension between unity and difference or controlling repetition and creative production, a
non-dialectical (non-totalizable) product. The nation becomes processural — it is always
in the process of being produced, so long as neither given unity nor fragmentation
becomes dominant. This is not a progressive or teleological process. At every moment.
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through the present performance of the nation, new ’rules' of process are produced, new
trends followed, and the current vector of (future) development abandoned.
This nation is not the standard modern nation, which itself is precisely what is
referenced in the pedagogy of the nation. It is a "post-modern" nation. Indeed, Bhabha
appears to view the nation form as a crucial agent in the process of interrupting modernity
itself. At the meta-national level, Bhabha's work represents a shift from the
predominance ot the totalizing/totalized nation to a new form, which itself follows and
helps drive a shift from modernism to post-modernism. Through this shift, the grand
progressive historicism of the nation, which views the present as the product of the past,
is displaced by a perpetual production of the nation in the present, which subverts any
grand teleology or even linear historical continuity, [see 292-294 and 298]
What makes Bhabha's work exciting is that he does not preserve the nation against
the minority/marginal that problematizes its unity. Rather, he makes the marginal the
very engine of cultural production that is the nation, not as a rigid, causally determined
unity, but as a site of the activity of the national people. He recognizes in the nation a
truly processural basis or temporal aspect, such that analysis of social structure alone is
insufficient to explain the nation. At best, such techniques yield a cross-section of the
nation, a form frozen in time, bereft of the temporal process — the movement — that is
fundamental to it.
It is significant that Bhabha identifies himself explicitly as writing from within the
in-between marginality of the emigre, exile, diasporan, migrant minority. In this way, he
inverts the usual positioning ofthe academic relative to his or her object ofstudy. He is
his own object of study, but this is not a simple identity relation of subject and object.
Rather, the he and the him are offset , in the way that the subjectivity and objectivity of the
national people are. [see 301]
In this light, Thom's failure to condemn enthology takes on increased significance.
He embraces the transformation of ethnology from ideology to science as making it
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legitimate, and even lakes Edward Said lo task for sinrptifying
,9th Century oriental^
around h,s assertion of its ideological function [Thom, 1990: 27). But, scientific
ethnology is still the objectification of cultural groups - if by more
"scientific" methods.
At the same time that Thom objects to claims of the "givenness" of the nation, he vaunts
an ethnology that objectifies social groupings: in other words, he condemns the self-
ethnology of traditional nationalism at the same time that he exculpates externally
imposed ethnology. Bhabha has pushed production of the nation beyond both internal
and external totalization. 8
Diminishing Returns
Bhabha maintains that the activity of the people perpetually disrupts the assertion
of totalizing national narratives. It is possible that this will be recognized, with
totalization itselfcoming to reflect its own provisionality. Under such conditions, the on-
going renegotiation of the assumptions of the culture becomes a positive state, one that
allows not just the mere survival of the people independently of totaling narratives, but
fosters the flowering of the active people.
In DissemiNation," Bhabha is somewhat ambiguous as to whether this process
will lead beyond the nation even in its post-modern form. Perhaps the ambiguity is
This general point resonates with my dissertation project itself, at least in its critical aspect. In my
Iran^f^A
pro
Pos<l
d tkls d|ssertation as an exercise in Armenian intellectual agency in an effort to helntransform Armenian Studies" from an objectification of things Armenian to an expression of ArmenL
P
subjectivity. This can be function can be expressed within Bhabha's framework asm attempt to disrupt thedominant discourse in the academic study of the nation and nationalism. ^
Consistent with my own critique of Bhabha, however, my work goes beyond a mere
fh°
n 0 the
i
dot
P!
nant dlscou[se, of the grand meta-national narratives. Negotiation with the
narrators ot these merely ultimately reinforces the discourse itself: it might alter the content of thediscourse somewhat, but will do nothing to diminish its damaging power over people and politics.
.
t f
.
My w°rk s
,®
eks t0
.8° beyond negotiation, to "narrate the narrators," that is, to objectify the
objectiflers, the (external) theorists of the nation. Though, at the meta-national level, I seek to open a spacein which productive conceptualization of the nation is possible, my work is at odds with Bhabha's Mv
objectification of the objectifies is in his frame merely a negating counter-narrative, which does not
negotiate new conceptual possibilities, but rather asserts new forms of the same old totalizing theory of the
nation. ®
But, my goal is precisely to undermine the academic narration of the nation, to change the
conditions under which academics and others who conceptualize within the "dominant discourse" - withimmediate and significant oppressive impact - perform the narration, and to stop such narratives as much
as possible. Though my reach probably overextends my grasp, my method is appropriate to this goal.
At the same time, my project also moves beyond criticism, to posit its own 'totalizing meta-
national narrative.'
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purposeful, ,o suggest the indeterminate nature of the process in question. What concerns
me here, however, is not the specific outcome of the process of negotiat.on as described
by Bhabha, but rather whether this process has the transformative effects
.ha, Bhabha
maintains it does.
Bhabha's analysis of the renegotiative narrative process is consistent with much of
contemporary cultural criticism, particularly that which is informed by post-modern
theory. This literature finds in the type of disruption that Bhabha advocates an
_ perhaps
the ~ contemporary engine of meaningful social change against oppression. At least
regarding the specific manner in which Bhabha presents this engine, this appears to be a
naive analysis.
To begin with, perpetual interruption in itselfis not necessarily an advance for the
marginal 1zed/oppressed
. The key assumption here is that this form of disruption itself
remains forceful throughout its exercise. Yet, in time, its power is diminished. Think of
the following Kafkan parable: Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs
what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally, it can be
calculated in advance, and it becomes a part ofthe ceremony [Kafka, 1961 : 93], Even
perpetual undermining becomes predictable - its very unpredictability becomes routine,
and then mundane. As time flows - which Bhabha posits as a repetitive time, but which,
following Kafka (and Sartre 9 ), one can recognize as a potentially institutionalizing time -
the impact of disruption becomes less and less, to the point where even the issue of
culture is deprived of its legitimate significance. As disruption itself becomes routine, it
is in fact absorbed into the status quo.
There are ample examples of this in contemporary U. S. culture. Originally,
"radical rap" was quite disruptive of racist white ideology, at once a forceful assertion of
resentment against a racism that it named, and a demonstration of cultural
accomplishment and ability equal or superior to typically "white" musical forms.
'See Volume 1 of the Critique ofDialectical Reason.
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However, the disruption gradually lost its punch, and ultimately became
with its own time slot on "MTV." And
institutionalized,
even as music videos themselves drew criticism
for all sorts of reasons - including for the commercial marketing of societal forces of the
type expressed in rap - ironic and harsh criticism of music videos, often based on critical
social and political positions, gained its own time slot on "VH 1 This type of
institutionalization of disruption or alternative supplement is echoed in the transformation
of "indie" (independent) film-making into a relatively mainstream activity, with its own
festival and cable channel (Sundance), its own icons, and a growing mass market.
Further, disruptive challenges can function to support their causes. Sidney Lumet
provides a brilliant and prophetic illustration in his film Network, in which a vibrant
narrative of popular resentment is capitalized upon by the very oppressive forces it
counters. This is a crucial point, and a frequent occurrence - the oppressive reversal of
Bhabha's formula.
Finally, disruption might become desirable and mass consumed, as occurs in
Network. Horror films offer an obvious example: where once the occultly dangerous
caused genuine fear, now it causes a desirable fear that is consumed in mass amounts in
Western
- particularly U. S. - culture. This consumption of disruption is pervasive.
One cannot turn on the television during the day without wading through countless "talk
shows that feature all sorts of "abnormal" people describing in detail their "abnormal"
behaviors, and perhaps engaging in such behaviors on screen. 10 One can hardly turn on
the radio at any time without finding a "shock jockey" saying or representing him- or
herself as doing things on the air far outside the bounds of "polite society."
In the 1970s, such talk shows were truly shocking, and in the 1980s Howard Stern
got fired lor the "shocking" things he said on the air. By now, however, shock has
become so institutionalized and mundane that it is expected
,
and consumers are
disappointed when not shocked or disquieted sufficiently.
As is the case in the most perfected forms of this type of television program, such as The Jerry Springer
Show. r *
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Perhaps Bhabha would argue (hat of course particular forms of disruption lose
them effectiveness and become institutionalized, but that new forms with their own
original power are perpetually produced. I would argue that, on the contrary,
contemporary Western society is characterized in general by a growing range of
disruptive cultural interventions. Multitudes of television programs seek to show deeper
and "dirtier" facts and situations; newspapers become more and more sensationalistic;
films are more and more violent, psychologically disturbing, and sexually explicit; people
are more violent, shooting each other over trivial issues, exhibiting pathological "road
rage," etc.; fashions and fashion advertising are more and more routinely risque or
unusual; and the National Enquirer is the nation's best-selling "newspaper," followed by
a host of similar publications. At the same time, these "disruptions" are less and less
significant or noteworthy. People have become used to them, and take them or leave
them. Again, in the type of societies that Bhabha seems to expect cultural disruption to
have effect, it is becoming less and less effective in general “
This is true when disruption is linked to oppression issues. Majoritarians are
more and more used to being challenged on issues of race, gender, sexuality, etc.,
oppression, and so such "disruptions" are less and less disquieting and effective. Society
is dominated by a backlash of indifference. Protests and demonstrations have become a
matter of mundane routine, quite often even for their participants, surviving more by
reference to the pure intensity of past protest than present energy.
What is more, perhaps where the shock is meaningful, the reaction is not what
Bhabha expects. Perhaps only weak disruptions have a chance of being met with
negotiation, precisely because they can be absorbed. Confronted with a truly powerful
disruption, a majoritarian might be antagonized not to renegotiation, but to a more
extreme form of totalization — akin to the extreme (and violent) homophobia that a
“Even the invocation of cultural disruption by academics has become rather trite.
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"heterosexual" male might exhibit precisely at the point where his own sexuality comes
into question, [see 315-317]
Bhabha acknowledges this type of reaction, that "elicits those racist fantasies of
punty and persecution" characteristic of extremist nationalisms. Yet, Bhabha thinks that
even this extremism
- perhaps because it is so extreme - disrupts the position of
majontarian enunciation: in its extremist reaction, "the paranoid position finally voids
the place from where it speaks," and gives way to the possibility of renegotiation [3 1 7],
This "faith" in the positive results of antagonizing the majority might be based on
Bhabha's understanding of Foucault's political activity. Foucault, after all, antagonized
police to beat him at demonstrations, as a way of exposing the raw oppressive power that
is their truth. This type of Gandhian strategy depends on the reaction of masses of
bystanders, who either (1) identify with those being beaten, and so come to develop an
antagonistic relationship with the police or (2) have sympathy for those beaten, or at least
do not have the stomach to be implicated in their beatings, and so who apply pressure to
stop the extremism. What Bhabha seems to miss is the overriding tendency not to see the
beatings, all the more if they are presented and represented endlessly through media
accounts, talk-show debates, etc. - not to care, not to engage. Narrative is not all-
consuming or including. Such a strategy can work, but depends on a certain context for
effectiveness. Indeed, this context might be historically specific andpast — the 1930s
and 40s in India (Gandhi), the 1950s and 60s in the United States (Martin Luther King).
Thus, even where an extremist majoritarian reaction is avoided, cultural
renegotiation and transformation does not necessarily take place. I have participated
directly, witnessed, and had reported to me a large number of conversations with
domestic social workers or community-level international development workers.
Typically, these workers have erected a psychological Maginot Line against right-wing
critiques ot their "do-gooder" personalities and politics; their "soft" approaches to the
poor and down-trodden; and their openness to different cultures, races, and lifestyles.
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They are ill-prepared for a critique from a different direction, that points out their
complicity in contemporary systems (institutions) of oppress,on, imperialist and racist
agendas, etc. This is especially true when their "good intentions" are exposed as self-
delusions that, at least according to Aristotle, they are responsible for and that mask
darker operations of self-interest.
Upon hearing such a critique, they often reduce it into terms that can be absorbed
safely into their system of thought. When pushed harder, they do not react violently, as
Bhabha’s ultra-racist would, but rather simply disengage, labeling their challenger him- or
herself as irrational and potentially violent. They refuse to hear the arguments that, if
they were to acknowledge them, would undermine their entire political legitimacy and
even sense of identity to the extent it is tied up with being a social worker or Peace Corps
volunteer. Nothing is renegotiated, and valid and powerful critiques are henceforth
recognized by their "outlines" and pre-emptively disengaged. Only when "cornered" —
when forced to engage, as in a class or seminar - do they become antagonistic, precisely
at the point where they view their identity coming into question.
Bhabha might counter that his focus is not changing individual mind sets — this
would, after all, just produce a set of homogeneous individuals. Recalcitrant racists are
not inconsistent with an anti-racist society. Indeed, their presence might play an essential
role in the reproduction of that society, might be the controlled trigger for the on-going
re-assertion of anti-racist sentiments by the majority of the society. He is focused on the
culture and society as a whole, not mere individuals.
This counter-argument only works against the points I made in reference to
Foucault and subsequently: my prior criticisms were based on the fact that society as a
whole has not been changed by renegotiations. What is more, even regarding the later
points, it is obvious that substantive social change in a generally oppressive society
requires the transformation of a significant percentage of its membership. It is hard to
conceive of an anti-racist society that is composed of a majority of racists. Even the
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imposition of an.i-racis, behaviors by force - on the unlikely assumption that this can
happen - does not produce a truly anti-racist society, and militates against the
democratic, non-totalizing social form Bhabha advocates.
Prison Narrative
Bhabha's appeal to cultural disruption is limited in another way as well It is
closed within the narrative level - I, is about interrupting narratives with other forms of
narrative, not material challenges and change. Of course, by "narrative," Bhabha does not
mean simply literary narratives or artistic works. It is enunciation more generally,
whether representative of something (pedagogical) or expressive of the narrator
(performative).
Yet, even if one might read Bhabha as intending to include actions within
enunciation, these can be present only in the form or content ofnarrative. As such, they
are purely "cultural.” Bhabha collapses narrative and materiality into a single realm, a
narrative realm. To accomplish this, he invokes Edward Said's concept of "wordliness,"
which levels text and life into text [292]. Materiality becomes merely the referent of
narrative.
At the same time, Bhabha implicitly maintains a sense of the material distinct
from narrative. Bhabha rejects a "'centered' causal logic" between "cultural formations
and social processes" [293], His intention appears to be to free the cultural from
determination by purely material social forces. What results from his rejection of a
causal connection between culture (expressed in narrative) and social processes — in
either direction or both -- is a sundering of the two. Missing from his theory is an
account of how processes in each realm - that of culture and that of materiality - affect
the other.
This is perhaps most clearly and repeatedly affirmed in the "Introduction" to Notion and Narration
[Bhabha: 1990b], the collection of essays containing "DissemiNation."
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Instead, he opts for the "purer linguistic air," that is, to focus on the
narrative/cultural level. He emphasizes the excess of language beyond its content,
beyond what remains of the material for him, and leaves the content behind, [see 314 -
315]
On the one hand, Bhabha opens up the narrative realm of activity and negotiated
change within the nation; on the other, heforecloses other forms of activity to resistance
and social change. Worse, in doing so, he renders even the privileged form ineffective:
in sundering the cultural/narrative from the material, he guarantees that cultural
resistance, disruption, and negotiation will be reflected back into the cultural. Thus, the
cultural space itself (the narrative space), becomes the prison of resistance. Signification
loses its pretense to reference, and cultural transformation and negotiation become 'safe'
for the dominant powers. Changes in the cultural - narrative changes - affect only
culture.
What is more, in doing so, they are unstable and unanchored. Without
correspondence to actual social changes, they are easily changed and manipulated further.
Rhetoric becomes easy and meaningless. It becomes, in fact, a cover for the same old
oppressions, obscuring them. Rhetoric changes without driving any changes in the
material realm. This is readily apparent in U. S. society. For instance, sexual harassers
become adept at the language of anti-harassment.
The gradually decreasing effectiveness of disruption is the result in part of the
growing disjunction between word and act. Without reference to material forces,
narrative disruption is meaningless. Material disruptions by their definition disrupt actual
social relations and structures. On the other hand, the power of narrative disruption
depends on its effects on the material. "Disruption" as Bhabha describes it is only
effective if it ultimately changes social structures - how they are produced as much as
what is produced. Disruption disquiets social agents, hopefully challenging them to
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changes in their oppressive aettons. It prods people toward social change, but does
determine them to it.
As artist and philosopher Ernst Neizvestny wrote prior to the end of the Soviet
Union, in the West, one could write or say whatever one wanted, while in the Soviet
Umon, a poet could be executed over the contents of a poem. Only in the Soviet Union
dtd art thus have meaning, precisely because it could incite and reflect action; in the
West, where anything and everything is filmed and said, art has lost its significance, it is
no longer a life and death issue. [Neizvestny, 1990] When culture is sundered from
social relations, it becomes a zone in which the most dramatic transformations have little
effect beyond the rhetorical. This is the space that Bhabha's "practice of cultural
difference" opens.
This was obviously no, the ease in Ancient Athens. Socrates was put to death
precisely because his rhetoric had affected the thinking and actions based on it of many
younger members of that society. The Athenians recognized correctly that this
threatened to destabilize their society, and put Socrates to death. 1 ’ One can imagine that,
if Socratic Athens were part of the current tele-radio age of meaningless "disruption,”
Socrates would not be put to death, but would be given his own radio call-in show instead
- much like Oliver North, the prosecuted-Constitution-trampier who has been recycled
into a conservative talk-show host. 1' Consistent with Neizvestny's point, the power of
Socrates' challenge to Athenian society was reflected in the fact that Athens put him to
death in order to end it. Only one talk-show host in the contemporary era appears to have
been powerful enough to evoke that reaction, but from a fringe extremist white
supremacist, not the majority society.
Plato, though he (belatedly) protested Socrates' death, failed to understand its validity from the general
Athenian standpoint He did, however, learn the implicit lesson taught, and (1) restricted his protests ordisruptions lo textual representations of the past events of Socrates' trial and death and (2) marginalized hisown impact through founding the Academy that allowed space for deeply penetrating philosophical
production without any danger to the broader society - or to himself.
F F
One can only shudder at this analogy. The analogy is limited, of course, by the fact that North's crimes
were not rhetorical but quite material. It was through the separation from (his) rhetoric from reality that he
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Worse than being ineffective, Bhabha’s narrat.ve focus tends in fact to enable
oppression. By acting without reference to material social forces, it ,eaves theseforces
free to function oppressively, without betng nottced. just as language exceeds its content,
wtth its indeterminate meanings and potentials, so does the social exceed its
representation. Free from scrutiny through representation, free from being fixed into a
narrative that is subject to negotiation, the social forces of oppression are free to operate
without interference. While Bhabha recognizes that the exercise of power might be more
effective by tapping into and maneuvering in the space opened up by negotiation [296 -
297], he does not recognize the potential of its maneuvering all that more freely in the
space of non-narrative materiality that it comes to monopolize.
I stress that I am not proposing to privilege the realm of social processes over
cultural production. As Hegel reminds us, structural political change without a
corresponding change at the conceptual level is unstable as well. What I am doing is
challenging Bhabha's focus on narrative/cultural production.
Gone But Not Forgotten
The implications of Bhabha's focus on the narrative are clear from the examples
of cultural disruption and renegotiation he selects. They are uniformly literary/artistic
works. His selection of Handsworth Songs is particularly significant in this regard. This
is a film by the Black Audio Collective during the uprisings of 1985, in the Handsworth
district of Birmingham, England" [306], It is thefilm , not the riots, that is the focal
assertion of culture difference; the film displaces the riots. More than this, the film
presents the riots themselves as mere representation/reference to something else: "There
are no stories in the riots, only the ghosts of other stories" [307], The riots (and the film)
are not acts, they do not accomplish directly
;
rather, they refer/represent. Acting is
displaced by referring.
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In this case, the film - making it and viewing it - is considered socially
disruptive. In another case, Bhabha slips a fiterary work, presenting it without
explanation as an apparent 'report' on or example of the operation of disruptive cultural
difference. In Salmon Rushdie's Satanic Verses, Gtbreel Parish,
a, a Muslim Indian,
repeatedly mimics a dead English colonialist in the presence of his widow, Rosa
Diamond. This mint,cry deprives the narratives of the "colonial tdeologies of patriotism
and patriarchy" that he mimics "of their imperial authority” [318], The mimicry in fact
interrupts Rosa Diamond's incessant repetition of the standard English historical
narrattves on which her sense of identity depends, causing her own identity to come into
question.
The immediate question is, why challenge "imperialism" in the form of the
narratives of an old woman, narratives that are anachronistic and do not reflect the current
forms of neo-imperialist rhetoric or domination. Going after such narratives is as easy as
it is irrelevant. Bhabha seems to get swept up in the idea of disruptive narrative so much
that he fails to evaluate the effects by any other standards.
Further, this is a literary representation of afictitious operation of cultural
difference. It is not evidence in the least of the actual possibility of effective operation of
this strategy, but at most offers readers a hope that similar activity on their part will have
similar effects. Nor could Bhabha argue that the text itself functions disruptively, to spur
individuals to cultural disruption or to cause it itself. The Satanic Verses was anything
but disruptive of Western culture and imperialism; on the contrary, one well-discussed
Muslim reaction to it became an extremely timely and useful justification for continuation
of the same old anti-Muslim orientalism, despite the partial institutionalization of Said's
critique in the preceding decade.
Bhabha slips inside the narrative of Handsworth Songs as well. His purpose
appears to be to find confirmation within the film — in the narrative of an interviewee, for
instance - of the privileging of narrative ("stories") over material change. What is more
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significant, however, is that he fails to distinguish between narrative and presuntabiy
al referent. His positioning inside or outside the narrative is unstable, precisely
because he does not recognize a distinction. There is a double level of reference-
HmdSWOrlh S°nSS The“ r™
- narratives thentseives refer to interna,
narratives, that in turn refer to something else.
Bhabha's shifting within these nested narratives suggests a kind of 'happy
skepticism' with regard to material forces - one never gets to them, but perceives or
participates in disruption nonetheless. In reality, this 'happy skepticism' is Bhabha's own
rhetorical cover-up. The actual referent of Handswarth Sengs - the riots that took place
in 1985 - becomes lost in an unstable shuffle from representation to representation to
representation. Their actuality is undercut by this referential instability.
Bhabha is mistaken to think that the riots can be displaced so easily, and that
narrative disruption can function effectively without depending on them. The efficacy of
the film derives not from some power inherent in a disruptive representation of social
unrest through film, but in the residual force of the actual riots in Birmingham. That
Bhabha’s obscures this derivation does not mean that it does not exist, and, taking the cue
from him, readers must rediscover elements of the past that he has obscured.
A string of references to references - stories that are ghosts of other stories -
does not contain the genuine shock or disruptive moment that is necessary if invocation
of the string is to produce disruption. In Humean terms, representations do not in
themselves produce the passion or will to action toward social change. A string of
references depends on an actual disruption to have effect - the string is just a linkage, and
does not create the passion or will to action. Any disruption caused by Hcindsworth
Songs depends on its connection to actual disruption, in this case the actual riots. The
disquiet felt upon viewing the film is simply the fading memory of an original disquiet
felt at the moment of their occurrence. The film triggers this memory, but does not
produce an original disruption.
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Obviously, for those who were not affected by the original riots, representation of
them might trigger other memories of similar disruptions. This is not the point. Their
resonances with so many other anti-raeist, anti-colonial, anti-authoritarian acts and
movements allows them to access the power of any of these disruptions. A viewer's
memory ofsome simtlar disruption supplies the force behind the film's disruptive effects.
Indeed, Bhabha's assertion that "there are no stories in the riots, only the ghosts of
other stories" [307] is consistent with this possibility: the disruptive impact of the riots
themselves might in part derive from their reference to the global, shattering disruption
caused by highly effective anti-colonial, anti-authoritarian, and anti-racist resistance
movements and actions around the globe, in colonized and colonial societies alike,
decades before.
Such a dependence on anti-colonialism is even more evident regarding Bhabha's
representation of The Satanic Verses. Bhabha's focus on this 'new' form of narrative
challenge to the narratives of imperialism displaces the earlier, direct challenges of anti-
colonialism. Bhabha marks this as a post-colonial strategy superseding earlier anti-
colonialism.
But, does it? Even granting that Gibreel's fictional disruption of Rosa's imperial
narratives reflects actual possibilities of disruption, such challenges are trivial to the point
of being irrelevant. This challenge merely replicates in a limited, narrative form, a
disruption that has occurred with much greater force and impact long before it. It occurs
decades after the end of formal colonialism, and well into a new era of new forms of neo-
imperial domination that cannot be expressed by the old formula that Rosa embodies.
She herselt is the (literally) dying residue of an obsolete form of colonialism (made
obsolete by anti-colonial struggle): a challenge to her leaves intact the new structures of
domination that have emerged and continue to. Worse, such a challenge is a diversion
from these new forms, and success is potentially a step toward complacency.
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Moreover, this literary disruption itself depends completely on the successes of
anti-colonialism that came before it, material terms, Gibreefs mimicry is only possible
m a post-colonial world, and authorized by the success of anti-colonialism. Its very
authonty makes it meaningless as disruption. It is too late, because it is already
acceptable. Doubtless, in fact, most contemporary British Anglo readers found Gibreefs
mimicry and Rosa's old-fash,oned imperialism quite amusing, precisely because even
they, as oppressors, have superseded it. She is akin to the old blatantly racist grandparent
that members of the contemporary ascending generation of much more subtly racist North
Americans tend to find so amusing.
Most importantly, in narrative terms, whatever disruptive power Gibreefs
disruption has derives from the memory of anti-colonialism. For contemporary cultural
disruption and renegotiation even to take place as represented in The Satanic Verses, and
for it to have any chance of success, requires the deeply seared memory of anti-
colomalism among the former colonizers. Cultural disruption and renegotiation is
parasitic upon the active power of a past anti-colonialism, and the extent of its success is
3. function of the residual power of anti-colonialism.
This process of cultural renegotiation is, in fact, the cycling down of a dying anti-
colonialism. It is powered by the residual reflection of anti-colonialism into the cultural
realm. At best, it functions to finish out certain social-change trends initiated through
anti-colonial movements; at worst, it obscures consolidation of a post-colonial order
developing through assertion of new forms of imperial domination that cannot be
expressed in the formulas of classical anti-colonialism. In the latter case, what once was
a threat to one's sense of self and security, becomes, as memory, a harmless object that
can be handled and manipulated.
At this point, I might supplement my initial critique of the institutionalization of
disruption. Here, it is not simply that disruption has become less effective as a tool of
social change, but that contemporary disruptions are not disruptive in themselves, but
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have impact only through reference to genuine disruptions of the past. As memories of
.he initial impacts fade in the face of changing socia. structures and forms of oppression -
- as well as efforts to erase them - so does the effectiveness of contemporary dtsruption.
The foregoing is not meant in any way to minimize or cast aspersions on anti-
colonialism and its struggles
- quite the contrary. This was a powerful force that
reshaped global politics and economics, and produced liberation on a level never
achieved before. At the same time, as with any force of political change, it has its life
span of effectiveness; the forces of oppression (if I may be Manichean) have responded to
this order-shattering threat to oppression, reconstituting their power 1 ' in other forms,
through other means. 16
'Socioanalysis'
After witnessing the explosion of nationalism in the early 1990s and the tendency
toward violent, even genocidal backlashes by nationalist majorities against minorities,
Bhabha appears to have modified his position. In a 1994 essay, "Anxious Nations,
Nervous States," Bhabha extends and revises his analysis of minoritarian resistance to
totalizing national narratives. In this essay, Bhabha focuses much more on the tendency
of a nationalist majority toward violent repression of difference, and unambiguously calls
for a transcendence of the nation form itself. In the final section of the essay, he presents
a general minoritization' of culture" - that is, transformation of culture from asserted
totality to space of complex hybridity - as the productive end of the renegotiation of
national cultures. His avowed goal is "a new cosmopolitanism to be found and formed
through the hybridity ot cultural boundaries -- on the model of the great post-colonial,
cosmopolitan centers [Bhabha, 1994: 215], It is through the fracturing of national
cultures and the abandonment ot the fantastic desires for cultural homogeneity — or their
15Or, one can hope, merely some of their power.
' This reconstitution, or neo-imperialism, was in fact an innovation by the United States that has carried us
to the top of world power in the 20th Century [see Harumi, 1997: ].
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supersession by a pluralism that simply multiplies the unities or relegates them to a
secondary role - that the limits of the modern nation can be redeemed.
The 1994 strategy for reaching this goal is roughly the same as in 1990, the
renegotiative disruption of myths of unity. In 1994, however, Bhabha foregrounds a
specific aspect and technique. He focuses on how nationalists refer to the past as the
proper determinant of contemporary culture. The general tension between pedagogy and
performance is specified here as the tension between what is apparently given from the
past (nationalist fantasy projected into the past) and the immediate, actual present that
exceeds determination by this past. Similar to his treatment of Renan in the 1990 essay,
Bhabha sees contemporary nationalist invocations of the past as covering its genuine
complexity with a simple linear determinancy. The nationalist version of the past is that
the cultural homogeneity that appears to be given to the present is natural or primordial.
It is this pedagogy of the nation that represses the present, "democratic" performance of
the nation.
Bhabha describes the method by which this hold of the past on the present can be
broken. It is not a matter of setting present against past, as if the difference were merely
generational or between two iterations of a culture. Rather, the past itselfmust be re-
opened to expose the multiple possibilities, the cultural ambiguities and pluralities, that
were present at each point in the development of the supposedly homogeneous culture.
The "strange forgetting of the history of the nation's past" [Bhabha, 1990a: 310] must be
challenged, and what has been forgotten remembered. The past of the nation then loses
its totalizing, determining power, not because it is ignored, but because intensive
exploration of it exposes its own lack of totality and inherently multi-valent nature. The
past cannot determine if it is indeterminate.
Bhabha explores a range of variations on this basic technique. In Kazuo
Ishiguro's The Remains ofthe Day, the present pretensions to democratic beliefs among a
number of good Englishmen are revealed through a flashback to have been preceded by
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pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic attitudes in the past. Their present "Englislmess," which they
view as founded on a commitment to democracy, is revealed as something else entirely.
Indeed, the other side of Englishness, colonialism, is revealed to be "intimately bound
up" with Nazism: the former Nazism was not a fluke, an inessential attribute, but a
perfectly logical correlate of the foundation of Englishness, colonialism. [Bhabha. 1994:
211 - 212], This exposes the complex truth of Englishness, its oppressive side. The
comfortable present of a self-satisfied majority that feels justified in preserving its culture
against recent immigrants and in fact requiring their assimilation into it is thereby
disrupted by the revelation that the essence of the culture is not so very democratic or
laudable at all. This opens the possibility for transcending homogenizing, unified culture,
with participation by the immigrants.
Elaine Reichek’s Native Intelligences reveals the presence of Native Americans in
the apparently mundane details of the domestic space of contemporary white North
Americans. The Native Americans and their cultural productions go almost unnoticed in
wall-paper patterns, wall-hangings, and so forth. Reichek's work is meant to trigger
recognition of this presence, and not simply as a step toward a critique ofpast
extermination and land-theft or contemporary "nativist" spirituality. Rather, her work
forces recognition of the Native American as present in white North America today
,
and
thus of how past colonialism and appropriation continue to operate in contemporary
white North American culture, corresponding to a continued oppression of Native
Americans on reservations, continued theft of their lands and destruction of their cultures,
sovereignty, and rights. This recognition reveals that the comfortable, holistic white
majority culture is actively implicated in on-going ethnocide and oppression. [214-215]
Interestingly, here the present is opened up to difference by destroying its unity
against the past. Contrary to the typical self-satisfaction of contemporary white North
Americans, the present does not represent the supersession of the evils of the past, such as
extermination and genocide. It is not the flowering of the true essence of the past.
Rather, the revelation of the presence of oppresston of Native Americans in contemporary
whne society transforms the evils of the past into an essential element of white culture,
presumably forcing a re-evaluation of it.
Such strategies of resistance are subject to the same basic concerns as the 1990
strategies. It must be stressed that this does not mean that the criticisms grounding the
strategies are inaccurate. They are profoundly accurate, and the literary and artistic
means of making them captures their complexity. But, that they are accurate and
penetrating critiques does not mean that they effect genuine social change. Not only is
their disruptive power less than Bhabha believes, but their narrative de-linking from
concrete social forces makes it very difficult for whatever power they have to spill over
into the concrete realm.
Bhabha's discussion of Reichek's work contains a telling phrase: her work
unpick[s] and refigure[s] history's 'unconscious,' amnesiac realities" [214], Other points
in the text manifest a similar influence of psychoanalytic theory on Bhabha's treatment of
the nation. The 1990 essay suggests this as well, in invocations of Freud 17 as well as its
implicit allusion to Nietzsche's The Birth ofTragedy} 6 The object of renegotiation of the
bounds imposed by totalizing national narratives is to renegotiate the domination of the
Dionysian' activity of the people by the 'Apollinian' structure of the totalizing national
narrative.
The general process suggested is what one might call the psychoanalysis of
society, or 'socioanalysis.' Through it, past subjugations of difference or present
repressions of past difference are exposed. Contemporary difference is thereby released
from its derivative repression.
This, of course, does not produce a new 'unified cultural psyche' in place of the
prior totalization of culture. Just as post-modern psychoanalysis recognizes precisely in
attempts to produce a unified subjectivity the repressive force that causes psychological
l7See Footnote 5, above, for one instance.
18 See Footnote 4, above.
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problems, Bhabhan socioanalysis seeks to release culture from totalizing narratives that
attempt to produce an analogous social unity. Just as the individual subject is fractured
into an untotalizable complex of forces and elements, so is culture. And, just as
subjective boundaries are challenged and complexified in this process, so are national
ones.
It is only through the removal of past totalizing repressions of difference without
replacement by new totalizing repressions that the 'health' of society can be achieved.
Beyond the questions I raised above about the effectiveness of the type of cultural
disruption that drives socioanalysis, a deeper problem exists. The problem with
psychoanalysis has always been that it cannot operate on the level of social and political
forces and positionings. Whether it transforms the psychology of the individual in such a
way as to accommodate or submit to those forces, or to resist and oppose those changes,
depends on forces outside the activity of psychoanalysis itself.
It is determined by external socio-cultural conditions. For instance, Freudian
psychoanalysis maintains concepts of normalcy and illness consistent with systems of
gender and sexuality oppression characteristic of Western industrial societies. It attempts
to rework "deviant" individuals (gays, lesbians, bisexuals, independent-minded women,
etc.) into what they are supposed to be according to that society, to force them into
conformity with a totalizing psychological narrative that itself has been determined by the
predominant socio-political forces.
Other forms of psychoanalysis — such as feminist psychotherapy — often
recognize these determining influences on Freudian psychoanalysis. In line with
Bhabha's socioanalysis, they attempt to remove the constraints and repressions introduced
into the subconsciousness of a subject by the oppressive socio-cultural forces.
Obviously, this removal does not alter the socio-cultural context itself, at least not
directly. The subject is continually confronted with forces that undermine any positive
effects of therapy. Indeed, a strategy that opens the subject to difference and destabilizes
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totalizing self-concepts might make the subject more vulnerable to internalizing
oppressive externa, forces. Unless the deeper structure of oppression is challenged,
resistance to it through therapy remains provisional and partial. And, this assumes that
the therapy will have even some level of initial
More often than not, only changes in the
success against internalized oppression.
oppressive context can have this effect.
Agam, as with Bhabha, successful therapy might remove barriers to social change
activities that might potentially alter the socio-cultural context of the subject. But, the
success itself might depend on external mitigating factors. The more extreme the
oppression, the less likely therapy - or therapy alone - will remove its effects. And,
even if it does, there remains the issue of dealing with the oppressive socio-cultural
context itself.
Socioanalysis is subject to similar concerns. Oppression is not purely cultural,
though it might have a strong cultural component. No doubt dealing with it on the
cultural level is important. However, without a corresponding transformation of material
relations and structures of domination, such a strategy remains provisional and partial.
What is more, the strategy of socioanalysis might conflict with the requirements of
material liberation. For instance, where a minority is the potential victim of genocide, a
socioanalytic renegotiation with the dominant majority might have little effect.
Indeed, socioanalysis might preserve oppressive cultural elements in a trans-
national hybridity. Bhabha assumes that everything that is bad and oppressive stems
from the imposition of totalizing narratives. If this is not true, then elements of
oppression can survive the transcendence ot totalizing cultural forms, only to be
reasserted in the new hybridity. Indeed, to the extent that the use of totalizing narrative
(its deployment) has been a tool of oppressive forces, they might compel new cultural
torms serve such purposes just as well — as suggested in my treatment of the use of
cultural disruption by oppressive forces.
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Perhaps the factor that militates against this in the "post-colonial" age is the
change that was wrought by anti-colonialism. Perhaps, just as with cultural disruption,
the legacy of anti-colonialism is necessary to the possibility of successful socioanalysis.
Thus, the latter depends on anti-colonialism just as much as the former. To the extent
that socioanalysis is effective, it relies on a context in which the social and political
transformations of anti-colonialism have been extensive. Without this concrete
foundation, it would produce merely rhetorical changes that themselves would mark the
accommodation of the marginalized to the oppressive status quo. Even assuming its
effectiveness within this context, this effectiveness is not due to its power to end
oppression, but to its access to the power of anti-colonialism.
As the successes of anti-colonialism give way more and more to post-colonial
forms of oppression, the slippage of socioanalysis into a purely accommodational
operation becomes inevitable.
The Difference of Difference
My argument thus far would seem to suggest that the problems within the nation
are more severe and destructive than Bhabha thinks. They cannot be overcome by the
means that he suggests. Am I then in general agreement with Hobsbawm? Are the
tensions within the nation too great to be overcome, or at least accommodated?
As I mentioned above, in "DissemiNation," Bhabha is rather ambivalent about the
end product of the renegotiative process. At some points, he seems to be assuming that
the process will not supersede the nation understood as the tension between pedagogy and
performance, but rather tend to transform the nation into a zone of marginalization itself,
a space defined by the immediate and "perplexed" activity of the people. He appears to
view this as a transformation of the concept of the nation from a Western, modern one, to
a post-colonial, post-modern one [see, for instance, 303], At others, he seems to be
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hintmg (still in ambiguous language), at the ultimate "transnational dissemination" of
culture [see, for instance, 320],
By 1994, however, Bhabha's position is much less ambiguous. He has clearly
shifted his account of the nation to emphasize a strategy of cultural difference that
,
ultimately leads beyond it, to trans-national, trans-state hybridity.
He thus dissolves the nation in a broader cultural complex. This is not Bhabha's
only option. He might just as well have recognized that the failure of the renegotiative
process is often due to the fact that the majorities and minorities in question should not be
considered as parts of a single nation, but as distinct nations. The tension within the
nation is due to the irreconcilable difference between a national minority and the
dominant majority.
In DissemiNation, 1 the majority-minority tension is always contained within a
nation(-state): a former colonizer-colonized (or enslaver-slave) tension had been
superseded by a majority-minority tension within a cultural 'unit.' In "Anxious Nations,
Nervous States, however, the discussion seems to concern a different type of minority-
majority tension, more reflective of anti-colonial struggle. This does not represent
Bhabha's acceptance of distinct nations, however, but rather the folding of colonial
tensions into a state. By valorizing trans-state, trans-national cultural hybridity as the
result of the renegotiative process, Bhabha avoids having to engage the issue of distinct
nations within a state.
Importantly, his analysis cannot apply to colonialism, because it does not contain
within it the possibility of separatism, of the breaking away of a marginalized, assailed
minority. II it were applied to the colonial situation, it would require negotiation with the
colonizing power, and that at the cultural level. In the following, I will attempt to show
that Bhabha's analysis is likewise inapplicable to the latest form of separatism, the
minoritarian national movements of the 1990s, on similar grounds. 19
19Though I detail here certain formal similarities of these movements to anti-colonial ones, 1 do not mean
to suggest any closer similarity. Contemporary separatist movements are generally not anti-colonial.
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Bhabha anticipates such an objection by insisting that he is not concerned with the
tensions between two groups that are the referents of totalizing narratives, but with the
margins between and within them. If a minority has its own totalizing pretensions, then it
is no longer properly marginal, and no longer a potential agent of resistance to the
totalization, the fundamental oppression.
Yet, where do the "marginalized" of his focus come from? The examples he
chooses are primarily post-colonial residuals: Native Americans in the form produced by
genocide and perpetual internment, the progeny of slaves in the United States, and post-
colonial immigrants to former colonizers (both the poor who are economic refugees and
elites whose home status was challenged by anti-colonialism). They are themselves parts
or fragments of alternate cultural groups, and their "difference" is derivative of this fact.
On Bhabha s account, however, they function as if they have no history, and have
simply appeared from some external non-zone, within a totalizing nationality. This is not
because he does not refer to their history, but rather because it has no bearing on his
account of their situation or activity: he splits them away from their origins, consistent
with their presumed tendency toward performance over pedagogy. They are minorities of
their new "nations" simpliciter.
Bhabha s conception of minority is thus intensive', it refers simply to a division
within a given presumed unit. Minorities are "fragments" of previously disrupted cultural
units (whether former colonies, slavery-era 'Africa,' or tribes), now permanently part of
new cultures that cannot thus be unitary.
Bhabha at points appears to imply that a minority is the product of the totalizing
narrative of the majority. Though he recognizes minorities as produced through
immigration, their minoritization results from totalizing national narratives that generate
difference by giving it significance. The "discovery" of difference within the nation as
narrative referent is perceived as a function of the internal psychodymamics of the culture
Though they often respond to just as deep and intense oppression, this oppression has taken a different
form, with a different history. It is important to avoid any reductive comparisons.
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in question - the reflection of its projection of difference onto an external other back into
itself. The minority is different, but cannot claim that difference, because to do so would
be tor the members to assert their own totalizing narrative. Members of the minority are
restricted to pure activity, that is, immediate action without a (totalizing) structure. The
only structure their activity can have - the only way it can be unified - is through the
reductive narratives of the majority. 20
Bhabha’s concept of minority assumes that a "fragment" is contained entirely
within its new home culture. This in turn requires a proper container. In
DissemiNation, this is the state. Bhabha is explicit about containment within a state as
the condition of the dynamic that he describes. It is the rigidity of state borders described
by Foucault that reflects difference into the interior of the "nation." [301 - 302]
It is significant that Foucault uses the term "state," while Bhabha uses "nation" in
apparent reference to the same socio-political formation. Bhabha does not seem to
differentiate between the two terms, [see 301 - 302] Definition of a nation seems to
depend on correspondence to a state. This assumption is manifested at other points as
well: for instance, in the introduction to Nation and Narration, Bhabha remarks that the
Palestinians "have not yet found their nation" [Bhabha, 1990b: 7], Surely in 1990 many
Palestinians would have had no doubt that they were a nation; the problem was, they did
not have a state that would ensure the survival and autonomy of the nation. Indeed,
Bhabha experiences Fanon's "exploration of] the space of the nation without
immediately identifying it with the historical institution of the state" as a near revelation,
and as a dissolution of the totality of the nation into the performance of the people
[Bhabha, 1990a: 303].
In fact, Bhabha cannot differentiate between nation and state. To admit that two
nations might exist within a single state is to admit the possibility that a minority might
20Though Bhabha does acknowledge that their purely marginalized status can become the "gathering points
of political solidarity" [307 - 308]. This gathering does not depend on or imply a unifying narrative,
however.
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be a nation itself, with its own complex dynamic. Bhabha does not allow the nation any
type of organic totality: any pretensions to wholeness are merely the assertions of
totalizing nationalist narratives. That these do not define a nation is the of Bhabha's
account of the nation. As a result, he appeals to the state to guarantee the bounds of the
process of cultural negotiation. Otherwise, his parsing of this or that social dynamic as a
nation is arbitrary, as is the designation of its interior components and difference.
Even the strain in "DissemiNation" that suggests an ultimate supersession of the
nation by trans-state, trans-national hybrid cultural forms depends on a container,
ultimately "the city."
His full shift toward trans-national, trans-state hybrid cultural forms in "Anxious
Nations, Nervous States," suggests awareness of this problem. Indeed, the title indicates
some sense of the distinction between "nation" and "state." But, rather than exploring the
implications of this difference, he sidesteps it. Precisely at the point at which the intra-
national, majority-marginalized dynamic might reveal distinct nations in tension, the
dynamic spills over the borders of the state and nation. Rather than the presumed nation
that is actually a state splitting into two nations — which would represent a deep problem
for his theory — the internal fracture eliminates nation and state from further
consideration. They are superseded by a cultural hybridity that is a joining of fragmented
remains of the national disintegration.
Refuting the 1990 statism is quite easy. It is simply a matter of presenting cases
that are clearly or can be tenably perceived to be multiple nations within a state, whether
fully or partially contained within the state. Examples abound, such as the above-
mentioned existence of a Palestinian nation within the state of Israel. What is more,
where these reveal a dominating majority and a fully or partially contained minority
nation, the 1994 reformulation becomes untenable as well. It is not that renegotiation is
not an option that a group or conflicting groups may choose, but it is not the only or most
obvious one. According to Bhabha, for a minority nation to assert its unity in the face of
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oppression by the dominant majority is for it to replicate the totalizing, internally
oppressive behavior of the majority. In this way, the presence of two nations within a
state is simply a function of two competing totalizing narratives. At the same time, it
appears to be an extreme disruption not subject to any of the objections raised above.
Bhabha's dismissal is simplistic. It assumes that fragmentation and hybridization
are not themselves methods ofoppression. In many cases, however, it is not the
differentiation of a subject minority, but the assimilation of its members into the
dominant majority, that is the goal of domination. The Kurds of Turkey are a perfect
example: the Turkish government, media, military, etc., do not claim that the Kurds are
different, but rather that they are not different, that they are "Mountain Turks" and should
resist the delusion that they form a distinct cultural group. The goal is to dissolve the
minority into the majority nation.
Bhabha would claim his analysis to apply to assimilative narratives as well.
Forced assimilation certainly relies on a totalizing narrative. According to Bhabha,
resistance should not be by a problematic totalizing counter-narrative, but through
disruption and renegotiation of the conditions of narration themselves. The result would
be a continuing process of undermining the totalizing, absorptive narrative, toward a
recognition of the performative aspect of the nation, or a supersession of the Turkish
nation, itself dissolved within a trans-national, trans-state hybridity.
Unfortunately, in this case, Bhabha's strategy does not have the beneficial effects
he believes it to. In either case, however, the destruction of the Kurdish nation occurs.
Perhaps this is toward some superior cosmopolitanism, but as my section on Ree makes
clear, cosmopolitanism does not represent a supersession of the key relevant power
structure — particularly an imperial one — and can even be viewed as a result of its
flexibility. The Kurdish nation is lost, but Turkish state power or the power of the state
order will at most mutate into a derivative form of domination.
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In cases in which oppression specifically means fragmentation of the minority, the
assertion ot minority unity must be understood relative to it. The situation is the opposite
ot ’classical colonization,' in which the assertion of difference is crucial to continued
domination. In pre-modern empires, assimilation or difference was irrelevant to the
dynamics of power. In the modern era, however, a dominator must make a decision
between forcing assimilation or emphasizing difference. Though Bhabha’s model clearly
preserves the emphasis on racial/cultural difference central to the oppressive scheme of
classical colonialism, in other situations, the oppressive majority seeks not to exclude but
to include. Positive social change is not an issue of negotiated, non-totalizing hybridity,
for even this tends to meet the goal of the dominant group, but rather ’dis-integration’
from the dominator, without annihilation.
Here the "difference" between nation and state becomes crucial. In Bhabha’s
scheme, a majority coercing assimilation does so into its national narrative. But, this
majority might not be national at all. It might be coercing participation in a state that
does not correspond to a particular nation, and so can correspond to a non-pluralistic
cultural hybridity produced through a negotiative process. There is no specific national
culture as goal of this process. Indeed, a perpetual renegotiation or cultural
indeterminacy serves the object of the statist majority perhaps best. On the other hand,
the minority nation is an obstacle to state integration that must be overcome - its
existence fragments the state and undermines the state's relative indifference to culture.
Further, Bbabha does not recognize the difference between a margin that is simply
the excess of a totalizing national narrative and a margin that is at the same time a distinct
group or part of one. He cannot recognize a minority nation that is as a totality
marginalized . 21 A subjugated minority under the pressure of forced assimilation (with
the presumed alternative being genocide) is a site of profound contention and tension, of
21 Bhabha clearly resists such a possibility. For instance, when discussing Huston Baker's self-described
work on the '"new national modes of sounding, interpreting and speaking the Negro in the Harlem
Renaissance,"' Bhabha uses quotation marks around his own use of the term "national" in reference to these
activities, emphasizing his evaluation of this use as problematic. [Bhabha, 1990a: 296]
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instability and the ever-present threat of dissolution (whether members of the minority
accept the majority's agenda or reject it, or whether it has been partially effective, as in
Northern Ireland). In such a case, the "unity" of the minority (nation) is asserted against
the dominant trend toward dissolution (into the majority or through annihilation).
Bhabha’s account of the relationship of unity and dissolution is thereby reversed: the
assertion of unity (of the minority), not difference (within the majority), is the resistant,
disruptive moment in the tense relationship between totalization and margin. Only where
annihilation is not at stake - where the majority's totalizing impulse can be disrupted into
a livable form — is the assertion of internal difference resistant and disruptive. Bhabha's
rejection of the assertion ot minority unity in the face of oppression is in fact a denial of
the very agency that, on his account, is the essence of the immediately present people.
Bhabha might yet respond that forced assimilation depends on an initial assertion
of difference. But this is the assertion of the minority, presumably under the pressures of
forced assimilation. It derives precisely from the pure activity of the people, the fact that
they exceed the totalizing narrative of the majority. It is not assertion of difference by the
majority, as a moment in a process of forcible assimilation. It might be the simple
activity of minority people against the majority's narrative, to which the majority then
reacts. It will then become the purposeful rejection by minoritarians of the initial
assimilative totalization. Or, it might begin with the purposeful rejection. In any event,
in this type of case, the assertion of a distinct unity is not a replication of the totalizing
logic of the majority, but rather is the moment, of resistance to it.
From the perspective ofthe marginalized minority
,
a minor national narrative is
not the opening unity that is fragmented by the genuine difference internal to it. On the
contrary, its fragmentation as asserted by the majority is. Difference within the minority
is not logically posterior to an asserted unity, but anterior to it. The effort of the minority
is to overcome dissolution. For Bhabha, difference is always intensive, that is, within a
previously asserted totality. A totalizing narrative asserts the nation as a unit(y) that is
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then intensively fragmented. For a marginalized nation, unity is extensive, that is, the
linkmg across an already existing or asserted fragmentation. The oppressed minority
nation begins extensively.
Bhabha might object that this is precisely his position: the nation arose in Europe
as a narrative response to the fragmentation of pre-modern social structures, just as in
other circumstances it has been a response to similar fragmentations - by minority
groups to forces disrupting their traditional social structures as well as by majority groups
confronted with 'disruptive' immigration. Setting aside the issue of whether it is
"narrative" for the moment, Bhabha's point is accurate. The nation in such circumstances
is a response. As a totalizing response, it is subject to the issues of difference within it
that Bhabha elaborates. As discussed above, his consideration of this internal complexity
of the nation, of the untotalizable difference within it, is crucial to understanding it. In
the case of a majority nation, the forces of fragmentation that trigger the totalizing
narrative response22 and the difference 'within' that cannot be totalized or contained in the
national narrative are the same.
In the case of a minority nation, however, the oppressive forces of fragmentation
that trigger the national response and the fragmentation properly internal to it are not
equivalent. The response does not obscure an initially genuine fragmentation or
difference - does not attempt to reduce the activity of the people to a unified,
homogenizing narrative -- which should be rediscovered through the disruptive agency of
that difference. Rather, it is the initial force of fragmentation that obscures the presence
of an actual social formation, and which is opposed by assertion of the existence of that
social formation.
That this counter-assertion should also be problematized does not mean that it is
not legitimate. Both the counter-assertion and the problematizing of it are legitimate,
irreducible moments of the minority nation, and function in the tense manner Bhabha
“Whether understood as the initial response to fragmentation in early modern Europe, or as every
beginning of a contemporary cycle of totalization and resistance.
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describes. However, it that second moment of fragmentation is taken fully to
delegitimate the counter-assertion, at that point it comes into resonance with the initially
destructive iragmentation. Both aspects must be maintained, in order for the minority
nation (1) to resist oppression in a (2) non-oppressive manner.
With his focus on the majorities and minorities of formerly colonizimt states,
Bhabha misses these complexities, and ends up privileging the performative aspect of the
nation universally. 23 He fails, in other words, to recognize the 'difference of difference,'
that fragmentation might function differently and have different meaning in different
circumstances.
But, even as regards anti-colonialism itself, the assertion of a competing "unity"
cannot be simply dismissed as equivalent to the form of domination that marginalizes in
the first place. It is not a simple matter of becoming like one's oppressor. A
fundamental, dichotomous opposition was crucial to anti-colonialism. Perhaps it is true
that colonizers introduced racial/cultural difference as a hierarchy from the moment at
which they came in contact with future colonies. Anti-colonialism transforms this
difference by challenging the hierarchization, and changing a difference within a state
structure to distinct state structures. The new form of difference was key to a rejection of
a relation of domination. It can restore an original or actual/organic difference only
through rejection of an imposed difference that binds the colonized to the colonizer, that
is, through separatism.
To reject this form of opposition is to reject anti-colonialism, which itself is the
basis for the form of resistance that Bhabha asserts. It is one thing to push anti-colonial
movements beyond mere opposition, to question to what extent their practices come to
reflect forms of oppression they resist and oppose; it is another to claim change must
proceed in such a way that it denies that on which it depends. Direct, unflinching
opposition and assertion of a consistent (if admittedly processural) political and
230n this point, he parts company with Nietzsche, who maintained a need for both Dionysian and
Apollinian aspects of the human psyche [see Ackermann, 1990: ].
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philosophical position is not necessarily 'bad' or oppressive (in itself); a blanket rejection
of such an alternative without reference to situation or the specific differences in
situations is an unjustifiable totalization itself; it replicates the logic of totalizing
othenzation that Bhabha claims is the core of the dominant mode of national thought.
My critique of Bhabha has implicitly focused on the type of intra-s/ate tension
characteristic of separatism and anti-colonialism. I do not reject Bhabha's strategy of
cultural difference because it cannot engage intra
-national difference, but rather because
it is unproductive if taken up by a true (national) minority.
On my account, Bhabha's analysis of the nation, and the dynamic he describes,
become merely a moment in a more comprehensive theory of the nation. His account is
problematic only when it is taken as the comprehensive dynamic. On the one hand,
Bhabha seems to consider his ultimate rejection of totalizing national narrative as
necessary to a theory of the nation, but on the other, he makes clear that he is attempting
only to add to the given understanding of the nation, and not to produce a general theory
of it himself [320]. Taken in the latter respect, it is invaluable; taken in the former, the
implicit pretension to universal application are its limit.
An Impoverished Minority
As touched upon above, Bhabha's concept of "minority" is limited to formerly
colonized or enslaved, residual or newly immigrant groups within the society of the
former colonizer or enslaver. As explained there, his concept of "minority" is of a
fragment of a now irrelevant social formation, a fragment that has been absorbed into a
society dominated by totalizing narrators.
Yet, he explicitly claims reference for this term to "diaspora(n)s" [see, for
instance, 319], "migrants," and any other "wandering people[] who will not be contained
within the Heim of the national culture and its unisonant discourse, but are themselves the
marks of a shifting boundary that alienates the frontiers of the modern nation" [see 315].
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His privileging of fragmentation over cohesion dictates an impoverished concept of
"minority" or "marginalized" that does not contain the actual concepts of "diaspora(n)" or
"migrant" (group).
Diasporan immigrants and migrants are not Bhabhan minorities. They are not
simply part of the society into which they have been injected. They maintain significant
(national) connection with the rest of the diaspora or their home country. The diasporan
properly understood maintains permanent resident in a place, but does not recognize the
culture or society of that place as his or her primary community. The migrant will return
home, and is working generally to support family members in the home country.
Bhabha's misunderstanding of the term migrant is evident in "DissemiNation." 24
There he describes the situation of and resistance by a "migrant" "Turkish worker in
Germany." 25 In fact, such a Turkish "guestworker" is the inverse of a "migrant."
Chances are, he has lived in Germany for years if not all of his life. Either he or his
children were likely educated exclusively in German schools, and speak perfect German.
His children might even be third-generation "guests." The classification of "guestworker"
in Germany is a sham, merely a way in which the German state prevents Turks, Kurds,
Vietnamese, and other immigrant laborers from acquiring German citizenship ~ thereby
diluting the purity of Germany and attaining a better position from which to challenge the
exploitation of their labor. They are permanent residents of Germany, fully integrated
into the society and essential to it. [see Klusmeyer, 1993]
True, this is consistent with Bhabha's account of the totalizing narrative that
produces a minority through making significant differences that have no transcendent
meaning. But, it precisely because this minoritarian is not a "migrant" that Bhabha's
analysis applies. A true migrant is a "guestworker"; the 'sham' is the global economic and
24And follows Ree's, as discussed above.
25Again, as represented (narrated) for him by another author, John Berger, whose narrative is certainly
external to the Turk's experience. What is worse, in Footnote 59, Bhabha acknowledges having "composed
th[e] passage [on the Turk] from quotations scattered throughout [Berger's] text," adding another layer of
narrative selection and perspective. As with his reliance on literature above (Rushdie, Ishiguro), Bhabha is
caught in the realm of narrative representation and signification, without direct connection to the "people"
whose "narrative movement" he claims to "have heard" [303] and give voice to.
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political order that forces him or her into low-wage, temporary labor in foreign countries,
under brutally exploitative and oppressive conditions. It is precisely in being kept
temporarily resident, and primarily tied to a home country through one's family and
culture, that the migrant is prevented from disrupting the employing society, from
entering into a renegotiative dynamic with its minority. At the least sign of trouble, the
migrant is deported. Indeed, the threat of the canceling of a temporary work permit is a
powerful tool keeping the worker compliant, and is used frequently. [Yang, 1997]
Under such conditions, 'cultural negotiation' becomes not merely unproductive,
but either impossible or the means ofexploitation and oppression itself. The migrant's
"cultural performance" - his or her insertion of cultural difference into host countries - is
not a disruption but an extracted requirement fit into a consumer economy of 'exotic
culture.' For instance, female overseas entertainers dance exotically for consuming men
of the host country. 'Exotic dancing' is their 'cultural performance,' and it is anything but
"performative." Their cultural agency itself is consumed, their difference, even if
disruptively intended (even if, for instance, they perceive themselves as true bearers of
their home culture), is consumed. There is no possibility of "performance" in the sense of
Bhabha. The very conditions of their presence in the host country make any agency in
cultural production actually part of the force of their oppression.
Performance is, here, not an assertion of non-totalizable difference, but the fitting
of the performer into a specific place in a unified oppressive structure — it transforms the
difference of culture into the sameness of domination by the "Other." Domination binds
the oppressed to the oppressor in a unified system through "difference."
Though it might be politically advantageous and comforting to view migrants as
subaltern agents, the daily grind of exploitation and oppression and the endless
displacement from a stable place of enunciation — both in terms of place and status --
make them, in fact, marginal to any process of cultural negotiation of the form Bhabha
considers central. It is not that Bhabha is wrong about the attempt to absorb the migrants'
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differences into a totalizing narrative, but that he fails to recognize the situational power
of the forces supporting this process, and their ability to absorb "performative” excess as
well. Recognizing that the narrated are also narrators is only half of the necessary
movement: it is also necessary to recognize the intensity with which any assertion of
genuine political agency is undermined or co-opted. That is not to say that these migrant
workers do not struggle and fight heroically; but it is to say that rarely do these struggles
have the etfects Bhabha assumes. Socio-political change is not as automatic — through
the sheer fact of "performance" - as Bhabha would have us believe.
The primary connection (cultural, political, and social) with the home country
does not offer relief. Migrants are truly a hybrid border between the home and work
societies. They are a product of arrangements between both, however imperial and
coerced. Their migrant status itself is part of a totalizing home narrative. Migrants are,
after all, essential elements of their home countries. Their remittances keep their home
countries economies afloat, their families from starving, and home unemployment rates
from triggering revolt. [Yang, 1997], Their activities are heavily regulated and
encouraged by their home governments. In other words, they are fully present in their
home societies precisely by being absent. 26
However, because of them, their home societies are not simple unities. Even if
nationalist narratives disavow or ignore them, or facilely assume their simple integration
into the home society, the complexity of their position is clear. Their difference is not
'internal to' the home society, but in their extension beyond it. They are linked into the
nation across distance, across state borders and cultural difference. Their unity is no
longer 'given' by mere circumstance of territory, language, or culture. It must be asserted
against the distance. In this sense, national 'unity,' the nation as a group, is linked
26Though Bhabha does not discuss states and societies outside of the industrialized, 'First World,' reflection
on migrants into them yield other important types. These include the migrant 'transnational corporation
man,' the 'sex tourist,' and the 'development worker.' Rather than being blocked from the culture of the
society in which he or she goes, the First purposefully ignores it while at the same time imposing profound
economic forces on it, the second consumes it, and the third dictates changes in it. In each case, the direct
or indirect 'disruption' of the culture and society into which the migrant moves is profound. It is obviously
not resistant, however, but powerfully imperialist and oppressive.
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through connections, not through 'containment' in a state. Its 'unity' - if this term can still
properly be used - is not the givenness of the organic, homogeneous group, but depends
on the assertion of relations across potentially fragmenting distance.
Bhabha's concept of the (national) group - the totality of the nation - is roughly
the same as Kedourie's, as discussed above. The group is an organic whole or a
homogeneous set of individuals. Of course, where Kedourie views the nation as the
pretension to such a group (the fantasy of such a group [totalizing narrative] that produces
violent action to try to force reality into correspondence with it) and rejects the nation in
favor of liberal individualism, Bhabha sees the tension between totalizing narrative and
the difference within the nation (as narrative referent) as constituting the nation. Yet, this
tension is still an intensive fragmentation.
To the extent that the society in which the migrant labors can be considered a
'unity,' it is likewise internally extensive. The migrant is not an internal differentium, but
rather an extension of the society, something "added to" it. That this does not "add up" to
a totality suggests an extensive perspective. As with Fanon's conception of the nation
independently of the state, this "supplementarity" comes as a revelation to Bhabha. But,
the supplementarity is just linked extension. Only from a perspective in which the
intensive is unjustifiably privileged does the "supplemental" take on an almost mystical
or transcendent significance, [see 305 - 306 ]
The general analysis applies to diasporan minorities as well. A diaspora is a
'unified,' trans-state group. For Bhabha, all immigrants arefragments of temporally
precedent groups that had some form of perceived unity, such as living on the same
territory. He has no concept of what it means for a group to be a segment of a group that
continues to exist despite or even through the aid of dispersion.
True diaspora inverts Bhabha's model. It is not merely the fracturing of a
conceptual unity (based on the assumption that most members of the nation were at some
point in one common territory, based on assumptions of residually shared characteristics
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such as religion or language). It is the transformation of an intensive unity into an
6XtemiVe °ne
’ WhiGh coincidentally transforms the very conditions and meaning of 'unity'
itself. Unity becomes a matter not of totalization, but rather of connection.
Bhabha rightly rejects the presumed
"horizontality" of the nation, that is, the idea
that the national population exists on the same narrative or social level, without hierarchy.
Yet, confined to an intensive concept of social formations, he misses the full complexity
of the term, with its implication of 'laterality,' that is, extension of the social formation
through lateral relations. Though he is right to expose the hierarchical relations that
structure the nation internally, he fails to account for the laterality in any way at all.
Bhabha claims that his theory of the nation allows for more complex
representations of cultural difference than is possible in inter-totality oppositions [see, for
instance, 292]. This is true, and his conceptual frame should be in play even where a
binary opposition' appears to be the better description of social tension and oppression.
However, what he does not acknowledge is that adopting this framework, in which the
complexities of cultural difference emerge in their continually disruptive form, requires in
many cases a backgrounding of the main structure of power relations and political
oppression and resistance itself. His own framework does not allow a comprehensives
view of social/political reality (and not just due to its focus on culture and narrative), and
must itself be supplemented by what exceeds it.
To his credit, one of Bhabha's goals is to challenge the temptation to valorize
minority group liberation that leaves untouched power relations within the group, and
which has tended to compromise to some extent the gains of decolonization. This is an
important goal, and was stressed by Fanon. Rather than identifying a process of
comprehensive, substantive liberation, however, Bhabha seems to have avoided the issue
of group liberation itself. While Bhabha complexifies the concept of oppressed minority,
he also opens the question of for whom does it produce its cultural interventions, that is,
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whom do they function to benefit? Is it for the state in which it is located? Or, is it for
itself, either as a fragment or a diaspora?
Bhabha's answer is dear: minoritarian cultural production is part of a process of
the society more generally - however indispensable and politically productive the
minoritarian production might be. It is this answer that commits Bhabha to the
problematic form of minoritarian politics analyzed above. The ground of that answer is
his reductive concept of minority.
Bhabha might counter that my concept of the group, with its reference to
extension, is simply liberal or pluralistic. Liberalism asserts the primacy of the atomic
individual, such that a group is always a merely contingent, external formation — whether
chosen or imposed. My contention is that the group is essential
-motivating the
formation and reproduction of the links necessary to it - but not given in the sense of an
organic totality. It is essential and constructed. Pluralism privileges difference in order
to make it inessential or meaningless. The group understood from the extensive
perspective is not concerned with difference, but with gaps or interruptions that must be
overcome.
I have used the term 'extensive perspective' with specific meaning. I am not
claiming that the nation can be understood without reference to intensive difference.
Rather, both moments are present. Or, rather, the nation can be looked at with either
privileged. Privileging intensity yields a concept akin to Bhabha's, with a given totalizing
narrative (pedagogy) disrupted by an 'inconceivable' difference in the beyond of the
narrative. Privileging extension yields my concept of the migrant's nation or diaspora.
The tension between perspectives — between pedagogy and performance, if you will — is
not simply antipathy: it is also mutual dependence. As either moment becomes focal in
the conception or actuality of the nation, the nation itself is threatened by either a
homogenizing, totalitarian implosion, or fragmentation. At such points, the other must be
triggered as limit, to reflect the dynamic away from an extreme.
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On my account, Bhabha's analysis of the nation, and the dynamic he describes,
become merely a moment in a more comprehensive theory of the nation. It is
problematic only when it is taken as the comprehensive dynamic. On the one hand,
Bhabha seems to consider his ultimate rejection of totalizing national narrative as
necessary to a theory of the nation, but on the other, he makes clear that he is attempting
only to add to the given understanding of the nation, and not to produce a general theory
of it himself [320]. Taken as the latter, it is invaluable.
The idea of a state narrative that is not a national (cultural) narrative - as in the
case of the Kurds, above - suggests a further issue. According to Bhabha,
marginalization is not simply a matter of "national" difference: it also takes gender,
sexuality, and (biologically conceived) racial forms. These differences are disruptive of
totalizing national narratives. What is more, they do have cultural components— for
instance, culturally determined roles for women, forms of sexuality, etc. But, they are not
simply cultural. Bhabha appears to collapse these forms of difference wholly into the
cultural realm, which is for him the cultural realm. For instance, he follows Kristeva's
nationalization of gender difference and issues, and indeed view of the nation "as a space
for the emergence of feminist political and psychic identifications" and as itself
reconstituted through "feminist strategies of political identification" [303 - 306], The
emphasis on the role of these differences in the constitution of the nation is well-taken, as
is the innovative analysis of the complexities of their interconnections. But, just as the
nation is not simply cultural, neither are these differences. Bhabha seems not to observe
the distinction between something being fully cultural, and the possibility that its totality
can be perceived from within a cultural framework, in terms of (1) its effects in the
cultural realm and (2) its presence beyond this realm reduced into its shadow in the realm.
The 'bottom line' here is that gender issues, for instance, cannot be fully
articulated within a conceptual framework focused on the nation (or culture). Though it
is important to engage gender issues from within the nation, part of the tension between
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them is due to the tact that they are competing forms of conceiving social relations and
difference, and only partially commensurable. Bhabha asserts that performative
difference undercuts the pretensions of any 'social identity' (nation, gender, class, race) to
a privileged or foundational position. But, in doing so, he assumes that they are all
dissolved into the same cultural space.
An Over-Active Imagination
Etienne Balibar follows Eric Hobsbawm in asserting the “ unreality” of the
nation. For both, the nation is an illusion or fantasy that does not correspond to social
reality. There are no “nations” as they are described by nationalists.
For Hobsbawm, the illusion of the nation is produced against the reality of class-
based social structures. The illusion covers over true class structures, by posing an
alternative analysis of social reality. It is a competing concept of the social that is based
on fantastic unifying and homogenizing ideals, rather than the social facts of economic
relations. As I said above, Hobsbawm rejects the nation because it is not (solely) based
on or does not correspond to class structures. The problem is that he assumes without
justification that class structures are the single, foundational social reality and context of
all relations.
My response to Hobsbawm’ s critique asserted that the structures found by
analysis of social data depended on the analyst’s pre-given conceptual frame. In other
words, one would find nations (albeit in a traditional, limited sense) if one assumed an
ultimately national (or cultural, linguistic, etc.) basis of social relations, while one would
find class tensions and struggles if one examined social data through a conceptual frame
that foregrounds class and economic relations. It was enough then to argue that a class-
focused conceptual frame is no more legitimate than a nation-focused one.
Balibar’s critique functions at a level deeper than Hobsbawm’s does. One cannot
reject it simply by examination of its problematic assumptions. Balibar’s critique, in fact.
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operates by examination of the problematic assumptions that he asserts are at the core of
concepts ot the nation. While Hobsbawm’s critique uses the standard methods of
historiography to demonstrate that “national histories” manipulate historical data to
produce bad analyses of them, Balibar locates the problematic nature of the nation at the
level of this historiography itself. Balibar's analysis of the nation is, in fact, one of the
most sophisticated statements of this prevalent view of the nation.
For Balibar, two illusions are at the core of national historiography. The first
“consists in believing that the generations which succeed one another over centuries on a
reasonably stable territory, under a reasonably univocal designation, have handed down
to each other an invariant substance” [Balibar, 1991a: 86], In other words, “ nationals”
see in the relative stability of a population over many generations on a specific territory
something more than the operation of specific material forces. They recognize a national
essence at the core of the stability. The second “consists in believing that the process of
development from which we select aspects retrospectively, so as to see ourselves as the
culmination of that process, was the only one possible” [86], National historiography
selects out only data that supports the idea that the nation’s history has been a necessary
“destiny.” It misinterprets and misrepresents the data comprising the “history of a
nation” as a necessary, determinate causal sequence, after excluding all data that suggest
alternative histories or the contingency of the process.
National historiography (1) invests a special transcendent and invisible
significance to the material events of a “national” history and (2) imposes on the data an
unnecessarily necessary linear series of causal relations. Thus, national historiography is
not just wrong about the data it examines (and does not). It relies on an untenable
concept of the movement and structure of history itself.
The first problem with this formulation is that it assumes that these particular
approaches to history are unique to national historiography. This is clearly not the case.
For instance, classical Marxism represents human history as a rigidly determinate past
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andfuture
- To this accoun t Of the socialist “destiny” of humanity, it adds the project of
effecting the transition through necessary revolutionary activity. In this sense, it
preserves the Christian eschatology. Were this a “better” account of history, then
perhaps Balibar’s critique of national historiography would hold. But my treatment of
Hobsbawm showed that it is not. The force of Balibar’s critique thus rests not on the
specific nature of national “projects” and “destinies,” but on a more general critique that
applies to many major non-national and anti-national approaches to history as well.
That is not to say that politicized approaches to history (that is, all approaches)
necessarily see the past as rigidly determined. Indeed, some - like Balibar’s - seek to
expose those points precisely at which what appears to have been absolutely determined
in the past can be seen as undetermined. As Bhabha argues, this opens up new possible
pasts andpresents. But, at the same time, even history that avoids claims of destiny and
project (1) selects a set of data relevant to the issue under consideration, usually by
asserting the fundamentality of that issue, and (2) makes claims about the progression of
forces and ideas that operated throughout the period in question. That an anti-totalizing
history does not make totalizing claims does not mean that its case against those who do
does not depend on just as selective an accounting of data — “exceptional” data are
privileged above those conforming to the totalizing narrative - and just as much of an
attribution of a constant force operating in the relevant history.
This is clear in cases of anti-national histories such as Balibar’s. Balibar does not
just point out the inevitable gaps in any nationalist presumptions about the linguistic,
cultural, etc., homogeneity of a population; he goes far beyond this, claiming that
“nation” is not even a partially correct analysis of the social relations of presumably
“national” populations. Rather than exposing the limits of nationality against its
supposedly absolute claims, it asserts a counter-absolute that must view any evidence of
national relations and structures - however cut and full of gaps - as spurious. Further, it
assumes a constant, diabolic and manipulative force of “nationalism” operating in
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history to cause these otherwise indismissable data that support claims of the existences
of nations.
This suggests a second central problem. In the very act of condemning “national
thinking that tinds a unifying essence at the core of a temporally (and spatially) diverse
population, Balibar grants himself the huge assumption that all national concepts are
essentially the same, containing the two elements he critiques. For him, all “national
histories” can be grouped into a gross category that can be critiqued in a very general
manner.
Are all national concepts the same? Do all share the same “national illusions”?
Do all nationals think alike in fundamental ways? Things cannot be this simple. The
work of Partha Chatterjee applies directly to such claims. In Nationalist Thought and the
Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? [1993b], Chatterjee challenges prevalent
claims that anti-colonial nationalisms were simple derivations of historically prior
European nationalisms. For Chatterjee, the very notion that anti-colonial and other non-
European national forms are mere replications of European ones is derivative of a more
general colonialist historiography and ideology. It is not that strains of European-
influenced nationalism have not existed in India (the focus of Chatterjee’s study), or even
that ‘grand nationalist historicism’ has not been present. Yet, the Indian nation and
nationalism(s) have been constituted by the tension between the imposition of a European
model of the nation27 (assuming just one of these) and the resistance to it that has been
part of a more general anti-colonialism and anti-neo-colonialism. The tension between
Euro-American influence and native social and ideological forms is necessarily present in
any assertion of independence.
Balibar mistakes the presence of some Euro-American components (quite often
the legacy of centuries of direct colonial domination) for replication of the complete
27Through imposition of bureaucratic structures related to European state forms, through the form of
interstate structures and organizations and what is required of component states and societies, through
ideology, etc.
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Euro-American nation form (assuming just one). His obliviousness to the internal
complexity ot anti-colonial nations and nationalisms and the powerful remnants of
colonialism that pervade every post-colonial society [see, for instance, Balibar, 1991b:
44] belie his surface ‘sensitivity' to anti-colonialism [see, for instance, 41]. This is not to
suggest that the potential oppressiveness of the nation form is a purely European
derivative. Not at all. Certainly, Europeans do not have a monopoly on oppression, and
forms of oppression quite often correspond cross-culturally. But, non-European
oppressiveness should not be considered strictly derivative of European sources.
Ignoring non-European forms of oppression is one of the strange effects of this type of
neo-colonialism.
This diversity is generalizable in two ways. First, Balibar offers no evidence that
different “national concepts” share the two illusions he claims. He merely asserts this in
a vague universalist tone. Indeed, his primary example of nationalism is Nazism. And
even when he explicitly discusses the issue of whether or not Nazism is an “exceptional”
or typical nationalism, he concludes that it is both, that is, has a contradictory nature
that is typical of all nationalisms. [50 - 52] And, this does not resolve the contradiction,
because the still present exceptionality of Nazism places it at once within and outside of
the realm of “typical” nationalisms. Yet, this must be true for all nationalisms. This
means that the contradiction is extended to all nationalisms, which are thereby both
exceptional and typical.
Part of the reason that Balibar considers all national concepts to share essential
features is that he assumes that for every presumed nation there is but one national
concept. A range of national concepts is generally present within the complex associated
with one labeled nation, as well as across them. Within any group that is labeled a
nation, there will inevitably be a number of competing concepts of the nation — of its
membership, its proper “project” (or whether it has one), its history, what it means by
‘self-determination,’ etc. Even if one or some of these fit Balibar’s concept, often one or
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more do not. Indeed, in most nations, national concepts fitting Balibar’s concept are
directly opposed by other national concepts. This point, of course, is fundamental to
Bhabha’s concept of the nation, as well as to Chatterjee’s
.
28
Some selt-described nations conceive themselves precisely as this complex of
different self-concepts, histories, projects, etc. For instance, Julia Kristeva, in Nations
Without Nationalisms
,
argues that France is not defined by a single concept or
nationalism, but by a commitment to plurality that allows a range of self-concepts and
nationalisms to co-exist in a productive tension. A similar strain exists in the United
States and Great Britain. Of course, the fact that in each state this strain is hotly
contested by ‘purist’ concepts of the relevant nation - usually based on racial and
linguistic considerations — tends to confirm the general point. Whether one accepts the
pluralistic claims of the liberals of these states or not, one will find in almost any self-
described nation — large, like India or China, medium-sized, such as Vietnam or Mexico,
or tiny, like Armenia or Albania — significantly different national concepts, nationalisms,
and so forth - often in great tension with each other.
Even in apparently rigidly unified nations, often strong internal and external
forces have selected out a certain nationalism or national concept for dominance. For
instance, one could argue that external as well as internal forces have had a significant
role in selecting out a particularly virulent and monological form of Serbian nationalism.
Yet, even in the midst of its most extreme activity, counter-currents existed that have
since become significant.
By unifying all national concepts associated with a given “nation,” Balibar
inevitably finds the elements he is searching for in each “super-nationalism.” But, this is
like lumping all forms of German national self-conception into Nazism, and then
deciding that German “nationalism” in general is fascist. “The Germans” may have
displayed an exceptional proclivity to fascism over the past century or so, but so have
20 See especially Chatterjee, 1993a.
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(some) Germans produced other concepts of their nation not
criticism.
necessarily subject to this
Strangely, at the root of Balibar’s error there seems a rads, or nationalist impulse
to homogenize and reduce an “other.” Balibar sees only a homogenous unity of
“nationalists” where a complex set of national self-concepts exists. Indeed, directly
contrary to his claims that the imposition of a national name merely assigns a single label
to a diversity, he is misled by the existence of such labels into thinking that only one
national concept is associated with each - that the nation fa homogeneous in this central
way.
Bahbar’s reduction of the nation to historical illusion thus (1) inaccurately
restricts this criticism to national history and (2) inaccurately asserts it as the general form
of all national concepts rather than merely one form among many, both within individual
nations and across the field of nations. Yet, implicit in my defense is acceptance of
Balibar s assumption that the constructedness of nations - to the extent that it is present -
- is equivalent to their being illusions. For him, the core meaning of the nation is a
“ my,h[] of national ori«inD” [87]. Though Balibar does not dismiss the nation in a
summary fashion as Hobsbawm does, he goes on not to explore the complex nature of the
nation as a genuine social form, but rather to determine exactly how the illusion
maintains its “continuing power” [87],
Balibar is clear on the pure unreality of the nation. Not only does he critique the
accuracy of national histories, but he also argues that the very concept of nation derives
from other social categories. The nation is (1) produced through the psychological
misapplication ot the idea ot kinship [lOOff.], (2) the racialization of the notion of
“linguistic community” [96ff.], and/or (3) “a religion - if not indeed the religion - of
modern times” [95], The nation is nothing in itself, but defined purely by reference to
other social forms and categories. It is a form of religion, a myth of kinship, etc. Indeed,
it is a second-degree illusion: race itself is a construct that, when applied to language,
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produces a “Active ethnicity” that is the basis of the “ideal nation” [96]: even the social
category from which nation derives (race) is a construct.
To say that nations are produced through human intentionality or agency is not to
prove that they are illusions or fantasies. There are two problems with such a claim.
First, it assumes that legitimate social formations are “all natural,” that is, constructed
from the blind, mechanical, brute operation of material social forces, without the self-
conscious activity of the human beings affected by and affecting/effecting these forces.
Obviously, human beings act and material forces are produced in part through direct and
indirect human agency. But, in Hegelian language, this account assumes that the only
legitimate social formations are those produced by “agents” (if this term can be used)
with consciousness” - they think as they act, perhaps about what they should do - but
without self-consciousness”
: they do not explicitly reflect on and try to affect their
conditions, reflect on their place in the world, the “ big picture” of the sources and effects
of their actions, their relations with others, etc., or, if they do, these thoughts are directly
derivative of material conditions without affecting those conditions. 29
It is precisely when human intentionality — desire — is recognized as a
constitutive — though not solely determining — component of the nation that it is
dismissed by Balibar and others as illusion or fantasy. For Balibar (as for Hobsbawm),
such a social metaphysics appears a residual ot his previous pure Marxism, even as it has
been tempered by post-structuralism. The post-structuralism perhaps frees him from the
explicit tenets of the rigid material determinism of classical Marxism, but has failed to
reach deeply into the hidden metaphysical assumptions underlying it. On the one hand,
he rejects the rigid materially determinist mentality that he claims to find at the core of
the nation, but on the other, he rejects the nation precisely because it is not materially
determined.
“"Consciousness" merely responds to external and internal forces, without rising above the realm of the
material, while "self-consciousness" is precisely mental intervention in the material that is not strictly
determined by material forces.
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One would expect, on the contrary, that the presence of human agency in the
production ot social terms is a positive - or at least potentially positive - thing
.
30
Certainly, oppressive and manipulative constructions are possible, and are the focus of
Hobsbawm s work. But, at the same time, the absence of human conceptual agency and
mtentionality seems inherently negative, reducing the nation to a mechanical product of
non-human forces. One might say that it is the “artificiality” of nations that makes them
at least possibly worthwhile.
The relationship between desire and the history of the nation is complex. On the
one hand, desire is a necessary component of truly human social forms. The constitutive
role of desire in the formation of the subject and social forms is, in fact, a central theme
of much of contemporary psychoanalytically-influenced post-structuralist theory. On the
other hand, I stress that desire does not operate in a vacuum. A given history may be the
product of desire alone, that is, a fabrication. But this is not necessary, and the generation
of a history solely by desire is illusion. This is the key to post-structural and
psychoanalytic critiques of the nation and nationalism. The crux of the critiques is that
desire is misused, or is an oppressive (manipulative) desire. Thus, there is recognition
that desire interacts with or is used relative to a set of facts. Desire transforms these facts
“ into something,” that is, organizes them and gives them meaning, in a neo-Kantian
sense. But, at the same time, desire is not free from facts, to construct its own. In
mundane philosophical terms, desire is necessary to the recognition and production of
social forms, but not sufficient.
^Interestingly, this construction of community through historical interpretation has become a central
method of neighborhood-level community organizing. Organizers in urban low-income US neighborhoods
are now taught this technique as a key tool in developing the sense of community necessary to transcending
the limits of "interest group" local-level politics, toward construction of progressive, stable communities
equipped to deal with the effects of poverty, racism, and other forms of oppression. Of course, quite often
these are the same people who condemn the nation or nationalism as false, coercive, oppressive, etc.
For instance, I attended more than one community organizing training session at the 1996
Massachusetts Partners in Prevention "Ounce of Prevention" Conference that focused on how to write
community histories in such a way as to foster recognition of commonalities and on-going productive
relations.
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The desire I am writing of here is the historian or social reflector’s desire. That is,
I am concerned with the production of interpretations of raw historical data that in fact
complete the data, though no interpretation is the one correct or necessary one, as well as
constructing concepts of or the ideal moment of the nation. Desire of course operates as
well in the moment, producing acts that themselves become the raw data of history.
These are then engaged by the desiring historical/social reflector, that is, by a different
desire, and transformed into history. Because an immediate actor’s desires do not bear a
linear, determinative relationship to her/his acts - not the least due to the fact that they
might be opaque to the actor, and not to mention the gap between explicit intention and
results due to internal and external forces beyond the control of the actor — they are not a
basis against which to evaluate the results of the historian/reflector’s desires. That opens
up the possibility of more than one “right” if partial or non-exclusive interpretation of
the historical/social data. When one factors in that the production of history and
conceptualization of social formations is itself also internal to production of historical
data, things become that much more complicated.
This split or offset desire has interesting Hegelian implications, and intersects
Bhabha’s offset narratives of the nation. The key issue here is that desire itself does not
generate history (the vulgar post-structuralist position), while neither do the raw data of
history determine it (with or without the intercession of a perceiving, structuring subject -
- this is the standard empiricist or Kantian concept of history and social formations,
respectively, that is, as understood by contemporary analytic philosophy and theorists,
and most historians).
More sophisticated post-structuralist concepts such as Balibar’s play on both sides
of this fence, allowing the latter assumption to sneak in without being acknowledged.
This is perhaps due to their capacity to recognize at once the implications of either
extreme position, without being able to recover sufficiently from their immersion in the
critical response to dominant analytic approaches to history and society. The criticized
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constrained concepts have long been major buttresses of dominant, often oppressive
histones, because they hide key assumptions about history and society, and exclude
discussion of their own biases and perspectivity, as well as delegitimating alternative
histones based on alternative but equally valid assumptions. As a reaction to these
constrained concepts, post-structural theorists have often formulated these alternative
views of historical and social facts, the role of the historian/reflector, etc., as opposite to
the dominant analytic ones, rather than as critical re-evaluations of the relationship of
desire to history and social formations. The necessarily reactive posture of sophisticated
theorists have often left no room for theorization of the subtleties of this relationship. At
the same time, recognition of this subtle relationship has required avoiding any simplistic
absolute openness or individual/desire-based relativism. Without the theoretical
apparatus in place to do this, a relatively unsophisticated valorization of the perspectives
of the oppressed were considered sufficient. This is clear in Balibar’s work, which takes
an oppresseds view of history as a ground. Unfortunately, his determination of which
oppressed view(s) should predominate allows him to import certain conceptual
assumptions without importing others. That is, he selects which oppressions are key, and
how they are related to each other. The impulse is laudable, but the result reintroduced
the constrictive approach to history reminiscent of the standard analytical approach.
I am concerned here with anticipating the opposite error, vulgar post-structuralist
interpretations of my claims about the “openness” of history. History cannot be leveled
to the pure product of the present
,
that is, the desiring historian. At the same time, it
cannot be leveled to the pure product of the past
,
that is, determined univocally as it
occurs. Most analyses tend to move on only one of these axes. The post-modern turn has
been the discovery of the axis of the present/desire. But often this discovery obscures the
still important role of the other axis.
The debates between “naturalism” and “constructivism” are akin to historical
debate of “nature versus nurture,” which are still significant in social theory today. The
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latest cycle has gone from one extreme to the other. In the 1960s, environment was
considered everything, while today the focus on genetics (and perhaps advances in
influencing genetics) have shifted emphasis almost solely onto the latter. If it is true that
environment has been revealed to be less than fully determinative of social behavior (for
instance, alcoholism, mental illness, obesity, etc., are recognized often as genetically
determined afflictions, while regarding such things as mental retardation, failure to
acknowledge its physical reality is problematic), the dramatic shift of recent years is just
as problematic. After all, study after study has revealed the strong link of women’s
substance abuse, mental illness, and other problems to childhood sexual and physical
abuse: to pretend that these are simply genetically determined is nothing more than a
convenient maneuver for preserving patriarchy.
The analogy to contemporary genetic research is fruitful. A dialectical
relationship is not a static tension between two forces, but rather a dynamic interaction.
At some points, one force predominates, at others the other does. For purposes of this
dissertation, a ‘synthesis” should not be considered a resolution of the tension, but rather
their fundamental linking to each other in an on-going process. Indeed, “balance” exists
only over the course of the process, not at individual points within it (except as temporary
conditions). It is, of course, possible that for certain nations, one moment — “natural” or
constructive — dominates in general, with the others merely a minor component. Such
a lopsided dialectic produces a lopsided nation, either essentially constructed (artificial)
or excessively materially determined (and thus imposed on its members without their
participation). It is the former that is truly “ illusory,” while the latter borders on
ethnicity rather than nation. This lop-sidedness is different from the perpetual shifting
and participation of both aspects in a nation.
More than this, this dialectical shifting continually revises the “origin ” ofthe
nation. Human intervention in individual development reaches beyond external effects,
such as education, to revise the very “givenness” of genetics. Genetic engineering
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produces new '‘givens,” rather than merely trying to influence what has been given. As
such, i, makes irrelevant the debate between nature and nurture - nature produces the
forces that nurture as the forces are turned onto nature itself. “Environment” - external
forces determining how genes are manipulated - comes to define what is “hereditary”
itself.
Origins” themselves become relative, not absolute. For instance, I would agree
that there is no absolute ethnicity. All ethnic groups are the products of the intermingling
(dramatic or gradual) between two or more prior groups, which are themselves such
products. Ethnicity is always relative or provisional. But, does that make it illusory?
That ethnicities change and develop, and even come into and out of existence, does not
mean they are illusory. For Balibar to reject them on this ground requires rejecting all
social structures, which perhaps he wishes to. That Armenian ethnicity, for example, was
probably formed initially by a conquest of Hittites by Urartans 2,500 years ago, and then
later revised through assimilation of Jews, Persians (and Indians), and other groups does
not mean that Armenians are not distinct from these other groups. It does mean,
however, that its ultimate reality depends on a concept of Armenian ethnicity as much as
the material processes that produced it. Armenian ethnicity is now a “given,” by this
conceptual leap.
A very precise link to the nation is possible, through Nietzsche’s concept of
‘secondary instincts.” According to this concept, cultural practices, ethics, and the like
become fixed over time. They become “naturalized.” But this is only the first step.
Over a long period of time, a human society itself is reworked in line with a non-absolute
but now rigidly determined culture, ethics, etc. The society produces its members as if
the culture and ethics were natural and necessary to them. Though the particular culture
and ethics is ultimately arbitrary, relative to these members it is absolutely necessary - it
is reflected in them as a “secondary instinct,” not biologically but socially “natural.”
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Balibar, with Nietzsche, rejects this as ultimately arbitrary, but at the same time,
Nietzsche recognizes an inevitability in this process that Balibar fails to acknowledge.
All social structures are “arbitrary” in this way, that is, take on the appearance of
naturalness that is perhaps the inertia that results from their actualization as opposed to
alternative potentials. Balibar’ s difficulties again appear to stem from certain Marxist
assumptions in his work. His implicit valorization of the “natural” seems derivative of a
belief in material determinism. At the risk of generalization, classical Marxism tends to
naturalize its historical scheme. So often classical Marxists have claimed that the
overthrow of capitalism is the inevitable result of a determined social evolution. This
claim is rarely made today, at least explicitly, but even as Balibar gives up this positive
side of the claim, he preserves its foundation as a tool in critique of the nation.
One might argue that Balibar (and classical Marxism more generally) does not
maintain a strict material determinism. Such an argument would appeal to the clearly
emphasized importance of the ideal component of Marxism. It requires class
consciousness and a recognition of solidarity (common interest) among the proletarians.
This is construed as recognition of the true nature of social relations, and it is, but what is
important is that it must proceed through the agency of organizers who recognize and
explain this reality to those afflicted by it. While Marx, in reversing Hegel, recognized
even in this ideal or intellectual activity the driving force of material relations, one might
just as well acknowledge the former as not entirely subject to the latter — or, more
accurately, upon rejecting strict determinism, one might recognize a greater latitude and
significance for the former, as well as an increased randomness in the latter that must be
organized by intellectual agents. To do this, however, is to recognize the “artificiality”
of all social structures. For Balibar to resist this conclusion would then appear to be from
the causes suggested above.
Balibar does recognize a residual reality in the illusion of the nation. That is, he
recognizes that the illusion of the nation does have real effects. He views it as an ideal
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construct that is - real ' because it is assumed to be real. People and states act as if there
are nations, and nations are referred to in laws, constitutions, etc. Thus, the nation is a
legal fiction, or institutionalization of a fiction. It is a narrative fiction, as well -
individuals perceive history ay ifnations have been agents in it. [96] But, this analysis
still preserves the fundamentality of the “ illusion.” It is not that Balibar recognizes the
reality of the nation itself, but rather that he recognizes the reality of the effects of the
nation as an illusion. “Nationals” are purely the effects of the nation, not also its
producing agents.
As Bhabha has shown, this one-sidedness is not accurate. Transcending Balibar’s
limits, one can recognize these effects - these new givens - as themselves subject to
reworking. As I have suggested, there is an on-going dialectic, a constant shifting. What
results is a blurring of the categories of “natural” and “artificial.” What is particularly
interesting is that, after extended rejections of the split between “good” and “bad”
nationalisms [see, for instance, 1991b: 47ff. ], Balibar himself assumes a similarly
problematic split between “natural” and “artificial.”
Nietzsche s second instinct is often treated as a description of the ultimate power
of ideology. But, it might be understood to mark the problematic nature of the
natural/artificial dichotomy itself. The problems associated with claims of naturalness or
artificiality are visible in a host of simple examples. For instance, why is an otter using a
rock to crack a mussel open not the use of a tool and therefore “unnatural”? What is
“natural” about “organic” crops grown according to a carefully planned and executed
cultivation procedure? Human agency is just as present and purposeful in the cultivation
of organic crops as in inorganic. The history of philosophy is the history of the assertion
that we are not “natural,” that we are distinct from animals and above them. Racism and
other forms of oppression often depend on animalizing the victims, as Balibar himself
explains [56ff.]. Our intelligence is said to mark us off from other living things, to make
us more than natural. At the same time, material determinism (Marxist or otherwise)
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suggests that even this intelligence is a natural derivative, such that any intervention by
our self-consciousness seives in the flow of nature is itself natural. Polyester is a “natural
liber” on this account. Barring a creationist view of the fact of human existence, we did
not create ourselves and were not created outside of nature. Thus, whatever we produce
or become is a product of nature.
Here we shift from a historical to a logical consideration of natural versus
artificial. To this point, the question has been about ultimate origins. The issue has been
whether this or that social formation was produced without direct intervention of self-
conscious human agents intentionally creating or altering it. But, this formulation
suggests a related issue. Before, I distinguished between artificiality and illusion. My
point was that the constructedness of the nation does not make it false or unreal. But this
distinction becomes a counter-argument against me at this point. For, it remains possible
to distinguish between illusory and constructed but real social formations. It is certainly
possible to argue that all social formations are to some extent constructed based on
human intentionality. But, this is different from some being the result not of human
agency and intervention in the process of concrete development, but rather of a false
perception of social reality that in fact does not contain the product of any such process.
In other words, it is one thing to say that this or that nation has been produced in the past
century through a human influenced or driven process, and quite another to say that it is
the purely ideal product of misperception of reality, thereby existing only within the
consciousness of some “nationalists.”
Or, is it? As I proposed above, “history” and “social reality” are indeterminate -
not mechanically factual — and are made determinate through interpreting analysis. A
thinking being is necessary not simply to perceive a historical development or social
structure, but to determine it. An ideal moment is therefore necessary to any social
formation perceived in time and place. One might say that a conceptual moment is
necessary to the full articulation of reality, which itself comes to transcend what is purely
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material and given. This, of course, is nothing different from saying that human history
and social relations involve human agency.
Three qualifications must be made. First, as I suggested above, that conscious
intentionality is a necessary component of social formations such as the nation does not
mean that none can be illusory. Illusion occurs precisely when interpretation and
intention are not linked to materiality. A nation is illusory when perception of it is not
even partially consistent with the data of social reality, and/or when the attempt to affect
it does not correspond to actions or results. On the other hand, a social formation is
“mechanical” - becoming a mere “ethnicity” - when it involves no self-reflective or
self-conscious agency of its members. Such a formation is the on-going passive product
of external or “ given” (material) forces and factors.
This allows for nations that begin more as concepts than as social formations,
contrary to Benedict Anderson’s model. For Anderson, material social relations and
modes of communication create the possibility for interpretation of a group as a lingual-
national community. Fie does discuss “russification,” in which reality is forced to
conform to a concept. But, it is a mistake to link the oppressiveness of a nation with the
extent to which mental activity is involved with its construction. It is a question of whose
concept the nation that results reflects: if a part of a proto-national population imposes its
conception on others who either have differing national conceptions or non-national
senses of identity and community, then the national structure is internally oppressive.
That does not make it illusory: it is oppressive precisely because the forced conformity
of its “members” is effective. Of course, a feature even of this forced conformity might
be the internalization of the initially false concept of the or a nation imposed by those
gaining power through it. It is true that in this case the exposure of the truth — the true
present or history obscured by the illusion — is liberating. But, at the same time, most
oppressive nations are not so simply constructed; indeed, to the extent that all nations are
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internally oppressive - as described by Bhabha - this does not eorrespond to
illusoriness.
pure
Third, the relationship between the conceptual and material aspects of a nation is
not a simple “ Hegelian” dialectic. 1 have argued that neither component can be reduced
to the other, but are rather distinct. At the same time, they are interactive. They do not
contradict each other, but rather differ from each other in a tense but also partially
complementary manner. There is not an ideal balance between two distinct aspects, the
conceptual and the material. Rather, they flow into each other - each influencing the
other and influenced by it - even as each resists reduction to the other. Indeed, each
takes on aspects of the other, in the manner that what is natural is also artificial and vice-
versa.
Balibar portrays the issue as a stark decision between two views. Either the
nation produces nationalism (that is, a materially real social formation produces concepts
of itself), or nationalism produces the nation (material reality is forced into conformity
with a prior idea). [1991b: 46] Though Balibar leaves the question open for a time, he
ultimately explicitly and unambiguously commits himself to the latter position [49ff.].
Balibar’s failure is two-fold. First, he opts for a strictly materialist rejection of the nation
as an ideal concept, as I have been explaining, rather than understanding the nation as
both natural and artificial (an intentional use of given social structures and a
naturalization of constructed social formations), both material and ideal. But, even this
type of formulation is inadequate. Balibar mistakenly splits the poles of this dialectical
tension. The proper poles are not the nation and nationalism, but rather the nation as
essential and producing nationalism, and vice versa. The dialectic is between two
different causal relations between nation (material) and nationalisms (conceptual). The
nation is a dialectical tension between the construction of material social structures driven
by concepts and the production of nationalisms, national concepts, and so forth based on
extant social structures. These aspects continually produce each other, rather than simply
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being perspectives on or aspects ot the complete comprehensive “nation.” The
nation is never complete, such that these are perspectival aspects, but rather is a process
ot on-going construction driven from both aspects, such that each aspect is continually
modified and developed even as it produces the other.
Perhaps central to the un-Hegelianness of the nation is that each aspect -
conceptual and material - is itself a complex, internally tense disunity. The contradiction
is not so much between material and conceptual aspects of the nation, as between
competing conceptions associated with distinct nationalisms, national concepts, and so
forth. These differing concepts generally cannot be reduced to a single national concept,
except through the force that marks the internal oppressiveness introduced above. The
material as well is not a simple structure — say, a set of homogeneous individuals, or a
group linked together via shared reading materials, etc. The material structure of the
nation is a hodgepodge and complex of complementary and contending social links and
networks, historical trends and forces, and so forth. These include “external” forces,
some of which undermine the very notion of a nation’s unity, and others that reinforce it.
It would not be inconsistent with Balibar (or Hobsbawm) to argue that gaps in the
structural or material “unity” of the nation are bridged by conceptual links. At the same
time, these links themselves are not overarching conceptions of the nation, but part of a
complex of contending concepts that requires mediation by material structures. Being on
the same land, or speaking the same language, or even being in the same organizations
(especially where these are traditional cultural or religious structures) links those who
would otherwise be in direct opposition. A concept of a nation tends to link individuals
across material gaps, and so the materiality of the nation is not in contradiction with its
conceptual aspect, but rather dependent upon it. Likewise, concrete relations tend to
mitigate the effects of ideological or conceptual differences, making such oppositions
oppositions within a single group, rather than oppositions that create two distinct groups.
That is not to say that the division of a nation into multiple nations, a nation and a non-
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national group, or two or more non-nations does not occur as a result of either material or
conceptual gaps and tensions. But it is to say that this result is not necessary.
Individual and Group
To this point, I have not clarified the subject of concepts of the nation. What is
the subject ot the concepts that comprise the complex associated with any given nation?
Balibar is clear: “ ... it is not a question of setting a collective identity against individual
identities. All identity is individual
.. [1991a: 94]. The nation is a concept that is
fully contained within individual consciousnesses. The individual conceives her-/himself
as belonging to this or that collectivity, and recognizes others who share this concept as
belonging. The concept might vary somewhat among individual members, but contains
the elements of project and destiny attached to a national name.
This is similar to Renan’s [1990] formulation, that the nation is the product of an
on-going individual will to be a nation, to belong to a nation. What is more, Balibar and
Anderson differ only on the issue of whether or not this “imagined community” has a
connection to material reality. Balibar makes clear that individual identity is not trans-
historical: it is influenced by and perhaps determined by material forces. However, it
does not accurately represent social reality. For Anderson [1992], on the other hand, the
nation is recognition of a material structure of communication, a shared relation to a set
of literary works, media, administrative structures, etc. The concept itself is produced
when individuals recognize that they have a relationship to, say, a language and literature
in common with other individuals. The nation is the concept of this group and its
common relationship to the language, literature, etc. Thus, Anderson sees a direct
material basis for the concept of a nation, which Balibar denies.
Yet, both share an underlying problematic assumption, which I have already
identified: the members of the nation have the same concept of it. On Anderson’s
account, without this shared concept, individuals would never recognize their
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commonality with other individuals within a proto-national language group (or
administrative unit); on Balibar’s, the nation does not have a material basis, and so
depends entirely on the presence of the concept in each member’s consciousness. I have
already discussed the problems with assuming that all members of a nation share the
same concept ot it, in both the preceding section and my explication of Bhabha’s
important contributions on this matter.
Even Bhabha maintains that the subject of concepts of the nation is purely
individual. The totality of the nation is a quality of the object of the concept - the
conception of the nation as a closed totality. In making the important contribution of the
difference among subjects, Bhabha fails to transcend their sameness as individuals,
despite differences in the content of their narratives.
This is understandable: he is most concerned with rejecting totalizing concepts of
the nation, precisely of the type that represent it as a collective subject. Balibar likewise
rejects this type of concept. I have already discussed the general problem with concepts
of groups that are strictly derivative of individuals, in the section on liberal approaches to
the nation in the previous chapter. That concerned group structures without reference to
material and mental aspects. It is easy to conceive of group structures that involve
fundamental relations to others, relations that are part of the very foundation of the
individual. It is another issue entirely to extend this insight to the mental realm. Balibar,
Anderson, and even Bhabha recognize an individual concept of the nation as derivative of
(or reactive against) the social relations of the individual subject producing it. This is
true even ot Hegelian approaches, which see self-consciousness of the nation as a
recognition of the trans-individual concept of the nation as it has been worked out in
history: the individual does not conceive it independently, but can assimilate the concept
that has been worked out collectively. The nation is supposed to be the unity of a social
concept of it that is the product of the operation of a universal (not individual or
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particular) logic, which is then recognized by individual subjects in their analysis of
history - this is the project and destiny Balibar rejects.
No nation can be the product of a set of individuals sharing the same concept of
the nation and their participation in it. On the contrary, Balibar and Hobsbawm’s
critiques hold, against Anderson's position. What is more, Bhabha and Balibar are
correct to maintain that totalizing concepts of the nation - a la Hegel - are untenable:
there is no grand unity working its way through history as the nation. In this sense, there
is no national subject that is not a conceptual or legal fiction, that is, created as the
fictitious object of a concept.
Yet, this does not require that the concept of the nation is purely individual. In
fact, viewed from a material perspective, and recognizing the path of development of a
concept as part of it, a national concept is never individual
.
31 Any concept of the nation
is the product of multiple minds, operating in temporal series or contemporaneous
interchange. This does not mean that all participants in the process of developing this or
that strain of nationalism or national concept adopt the same concept — that a consensus
is built. Yet, the content of the consciousness of each cannot be said to be “ individual” -
- it is the product of influences and interchanges. Differences among these participants
represents individuality without strict individuation. It is this connectedness -- this real,
concrete, traceable connectedness in time and place - that grounds national connections
that are not reductions to unity. The nation is not an intellectual (or material) unity,
neither homogeneous (all members do not share the same concept or objective
characteristics) nor organic (they are not parts of a mental or material whole as a
'"'division of labor,” a la Deutsch). But, members are connected to each other through
participation in the development of national concepts (as well as in material structures to
be elaborated below). Again, each individually held concept itself is the presence of
31As an aside, Hegelian “Absolute Knowledge” in a national context might be an individually-held
perfected concept of the nation. I hold that such a concept does not exist, not due to epistemological limits
but a marker of the on-going activity/productivity of the nation, as investigated below.
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other minds within the mind of the specific individual, while for an individual this can be
or is a d.tterent concept. Members are connected in this manner formally, without
necessarily sharing the specific content of consciousness with each other. Of course.
there are significant overlaps, which mark the presence of others’ ideas in one's concept
and one’s ideas in others’ concepts.
Where this overlap is significant, one can identify a strain of nationalism or
national concept. But, as I have suggested, there are always different, irreducible strains.
The connection of great overlap can be granted, but in cases where there are great
differences and even direct oppositions, would there not be more than one nation?
Balibar (and Hobsbawm) might argue that here the common referent to the label
naming the nation (France, Vietnam, etc.) is all that guarantees unity across such divides.
This unity is thus shallow and illusory, because it is conceived as having a much deeper
significance than the mere sharing of a name. Whether intentional or not, for Bhabha, it
is containment in a state structure that provides some ground for national cohesion
despite fundamental difference within the presumably national group.
Indeed, one might argue that, without an appeal to such a guarantor, those clearly
outside a given nation with concepts of it must be part of the nation. Obviously, any
theory that suggests that Turkish anti-Armenianism implies the Armenianness of
participating Turks is completely untenable.
Any appeal to an ultimate guarantor of “national unity” requires a reduction of
the nation to that guarantor. The nation is a label, or a state, or a linguistic community.
My position is different. Contending concepts of a given nation are not unified by
containment within a foundational unity. Rather, relative to different concepts, there are
bridges which overcome the gaps but are in themselves are insufficient to guarantee
unity.
For instance, language is never a unity in itself, contrary to Anderson’s belief.
Even where a single language is spoken by members of a nation and that language is
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unique to the nation, the language might not be internally uniform. Dialects might exist,
possibly very different ones. What is more, the use of even the main dialect might vary,
as described in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature
[1986], they analyze the writings of Kafka to show that, even though his writing appears
to be perfectly standard, majoritarian German, and can be read with understanding by any
standard German speaker, his distinctive sparse usage creates a “different language”
within German, which places him at once within the greater German language
community and without it. Similar arguments have been made regarding African-
American literature in English, most notably by Henry Louis Gates, Jr., in The Signifying
Monkey: A Theory ofAfrican-American Literary Criticism [1988], These assert that
majority English speakers in the United States can read many works by African-
American authors with understanding, but only one-dimensionally. Many texts or
elements of them have multiple meanings that can be understood only from within the
minority culture, and so the works themselves, while apparently (or in one sense) part of
the majority literature, actually comprise a separate literature as well. Even in terms of
agency relative to the use of a language, an internal split generally occurs. Those from
different classes and different educational backgrounds do not have the same relationship
to the “mother tongue” - for some, it is the malleable substance of their artistic and
intellectual creations, while for others it is an external and inferiorizing tangle of difficult
rules, unknown words, etc. The former are agents and subjects of language, while the
latter are passive in its face, and often its objects without a sufficient voice. The literature
and media do not represent their voices, but what elites believe they should be saying.
At the same time, relative to debates and oppositions among different national
concepts and even nationalist programs, language can be common. It is not absolutely
common or unified, but rather, relative to the gaps and tensions within the complex of
nationalisms and national concepts, it appears common and functions to bridge those
gaps. At the same time, where language’s own gaps and disparities occur — indeed,
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where members of the same purported nation speak different languages
,
which occurs
especially in diasporan nations - it might be conceptual links, cultural practices,
organizational links, etc. - or a combination - that bridge this set of gaps and
discontinuities - and even oppositions. Even where sub-national elements might consist
of partial homogeneities or organic structures, these themselves are joined into the nation
through lateral links.
The powerful insights of post-structural theory include a rejection of claims to
group unity based on homogeneity or organic complementarity (parts unified into a
whole). At the same time, this powerful critique has generally been accompanied by the
implicit assumption that no other form of national group is possible. My understanding
of the nation does not depend on such group forms, but rather focuses on the actual
relations among members.
As I explained in my treatment of Bhabha’s work, focus on homogeneity or
organic unity does not include lateral relations, but only relations between individual
members of the nation and the nation as a whole (individual members either are the
nation as a whole, which is merely the collection of identical members, or they are a
partial component of an organic whole). What is more, the nation is reduced ultimately
to one type of unity (relation) or the coincidence of multiple coextensive unities (through
shared territory and language, for instance). Yet, any type of unity is cut by internal gaps
and discontinuities. My assertion is that a nation exists precisely where these gaps are
bridged on other levels, such that every discontinuity gives way to another aspect on
which the discontinuity is bridged. No aspect is foundational - all give way to gaps that
are bridged on other levels. But, with the nation, for every aspect with its discontinuities,
there is always another level where a bridging takes place.
It is precisely where gaps on different levels correspond that two distinct social
formations are present. These might be distinct nations, but also might be other forms as
well. That even an existing nation might develop fractures that split it is not a limit on
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this theory, but a strength. Similarly, efforts to produce a nation through conceptual or
material linkages and totalizing are by no means guaranteed to succeed, and history is
filled with such failed attempts. Indeed, they most often have failed precisely because
they have attempted or assumed a foundational unity that proved illusory
.
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It is important to point out that the mere will to belong to this or that nation is not
a conceptual link to others with concepts of the nation. The conceptual link requires
being part of the development of a concept of the nation, not merely wishing to be. Thus,
I cannot be Japanese merely by claiming that I am. On the contrary, given that any
concept including me in the Japanese nation would be at odds with most other concepts, a
strong material bridge is necessary, such as my habitation in the Japanese state, fluency in
Japanese, etc.
Of course, given my racial difference from the typical conception of Japanese, I
will probably always be on the social border of the nation, no matter what my material
linkages. It is important to stress that the borders of a nation are always fuzzy and
ambiguous, a continuum rather than a line. This is confirmed by the fact that many
different national concepts and nationalisms associated with a given nation fix the
membership in very different ways, producing together such an ambiguous or fuzzy
border.
On the other hand, it is also possible to conceive on this border those who do not
consider themselves members of a nation, but are linked through a range of non-
conceptual connections. In both types of cases this evolves, whether tending toward or
away from the nation.
It is also important to point out that many conceptions of nations assert rather
rigid membership criteria, themselves appealing to such things as lineages, language,
racial phenotypes, and even surnames. At the same time, these are generally challenged
by other strains, introducing an opposition at the conceptual level that does not
32 Such instances should not be confused with those in which one strain of nationalism or national concept
came to dominate an entire nation, and to force it into conformity, as in the case of Nazism.
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necessarily correspond to but does emphasize tensions and discontinuities in phenotypes,
lineages, language, etc.
Finally, it is important to differentiate between an individual and general
perspective on the nation. From a general perspective, gaps and discontinuities in the
conceptual structure of the nation can be overcome by material bridges. This does not
mean that every member of the nation does not have some sort of conceptual as well as
material linkage into the nation. At the individual level, both must be present, though
more emphasis on one allows less on the other.
This brings us back to the original material-ideal dialectic. It is important to stress
that even at the general level, both are necessary, though each may have gaps. The nation
is not simply an individual concept, nor is it simply a material social structure. At the
same time, different nations are composed in different ways. What is more, this
composition is continually shifting in time. For instance, a nation inhabiting a given
territory, with a relatively unified language, religion, and culture, reinforced by
domination by an external power, might depend relatively little in the conceptual aspect
of its nationhood. A minimum conceptualization is necessary to complement the strong
material structures. But, if these structures are upset ~ if, say, the population is dispersed,
such that members eventually partially assimilate into new cultures and languages, the
conceptual component might become focal.
Identity
Identity carries two meanings in reference to the nation. I have already dealt at
length with the first sense, as the homogeneity of members of a nation. The second is the
“ identity” of the nation through time. What is it that makes the present iteration of, say,
the Cambodian nation identical to previous iterations? The usual answer is precisely
what Balibar rejects, the idea that somehow some national essence is maintained through
time, such that the present iteration is fundamentally the same as previous ones.
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Discussion of the “identity through time” of social formations extends at least as
lar back as Hume, who as part of his general critique of identity through time, questioned
what it was that was the “same” in countries over a period of centuries. Certainly no
individuals were common, and even a country’s territory might have changed
significantly during this time. He concluded, much as Balibar, that our perception of a
continuing identity is due to an illusory assumption of some hidden substance that
persists through time, though it cannot be observed.
Appeal to Kant does mitigate the effects of Hume’s insight, resonating with my
previous implicit appeal to Kant in recognizing that historical data has no necessary
organization itself, but is rather organized by the conceptual frame of its perceiver
.
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But,
it is important to see the openness suggested by Hume’s insight 34 not as a hindrance to
arguments asserting the existence of the nation, but rather a feature of the historical space
in which nations exist and develop. In fact, perception of the “identity” of a nation
through time depends precisely on the openness that Hume recognizes. Identity here
should be understood as persistence
,
an active reassertion or reconstruction of the nation
“Because I do not hold that there is just one possible true conceptual frame universal to all sentient
perceivers, I do not follow Kant in finding Reason to be the sole determining "lawgiver" of Nature. The
possibility of contending social conceptual frames is not limitless, but rather is restricted by the history
itself. There are good and bad fits of the data; the data must be accounted for comprehensively. But, with
Hume, the exact relationships among data — or what comprises a datum or "unit of data" — is not singularly
determined.
“This openness is not an absolute skepticism. Hume's critique of identity through time was not a critique
of our necessary perception of it, but rather of the chance of attaining absolute certainty that our perception
-- which seems absolutely certain to us -- is absolutely true. Hume did not intent to authorize an end of
truth, or a historical subjectivism. Rather, he showed the limits of our certainty of what seems absolutely
certain. As Robert Paul Wolff shows, the psychological mechanisms that ensure that we perceive as
certain that which cannot be absolutely proven so — in this case, identity — anticipates Kant's attribution of
organizing categories in the minds of rational perceivers. [Wolff, “ Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity” ]
As Robert Paul Wolff has further commented [Wolff, 1991], Hume and Kant's ideas on these
issues become really productive when applied to perception of social and historical reality. For, when the
categories themselves are revealed to be at most the secondary instincts described by Nietzsche, and in any
event the product of external forces on the perceiver, this critique of the certainty of our social and
historical perceptions becomes a fertile ground for posing alternative interpretations of social and historical
data.
But, even here, the critique does not authorize an infinite variety of valid interpretations. On the
contrary, the critique merely calls into question any asserted interpretation. This resonates with Bhabha's
post-structuralist approach to grand interpretations of history and society, which always give way to — not
counter-totalizations — but the recognition of data that do not fit the interpretations. This is not a wild
relativistic skepticism, but rather a powerful critique of the production of "dominant" and "dominating"
interpretations of historical and social data.
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in time, rather than a static inertia. Such a conception frees the nation from dependence
on notions of a grounding substance, a destiny, and so forth.
This shift echoes my critique of Bhabha’s solely intensive view of the nation, in
favor of recognition of its extension as well. Similarly, identity is a replication in time
that does not extend beyond a previous iteration of the nation. Rather than being a
persistence in time, it actually rigidifies time itself, by stopping the development and
change that marks its passing. It is in conflict with time.
Persistence in time requires non-identity through time. This seems paradoxical,
but is not, once the concept of contiguity (laterality in time) is substituted for strict
identity. It is not that the Egyptian nation is today the same in some fundamental way as
it was 150 years ago, but rather that what exists today is contiguous or deeply linked with
past iterations of this nation. A nation — and this is why nations are so concerned with
history - is not just a cross-sectional snapshot at a given moment in time. The concept is
temporally as well as spatially extensive. It has a temporal as well as a spatial structure.
Claims by nationalists regarding the past vary; some assert an identity with the
past in the manner Balibar rejects, while others view a continuity from the past. Often,
however, even the latter is construed as a genealogical descendance, which suggests some
substance passed down. In any event, the perception of a national identity through time
or national essence does not necessarily represent a pure illusion, but rather might be a
misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the type of extension in time I am suggesting.
That this continuity or extension in time is reduced to simplistic notions such as identity
and invariant substance is itself anticipated by Hume’s critique. However, the critique of
identity does not apply beyond it, to all forms of the structuring of history and the social
formations within it. The critique leaves untouched the type of structure I am suggesting.
In a similar way, though say much of contemporary feminist philosophy does not share
positions with Plato, it still usually has a strong (if very problematic and tense)
relationship to Platonic philosophy.
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This suggests a further clarification. Even cases where nationalists claim that
their nation reaches back far into the past, into pre-modern and even ancient times, this is
not necessarily an illusion - often, there is some connection to pre-national groups,
languages, territories, etc. At the same time, of course, such claimed connections are
often purely illusory, uses of history for contemporary agendas, or relatively minor
connections that do not have the significance imparted to them by contemporary
nationalists.
This relationship to the past does not mean that it is rigidly determined in time, as
Bhabha rejects: the past does not strictly produce the present, though it is of course a
limit on it (or, viewed alternatively, creates its possibilities, which are of course not
infinite). In other words, the temporal structure can only be determined retroactively
from the present moment, and is valid only in that moment. The present cannot be
deduced from the past, but together they determine the nation as it is extended in time.
At each moment, a new determination must be made that accounts for the manner in
which the open potential of new moments have been determined (and interpreted) in the
passing of time. Of course, this new determination is open to a range of interpretations,
as described earlier.
If the persistence of a nation — its survival — depended on retention of some
central core substance, then substantial internal or external changes would mean the
destruction of the nation. But, assuming nations do exist (as argued above), then many
nations have survived absolutely cataclysmic changes and shifts. For instance, the
Armenian nation as it existed prior to 1915 was relatively concentrated on a territory in
eastern Anatolia (with other long-standing settlement areas in the Caucasus and western
and southern Anatolia), was unified by a single religious structure, shared a language, and
so forth. The Armenian Genocide dramatically changed all of this, dispersing the
Armenian population around the world, with many people converting to Protestantism
and Catholicism, ultimately losing the language, and so forth. Even the dialects within
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Armenian became much more pronounced. A Cold-War tension was introduced within
the Armenian nation, between East and West, and the anti-Middle Eastern mentality of
the United States and Western Europe came to influence relations between Armenians in
these areas and in the Middle East. If the Armenian nation were guaranteed by some
substance
- perhaps a linguistic, territorial, or religious one, or something underlying this
complex of commonalities - then it is hard to see what it could be if it is supposed to
have survived past the Genocide.
A much more plausible explanation is that the pre-1915 general dependence on
territorial proximity (at least containment in two or three contiguous empires), relative
and formalized religious and linguistic homogeneity, and so forth gave way to other
major bridges, including such things as a sense of shared history (particularly the
Genocide), organizational structures (global political parties, communications networks,
etc.), an increase in political networking and activity, and new conceptual links and
structures. The entire basis of the Armenian nation shifted in a very short period; had it
been rigidly associated with those links that grounded it prior to World War I, a Genocide
that destroyed these links (not to mention at least two-thirds of its Anatolian population,
and half its global population) would undoubtedly have destroyed it.
This is not to suggest that a nation will necessarily survive such a shock, and
many have not. But, an appeal to strict identity does not provide an adequate account of
such a survival.
The continuity of a nation in time is produced by a set of temporally extensive
relations among temporally extensive elements, such as dependence on territory or
language, the development of a specific conceptual or nationalism strain, etc. The
bridges that comprise a nation’s contiguity in time are the dependence relations between
different aspects of the nation discussed above. These must be present as at least
potentials in order for a shift to occur under changing internal or external conditions. For
instance, the relative linguistic “unity” of pre-1915 Armenia was not by any means
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comprehensive. It relied on conceptual bridges across dialects, the joining together of
Eastern and Western Armenian speakers in religious and political organizations, etc. The
major connective duty was performed by the language, which defined for the most part
the community ot substantive relations for most Armenians. But, its discontinuities and
tensions were bridged by these other forms of linkage. The disruption of the Genocide
caused the burden to shift to these other aspects of national cohesion. Without them, no
shift would have been possible.
The links among the different aspects are thus the primary guarantors of
continuity in time. Yet, not even this set of potential linkage or pathways should be
considered identical through time. Even these change in time, as new focal aspects
depend on new types of bridges.
These will, further, vary from nation to nation. There is no specific model beyond
what I have explained so far. That is, there is no grand concept of the nation. It cannot
be reduced to “imagined community,” or “illusory concepts of destiny and project,” or a
set of “offset narratives.” Grand concepts inevitably fail because they assert a rigidity
that cannot hold in time. Against Anderson, for instance, it is not enough to say that
members of a nation have different relations to literature, the media, etc., that make it
difficult to believe that they are “imagining” the same nation, or even that all are
imagining at all. For, if this were true, it appears that the nation would lack the flexibility
necessary to survive. Thus, Anderson’s concept is caught in a double bind of sorts.
Historical data and social demographics conflict with his notion of a unified concept of
the nation among nationals, so if these data and demographics are taken seriously, his
concept fails. But, if it is true that members of a nation are homogeneous in the manner
in which his theory holds, then the resulting nation itself is very fragile, and cannot
survive the kinds of shifts and destabilizations typical of modern history. An “imagined
community” is not rigid - the literary canon, the content and perspectives of the media,
etc., change over time, which means the image of the nation does as well. However, it is
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not clear how it might go from a literary basis to some other. At most, one could argue a
certain inertia of the imagined community - once formed, the image itself is sustained,
even though the means by which it has been produced is no longer active. But. this
rigidities the nation in a different way, as the dead image already produced and
henceforth conserved.
This is not to suggest that concepts such as those described by Anderson do not
have their role, nor that these concepts bear no relation to material conditions that are
their basis. But, the concept is not the total description of the nation. As any grand
concept, it at the most describes only a temporally and/or spatial partial aspect or
component of a nation.
Anderson s concept is limited in another way. In its initial iteration, it is a
materially determined linguistically-based social form. In later iterations, it remains a
conceptual image produced by a perception of shared experiences or a shared range of
activity and perception, even in cases where this is not strictly linguistic or literary.
Others have extended this to perception of a shared place in history, and so forth.
As I have explained, some theorists view the nation as a purely cultural
phenomenon. Even Bhabha’s complex analysis of the nation remains imprisoned in just
one aspect of the field of relations that characterize the potential of nations. As I
explained above, his concept of the nation is purely narrative. Other theorists, such as
Breuilly, insist that the nation is not cultural at all, but rather purely political. Gellner
views the nation as a by product and tool of industrial society, while Tom Nairn [1981]
views nations as a function of uneven economic development.
Even those who consider the nation an illusion reduce it to some specific and
unitary cause. For Kedourie and Thom, the nation is the product of certain intellectual
and academic currents of 18th and 19th Century Western Europe. For Balibar, it is
produced out of a linguisized racism.
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The catalogue goes on. The point is that most theorists of the nation privilege a
particular aspect of it as the key to all nations, at all times. Out of this, they construct a
grand concept.
Even Hobsbawm, who himself catalogues such monological approaches to
defining the nation — Is it based on religion? language? territory? and so forth —
maintains the notion that the nation must be based in one of these, and tests them serially
to show that no one category accounts for the nation. But all he does is show that for any
category, some presumed nation exists that is not accounted for by reference to the
category. Early references to Stalin’s recognition of the multi-aspected nature of the
nation do not alter the outcome: Stalin’s model calls for the coincidence of territorial,
linguistic, economic, etc., unity, an impossible demand in the face of Hobsbawm’s
critique.
More than this, every theorist I have treated asserts a one-dimensional concept of
the nation. Each attributes it to one type of social bond, one type of social structure, one
type of psychological or mental move, one type of manipulation, etc. For Anderson, each
member imagines in the same way, if not exactly the same thing, and is thus bound into
the nation identically. For Hobsbawm, it is one type of manipulation; the manipulated
form a core of the nation, while the manipulated are each bound to its symbols and ideal
concept in the same way. For Bhabha, every nation is explained by the tension between
majority and marginalized, as the former impose totalizing conceptions on the broad
population; every majority person is a totalizer, and every marginal person an object of
totalization. For Gellner, the nation is a homogeneous cultural milieu, in which people
with the same basic language and cultural knowledge are interchangeable; every member
exists in the same cultural container in the same way (through having the same general
cultural attributes), and has the same “mobility” within it. For Breuilly, it is the
compromise or compulsions resolving the tensions among different interest groups within
a state or proto-state; whatever the specific interest group, each members is linked to the
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nation-as-state through his/her interests. For many of the liberal philosophers, the nation
is a set ot cultural practices in which each members participates identically, usually
coupled with a political agenda that is characterized as a common project or interest of all
members.
In each of these cases, a diagram ot the nation requires only simple plane
geometry, and is neat and uniform. But real nations - or at least most of them - cannot
be captured in such simple two-dimensional diagrams, if in spatially represented
diagrams at all. Lines of relationship, connection, commitment, tension, etc., exist on
and between multiple levels, even as the levels themselves flow in and out of each others,
in tense, complementary, or dualistic relationships. One cannot say, a nation consists of
members related to each other through this medium, or related to that central mediator or
core. No one form of relation, no one continuous structure of relations, can capture its
reality.
This should be expected: a group as large as the nation is unlikely to take the
form of a single, simple structure, to be captured in a sound-bite definition. Individual
and sub-national group heterogeneity obviously increases with size, and cannot be linked
into a genuine social formation through one means, media, or tool - at least not without
significant coercion, direct force, and eliminations. Conceiving the or a nation always
involves recognizing internal variations and multiple approaches. The heterogeneity of
the nation is not just a function of its membership, but of the material and mental
relations and links that constitute their nationality.
Hroch’s extraordinary work traces the varied development of a number of East
European national movements, through cultural to political to popular stages.
Chatterjee’s [1993b] brilliant history of the Indian national movement exposes a
transition from a purely cultural — but real — form, to a political and popular form.
Though Hroch especially generalizes on his findings to assert a general model of national
development, from cultural to political, he stresses the indeterminacy of the process, and
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the significant variations among the nations he studies. My own analysis of the
Armenian nation suggests the possibility of shifts from the political to the cultural, as
well. More importantly, it stresses the offset contemporariness of these and other aspects.
such that the nation at any given time cannot be reduced to just one, and requires many at
least as potentials.
The undefined nature ot the nation - or the perpetual redefinition, or addition
to the definition - is perhaps what relates the nation to the modern territorial state and
distinguishes it from the latter. The state is fully defined as a specific territory governed
by a specific government, generally explained in detail in a definitive constitution. The
state is about definition, regulation, specification, and so forth. It imposes a specific form
on a populace and territory. Whereas states are defined and “constituted” by formal
descriptions and agreements (constitutions, state and international laws, treaties, etc.) and
so are the products of definition, nations generally are marked by an on-going process of
definition — or, better, articulation and development — that places any formal or informal
definitions and specifications in tension with a continuing production of new concepts,
angles, and variations. Though documentary decrees and related formal descriptions of a
nation certainly might have a role in its development, alone they are not sufficient to
produce a nation. Wherever such things appear to account for the emergence of a nation,
there will always be the shadow of significant and contended “organic” processes of
development, however coerced or manipulated by the agents of the decrees and
descriptions.
National Activity
Bhabha perhaps comes closest to capturing the conceptual complexity of nations,
with the idea that assertions of totalizing concepts of the nation create margins that
undermine these concepts themselves. This suggests the impossibility of a totalizing,
unified concept. But it is Partha Chatterjee that unlocks the secret of the transitions in
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time and them implications. As I described above, he sees the capacity to create new
national concepts and nationalisms as central to nations resisting domination by European
powers.
This is a central point for all nations. Anderson’s theory of the nation by and
large ignores concepts of it, even as it focuses on the existence of an image of the nation.
The content of non-European national images begins with the idea that a set of colonial
administrators share in a common colonial administration structure that defines a specific
territory. This initial image is then disseminated to the other people on that territory.
Obviously, this is just the transformation of a territory and population defined by
European colonizers into an independent socio-political unit. The image has almost no
content, and only that which is derivative of the European given. Now, it might be that
pre-existing cultural forms are grafted onto this new structure, to give it the depth of
European nations; that is, that the imaginations of neo-nationals are not satisfied with
such a bare concept of their nation, and in conjunction with social structures that have
already been producing cultural artifacts and with new governmental and civil
communications and administrative structures (schools, media, etc.), the image is filled
out.
So perhaps such images approach to European ones. But, Anderson remains
unclear about the content of European national images. The general model seems
unaffected by the particularities of specific images (not to mention the variation within a
given nation). They are all at least formally the same, that is, fit in the same model.
Anderson suggests that the image is a world or land in which nationals can see
themselves in their daily lives, a world that is familiar to them, containing situations and
personalities to which they are accustomed. Besides begging questions about the obvious
translatability of much literature, and its resonances with those in other cultures, as well
as the obvious regionalism of much other literature and news papers, this account leaves
open the specific nature of these images. Presumably, different images are different, at
369
least by name and territory. But, at a formal level, there appears no difference, and it is
this difference that seems most crucial to national difference.
Perhaps “national difference’' is not the right expression. It is not a matter of
asserting some fundamental ditterence between nations or the people in them. It has been
my experience that, say, Japanese or Honduran friends who have a strong sense of
national connection understand my Armenian nationality much better than even many
Armenians. There is certainly a formal correspondence across nations, but this is more a
function of the presence of a range of different personality types and philosophical
dispositions not derivative of nationality, but grafted on top of it (as described earlier).
Whatever is shared among nations is not some interchangeable form, like what goes into
or comes off of a modern production line. It is a mutual appreciation of the specificity of
another’s nation that is part of the ability to empathize with him/her.
In any event, the issue is not this one of “difference,” but rather of agency. For
those on Anderson’s model who comprise the first wave of European nations, their
nationality is presented as the result of inexorable material forces, of language
development in modem capitalism. For later waves, their efforts might have been more
conscious, but were constrained (willingly) within an attempt to reproduce the same type
of nationality as the first wave resulted in. Chatterjee’s [1993b] profound insight is to
recognize the agency of construction not just of the nation, but of the concept of the
nation. As I have made clear, concepts of a nation are constitutive elements of it. For
Chatterjee, construction of a nation — an image of the nation — involves development of a
concept that is not reducible to pre-existing national forms. Self-definition runs to the
core of the nation.
That is not to say that the nation is a purely ideal effect of self-definition. Yet, the
concepts of a nation at play in its constitution can (or must) involve fundamental
revisions or extensions of any generally applicable model of the nation applicable to the
range of previously existing nations. The content ofconcepts ofthe nation generates the
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Jorm as much as theform is constrained by given concepts ofthe nation. The
constitution ot a nation involves as a necessary moment active self-conceptualization by
members. This is the deepest meaning of the oft-stated desire for “self-determination” at
the core of national movements. As Chatterjee recognizes, this is meaningless if
interpreted in the limited sense of the right to form a unit like other units. This is the
form of self-determination at the basis of the American Revolution, and raises questions
about just how national that Revolution was, at least initially. As he and many within the
national movement of India he analyzes recognize(d), decolonization requires much more
than mere political separation, which is in a sense replication. It requires redefinition of
the former colony both away from what it was forced to be by the colonizers, and from
what constitutes an independent nation in the realm of the colonizers -- which is at once
implicated in colonization and also would represent a continuation of the influence of the
colonizer.
It is this level of self-definition that even Anderson’s theory of the nation — one
that is quite sympathetic to it - fails to account for. The form of the imagined
community strangles the constitutive power of agency in the conceptualization of the
nation, and reduces it to a mere content in the prison of a rigid, unaffected form. Agency
comes only as a negative, in the form of “russification,” or a mild positive, in the form of
dissemination of the national image. Anderson’s general model is of material (economic
and cultural/linguistic) forces determining a conceptual or psychological form.
Intentionality intervenes in the former case to direct the artificial construction of the
material “forces” that will produce an imagined community. In the latter case,
intentionality drives mere replication and dissemination of an already given concept or
model.
I stress that I am not suggesting the absolute uniqueness of each nation, nor their
exclusiveness. National concepts certainly overlap, and do so significantly. There is an
on-going tension between the received concepts of the nation and the agency of those
371
enacting or “performing” a nation. This pushes Bhabha’s model to the meta-level of
nation-formation. It is not a matter of a mere plurality of meta-concepts of the nation, but
rather the on-going production of new concepts that cannot be assimilated into those that
exist. For the formerly colonized and subjugated, these are reactions to the imposition of
dominant concepts of what an independent political structure should be (usually
combining elements of nation and state) - reactions that are not purely reactive, and so
exceed mere negation of the imposed concepts, [see Chatterjee, 1993b]
It is this aspect of activity - of the production of new concepts and national forms
— that distinguishes nations from ethnic groups. Ethnic groups receive their “identity”
from outside: from ancestors, parents, history, etc. - one is bom into an ethnicity. 35 In
some circumstances, such as immigration or minoritization, one might decide whether to
embrace an ethnic identity or not - to leam one’s parents’ language, to live according to
certain customs and traditions, etc. Further, in the flow of history and human activity,
these evolve, and respond to each generation. But, the mutations are minor and generally
seek to preserve features of ethnic life in the context of changing external conditions.
They are not active attempts to re-define or produce culture and socio-political structures.
A nation, on the other hand, has a much more pronounced active aspect, as I have
been describing. It might be characterized as an on-going aspect of self-generation. This,
as Bhabha emphasizes and even Renan [1990] admits, is in tension with what is given
from the past or passively accepted — again, nations are not simply shared subjective
willings. This active aspect is individual, sub-national multi-individual, and national
agency in the complex process that produces and reproduces the conceptual and social-
structural aspects of a nation. This can involve all sorts of contending and
complementary vectors of agency in forming the ideas and social relations that ground a
nation. Specific vectors can take the nation as their object or not; that is, agents can be
35
It may be that there is no real identity in an ethnic group, akin to the claims of Balibar and Hobsbawm.
But, this is irrelevant, precisely because the nation is not an ethnic group, but a deep departure from one.
Balibar and Hobsbawm believe that the nation is strictly derivative of a presumption of ethnicity, and so
focus much effort on disproving the reality of ethnicity.
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aware ot and even intend activity as part of the process of the articulation of the nation, or
they can be unaware ot it and/or have sub- or non-national intentions
.
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It is important to stress that not all nations are ethnic groups, and even more so
that not all ethnic groups are nations. As I will discuss in more detail below, not every
one is part of a clear ethnic group, just as not everyone is a member of a nation - though
pretty much all people are citizens or subjects of this or that state (however foreign it
appears to them).
It is also important to stress that even where ethnic groups are linked to nations,
they are not necessarily coincident. This explanation allows one to differentiate not
merely non-national ethnic groups from “ ethnic nations” (that is, nations which
correspond fairly directly with ethnicities, to the extent that they exist), but also national
and non-national members of a single ethnic group of which part forms a nation. In the
foregoing references to the global Armenian nation, I was not asserting that all ethnic
Armenians are part of the Armenian nation. On the contrary, many have effectively
assimilated into their host countries, retaining as markers of their ethnicity perhaps only
Armenian Church affiliation, a taste for Armenian cuisine, a connection to the history of
“ Armenia,” typical Armenian physical features, Armenian surnames, and so forth. They
are not actively engaged in the production of the culture or national socio-political
structure, but rather have merely received their “ Armenian-ness” as a gradually
diminishing residual of their ancestors’ participation in the Armenian nation. Their lack
of activity is evident from the very fact of the diminishing intensity of the ethnic residual.
They are ethnic Armenians, but not members of the Armenian nation.
I hesitate in presenting this analysis, because I reject attempts to tix criteria for
deciding who is in and not in a given nation. Any such declarations are problematic.
Adequate “ participation” in a nation might be as simple as verbal affirmation of one’s
membership, when not strongly contradicted by “objective” factors. This is not meant to
36This formulation runs directly counter to Thom’s, as I critiqued it in Chapter 1.
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assert subjective perception of membership alone as the criterion for determining actual
membership, but rather to allow potential victims of unjustified exclusion adequate
recourse. It should be stressed that, although many sub-national groups assert definitions
ol their nations that include and exclude different individuals based on different sets of
relatively self-serving criteria (my nation is always what / am or we are), what I am
suggesting here is that those who are merely, say, ethnic Armenians, have chosen this
more than having it chosen for them.
The difficulty of discussing issues of inclusion is not a weakness in my theory,
but rather is a function of the contentious realm of concepts of a nation that is at the core
of my account.
Racism, Nationalism, Gender, and the Nation
It is commonplace to consider “nationalism” a form of racism. Racism is the
belief that one’s presumed “race” (however defined) is superior to other “races”
(however defined, as long as there is no acceptable overlap), or that this or that “race”
(however defined) is inferior to one’s own “race” (however defined). “Nationalism,” is
then considered by some to be racism concerning “nationalized” races: it is the belief
that one’s own “nation” (however defined) is superior to other “nations” (however
defined). Usually, the second formulation of racism is not applied to nationalism:
whereas oppressed races might view themselves as inferior to a “ superior” race, but
superior to an “ inferior” race, nationalists are considered to make absolute claims of
superiority.
Using this formulation, many theorists — including Bhabha and Balibar — see
nations themselves as organized around this “nationalist” relationship to an inferior
“other.” Most such theorists attribute this production of and organization against an
“other” to a basic psychological phenomenon, resulting from feelings of inadequacy,
other forms of oppression (such as economic), and so forth.
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Balibar extends analysis ot this relation. He believes the nation to be grounded in
a Active ethnicity” that is, an ideal racial group to which members of the nation believe
themselves to belong. Though there are no true ethnic groups at the base of nations, the
rhetoric and institutions producing a nation function as if there were, that is, create one.
It is this racial notion that tempers the potential openness of the type of linguistic or
communicative community that Anderson considers the nation. Balibar’ s concept is a
racialized imagined community, or one that depends on a perception of race in addition
to communication. [Balibar, 1991a: 96ff.; 1991b: 49]
Balibar, however, is careful not to adopt the easily critiqued notion that
nationalism is just a form of racism, based on a nationalized concept of race. He
recognizes that nationalism is not simply coincident with racism. [Balibar, 1991b: 46ff.]
At the same time, he rejects any equally simplistic notion that nationalism is exclusive of
racism, or that nationalisms that are undeniably racist are exceptional or abnormal forms.
Through an analysis of Nazism, he concludes that racist nationalisms are at once typical
and exceptional of nationalism in general [50 - 52]. It is not a matter of determining
which nationalisms are “good” and which are “bad” (racist) [46]: there is a thin line
between “ ‘dying for one’s fatherland’” and “ ‘killing for one’s country’” [47]. In other
words, all nationalisms have a racist component: “though racism is not equally manifest
in all nationalisms or in all the moments of their history, it none the less always
represents a necessary tendency in their constitution” [48],
This, of course, could have been anticipated by the given relationship between
race and nation: at the core of nation formation there is always a racial moment [see 48],
What emerges is a complex relationship, in which “there is always a reciprocity of
determination between [nationalism] and racism [52]. This means that, while each form
is distinct from the other, nationalisms are continually appropriating extant racisms or are
the results of transmutations of racisms [52], while “racism is constantly emerging out of
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nationalism” [53]. Indeed, what has emerged in the modern era is a cycle of
determination, in which each is continually emerging out of the other.
It is a tense relationship, because there is a “gap . . . between the representations
and practices of nationalism and racism” [54], After all, a racism is a “super-
nationalism,” that is, races are international. At the same time, nationalisms often seek to
assimilate individuals of other races (France, Canada, the United States [if the latter two
are nations at all]), or acknowledge the presence of mixed raciality at the core of the
fictive ethnicity (Spain, most Caribbean, Latin American, and South American
nations, etc.). [59-60] The general relationship between racism and nationalism
Balibar summarizes by saying that “racism is not an ‘expression’ of nationalism, but a
supplement ofnationalism or more precisely a supplement internal to nationalism
,
always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet always still
insufficient to achieve its project” [54]. In other words, racism is at once at the core of
any nationalism, but does not account for the full articulation of nationalism, while at the
same time that, where it exists in conjunction with a nationalism, it exceeds the latter,
which I interpret to mean both in terms of its scope — which pushes toward international
racial categories - and its focus on oppression - which drives the nationalism toward an
extreme of oppression. Of course, to the extent that racism is internal to nationalism, this
last - the racist oppression - is nationalist.
Balibar’ s analysis of the relationship between racism and nationalism is
productive for its recognition of a distinction between them as well as their
interconnection and intermingling. At the same time, it is compromised by his own
assumptions, which determine the ultimately misleading and problematic implications of
his analysis of the nation and nationalism. The first key assumption is that nations and
nationalisms are grounded in a racial concept of social structures, the “fictive ethnicity.”
The second key assumption is that nationalism is structurally isomorphic to racism. I
deal with them in turn.
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(1)
1 have already challenged al length the very need for a “ fictive ethnicity” at
the core of national consciousness. Assumption of a “ fictive ethnicity," that is, a grand
totalized concept of the racial ground of a nation, is merely one possible concept of the
nation, that with other concepts - including opposing ones - itself is in a dialectical
relationship with material social structures and forces. Thus, there is not necessarily a
racial core ot the nation, and, what is more, most likely a complex tension among
competing concepts that themselves are in a complex dialectic with material structures
and forces. In some instances and periods, a racial concept might dominate other
concepts and the material realm, but Balibar’s account itself is at most a specific
configuration of elements having in general a much more diverse potential.
(2) Balibar considers central to " theories and strategies of nationalism
... the
contradiction between universality and particularism,” Nationalism at once specifies and
celebrates one’s own unique national identity against others’, and attempts to homogenize
( universalize ) the national population. Racism pushes the universalization past the
boundaries of the assumed nation, while at the same time intensifying the absoluteness of
(racial) ditterence beyond culture, language, and minor phenotypes, to the deepest core of
physical and spiritual essence. [54]
The problem with this formulation is that it reduces nationalism to a mere
categorization
,
and specific nations to categories. The issue for Balibar is whether it is a
universalizing — that is, expands a given category — or particularizing — divides universal
humanity to determine a specific category. It is true that race is a categorization, one that
divides humanity into sets ot supposedly fundamentally different individuals and that
unifies distinct individuals within a category on the same grounds. This is not, however,
the deepest tension within the nation or nationalism. This tension itself is one moment in
the core tension of categorization versus community.
I have already suggested the poverty of Balibar’s notion of “community.” For
him, it is an individually held abstract construct in which one perceives (imagines)
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onesell as situated in this or that imaginary social grouping. This, of course, ignores the
reality of a member of a nation's lived experience within a set of direct and indirect
relations that are reflected in and structured by one’s concept(s) of his/her nation (as well
as non-national group, historical, and categorical concepts). The nation is forged in the
coincidence and tension between these real social relations and conceptual constructs of
one’s social relations, categorizations, etc. At the conceptual level, there is a tension
between the nation as generated out ot one’s perception and conceptualization of real
direct and indirect social relations — which is not necessarily exclusively “national” —
and totalizing categorization of one’s nation and membership in it. The real relations are
nationalized through this interaction with the totalizing conceptual categorization of the
nation.
Race, on the other hand, is strictly categorical. In a racialized conception of
oneself and others, the totalizing categories of the races impose themselves on and
structure the lived direct and indirect relations to others. At the most and only in the
historical period in which racial identities coalesce, specific relations -- for instance,
competition for jobs or wealth, etc. -- become racialized by employment, political, etc.,
distinctions made based on phenotypes. But, this is not the generation of race out of
these tensions, but the development of racist ideologies in order to gain advantages within
such a situation. The physical differentiation of people with deeply oppressive economic,
political, etc., consequences is perhaps always available by analogy to gender. In any
event, once specifically racial ideologies - racialized views of the world - become
available, it is these ideologies that are imposed on and structure the concrete social
relations of individuals. What is more, the relation imposed is purely one of domination
or oppression. This is what is meant by “prejudice” (at the individual level) --
individuals engage others in conformity with the dictates of racial categories. Their very
conception of others is determined first andforemost by these categories and the
meanings they have been given, as well as the racist presumption of “natural”
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domination relations among them. Racism as a social force strongly influences the very
development of individuals and their relations, through structural forces and inculcation
ot racist consciousness (a racialized conceptual frame grounding prejudice).
In our racialized world, it is never a question of balancing our lived experiences
that are at odds with the abstract, absolute racialized conceptual frame with this frame:
racism is that state in which the abstract categorization has precedence over and strongly
influences the lived experiences themselves. Balibar believes the same is true of
nationalism, because his implicit view of the nation is as strictly categorical, resting on an
ideal categorization of one’s own ethnicity as opposed to other ethnicities.
My account of the nation suggests a much more complex relationship between
conceptual and material forces. What is more, even on the conceptual level, in addition
to categorical (abstract) concepts of the nation, there are (1) concepts in large part
determined by material forces and (2) concepts that are not necessarily determined solely
by material forces, but which are none the less not categorical abstractions. One might
add that, whereas racist schemes are always about domination of one or more races by a
master race, the history of nationalisms shows a tension between this type of
superiorizing nationalisms and more universalist views that level the status of all nations.
That this latter has often been used to justified intra-national oppression and the
oppression of nations not linked to power in states is an serious issue, but does not
undermine my point, calling attention instead to the absolute non-absoluteness of any
determination of nationalism as racist or not.
Further, racism depends on a categorical schema that includes at least two races.
Nationalism, on the other hand, need not oppress another nation. It can just as easily
oppress a non-national group, or even part of the nation itself. What is more, it often
oppresses by denying the nationality of a self-described national group. For instance, the
present Turkish assault on its Kurds seeks to force Kurds — who insist, consistent with a
compendious set ot historical and sociological data, that they are not in any way Turkish,
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to give up their claims of Kurdish nationality and recognize themselves to be “Mountain
Turks,” a fantastic category manufactured in a propagandist’s dreamworld. None of this
is mean to excuse the oppressiveness of an oppressive nationalism, but rather to highlight
its potential differences from racism.
It is this internal complexity that accounts for the ever-present “ambiguity” of
nations and nationalisms, and it is through its categorical conceptual element that the
nation is linked to racism. Racism “exceeds” nationalism precisely in its structural
simplicity and “purity.”
My account allows for the presence of racism within nationalism, without
committing nationalism at its core exclusively to a racist moment. Racism is often a
component of a nationalism or strain of it, and sometimes the basis of a nation itself. At
the least, racism is present as a potential, and one of which a nationalism must be
mindful. But, it must be remembered, that even categorization itself is not necessarily
racist. The more that the nation is grounded in genuine social relations, the less that
categorization is racist, that is, imposes itself on those relations. Racism is not simply
categorization, but rather the domination of actual social relations by categorization, a
categorization that itself includes an oppressive hierarchy. To the extent that a
nationalism (a definition or concept of a nation, and an attitude toward or program for the
object of that definition or concept) is not the desire to order social relations based on an
abstract, hierarchizing categorization, it is not racist. Again, the potential for racism still
exists, and in practice is always or nearly so manifested in the form of at least a minor
strain of racist nationalism within the greater complex of nationalisms associated with a
given nation (which might exist in a specific sub-national group, or be taken up within a
range of “nationals” though not as their exclusive nationalism or national self-concept).
Balibar does not consider intra-national racisms. He is concerned to show that the
unity of the presumed nation depends on exclusion of an external other. But, racisms
based on skin color exist within many apparently national social structures, for instance
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in much of North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Thus, racism does not
correspond to nationalism, though both are present. Even if one argues that the belief in
national unity is employed to obscure or legitimate intra-national racism - as might be
the case regarding gender - these are not the same or necessarily related. One might
argue that in these cases the racism exists within states, but in fact prevents a true nation
from forming. However, by analogy to gender, it is possible to develop a nation that does
not depends on full equality of members, but rather makes claims to being an organic but
internally hierarchical whole. Though intra-Armenian racism is not by any means
universal, there are some North American diasporans whose concept of the nation is
internally racialized, with North American over Middle Eastern Armenians. This, of
course, marks the importation of “orientalism” into Armenian self-conceptions.
To the extent that a nation is derivative of a hierarchizing categorization that
drives construction of social relations, it has a racist core. This can be superseded, of
course, to the extent that these relations themselves actually come to exist and ground the
nation. However, quite often this process of category-driven nationalization of a
population does not accomplish this, but comes to depend perpetually on the presence of
the racist relation — a social relation that pits one against a supposedly inferior or less
legitimate “other” - to maintain the interior relations of the nation - social relations
among the “ us” who have in common a relation against the “others.” Thus, it is not that
nations are fundamentally organized around antipathy toward some “ other,” but rather
that the weakness ot the concrete and conceptual 37 basis of a nation can be measured by
the extent to which it depends on such an antipathy.
Balibar would probably reject such a formulation as a re-emergence of the
problematic normal / abnormal or “ good”/” bad distinction among nationalisms.
First of all, these are not the same. I am not arguing that one form of nation or
nationalism is “normal’ and the other "abnormal.” Rather, I am making a distinction
J 7Non-categorizing conceptual basis.
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based on real differences in the internal configurations of different nationalisms. Though
they are the same in the structure of potentials abstractly grounding them, they are
different in the determinations of these potentials. Some determinations are more
liberatory or less oppressive in motive and consequence than others. It is therefore
appropriate and in fact quite important to make value judgments about different
determinations. It almost replicates the racial turn to group all nationalisms together, and
then to assert that no differentiating judgments should be made precisely because that will
introduce a differentiation into the abstract category that must be given precedence over
the reality of those objects grouped within in. Balibar’s insistence on not making such
judgments in fact creates an ambivalence that cannot help but implicate all nationalisms
in the violence of (1) the worst forms of nationalism generally and (2) the worst strains
associated with each specific nation. Without such judgments, one is forced to reject
nationalism generally.
Balibar claims that his analysis of nationalism over-rides the usual distinctions
among its good and bad instances and correlates. It is not that he denies the variety of
nationalisms or racisms [see 40], In fact, he offers a detailed typology of racisms [38ff.].
But, these are unified into a coherent, singular system: different types of racism (and,
presumably, nationalism) become purely tactical variants in an over-all unified force of
racism [38ff.]. And they are not merely analogical variants, but historically linked as
well [41]. Racism differentiates itself in order (1) to become accessible in a
comprehensive range of societies and situations and (2) to overcome obstacles in its path,
both those produced by anti-racist movements and independently of them.
It is thus with nationalism: its variants are merely evidence of its being fit into
different contexts — even for different purposes, such as anti-colonial liberation - but it is
still and always built on a racist core. When Balibar lists the correlates of “nationalism”
that are meant to give a sense of the imprecision or slipperiness of the term, he includes
both “positive” and “negative” terms. But, this is misleading, for theform of the
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relations indicated by all terms are of a specific form: they are either for one’s nation
(‘’civic spirit,” “patriotism,” “ethnicism”) or against another nation or group (
ethnocentrism,” “xenophobia,” “chauvinism,” “imperialism,” “jingoism”)- which
amounts to the same thing, given the thin line between “ ’dying for one’s fatherland’” and
killing tor one’s country’” - or opposing an “internal enemy” (“populism,”
“xenophobia”). Each of these is a positive valuation of one’s own group, a negative
devaluation of another group, or purgation of intrusive external elements that combines
both. It is always of the form of racism.
The meaning of “nationalism” is, of course, a matter of convention as much as
fact. ’ If such things as “national consciousness,” “national movement,” and so forth
are included within it, its potential meaning greatly expands beyond the form of racism.
Balibar’s list - which does echo a prevalent strain in theoretical approaches to
nationalism - does not demonstrate the slippery nature of nationalism, its multiple and
shifting meanings. On the contrary, it reduces and fixes it arbitrarily, into a specific form
relatable to racism.
Balibar does recognize a relational component of the nation at least as a
communicative structure [Balibar, 1991a: 97], Yet, he sees these as relations that must
be subordinated to the categorical structure “racial ethnicity.” This is clear in his
reduction ol the self-conception of the relational component to a grand myth of
“ kinship.” He rejects the notion that people within a national community are
“interrelated” as an ideological misuse of the notion of kinship, and particularly of
“extended kinship.” Rather than recognizing that this notion of national kinship might
be a metaphor expressing the perception of the concrete relations among nationals, he
rejects it outright, because he links it to the “symbolic kernel of the idea of race[,] . . .
genealogy.” More than this, he apparent lineage of at least some nations, but rejects the
idea of kinship because he claims that it is a claim that “the filiation of individuals
transmits from generation to generation a substance both biological and spiritual,” which
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he considers one of the two pillars of the illusion of the nation (see above). His post-
structuralist negative fetishization of '‘substance” requires strict literalism in the
interpretation of perceptions of kinship, which cannot then stand up to a solid critique
[ 100 ]
It is not clear that “ kinship” means to many “ nationalists” what Balibar believes
it does. Though he pays lip service to the “extended” nature of this concept, his literal
understanding comes from the concept of the nuclear family. Extended family structures
involve an internal diversity related (1) to intermarriage with those outside the “family”
(that is, the “naturalization” of non-family members) and (2) the absorption of
individuals in this manner through non-marital means. Nuclear families are rigidly given,
and do not change until the children leave the home. Such families never naturalize new
members. What is more, such families tend to suppress the individuality of their
members, in a manner captured quite well by Hegel. The nuclear family is a social unit.
The extended family tends to have a much more complicated internal structure that, even
where it is hierarchical, cannot subsume its members into a simple unity.
More importantly, it is not clear that all or even many nations foreground a literal
sense of kinship. I know of few Armenians (whose name itself, whether in Armenian
Hai” from the supposed founder of the group “Haig,” or “Armenian” from another
version of the founder, “Armen,” is meant to suggest a familial origin) who take such
ideas literally, though they might recognize historical figures instrumental in the
production of an ancient group with key ties to present-day Armenians. One might just
as well assume that all Jews, Christians, and Muslims believe that humanity is descended
Irom Adam and “ Eve” who lived on earth less than 10,000 years ago. What is more,
while “ fundamentalism” might correspond to such a belief, it is clear that there is no
correlation between “nationalism” (on my broad definition) and any such literalist
interpretation of “national” history. It would seem, rather, to be an issue of education
level, rural versus urban sensibilities, and so forth.
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Indeed, it would appear that this idea of “kinship” is not strongly literal. In
nations, it is common for their to be pressure for nationals to procreate with other
nationals. Yet, on a literal reading of" kinship” as the core of intra-national relation, this
would directly contradict the incest taboos that are quite prevalent in most societies.
Interestingly, in this sense, kinship groups are directly contrary to races.
Again, at most, I would argue that any claims of “kinship” are attempts to
conceptualize the network of concrete, lived direct and indirect social relations that are
the material aspect of the nation. In an intellectual, political, and social context quite
poor in concepts of social groups, which tends to reduce all perceived structures
involving more than one subject as a simple aggregate of individuals, interest and identity
groups [groups of like individuals, without reference to actual relations among them],
organic social wholes, and families, J ' it would appear that the extended family might be
the closest approximation of the nation.
Of course, I again stress that I do not think that “kinship” is usually invoked as
the central concept of the nation. The nation is a different type of formation. That people
might feel a strong emotional bond to their nation might have its basis as much in the
actual commitments they have to some other directly connected members as to a
misplaced love for a “ sublime object of ideology.” It is, indeed, quite reasonable to
expect that members of a group would feel a certain loyalty or commitment to that group
-- as one might to a family - that appears natural, though it is in fact contingent entirely
upon which group one is born or circumstances propel one into. Though one’s
commitments are ultimately arbitrary does not mean that they are unreal or, relative to
one’s realm of free activity, contingent. It is thus reasonable to expect individuals to
i8
I must, of course, cite Sartre as a happy exception to this poverty. However, even he fails to conceive of
non-homogeneous groups. His typology of groups are applicable to small groups in a limited temporal or
historical context; bigger groups are not so homogeneous, as has been my basic point throughout this
chapter. His typology might better be related to larger groups as a description not of the groups
themselves, but rather as ( 1 ) the types of relations that exist among group members and (2) tendencies
within the larger group that are not exclusive, such that a hybrid structure is present.
It is useful to keep Sartre in mind, given that he conceives relations in ways beyond the simple
“connectivity” that I seems to underlie my concept of social relations. Still, his concepts also suffer from
being somewhat abstract.
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perceive them as natural or necessary, and create something of an ideal object to justify
them. It is just as important to recognize the fact that this “idealization” might be
materially grounded, as described above. That is, the “.deal nation” might be an attempt
to conceptualize the real complexity of the object(s) of a member's social commitments,
which are too complicated to be reduced to a specific set of individuals with whom the
member is in immediate contact, but clearly involves those to whom he or she is
indirectly linked.
It is perhaps useful at this point to revisit the issue of what type of group the
nation is, and how to understand it as a group. There is at the base of this an
epistemological problem, to which I have just alluded: one approaches the nation with a
conceptual poverty regarding notions of social groups. Indeed, it is my belief that a
genuine engagement with the nation might make available new concepts of groups. From
the perspective of the theorist, one begins with the type of dichotomy Hegel offers - two
extremes, of the individual on the one hand (the atomic subject who is fundamentally
discrete from other atomic subjects, and prior to any social relations) and the group on the
other (the group alternatively as the category or as organic whole, as in Aristotle). The
aggregate of individuals is then shown to be as well an organic unity, as the individual is
shown to be a fully realized member of a category - a whole identical to other subjective
wholes that comprise the category, which is thus given in total with each individual. The
individual is a mere part of the whole, so the whole is the truth of the individual subject,
who is incomplete without it; at the same time, the group exists in the individual, so the
individual is the essential moment of the antithesis of individual-group.
Whether Hegel’s dialectical form is actually more complex than this or
consideration of the individual and group must employ a more complex dialectical form
is an academic question. I am concerned here only with using the tools necessary to
produce an accurately complex concept of group structures grounding the nation. It is
clear that neither formulation can be correct, even as both are regularly invoked by
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theorists of the nation. As 1 have shown Chapter 2, liberal theorists begin with the atomic
individual subject, and cannot get beyond the group as an aggregate of individuals.
Perhaps Carol Gould pushes this analysis farthest, in focusing on the social relations
among tndtviduals, but she, as other liberals, is trapped within the liberal philosophical
assumption of the ultimately atomic individual. That these individuals are influenced by
external torces does not alter their atomic nature.
On the other hand, a common critique of the nation - often but not necessarily
from a liberal perspective, as d lseussed in my treatment of Kedourie in Chapter 1 - is
that it is a group structure that utterly erases the individuality of its members. Members
are subsumed in an overwhelming organic totality (the Spartan model) or a rigid
homogeneity. In either case, a totalitarian socio-political structure reduces and eliminates
the freedom of the individual.
To get beyond this limited pair of extreme reductions that trivialize or demonize
the nation (and all other meaningful concrete relation-based social groups), one cannot
simply invoke an alternative concept. Rather, one must work through a conceptual
dialectic that produces such a concept. In one sense, this is driven by the complex
realities of the nation. In another - echoing at the theoretical level the conceptual-
material tension at the core of specific nations — the conceptual dialectic makes
perception of the complex realities possible.
I have elsewhere described the properly Hegelian dialectic 39 as not simply the
gross thesis-antithesis-to-synthesis model. This is merely a single temporal moment in a
broader temporally as well as laterally structured dialectic. Each synthesis splits apart,
into a new thesis and antithesis. Thus, the above resolution of the individual and group is
accomplished through an unstable synthesis - unstable because it is gross. The
33Again, it is not necessary to accept this as an accurate interpretation of Hegel to recognize its accuracy
and usefulness in engaging the nation. Hegel's work - in particular, the exceptional Phenomenology- of
Spirit -- m ight be taken simply as a departure point. Hegel's own concept of the nation, as a cultural
underpinning ot the institutional state, is uninteresting, and merely fits the nation into his overall schema,
as suggested in Chapter 2.
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complexities of material and intellectual reality drive the dialectic to a more complex
level. The new antithesis is between moments that have taken on elements of the
opposing elements. The initial synthesis of individual and group attempts to reduce each
to the other, that is, to transform each into the other. This far overshoots a stable
synthesis - it is the extreme negation of each of the initial moments of the antithesis. In
other words, in proving the unity of the two moments, it in fact forces each to be the
other. But, this results in two one-sided syntheses that are not resolved with each other.
As soon as one shows that the individual is in fact the truth of the group, one is forced to
apply the same logic to the individual, which reveals its truth to be the group. To the
casual observer, this seems to unify the two terms, but in fact they merely switch
positions.
Or, not merely so. Through this initial synthesis, each element is revealed at the
least to be connected to the other element: the individual is fundamentally related to the
group, and vice-versa. Each takes on elements of the other, or, more precisely, the
elements of the other in each are revealed. What this means is not that the individual is
the truth of the group, or the group of the individual, but that a proper concept of the
group cannot erase the individual but depends to some extent on its independent
existence, and vice-versa.
What this means, in turn, is that the “ individual” on which the group depends is
not to be understood as the artificially abstracted or purified moment of the individual-
group antithesis, but an individual already in the context of social relations. From the
other direction, the individual depends on the group, but this is not the pure organic group
that subsumes the individual and erases its independence, but the group that depends as
well for the individual on it. Each depends on the other term that is independent of it, but
at the same time that is dependent on it. Rather than the individual being revealed as a
unity (that is, the truth of the thus merely aggregate group), a new concept of
“ individual” is produced which is not entirely opposite of the group; and vice-versa.
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The initial synthesis falls apart, but not into two moments as extremely opposed
as individual and group. The resulting "group” and “individual” are no longer pure
concepts; the other moment has “bled into” each in the tension of synthesis. The initial
synthesis is necessary to bring the two moments into proximity, such that the failure of
the synthesis will still mark an advance. What emerges is a dynamic of determination
between “individual” and “group” such that each historically is the product of the other
in a dialectic echoing the material-ideal structure - each is product and produced by
partial steps.
This might be viewed as a "happy” form of Jean Hyppolite’s version of Hegel’s
dialectic, a perpetually unresolved dialectic. There is no end to it, no grand synthesis in
which individual and group are merged. But, what is revealed is the productivity of the
on-going tension itself, as each term asserts itself under conditions of on-going influence
by the other. One might even argue that only so long as there is the tension, is there the
flexible production that ensures persistence.
The terms do not become each other, but rather become necessarily linked to each
other. Each term carries one conceptually to the other, but is not the other. Identification
is productively forestalled. Logically, this is the “mutual presupposition” conceived by
Deleuze and Guattari, though historically, this plays out as an open-ended cycle of
reversing-direction determinations. It is important to point out that the nation does not
fully determine the concepts of it that individuals will then impose on it, though it does
partially. In other words, this dynamic is not logically determined, but open as well as
open-ended.
It is thus possible to write of the lateral extension of the nation -- that it is not an
organic unity, but internally diverse and at some points discontinuous — without thereby
requiring that it be an aggregate or social structure of atomic individuals. It is also
possible to write of members of the nations as relational, non-atomic or discrete subjects,
without this in turn meaning that they are subsumed into an organic whole or
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homogeneity. National community is at once constructed out of individuals and the
constructor of its members.
What is more, a nation is itself at once a “unity,” a “diversity,” and apart ofa
greater "diversity " ofnations that, in Sartrean terms, serially determine each by the rest.
In this sense, the nation becomes the marker of a tension between internal and external
forces. Again, these are not resolved in a grand synthesis, but rather their perpetual
tension produces the nation. But, this is another issue, related to the issue of self-
determination
. . .
Though Bahbar’s analysis of the relationship between nationalism and sexism is
less extensive than his treatment of that between nationalism and racism, it is still
significant. He argues that nationalism uses an extant sexism to regulate reproduction in
a manner that maintains the genealogical “purity” viewed as the foundation of the nation,
[see Balibar, 1991a: 102]
This means that gender oppression is logically prior to the nation. Not only are
nationalism and sexism independent of each other, but sexism has logical priority. First,
Balibar is clear that nationalism depends on “the inequality of sexual roles in conjugal
love and child-rearing” [102]. The “reproduction” of the nation is seen to require
regulation of sex and procreation by the (national) state. This, in turn, is accomplished
through gender domination. Through this domination, nationalism transforms the
family from a literal kinship unit, into the nation itself. Control of reproduction is not
necessarily strictly national, but it is necessary to a nation.
On Balibar s account, a close relation holds between sexism and racism as well.
u Racism and sexism function together and in particular, racism always presupposes
sexism” [Balibar, 1991b: 49], Racism and sexism are not two distinct sets of oppressive
practices and structures, at most analogous to each other. Rather, they are part of a single
system of “complementary exclusions and dominations which are mutually
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interconnected” [49], Sexism and racism work together to select out two complementary
sets of “objects” for oppression.
Underlying this analysis is the view of racism Balibar defends: racism should be
broadly defined to contain “ all torms of exclusion and depreciation
... all forms of
minority oppression which
. . . lead to the ‘racialization’ of various social groups - not
just ethnic groups, but women, sexual deviants [sic], the mentally ill, subproletarians and
so on” [48]. The benefit of this broad category is that it recognizes “the common
mechanism of the naturalization of differences” [48]. Thus, all forms of oppression,
including caste and class, gender, ethnic/racial, heterosexism and related oppressions,
oppression of the mentally ill, and so forth, (1) function in the same way structurally,
perceiving (that is, creating) differences among individuals based on biological or other
characteristics and giving a meaning to these differences that allows for hierarchization,
and (2) comprise a single system of oppression as complementary partners. At the same
time, Balibar hierarchizes these elements, both making nationalism derivative of racism
(not simply as a specific form) and making “ethnic racism” itself derivative of “sexual
racism” [see 49], In this scheme, the nation rests on nationalism which rests on racism
which rests on sexism.
By making racism at once the general form of oppression and recognizing
something other than “ethnic racism” (the specific form we usually mean by use of the
term “racism”) as an at least historically privileged form, Balibar produces a “Unified
Oppression Theory.” Unfortunately, things are a bit more complicated in the social
realm than in the physical, and in the physical it is not at all clear that a Unified Field
Theory is possible. Just as, according to Balibar, nationalism and racism are often in
direct opposition [54ff.], it is not clear that any of the forms of oppression listed by
Balibar are fully complementary of each other. It is true that, historically, in many
instances (1) different types of oppressions align with each other (such as the semi-
religious, semi-ethnic/racial anti-Arabism of the West), (2) one type of oppression is
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accomplished in part through use of another form (such as the use of racism to divert
white/citizen working class laborers’ frustration away from their exploiters, and onto their
competition for jobs, non-white or immigrant workers), and (3) two types are
manifestations of the same oppressive impulse (as in the case of colonized women
exploited and abused sexually by colonizers, as brilliantly analyzed by Marnia Lazreg
[1994]).
But it is also true that, in other cases, forms of oppression appear to operate
independently of one another. As even Balibar admits, racism and nationalism can come
into conflict. This is, of course, all the more true when one recognizes that his concept of
nationalism is skewed to link it to racism in the first place. When one considers the fuller
range of concepts of nationalisms available, it is clear that these two terms might be not
just at cross purposes, but a nationalism might oppose racism directly. When one further
factors in such terms as “ national consciousness,” “ national movement,” and so forth -
which are included or excluded from the meaning of “nationalism” purely by convention
— one might recognize a deeper disjuncture between nationalism and racism.
The general problem might be fit into a question, “If oppressions are unified in
some fundamental way, how can there be an informed anti-racist sexist (or feminist
racist, or elitist anti-imperialist, or nationally oppressive socialist, etc.)?” The stock
answer is that a dominant oppression — say, exploitation of labor — drives the exploited
to, say, racism, sexism, or imperialism. They do benefit from the oppression they help
perpetrate or even drive. Yet, they engage in this only because they are in a “double-
bind” or propagandized. They are in a “ double-bind” if their wages are so low that the
only way they can afford food is if it is produced cheaply by colonized farmers in a
dominated region of a colonial empire; or if their information technology jobs are too
low-paying for them to afford clothes made by expensive domestic labor, so they accept
buying clothes constructed by children getting 12 cents a day in “some Third World
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country.” They are propagandized (or, self-deluded) if they blame the fact that are not
earning enough on “those damned immigrants that work for less, in non-union shops.”
This is an important point, and is to some extent or in some instances quite
accurate. Yet, at the same time, that one experiences oppression does not immediately
remove one from all responsibility for one’s effects on others. The situation is more
complicated. The poor, unemployed, white redneck guy is not compelled by his
circumstances to beat his wife and/or kids, or to regularly humiliate in public non-white
immigrants who speak with accents or cannot speak English at all. There is no benefit
from these acts, and there is just as clearly great harm done. Though there may be
powerful forces driving the perpetrator not to recognize the real effects of his acts, there
is always an element of volition. 40 It is the same volition exercised by a “career woman”
who needs cheap childcare in order to work
- perhaps as a fine social worker - and who
hires an “ illegal alien” to provide it at a very low wage, with no health benefits, and so
forth; or by a member of a genocided group who decides that women in the group must
bear as many children as possible to rebuild the group, regardless of their own well-being.
The examples go on. Though there are genuine ’cross-oppressive’ double binds, these are
the products of the coincidence -- perhaps orchestrated — of two forms of oppression; in
cases where this coincidence does not occur, the forms are not linked in a necessary way.
In practice, there is not just one, necessary relationship among forms or forces of
oppression. They might be intimately related or even fused, but they might also be
independent of each other. Oppressions do complement one another in many instances,
but this results because (1) the immediate forces of the different oppressions have the
same sources, (2) they happen to evolve into a symbiotic relationship, or (3) one force of
oppression takes on another as a tool. It is not a function of the general historical or
40Though more often the subject is not absolutely forced to act in an oppressive way. Much more common
is a perpetrator of oppression who blocks his/her recognition of his/her oppression. Slavoj Zizek [1991]
and Robert Ackermann [1995] have explored this form of denial. A fuller treatment of it here would go
beyond the scope of this work.
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logical unity of all oppression - unity itself must be determined by specific forces in
specific cases, and is not universal.
Why have I taken the trouble to argue against a Unified Oppression Theory, when
“rescuing” nationalism appears to have been accomplished only by arguing against the
reduction ot nationalism to racism, based on its structure and origin, as well as
enforcement of a unitary general concept of nationalism? My concern here is the
opposite, rescuing nationalism” should not suggest that an anti-oppressive nationalism
— a nationalism fighting against domination of its perceived nation - is generally anti-
oppressive. It seems that, once Balibar or anyone else is committed to a Unified
Oppression Theory, he/she must argue as well for a reductive, oppressive core of
nationalism, or be unable to explain how a force against one type of oppression might be
a force for another type. Again, as I have argued, recognition of oppression itself
determining participation by the oppressed in other forms of oppression only explains this
phenomenon part-way. Only by de-linking forms of oppression and resistance to them is
it possible to understand the true complexities of relationships among forms of
oppression and liberation, and that there is no necessary configuration or positive or
negative relationship among them. A liberatory nationalism is neither necessarilyfor nor
against other forms or oppression.
At the same time, this potentially oppressive or non-oppressive structure of
nationalism suggests a deep break with the other forms under discussion: each of them is
purely and by definition oppressive. There is no liberatory racism — no such thing as
“reverse racism” — because there is a thick line between fighting the oppression of one’s
group and oppressing other groups.
Balibar’s reduction of each oppression and all oppressions together to one core
historical and logical movement is a complete “totalization” (in Bhabha’s usage) of
oppression. It imposes a perfected, unitary form over a complex of forms and their inter-
relations. This simplification itself can function as a tool of oppression, allowing denial
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of the oppressiveness of exceptional or fugitive forms. Indeed, it is often the relative
/'/^dependence of oppressions - and even different instances of the same oppression -
from one another that prevents one solid anti-oppressive maneuver or movement from
anything but a specific or temporary success. It is the disunity among and within
oppressive forms — as much as their unity — that accounts for the resilience of
oppression. Indeed, it is often disunity, not unity, that allows instances of different forms
of oppression to complement one another.
It is important here to distinguish between historical and logical unity and
disunity. Again, I am not arguing against the unity of forms — their concrete or
analogical linkage. In such cases, these links function in a manner similar to the links
that bridge the gaps within the aspects or levels of national structures. But, just as there
are different nations (certainly in some cases related to each other, but often in a reactive
or oppositional manner), there are different oppressive unities within the broad history of
oppression.
Given the foregoing, that a liberatory nationalism has elements of oppression
within it does not mean that these are integral to it as a nationalism. External forms of
oppression might be grafted onto the nationalism without a direct relation to the essence
of the nationalism itself. While in some cases, for instance, a nationalism might employ
sexism or heterosexism to control and manipulate a population, in others the sexism and
heterosexism might be a function of the more general context of the nationalism, and not
the nationalism itself. This is quite often the case, say, regarding racism or elitism within
the feminist movement or, more properly, particular strains within the movement. Where
this exists, it is generally not a function of the feminism itself - as some argue - but
rather imported from the social context in which the feminism develops. If it draws on
members from the upper and/or upper-middle classes, for instance, much of the elitism
inherent within these classes is imported with the members.
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On the other hand, it does not require that distinct oppressions be unified into a
single system or formal unity for opposition to the distinct oppressions to be unified.
This seems to be an assumption underlying much of the rhetoric around Unified
Oppression Theories. Human beings can fight against that which is not directly in their
interest, and, for instance, a man in a national movement can recognize the
oppressiveness of sexist structures within the movement and oppose those. This might,
of course, influence specific strains of nationalism within a nation. But this does not
mark the necessary relation of fighting national oppression and gender oppression.
Rather, the fact that some strains are gender oppressive and some fight it suggests that the
latter are contingent historical formations, made all the more significant by the fact that
they are not necessary.
“ Race” as a form of categorization is used almost exclusively as the basis of
racist oppression. It is seldom if every chosen by those race marks for oppression. This
is not to ignore the positive valuations given to cultures and histories associated with
oppressed races. It is, however, to recognize that these positive valuations, which are
fully legitimate, are responses to oppressive devaluing of those cultures, histories, and
races. Race as a positive attribute is a response to race as a negative. Neither am I
arguing for a liberalist, “color-blind” approach to subjects. Within our present historical
context, which is deeply and fundamentally organized around racial consciousness,
“color-blindness” functions as a means of denying the depth of the oppressive structures
in place. “Color-blindness” can only exist legitimately as a possible political outcome of
anti-racist activity; but, whether it is the proper ultimate outcome cannot be determined
from within our presently racist context.
The positive valuation of race tends to focus on characteristically national aspects,
which suggests that race as a category tends to be a positive social grouping as it
approaches the nation form. In the United States, “Black Nationalism” appears to be
such a racial form tending toward nation, at both the political organizing and the
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community/social structural levels. At the same time, I am not arguing for a valuation
schema in which “nation” is “good community” and “race” is “bad categorization.”
My point is, rather, that the polyvalent nature of “nation-in-general” allows it to be
appropriated or engaged by an anti-racist movement. In this way, it might itself be the
medium through which race itself can be transvalued, though I am not sure I would argue
for this.
An examination of the relationship between sexism and nationalism would be
similar to that between racism and the latter. However, this similarity is limited by a
difference in the nature of gender and race. Within the vast realm of feminist theory,
there are strong positions and traditions that perceive gender (1) as an artificial construct
grounding oppression, (2) as a distinction that might have a biological foundation, but
that is irrelevant for all non-biological considerations, (3) as a biologically determined
difference that should be celebrated, which in turn requires re-valuing femininity, (4) as a
biologically or socially determined difference, in which the feminine is devalued -- to the
detriment of men as well as women - and should not be, but rather celebrated, (5) as an
artificial duality that regulates social roles and sexual activity away from a much more
complex and “disruptive” (revolutionary) set of possibilities, (6) as a constructed
difference grounding an oppression that requires the building of alternative concepts of
the women’s (and men’s) gender, and so on. Questions such as, Should gender be
erased, valued, or transformed? remain open and debated.
My point here is that concepts of gender and anti-sexism sometimes see gender as
a legitimate social category, and not simply because of a presumed biological origin.
Though theorists such as bell hooks [1984] are absolutely clear that gender is at most a
potential for community that should never be assumed, but rather painstakingly,
carefully, and respectfully built, there is a foothold of community in gender. For, gender
can be and often is perceived as a positive identity rather than an externally imposed
categorization. With race, the categorization develops as a tool of oppression or
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exclusion; with gender, it is possible that the categorization is logically prior to an
appropriation by oppressive forces, or its transformation into the basis of oppression. In
this sense, its relationship to oppression is ambivalent, much as is the nation’s. Gender
can be the basis of oppression or not, as nation can be. Of course, gender is still a
categorization, with at most a potential for community in the form of a valued identity.
Structurally, gender is different from both race and nation, and closer to nation than race
is.
Yet, in terms of content - that is, actual races and nations, and what is perceived
to make them so — race seems to abut and even overlap with nation in certain
circumstances and forms. This is absolutely not true of gender and nation; they are
clearly conceptually distinct. The questions are then (1) What is the relationship of
gender and nation? and (2) Is the nation implicated in sexism?
Partha Chatterjee [1993: 1 16 - 157] greatly extends the type of analysis Bhabha
brings to the interior of the nation, itself an application of “Subaltern Studies.”
Chatterjee emphasizes the link between the force of colonization on India and the
“women’s question.” Colonialism at once drove and constrained the engagement of 19th
Century Indian nationalism with gender issues. Women were caught between the force of
colonialism on the one hand and the counter-force that as a necessarily resistant move
valorized “Indian cultural tradition” on the other. In Bhabha’s terminology, they were
marginalized within the emergent nation.
Chatterjee, however, departs from Bhabha significantly. He considers the
counter-totalization of anti-colonial Indian nationalism as a necessary form within the
context. Its ultimate betrayal of women is necessary: “the story of nationalist
emancipation is necessarily a story of betrayal. Because it could confer freedom only by
imposing at the same time a whole set of new controls, it could define a cultural identity
for the nation only by excluding many from its fold . . .” [154], At the same time, he is
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clear that this is inexcusable gender oppression, and that this betrayal continues to be
contested. His view of the situation is explicitly “ pessimistic”
[ 155 ],
I choose another resolution to the presence of sexism within nationalism. I reject
first of all the “necessity” argument. This seems a fatalistic rehash of standard
nationalist justifications for ignoring women’s issues in order to pursue the central cause.
There is volition, in the fact that this sexism is external to the nationalism, or nationalism
is not determined with respect to gender issues. The force of patriarchy - within all
national and other groups - is quite sufficient to account for the strong presence of
sexism in so many otherwise liberatory nationalist movements.
This independence suggests the nature of the relationship between nation and
gender. A nation is always specific - it refers to a specific social structure that is
significantly smaller than all of humanity. It thus always cuts across gender, considered
as universal categories. At the same time, gender always exists internal to the nation, as
one type of concrete relation that is part of what binds a nation or introduces gaps within
it, as well as general categorizations. The nation is dependent on the gendered relations
and tensions - among and within gender categories - for its constitution and articulation.
At the same time, the nation and nationalisms to some extent determine these relations,
which in turn affects the universal gender categories. This not to say that nation and
gender merely intersect - that a nation exceeds gender relations just as universal gender
categories circumscribe the nation. They are different social forms: universal gender
categories depend on cultural (national and other) structures to give concrete meaning to
the categories, just as the nation depends on gender relations as building blocks. In other
words, a nation as a social, political, and cultural milieu and community structure impacts
the development its members, including their genderization, even as gender structures
and roles transcend individual nations. Gender is at once constructed within nations —
becoming split and specific -- and independent of this specification, both in terms of
material forces and self-conscious social (feminist) movements.
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From the perspective of the nation, gender is at once within and beyond. This
drives a double-aspected potential relationship of nationalism to gender. Internally,
nations influence gender relations and categories, and so nationalisms often actively
regulate and control genderization and gender relations, which is formally sexist (and
generally sexist in content as well). Yet, externally, gender escapes a nation - it is
categories that the nation can only partially influence, its abstract universality a foil to the
nation’s specificity and concreteness that resists deadening determination by the
nationalism. Nationalisms usually recognize only the first aspect of the relationship, and
mistakenly ascribe the external excess of gender to be contained in other nations,
particularly those that are hostile or oppressive to it. Such a nationalism rejects
alternative concepts of gender relations — particularly feminist ones — as the agenda of
external enemies. This is true to the extent that a particular feminist strain is implicated
in colonialist or condescending attitudes toward the nation in question. But, at the same
time, such concrete feminist agendas tied to oppressive groups do not exhaust the
potential of what might be called "Universal Anti-Sexism,” an abstract anti-sexism that
is not subject to external agendas and control. This independence is a function of gender
itself, which is never contained fully within the set of all national units (even when these
are supplemented by non-national social structures to cover the entire human population).
It is only through recognition of this properly dual nature of the relation can a nationalism
that seeks liberation from colonial or external domination at the same time submit itself
to gender liberation. This is not a matter of accepting the power of external feminist
movements, but rather recognizing the independence of gender abstractly considered
from the level of national struggles entirely.
“Universal Anti-Sexism” is not, then, a representative of external enemies or
oppressors on the national or state level. Women within a nation — especially those that
oppose gender domination — at once are participants in the nation and also part of the
category of women universally, which links them with a potential anti-sexism that is
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legitimately deployed against sexism within the nation. It is legitimate both because it
does not represent any agenda besides the liberatton of women within the nation from
sexism - that is, it is a concrete specification of feminism - and because sexism is not
necessary to nationalism in general (though it may be or be perceived to be necessary to
this or that nationalism, which thereby becomes indefensible because it is unnecessarily
oppressive).
In the same way, a nation exceeds the gender structure or Universal Anti-Sexism.
Feminism itself organizes and structures liberation struggles, and sometimes around the
interests of only some women - usually elites. Such a feminist movement is like a
nationalism organized around elite interests within a presumed nation. The internal split
might be between upper and lower class women, or across cultural, national, or state
difference. In the latter case, the feminism might be anti-national or oppressive of some
nations. At the same time, there is nothing within abstract anti-sexism that determines
this oppressiveness.
A respectful engagement by a nationalism with feminism, or a feminism with
(liberatory or non-oppressive) nationalism is not a function simply of the excess of
gender and nation from within the other. As I explained in critiquing Bhabha’s notions of
the effects of marginalized narratives, alone they merely mark the potential for resistant
activity, but are not in themselves that activity itself. Thus, it is not enough for a
nationalism to recognize the presence of “women’s voices” within a nation or national
movement, or a feminism to recognize cultural and national difference within the
category ol women or itself as a specific anti-feminist group. It requires recognition of
the concrete partial independence of those voices and what they represent: it requires a
respectful sharing of political control. Only by recognizing the limits of the nation can a
nationalism respectfully engage gender issues, and vice-versa. Gender and nation are
alternative conceptions of social reality, which cannot be resolved into one simple system
or structure. It is not they contradict one another, but that each is incomplete. Any
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nationalism or ami-sexism is in par, a perspective on social reality
,
ha, privileges itself
In doing so, i, asserts itself beyond its legitimate oractual realm of conceptual, za, ion and
action. Only by recognizing the other perspective can a truly liberatory relationship
between (a) feminism and (a) nationalism exist.
This account is certainly influenced by a strain in feminist theory that might be
unified under Ann Ferguson's term “aspect theory of the self’ [Ferguson. 1991], On
such an account, the individual has different aspects, relating her/him to a class position,
a race, a state citizenship, an ethnicity, a nationality, a gender, a sexuality, a religion, a
physical state, and/or so forth. These different aspects of identity can come into conflict,
reflecting the social, economic, and political tensions between the identity categories and
groups more generally. Such an account has been extended in the work of theorists such
as Gloria Anzaldua and Maria Lugones, who recognize that even within aspects, there
might be multiplicity and tension, as for instance different cultural ties, sexualities, and so
forth come into conflict.
Such an account is crucial to recognition of the limits of nationality, gender, etc.,
which in turn is crucial to my de-linking of nation and gender, and thus of nationalism
and sexism. At the same time, such an account is incomplete or limited, in that it tends to
privilege the individual. Though each of these three theorists is focused on the building
of non-oppressive community among women across other differences, and more
generally among people across difference, the perspective of this theory is the register of
group social structures and categorical schemes on the individual. This is a crucial step in
rejecting the domination ot complex individuals by groups or categories associated with
one aspect that asserts itselt as fundamental; yet, it also tends to transform group
participation into an individual characteristic. Indeed, the individual is seen to possess
her/his aspects.
This itself intersects liberal notions of the subject. Though the particular theorists
in question are critical of liberalism and the assumption of the atomic individual, this
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general model all too easily devolves into a notion that individuals carry their multiple
identities with them. For instance, with a focus on the individual, the nation is reduced to
an individually held attribute. One has nationality, and a nation is all those who share a
particular nationality. If this notion of nationality is dominant within a certain strain of
feminism (and it is in many), then recognition of women’s nationality is not recognition
of their nation, but rather the fracturing of it. Because nationality involves necessarily
social relations with other “ nationals,” it cannot exist in this individuated form. Women
are forced to choose between gender and nation, though they and those who compel the
choice might not be aware of the fact that a choice is being made. This, of course, works
in reverse, though slightly differently. Gender is a category, and so in some sense an
individual has this or that gender completely. However, it is a mistake for members of a
nation or national movement to believe that gender is simply an abstract category that is
concretized fully by articulation within a national framework. Recognizing the gender
issues of women in a nation requires recognizing their partial independence from the
national framework, that is, a commonality of situation or interest with some outside the
nation. Though a gender category is not a community or set of social relations, that does
not mean that it can be individually articulated. For an individual’s gender construction
and situation to be fully articulated requires recognition of its excess beyond the nation.
What is more, to the extent that such an individuated notion of nationality (or
gender, race, etc.) is internalized by a member of a nation, he/she assents to transforming
it into an individual possession. This is the root of identity politics in its bad sense,
which devolves at its most cynical into an almost capitalistic competition among atomic
individuals possessing various identities — even among those within the same identity
group, who view for the fullest possible individual possession of that identity so as to be
best able to trade on it. Identity is commodified and takes on a value based on (1) the
power of one’s claim to authoritative possession of one’s identity relative to other
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members of the identity group - how much of an authority on Thai or Brazilian cuisine
one is, etc. - and (2) the advantages it is possible to gain by trading on one’s identity.
Ethnic minorities - especially immigrants - are particularly susceptible to a
commodification of nationality. This is due to (1) the contemporary rise in the value
given to ethnicity - with its cultural, linguistic, culinary, etc., artifacts - under the
general ascendance of “multiculturalism,” especially in North America and Western
Europe and (2) the superior power of the social relations of the dominant society or state
in which ethnic minorities live, relative to their “national relations,” which have great
difficulty competing with the former. One might regard “multiculturalism” as a
resolution of this tension, in favor of the dominant society and a partial set of the
concerned minority. The minority members exchange their nations as complex social
structures distinct from the dominant structure for individual payoffs in the terms
described above. “Ethnicism” and “multiculturalism,” which are generally considered
by minority groups as beneficial, are thereby revealed to be power instruments in and
manifestations of their dissolutions.
Thus is the general relationship between nationalism and feminism, and nation
and gender. There is a certain asymmetric balance at the general level. The balance is
thrown off in practice, however. Cynthia Enloe [1994] has remarked on the failure of
most national movements and nationalisms to engage gender issues in meaningful ways,
even when strong internal pro-national feminist movements exist. She comments on the
complicity at the level of academic theorists of the nation as well, who fail to consider the
genuinely significant roles of women in nation formation and national life, as well as the
complexity of their position within a national structure. Bhabha, Balibar, Chatterjee, and
Robert Ackermann are almost alone as exceptions among serious theorists of the nation.
Gender is not mentioned at all in the theories of Hobsbawm, Gellner, or Anderson, the
“big three” as it were in the field.
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On the other hand, within the vast realm of feminism, at both the theoretical and
practical levels, there has been a complicated, strong, and sustained engagement with
nationality. While this is obvious in the work of theorists such as Marnia Lazreg, whose
focus is on gender issues within a particular national colonial, anti-colonial, and post-
colonial context, it exists in more general feminist discussions of nation. Within national
movements themselves, particularly anti-colonial or revolutionary ones, the role of
women has been significant and decisive in most every struggle globally. Algerian
women, Nicaraguan women, Vietnamese women, Indian women, etc., have played major
roles in struggles for national independence and in the process of nation formation. 41
Though there are significant strains in Universal Anti-Sexism and particular
feminist movements that ignore national difference or even participate in national
domination, such that it is not possible to assert any generalization about feminism’s
eng3gement with the nation, it is clear that within feminism these are serious issues that
are the source of serious debate and tension. In national movements and national
communities, on the contrary, such serious engagement and debate is minimized, and
itself often labeled as a threat to the nation. 42
W have not included particularly feminist theories of the nation in my critiques or extensively in this
chapter for two reasons. First, though there are many feminist accounts of the nation that might be labeled
antinational-ist’ or viewed as exploitative of the nation, to present such accounts would not have
advanced my general critiques significantly - while at the same time having been fodder for sexist
nationalist reductions of all of feminism to such negative positions. Second, at the risk of being accused of
a sexist dismissal myself, most feminist approaches to the nation concern the relationship between gender
and nation (or ethnicity, citizenship, or culture). Much of this work is, as my text suggests, highly
insightful. But, at the same time, it is not focused on producing new concepts of the nation, and tends
instead to import existing concepts.
Though much of this work has quite often been respectful of nationality, it would not have
advanced my own theorization. The reserved engagement of the nation by many feminists is not
necessarily bad, but rather manifests the respectful resistance to imposing an external perspective on the
nation. Such theorists thus avoid the trap that authors treated in Chapters 1 and 2 have fallen into, though
their externality is not a competing but merely distinct political form. The resistance to imposing a purely
feminist appraisal on the nation, or a generally reductive concept, itself comes from or manifests
recognition of the complex independence of nation from gender.
42
I emphasize this in the sincere hope that this will change, because it can change and should. Though
there are many even in my own groups within my own nation who will be angered by such a statement, it
is my hope that this anger and the contention that follows will open the nation to change.
It nation and gender — or nationalism and feminism — are construed as fundamentally
oppositional, competing as it were for “scarce political resources,” then nationalisms are in some sense
justified in not engaging gender. This is true even if the presumed sexist nature of nationalism is
acknowledged: if it is a necessary function of nationalism and nationality, then there is nothing a devoted
nationalist or national can do. Indeed, a respectful engagement with feminism can only come through
abandonment of one’s nation, which is a price to high to pay for many. It is interesting that Balibar’s
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Heterosexism is even more uniformly prevalent in nationalisms, though at the
same time usually less explicit. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that heterosexism
is itself a function of a nationalism's desire to control reproduction and control the
activities of nationals more generally. While this might be true, at least to some extent
and in many cases, the relative implicitness of heterosexism suggests that it is at least
often assumed rather than generated by nationalism. That is, the “ undesirability” or
“threat” of non-heterosexuality is imported into a nationalism. The same general points
apply as did for gender, only a stronger admonition of nationalisms is called for.
I have discussed at length the relationship between nation and class in my
treatment of Hobsbawm. Here I might add that, in some cases, particularly colonialism
or conquest, class tends to correspond to nation, though even there intra-national class
divisions exist. As Hobsbawm shows, sometimes nationalisms are also socialisms, and
sometimes not. Again, the model of gender tends to apply here as well, though gender
and class are partially different types of categorizations.
The Nation and the State
The history of the past two centuries has been an era of great changes in the global
system of states. It has been marked by tumultuous waves of state formation, out of
disintegrating old world and post-Columbian colonial empires. In these two centuries,
the nation has been born, and nationalisms have figured greatly in each wave of change.
The general understanding of the history of the state form over these two centuries
has been its gradual though often violent coming into correspondence with emergent
nations. Nationalisms themselves have tended to view control of its own state as one of
the primary ends of a nationalism, and often the guarantor of its other ends. The history
position that nationalism is necessarily linked to sexism replicates the logic of the all-too-many nationalists,
which see feminism as antithetical to the “national culture.”
Only by emphasizing that the relationship is not predetermined and that nationalist sexism or anti-
feminism is a choice among different equally possible options, can nationalists be held fully responsible
tor sexism.
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IS seen as waves of assertion by emergent nationalisms of the claims of their nations.
First, though evolutions and revolutions, certain Western European states became
nationalized. For instance, the French Revolution began the process that would “turn
peasants into Frenchman" [Weber, 1976], Even in Britain, a complex colonialist
nationality derived from Englishness absorbed some central semi-subject groups (the
Welsh, Scottish, and Protestant Irish), to form a core Anglo identity against the greater
balance of subjugated and colonized peoples close and far from home, light and dark of
skin.
A second wave of “national” state formation began though a series of revolutions
against Britain, Spain, and Portugal throughout the Americas. These revolutions at the
least established states that were claimed to be the container of proto-nations that would
emerge through education and development. Another wave overlapped, this time in
Central and Eastern Europe and Asia Minor. It produced a set of states that, for the most
part, claimed a national basis. States such as Germany and Italy, as well as Poland,
Greece, Hungary, etc., are examples. During this period Japan, which had resisted
colonization by Western powers, self-consciously transformed itself into a national state
on the European model. A number of British colonies dominated by whites also gained
“ independence” during this period, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
though it would be some time before a credible “national identity” could be asserted
independently of the British Commonwealth.
Most other Asian regions, cultural groups, and societies were already colonized,
and those that were not — especially China — were unable to develop modern state
structures that would resist European and North American domination. The colonial grip
was universal and strong in Africa. Much of the Middle East had come under direct or
indirect European control, the latter through financial and military domination of the
weakened Ottoman Empire. Anti-colonial movements in such areas had existed from the
beginning of their domination, but only reached full power in the 20th Century, and
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particularly after World War II. In the decades after the war, colonial region after
colonial region became states.
Finally, as the so-called Soviet Empire weakened in the 1980s, subject and client
groups - in some cases, pre-Soviet nationalities, in others, constructed or emergent
nations - asserted claims to statehood. We are still living in this era, though its intensity
is dying down.
Of course, this plodding nationalization of the globe has not been so linear or
smooth as such an abstract telling might make it appear. In almost every resultant
“ national states” residual internal differences have forced crises of varying proportions,
and for most, “ national unity” requires on-going force. Separatist movement have
haunted France and Spain, and the Irish question has bee central to British home politics
for more than a century. Since the mid- 19th Century, civil wars and revolutions were
rampant throughout the Americas. Central and Eastern Europe have been particularly
unstable, as border disputes and complex national and state tensions have erupted into at
least one World War. Even the yoke of Soviet authority appears in part to have broken
from their violence. In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, internal tensions have been
similar to those in the Americas, with complex internal power politics and external forces
necessary to stave off revolution and civil war, where these could be.
Nationalist or pro-nationalist readings of this instability usually attribute it to the
incompleteness of the national movements in question, and the vicissitudes of the
subsequent development of the nations. Such readings also sometimes recognize external
or non-national forces as factors, particularly such things as communism, derailing or
interfering with the proper development of the nations. Related readings in some states
have even come to view this on-going tension or plurality as part of the nature of the
nation itself, as in the cases of the United States and France. Anti-national or a-national
readings view the residual tension and violence as evidence of the problematic nature of
the nation and nationalism themselves. They are inherently disruptive and violent, or
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attempt to impose fantastic and impossible homogeneities or unities on necessarily
diverse populations, producing sometimes genocidal intolerance. Such readings
sometimes valorize other social forces, such as class-based movements or economic
forces (capitalism, industrialization) against the nation and nationalism. Radical readings
that call into question the very logic or desirability of the modern state form associate the
nation and nationalism with it: the nation-state is the perfected or most developed form
of the (oppressive) state. They therefore reject nation and state together, in favor of a
non-national state form of political participation, including cosmopolitan “world
citizenship,” localized direct assembly, and so forth.
All these positions are unified on one underlying point: all view nations and/or
nationalisms claiming to represent nations as the driving force of the attempts to produce
national states. But, as Chapter 1 ’s treatment of Kedourie suggests, this is a reductive or
simplified representation of what has actually occurred. The tension and even violence
do not necessarily represent merely the attitudes and actions of those most visible in
relation to the status quo of the state system, national movements and nationalists. What
emerged in my treatment of Kedourie was a tension between (minority) nation and state.
Here, I wish to generalize this tension.
A counter-reading of the history of the age of nations given above is to view it as
a perpetual failure of the state form and global state order to accommodate the complex
and dynamic realities of national (and other) social structures. The appearance of
stability during apparently stable periods in this history has obscured a bubbling cauldron
of conflicting and dynamic social forces. The stability of a state or set of states
containing them has been provisional, and maintained only through the constant
application of state-legitimated violence and control. As tensions mounted -- as forces
increased in intensity and range, as the state order determining political participation and
self-concepts has less and less reflected the socio-political reality beneath it — a crisis
point was reached, for a given state, a region, or the world. With the reaching of that
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point, violence, tension, revolution, secession, etc., erupted in a massive wave of
reconfiguration. As the state order was shifted and the internal structure of specific states
changed, they came to reflect somewhat better the forces that had driven the change. Yet,
again, this stability itself allowed the surfacing of new or re-emergent forces, tensions,
and groups, widening the gap between state order and national (and class, etc.) reality
beneath - until a new crisis point was reached, and so on . 43
On this reading, the dynamic of nation and state does not tend toward stability or
a final rest-point. Each state order is perceived to be such a rest-point, but not simply
because the history of the order is normalized to appear to lead ineluctably to it (as
nationalisms often represent their movement toward a state). Rather, it is an appeal to the
absolute givenness of 1 law’ that legitimates each iteration of the state order as an
absolute. This has been true long before nations and nationalisms developed. By
enshrining a given balance of power or imbalance of domination in formal agreements,
covenants, treaties, etc., it is frozen in a mysterious and mystifying “law” that is parasitic
upon a more general reverence for law (that reflects the interests of elites and is imposed
through coercive propaganda and direct force). In contemporary terms, the “territorial
integrity” of existing states is given priority over alternative sets of borders, though the
latter might correspond better (though not in a final or complete sense) to the actual social
structures on the territories in question. No matter how clearly contingent a given
configuration of the global state system, each new iteration appeared/s as absolutely
legitimate and necessary. Its analogical link to past “absolute” status quos is lost to
those within its conceptual grip.
Even where convincing legalistic claims of the basic “right to self-determination”
are asserted, they generally fail to change the ordering, and never through argument. It is
“This account is, of course, an abstraction that focuses on nations and states. Obviously, the dynamic in
question has involved other forces and factors, particularly class movements and economic tensions. A
comprehensive history of the era of nations would have to discuss such non-national forces and structures
as well. The model as is does not explain any event or cycle of the dynamic fully. At the same time, it
does sketch the general form of any such comprehensive account, and justifiably foregrounds the nation
and nationalism, which is my particularly concern.
410
here that the inertia of the system - the reverence for the status quo - becomes apparent
cousin to “precedent” in law. For, even where the “right to self-determination” balances
“territorial integrity ” what emerges is not a decision but a stalemate. No action can be
taken, because no change is authorized. But, this is of course a decision, and a victory for
the existing order. No amount of debate changes this - no debate about these two
competing claims can resolve a tension except by implicitly reaffirming the status quo.
The only changes that result are forced on non-legal or non-philosophical levels,
though power politics, the interference of those with specific agendas, and military
conflict. Thus, the very state system - as enshrined in international legal principles -
breeds and encourages military conflict and the rewarding offeree. That is, of course,
not to say that all force is rewarded - it must be irrelevant to the interests of Great
Powers and regional powers, or intractable even in their face, to succeed. This in turn
reinforces the global structure of domination that has evolved out of colonialism, as well
as encouraging great extremism among those who would oppose this structure.
One must keep in mind that the “inertia” of the status quo is actually continually
reproduced through mental and material force in individual states and in the world
generally. Thus, tension is not simply the product of disruptive self-determination
movements - or power plays by elites currently out of power. It is a product as much of
the force necessary to reproduce the status quo as the forces seeking to alter it. Again, it
is the myth of inertia, dependent on the mystification of inter- and intra-state law that
skews perception of the actual dynamics of such things as contemporary national
separatism. This is not to valorize separatism, or to assume its moral authority, but rather
to challenge its prejudicial illegitimacy in the face of the existing state order, so that
specific claims and movements can be examined on their own merits, with a full
appreciation of the forces and possible oppressions that have produced them or legitimate
them.
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This suggests the deeper cause of this perpetual non-correspondence. The past
two centuries have seen dramatic population shifts and migrations, as well as complex
interfusions of populations within transnational states. In some nations, the Bhabhan
production of marginal groups has produced political movements at cross-purposes with
nationalisms, or even that resist certain homogenizing nationalisms directly. For Bhabha,
particularly the former is the motivating force for nationalism. These shifts and
alternative agendas produce a crisis in "traditional” correspondences between culture,
language, and territory. On his read, nationalism attempts to rebuild such
correspondences.
On my understanding of the nation, however, such a “traditional” correspondence
is not national. One must look at the very structures of nation and state to comprehend
their tension. Most theorists respect a definitional or conceptual distinction between
nation and state. They are not two aspects of the same socio-political phenomenon. The
state is not the formalized political structure erected on the foundation of the nation, as
the cultural and societal basis of common political participation in the state. Nor is the
nation the cultural and social aspect of the formal nation - whether actual or constructed.
In general, states and nations refer not to the same socio-political formations operating on
different conceptual planes, but rather different (types of) socio-political formations
operating on the same set of conceptual and material planes. The “nation-state” (a nation
that is also a state) is not the ultimate actualization of the nation, nor the essential form of
the modern state.
Stability is thus impossible because nations and states are incompatible. The
distinction between formal and informal here is deeper than aspectual: it is the key to
recognizing two distinct social forms that compete with each other on all social and
political levels. I have sketched the nation as an on-going, non-totalizable dynamic
moving among different aspects of the material and conceptual realms. The modern
state, on the other hand, is essentially defined by governmental structures, constitutions,
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codes of law, and/or so forth. The state is the formal organization of a population for
decision-making and regulated functioning. The state tends to organize and subjugate
what it encounters within itself to a formal order. What is more, its shifts and evolutions
-- often driven by changes in the social actuality it organizes — occur through rigid,
formalized (often legal) means. This is true of liberal concepts of the state: even a state’s
realms of disorganization or informality are clearly defined in constitutional or legal
ways, in fact, only when these abstract guarantors of order are strong is a disorganized or
informal realm out of direct control by the government allowed to exist. Though this is
perhaps an idealization of the state -- real states are never what they are defined to be, as
informal or unofficial power operates within and despite the official structure the
dynamic of the state is always toward the subjugation of the unofficial and informal
.
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The state is fundamentally the on-going result of definition and organization; this aspect
is dominant over independently emerging social reality.
Definition and organization is only one component or aspect of the nation, and not
privileged over independent generation of raw social forces and structures prior to
definition and organization. What is more, with these there is usually a multiplicity of
concepts and definitions operative, as well as different strains, sub-cultures and -
networks, and so forth on the material level. The mutability of the nation form is further
factor in the tension between nation and state. Even where a nation and state correspond
fairly well at a given point, that is not a guarantee that the nation will not mutate and
develop in new ways, ways that the state (a rigid formal structure) cannot easily follow.
The distinction between nation and state is not, then, merely between the formal
and informal aspects of a social object, but rather between a comprehensive social form
that tends to be formal — or is delineated through institutional means — (the state), and a
‘‘‘‘Thus, the recent spate of anti-govemmental violence in the United States registers the recognition on the
extreme right-wing fringe of the state’s inherently hegemonic nature.
Of course, where the non-governmental is the actual origin of a government and considered its
end — as in some conceptions of, say, the United States -- there is a deeper tension between the state
(government) and the powerful who operate somewhat independently of it (big business, etc.).
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dynamic tension between such formalization and continually asserted social reality (the
nation). The tension between nation and state is between two distinct social schemes that
are not, at least abstractly, resolvable into a unified socio-political formation.
This distinction has another aspect as well. As I have said, states are part of a
global system of states, in which political participation depends on statehood. Thus, one
does not talk about this or that state as an isolated or independent social form. Indeed,
states are in part defined by interstate agreements. This system evolved at first as a
European system long before the era of nations, along with the grand colonialism of the
past 500 years, which saw the world as a space to be divided up among the powers of
Europe, precisely because they did not contain societies and cultures that could support
modern states on a level with the European ones. States are determined by their borders
with other states, “serially determined" in Sartrean terms. Such a system necessarily
takes the globe as a whole to be parsed into territorial states. Though the internal
dynamics of a state do sometimes function independently of external forces, this is
through (1) direct or indirect power over other states and/or (2) the principle of state
sovereignty, which itself derives from interstate agreement and law.
Balibar and many others argue that nations are serially determined as well, if not
in a “world system” of nations, then at least relative to proximate “enemy” nations. I
have argued against such a purely external view of the nation, for a balancing potential of
interior determination. This is an implication of the concept of laterality I offered against
Bhabha’s pure intensity. An intensive view of the nation - that the nation is first of all
contained in a territorial state, and develops within it -- derives from the view that nations
are serially determined, by reference to external others. I do not argue for a pure laterality
or self-generation, but rather distinguish between the system of states, which are
necessarily contiguous and serially determined, with nations, which are not necessarily
contiguous, and do not form an exhaustive system such that (1) every person is in a
nation and (2) every person is in no more than one nation.
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Resolution is only possible where the nation itself tends toward formalization.
Under some circumstances, a nation might take a rigidified form, if a single definitional
component becomes dominant over other self-concepts and its material complexity. But,
this is merely a specific configuration of the abstract potential that is the nation in
general, and so not the general form of the nation. This is often the result when a state
produces or controls a nation ~ the latter becomes rigid or fossilized, though often with
the potential to mutate away from such a form, even when it is a pure product of state
propaganda. It will tend to remain subject to the state to the extent that its reproduction
depends on state institutions, support, concepts, etc.
This raises an important historical point: it is not that nations and states do not
come to be associated with each other. On the contrary, this is quite common and the
explicit goal of many nationalisms as well as state educational and social policies. But,
such parings must be understood as driven by one or the other social form. In other
words, a nation or nationalism produces or captures a state as part of its agenda, or a state
produces or captures a nation in line with its. This is not a partnership or a merger; and it
is not the “ full flowering” of the prior social formation. In a “nation-state” - actual or
ideal — the nation or the state is always dominant and privileged. Indeed, the dominant
torm produces or deforms the subordinate in its own image. A state produces or captures
a nation to correspond to its rigidities, while a nationalism produces or captures a state
that will be consistent with and reinforce its particular concept of the nation. Such a state
will emphasize what the nationalism does — whether diasporan participation, plurality,
territoriality, linguistic purity, etc.
Much more than a gradual coming into correspondence of nation and state, the
past two centuries have at a general level been an on-going battle between nations and
states for domination of the other. Each has recognized the other as a major socio-
political form (with class as well entering the fray) in contention with it. Specific
national movements have recognized the necessity of attaining statehood for legitimacy
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and stability in the political realm, while specific states have recognized the importance
of nation and nationalism as a tool for maintaining an exclusive popular basis for power.
As, for instance, those loyal to the late 19th Century Ottoman state realized,
nationalization was the only way to survive and prosper in the modern age. Likewise, as
so many subject and colonized peoples recognized, culture and society - national
structures - tended to survive only when linked to a state.
The beginnings ot this tension came perhaps in the Thirty Years War. which
drove the linking of populations to state politics (particularly in the form of military
action/war). The old state system was shattered not through disruption of the old
complicated balance of power (which would re-emerge again and again to be disrupted,
as for instance in the prelude to World War I), but rather through the gradual involvement
of the general population of states as military actors and direct victims. Populations45
became the newest weapon in war, but proved to be less than passive. The old hold of
religion had been weakened, and was anyways inappropriate to the new, worldly activity
of state building and centralization. Over the next century and more, new forms of socio-
political formation and participation emerged, chief among them the nation and
nationalism. States tapped them even as they began to challenge the state form itself, at
once serving it and transforming and destabilizing it.
Yet, arguing that the nation and state are incompatible forms is not the same as
arguing that this is recognized from within nations and nationalisms. Many theorists
assert that nationalism is inherently irrational or attempts to force an impossible structure
onto social reality, that of the national state. Is the nation or nationalism related
subjectively to the territorial state? That is, are they themselves grounded by definition in
the futile hope of achieving a stable national territorial state?
4S
It is important to observe here the distinction between the “nation” and the “people,” made by
specifically by Chatterjee and Hobsbawm. The nation is not simply the people, taken as the general
population, with its organic social forms and relations. The nation is a specific configuration of the
population, involving concepts as well as these social forms and relations in a developmental, mutually
influencing dynamic. Nationalism is a means of linking the people to a state — the nation in some sense
opens into both the formal, definitional, organizing/ed realm of the state and the organic, informal,
unorganized realm of the “ people.”
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Lowell Barrington has argued specifically that both nation and nationalism are so
related [Barrington, 1997], He defines a nation as a “collective!] united by shared
cultural features (myths, values, etc.) and the belief in the right to territorial self-
determination” for that nation [713] “ For Barrington, this desire that the nation have its
territorial state is the key feature that distinguishes the nation from mere ethnicity,
cultural group, and so forth. A problem immediately arises: do all members of a
supposed nation have to share this desire, or just some? ifjust some do, how can the
other members be considered part of the nation? 1 do not hesitate to say that there is no
social formation that is commonly called a nation (whether it corresponds to a state or
not) in which all members have a substantive desire for political self-determination."
This is very clear in the Armenian nation during the 20th Century. At any given
point in the contemporary history of this nation, a significant portion of the national
population has not desired territorial self-determination — even in the presence of (a)
strong and periodically successful nationalist movement(s). The issue is not that
nationalist organizing failed to reach the entire population, but rather that portions of the
nation deliberately chose not to take on concerns about territorial self-determination.
For instance, during the 1915 Genocide, many surviving Armenians fled their
traditional homeland for destinations around the world. As part of the psychological
consequences of genocide victimization, many survivors wanted no part of the
subsequent Armenian state (1918 - 1920), instead focusing their efforts on building viable
minority communities within new countries, all connected into a global national
Diaspora. This was a yet more significant trend in second- and subsequent-generation
emigrant Aimenians. Some Armenians within and outside the Soviet Union also viewed
46
I have already treated the first part of this definition earlier in the chapter.
'“'Barrington distinguishes between the mere desire for territorial self-determination (nationality) and action
on that desire (nationalism). Even so, the former must be an explicit and central belief for it to have the
role in defining national identity that Barrington gives it. It is meaningless to assert that members of a
given nation share some vague preference for territorial self-determination. Such a basis of nationality
would trivialize the nation.
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the rump Armenia’s subsequent coerced inclusion as afelix culpa that supported the
survival, cohesion, and even relative ascendance of Armenians in the East.
Atter the independence of the Armenian Republic in 1991, there has been
widespread support for the Republic within the external Diaspora. In this sense,
Armenians around the world have supported the idea of an independent Armenian state.
But at the same time, most in the Diaspora have not supported it for themselves. They, as
Armenians, have had no intention of direct involvement in the self-determination of
Armenia - they have had no intention of relocating to the Republic, not because they
have been barred from it, but because they have chosen not to. The Republic thus has not
represented their self-determination, and their nationality seems clearly not based on a
desire for national self-determination. At most, they have desired self-determination for
Armenia as an end for others
,
or an abstract end for the "nation."
Even if one allows an abstract or offset desire for territorial self-determination to
qualify under Barrington's definition, for many Armenians, this desire has been a weak
desire, a vague preference for the existence of an independent Armenian state. Such a
preference is on the level of a desire to win a lottery, become famous, or something
similar — it is an idle wish that would be line if it happened without effort, but around
which these individuals do not organize their lives, and to which they have little
attachment. Their sense of "Armenian-ness" has been quite independent of the territorial
self-determination of Armenia. Contrary to such a desire being the defining characteristic
of their nationality, to the extent that it exists, it is derivative of this nationality. 48
My analysis ot Armenian "non-territorial" nationality is different from Ronald Suny's, as represented by Barrington in
Note 1 2 (p. 7 1 6, c. I ), with the apparent intent ot obviating the type of criticism I make. According to Barrington, Suny
means that early 20th Century Armenians had a "sense of the right to a homeland" - a homeland which they had lost bin
which they wished to regain. National consciousness was thus organized around connection to this lost homeland, to wh
Armenians felt they had a "right."
My position is different. I hold that the very nature of the Armenian nation changed in the
aftermath of the Genocide. While shared territory might have mediated or grounded the network of social
relations, practices, and psychological structures at the heart of the pre-Genocide Armenian nation, with
dispersion territory was replaced by such things as language and literature, cultural and political
associations, religious institutions, and "shared history" (in the form especially of the immediately past
experience of Genocide and dispersion) as the basis of the nation.
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As these points suggest, the distinction between those who have desired territorial
self-determination and those who have not has not corresponded to any other intra-ethnic
Iracture or border that could be defended as the boundary between merely ethnic
Armenians and true members of the nation. In the Armenian community prior to 1991,
for instance, the split between those strongly desiring a sovereign state and those not
occurred within both the external Diaspora and the Soviet Republic of Armenia. More
than this, though political affiliations in some cases depended on one's position on this
issue, a structure that, on my account, corresponds to the Armenian nation straddled this
divide. The very fact that debate over self-determination occurred within families, local
communities, churches, etc., suggests that people were bound together in a national
structure across this divide: splitting the world Armenian population based on the desire
for a territorial state would, in fact, require ignoring social structures - such as familial
and informal social networks, formal local and national associations and institutions, and
the deeper communicative and relational structures of the nation - that have an obvious
role in the constitution ot the nation and without which it would be difficult to recognize
a meaningful entity that could be called a nation. Such a division would define the nation
in a manner that necessarily fractures or destroys it. 49
Though a diasporan nation's independence from territory fosters alternative
national consciousnesses not focused on territory among many members, it also fosters an
increased desire tor territory among other members. Mere diaspora does not imply a
universal absence of the desire for territory. Nor is it any less likely for a diasporan
nation to be organized around the desire for control of the "national territory" than any
other type ot nation. Likewise, direct connection to a "national territory" does not imply
the universal presence of the desire for territorial self-determination. In territorially-
bounded groups, such as proto-national colonized groups, in which members experience a
49
This does not mean that an ethnic nation is equivalent to its associated ethnic group. My point is merely
that the distinction between ethnicity and associated nation, where these are not coincident, does not
depend on the presence or absence of a desire for territorial self-determination. Length constraints prevent
a fuller examination of this point.
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d,rect connection to a territory, there is generaily also a split among members regarding
the tssue of self-determination. For instance, there is no doubt that in 1954 a large and
commuted segment of the Algerian population desired independence from the French.
Yet, there is also no doubt that a portion of the population remained loyal to the French
due to a colon,zed mentality or out of their own self-interest, against the group's. Though
“ is common and politically advantageous in the midst of an anti-colonial struggle to
deny the nationality of such people, the truth is less simple. Again, the dividing line
between those committed to self-determination and those not did not necessarily
correspond to any other significant division that might distinguish members of the nation
from non-members.
Barrington would probably reject my criticism on the grounds that it conflates
"ethnicity" and "nation" [see 712]. Are Armenians, Jews, and others in diaspora;
ethnically homogeneous territorially-bounded colonized groups; and other presumed
ethnic nations merely ethnic groups, while those segments that maintain a commitment to
self-determination are the national subsections of the broader ethnic groups? My
argument has already foreclosed this: as described above, the split between those who
desire self-determination and those who do not fails to correspond to any other intra-
ethnic fault line or constitute a general intra-ethnic boundary that might differentiate the
nation from the larger group.
One might even argue that definition of the nation in terms of a desire for
territorial self-determination expresses a specifically nationalist50 concept of the nation.
Though such a desire might mark those with the greatest commitment to the nation and in
that sense be laudable from a national perspective, the nation to which they are
committed contains as well those with a lesser commitment, those with competing
commitments to other things, and/or those with interests antagonistic to the nation. That
even a staunch nationalist as part of his/her pursuit of territorial self-determination often
' uThough I dispute even the link of nationalism to territoriality below.
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is forced or chooses to engage such people suggests how much a par. of the nation they
are.
Barrington might then argue that, to avoid criticism for conflating ethnic group
and nation, I have entirely eliminated the distinction between them. This can be true only
if the only possible distinguishing feature is the desire for territorial self-determination.
Barrington holds this assumption, as is clear from his treatment of Yael Tamir's theory of
the nation [712], My own account of their difference - depending on the relative
passivity of ethnic identity (see above)
- preserves the difference without appeal
territorial self-determination. 51
to
If nations are not necessarily linked to territorial states as achieved or desired
links, it would seem more likely that a nationalism, by definition, should be. For
Barrington, “nationalism” is “the pursuit - through argument or other activity - of a set
of rights for the self-defined members of the nation, including, at a minimum, territorial
autonomy or sovereignty” [714], A nationalism (1) makes claims about who is in a
nation and (2) is action on the desire for territorial self-determination and possibly
additional perceived political "rights."
As I described above, there are many different forms of nationalism, each of
which involves a different concept of the nation and the appropriate agenda for its
formation or activity. A drive for territorial self-determination is only one possibility or
aspect among many.
The frequency with which it is the chosen form of a nationalism depends on the
context in which all nationalisms operate. Since the American and French Revolutions,
the sovereign territorial state has been typically recognized as the primary form of formal
group organization and popular self-determination. Indeed, within a global system of
5IThe moment of activity in the formation and reproduction of the nation might involve the desire for
territorial self-determination, but need not. The members of a nation might be unified around a central
desire, and that desire might be tor territorial self-determination. But, neither step is necessary. “Activity”
might have a range of forms, and vary across the membership ot the nation. Only in exceptional cases is it
a universal desire for self-determination.
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territorial states political participation and sovereignty has depended on statehood. Thus.
H is reasonable that - whether the modern territorial state is the appropriate political form
of the nation - many nationalisms have pursued their own. This is particularly true in
cases of domination or colonization: an end to oppression has required at least in part the
rejection of domination within the colonial state structure imposed by the colonizer, and
this in turn has required the colonized to gain their own state, which is recognized as a
territory free from external formal political power. Thus, the territorial state has been
chosen in the general context of constrained options, and in this context it is often a
logical if not ultimately productive choice. Pursuit of a state is generally the only option
for the improvement of a nation’s situation, though it is by no means a necessary or
particularly good one.
Given the modem realities of global economics and politics, however, it is not at
all clear that the state actually necessarily represents group self-determination. On the
one hand, statehood can be a butter against disruptive external domination and allow
better functioning and development of a nation; at times its rigidity is itself an advantage
against tumultuous internal and external forces of change and dissolution. On the other,
the level of a state's true sovereignty is relative to its economic, military, and "cultural"
power, or at least its ability to project an image of such power. Whereas in the past,
formal independence usually corresponded to genuine power, while weakness meant
subjugation as conquered territory or colony, in the modem era formal independence has
more and more become a function not simply of power, but also of a perceived universal
right to group selt-determination. As a result, formal independence alone is largely an
abstraction, which the experiences of many former colonies and small/weak states in the
present era illustrate dramatically. Indeed, mere territorial sovereignty has become a
dangerous seduction for smaller, weaker nations - one that often hides exploitation and
subordination under the veil of apparently mutual relations among formally equal states.
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Paradoxically, statehood itself often depends on the de-territorialization of a
nation. For instance, it is difficult to conceive of !srael without a worldwide and
powerful Jewish nation, with a political and economic presence particularly in the United
States. The Armenian Diaspora has also been in incredtble support to the new Republic
More importantly migrant workers, expatriates, and so forth from a host of states and
non-state nations (for instance, the Philippines, India, and the Dominican Republic, and
Tibetans, Puerto Ricans, and Palestinians) play important roles in the home economies
and in the preservation of the home states and nations, respectively. The age of migration
and diaspora does not signal the end of the nation, but rather its increased independence
from the territorial state.
At the same time, it might be argued that the non-coincidence of states and
nations - to the extent that modern territorial states are inevitable - and the independent
functioning of states is positive as well. After all, a state that is not seen as the absolute
end of a national movement by its dominant nation (whether it is contained primarily
within the state or has a diasporan component as well) is more likely to be tolerant of
minority groups (racial, ethnic, and national, as well religious, gendered, etc.) and, in fact,
to encourage their full participation in the political and social life of the state.
The disillusionment of former colonies that struggled hard for independence, only
to find themselves inserted at the lowest levels of the global economic, political, and
cultural hierarchy, has been fertile ground for the growth of new ideas about social
organization and new political forms. Chatterjee focuses on these. For him, what has
emerged has not been a supersession of nation and nationalism, but production of a range
of new concepts for each. Nationalist" thinking — thinking about the goals and meaning
of various nationalisms and nationalism more generally — has come to be informed by
these experiences and the changing world context. That is not to say that nationalisms of
the type on which Barrington focuses no longer exist - not at all. But, beside and/or with
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them, other forms and aspectsjust as fundamental to any definition of nationalism are
also present. [Chatterjee 1993a and 1993b]
A full concept of "self-determination" would seem to require attention to the
interior of the nation, and the relationships among its individual members and among
different segments of the membership, 52 in addition to exterior considerations. It is, of
course, undeniably true that many nationalisms themselves do not give/have not given
such attention, or at least fail/have failed to give it an emphasis equal to their attention to
territorial claims. These nationalisms tend to fit Barrington's definition, which requires
primary if not exclusive focus on territorial self-determination. But, just as clearly, other
self-described nationalisms at the very least privilege/have privileged internal concerns as
much as external. For instance, as Flobsbawm argues, class issues have often been as
much of a factor in national movements as territorial self-determination [1992: 122 -
130]. The French Revolution primarily concerned class issues, not territorial self-
determination.
Of course, one might force even these nationalisms into compliance with
Barrington s definition, on the argument that there is no "national interior" without secure
national borders. 53 But, a reverse argument might also be made: even in cases in which
territorial control is a focus, it might be perceived as meaningless without concern for the
internal structure of the nation — and even individual participation in the nation. At least
according to some nationalisms, pursuit of territory alone is not nationalism: securing
territory without benefit to or participation by the general populace means that the
territory has not been "nationalized," that is, secured in fact and not just name by the
"nation" concerned.
It is true that nationalisms emphasizing internal as well as territorial issues belong
to the category of social movements based on nationality that pursue territorial self-
52
In terms of gender, class, religion, etc.
5JAn argument frequently used by nationalists attempting to avoid dealing with internal issues, in the
service of sub-national interests and agendas.
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determination. However, this categorization does not exhaust their fundamental natures:
these social movements are not nationalisms only because they pursue territorial self-
determination - one must also make reference to the internal aspect. Even if this
category were to contain all nationalisms that have an internal aspect (which 1 do not
believe to be the case), it would be a misleading categorization.
This concern for the internal is much more than merely fixing the membership of
the nation, and so not covered by Barrington's definition. On the contrary, controlling
membership can be a means of m/ra-national domination. Rather than securing the well-
being of members of the nation, it might be a tool against members to be excluded and a
threat against those included.
I have already discussed the deeper level of “self-determination” isolated by
Chatterjee, in his critique of Eurocentric concepts of the nation. For Chatterjee, genuine
self-determination requires agency in determining the form of self-determination itself.
Thus, a nationalism might be explicit about rejecting territoriality, often as a result of
recognizing the problematic role of the state system and “sovereignty” in neo-
colonialism.
At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that non-territorial nationalisms are
merely possible for non-European nations. As I have followed Barrington in making
clear [see Barrington, 1997: 714], associated with every actual or ideal nation there are
generally many different nationalisms. Contra Barrington, some of these will be
unconcerned with or unfocused on territorial statehood.
Robert Ackermann has advanced an important position regarding the relationship
of nation to state [Ackermann, 1995: ]. He argues that for “nationalists” the nation and
state are two aspects of the same socio-psychological structure. The state has a material
basis, in the reality of this or that territorial state and its laws and government. The nation
is a purely ideal construct, which is the perfected negation of the negative aspects of the
state — which itself becomes an idealized abstraction, in which only the “negative”
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aspects are preserved and to which other negatives are added. More precisely, the nation
and state are a dialectical pair. The actual and idealized aspects of a nation-state are split
into purely “good” and purely “bad” elements (dependent on the preferences of the
individual or set of individuals conceiving of the nation-state in a particular way). The
good elements are attributed to the nation, which is a pure ideal, while the “bad” are
attributed to the state, which is the catch-all for social, political, and economic discontent
and frustration — regardless of its actual relationship to the state.
Nationalists” thus use a “good”/” bad” distinction to rescue their “nation”
against any type of criticism. Whatever is bad, oppressive, etc., is due to the state
(government, laws, etc.); whatever is good is due to the nation (culture, civil society,
etc.). Indeed, the solution to what is bad lies in emphasizing the nation more in relation
to the state - making the state more “national.” *
As is clear, he bases the position on the assumptions that I have already argued
against: that (1) nation and state are aspects of the same social formation and (2) a nation
is a purely ideal psychological concept produced as a balancing response to the all-too-
concrete frailty of a given state. At the same time, my very de-coupling of nation and
state might function as a variant form of precisely the maneuver Ackermann has
critiqued. One might argue that I have rescued the nation from charges of internal
oppressiveness, rigidity, authoritarian control, racism, etc., by presenting a concept of the
state that lends it more to these things than the more complicated and potentially anti-
oppressive nation.
My sympathies for progressive national movements and nations have, no doubt,
been clear throughout this work. Yet, that my project has been to rescue the progressive
potential of the nation and nationalism does not amount to a general valorization of
either: I trust that this has been clear in the text as well. I have attempted a
comprehensive theory of the nation and nationalism that does not subject them to a
general evaluation as “good” or “bad” - or an ideologically suspect distinction between
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good or bad nations and nationalisms. I have analyzed oppressive, anti-oppressive, and
non-oppressive aspects and tendencies of each phenomenon, and presented examples at
vanous points on the continuum. I have stressed throughout this chapter that nations and
nationalisms are internally complex, such that oppressive, anti-oppressive, and non-
oppressive tendencies are present.
I have denied
- perhaps unfairly - this deep an internal complexity to the modern
territorial state form. In doing so, I have made it the conceptual enemy of the nation. I
have qualified this with the possibility that in some circumstances statehood is a
relatively productive political venue. I have also tried to be clear that a “bad” nation or
nationalism - one that is internally or externally oppressive - is not a function of its
association with a state. Though such an association - especially construction or
domination of a nation or nationalism by a state - can result in oppressive national/ist
forms, it need not: in some cases, a stable political and legal structure might temper or
brake extremist nationalisms and complicate the structure of the nation in a productive
way. What is more, negative tendencies or aspects in a nation or a nationalism need not
be the result of association with a state. Extremist state politics might themselves be a
function of extremist nationalisms, as in the case of Turkey since 1908 and Nazi
Germany.
In any event, I do not argue for the “rescue” of the state by the nation. On the
contrary, I am clear that the nation is not a purely or necessarily positive socio-political
torm, and that the domination of a state by a nation is not a necessarily fruitful goal for a
national movement.
My concept of the state does allow for minimizing the state itself, on the
libertarian model. I am not necessarily an advocate of such a politics, but wish to suggest
that the flip-side of the formal and rigid side of the state is formal and rigid restrictions on
power. This perhaps makes states generally tolerable - though it is a greater fantasy than
Balibar or Hobsbawm attribute to nationalists to hold that in even the most liberal state
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there is not a strong streak of governmental authority - and might even explain the
relative ascendancy of clearly problematic liberal states over more authoritarian forms, or
at least the middle and upper class preference for them.
At the same time, I am not sure that 1 want to claim neutrality regarding nation
and state. My reasons for not doing so are quite different from those Ackermann
attributes to “nationalists” - especially in recognizing the nitty-gritty and complicated
reality of nations and nationalisms, analyzing their often oppressive forms, and
challenging nationalisms and national movements to engage their negative aspects
directly and productively, toward a transformation away from them. 1 do have serious
suspicions of states, particularly powerful states, that is quite well grounded in concrete
facts. 1 do see the nation as a potentially significant alternative form, though not to the
exclusion of other alternatives to the territorial state: 1 am not arguing for a world only of
nations, but rather for legitimacy of nations within a world of alternative socio-political
forms. Not everyone is in a nation, or wishes to be. If my position means choosing the
nation over the state, then that is that.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have tried to accomplish three things. The first is to examine
the way many theories of the nation and nationalism reflect competing conceptual frames
and political agendas. They seek either to delegitimate the nation as a soctal and political
form, or to transform and reduce it to a specific type that is useful or safe for their agenda.
I have tried at once to be specific - treating particular theories, and assertions in and
implications of them - and at the same time to present and analyze the more general
patterns and trends that link different forms of antinational-ism, reductions of the nation,
and/or uses of it.
It is certainly possible to criticize my work as too detailed, requiring the reader to
work through critiques of point after point for theory after theory. I believe this has been
necessary to expose both the breadth and the depth of the problems with much of the
literature on nations and nationalisms. Some theorists -- such as Anderson [1991] and
Breuilly [1994] - have criticized general approaches to the nation for limits, but - with
the exception of Chatterjee [1993a and 1993b] - not in the depth necessary to expose the
political agendas often behind them; the often complex and multi-faceted forms of the
ideological manipulations they embody; or their often devastating effects on nations, as
both theoretical objects and actual social formations.
A surface analysis of many theories - liberal, cosmopolitan, Marxist, or otherwise
- leaves intact the impression of their objectivity and benevolence. Only by digging
deeper do the full implications of such theories become visible. A general analysis often
touches on only the most blatant of problems, presumptions, etc. — things visible to most
thoughtful readers anyway. It is the subtler tendencies and the unapparent implications
that pose the real danger, for they are what get through the net of obvious criticisms.
And, without a comprehensive but detailed analysis, the significant totality of tendencies
that consist of a long development of subtle manipulations, barely perceptible
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deformations of the facts, and apparently trivial premises, retains its guise of
unimportance. The devil is often in the details - when viewed as a whole.
It is one thing to argue merely that a position is wrong or a perspective flawed. It
is quite another to explain how it works, what it implies, and why it exists at all. When a
position or perspective represents or enacts an oppressive force, this task is that much
more difficult.
A_Ppst-Post-Strnctnralist Almost Semi-Structuralist ^ th „ Nntjnn
My second general goal has been to describe and develop an alternative
perspective on and account of the nation, flowing out of the critiques and at the same time
extending beyond them. Whether the actual product of this effort represents a viable and
worthwhile concept must be the reader’s decision. But, at the least, I hope to have raised
the issues that must be addressed in any truly comprehensive and deep theory of the
nation, and to have foreclosed reiterations of more limited and reductive concepts.
Specifically, three points should be clear. First, it is untenable to conceive the
nation as either primarily material/concrete or primarily mental/psychological/ideal.
Both forces or factors are fully present in the general form of the nation, and neither can
be isolated entirely apart from the other. This means that the issue of whether the nation
generally is fact or fiction is ill-formed. This or that nation might be so evaluated, but the
concept of the nation remains complex.
Second, the nation is a complex socio-intellectual structure. Even if some nations
represent reductions of the potentials of that structure, this does not reflect on the general
form. As I pointed out above, virtually every theorist of the nation asserts a one-
dimensional concept of the nation. Each attributes it to one type of social bond, one type
ot social structure, one type of logical relation (including identity), one medium of
relations among members (language, etc.) or center, one type of psychological or mental
move, one type of manipulation, etc. I contend, on the contrary, that the nation always
430
involves more than one tvDe of rehtinn tv • .•
. .
}P (linguistic, conceptual, spatial, etc.) none ofW "nkS ^ emire na ‘,0n
' °" *-» of connection is patfial, andquires (and flows into) others. There may be tensions among these forms, as well as
complementarity. I, is never,*, an imagined community, a tension between majority
and margin, a culture, a political consciousness.
What is more, members are not one fixed thing in the nation (“atomic
individuals,
“parts,” etc.), and change with the type of relationship or level that is
foregrounded
- that is, with the angle of perception. There is no one perspective from
Which the “totality” of the nation is perceptible.
Again, this all should be expected: a group as large as the nation is unlikely to
take the form of a single, simple structure, to be captured in a sound-bite definition
.
One consequence of this general complexity has been my use of a relatively
limited number of examples. Besides the volume of details included in my critique of
Greenfeld’s claims about the United States as a nation, my main example has been
Armenia. The reason is simple: these are the only nations with which I am intimately
miliar, through extensive reading as well as just as extensive participation. They are the
only nations that I know well enough to present in the kind of detail necessary to the
“model” I have developed. Most theorists present many, many models, with details just
sufficient to support their reductive assertions about the nation and nationalism, and
limited enough to prevent questions about these assertions from being raised. Even
Hobsbawm focuses on specific details that suggest nations to be counter-examples to the
claims ot “nationalists”; he does not present sufficient detail to support a different, more
complex analysis of the structure of nations. Even Breuilly, who explicitly criticizes
other theorists for using details in an opportunistic manner, and presents “full” case
studies as a remedy, presents only those data (though many of them!) that concern proto-
parhamentary political negotiations among sub-national interest groups. It is for this
reason that Partha Chatterjee's supremely detailed and comprehensive (as well as
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intellectually powerful) analyses of India as nation, state, etc., stand as perhaps the
greatest contribution to the study ot nations and nationalisms thus far.
Ot course, my choices might be just as selective, for instance, to suggest an
apparent diversity that masks an actual imposed homogeneity. Against this, I can offer
no defense, and again recognize such charges to be in the jurisdiction of the reader.
The posing of the nature as an irreducibly complex structure is a new position in
the literature. To this point in the history ot theorization of the nation, it has always been
a question either of recognizing the heterogeneity of a national population or of treating
the nation as an actual social formation. Accepting either clause implied the falsity of the
other. If I have not accomplished my goal, I hope at the least to have issued a call for a
theory of the nation that can accommodate both of these positions at once.
Bevond Good and Bad
I have taken a strong line against antinational-ism and the conceptual use or
reductive containment of nations. These are the prevailing currents in the literature, and
strong rowing is necessary to move against them. But, as I made clear in the conclusion
to Chapter 1 and, I hope, demonstrated in Chapter 3, this is not meant to suggest that
nations are somehow naturally good. I have tried merely to establish them as non-
derivative and actual social formations (which is much different from claiming they are
“natural” in some biological or historical sense). That they should not be approached
through the frames of specific or distinct political agendas does not mean that they should
be approached through a nationalist framework. Though the relationship between
conceptual frames and the data perceived through them is always tricky, my intention has
been to develop a conceptual frame the features of which are generated through critique
of those reductive frames treated in Chapters 1 and 2, and hence the identified needs of
conceiving the nation — not through a frame that inherently or explicitly valorizes the
nation. Again, whether I have succeeded is a question I must defer to my readers.
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Judgments about whether nations are “good” or“bad,” that is, tend to be
-atory or oppressive (internaiiy, externa, ly, or both) cannot be made generaiiy
- or
b
W ,CT
7!
" b0 ‘h ° r neither
'
“^ na '10n" "
^
- neither good nor
ad (nor both nor neither) - i, is abstract, with compiex potential Oniy in a concrete
orm, in whtch the specific features determined, can such a j udgment be made. Neither
are there general features of such determinations associated with "good” or “bad-
such as
-civic” versus “ethnic” forms. One must consider the effects of the existence of
«he nation on those within and without i, (whether one considers it an agent or context of
oppression). Though its structure might support or produce oppression, this cannot be
determined a priori, based solely on the abstract form of the structure. For, i, becomes
oppressive only when it actually produces oppression. This applies even to neutrality: it
!S n°' 'me tHat tHe nati°n f°rm iS neMral with >o oppression. Rather, it is abstract
and undetermined, such that its relationship is merely potential.
Of course, such judgments also require taking proper stock of the context of a
nation, including other relevant social structures and forces (including states). The nation
is never a discrete unit that can be immediately evaluated on internal criteria alone.
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